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ABSTRACT 
I. The aim of this doctoral thesis is to set forth and 
appraise Tillich's discussion of the problem of the historical 
Jesus. This problem incorporates two related questions.: first, 
whether a continuity can be established between the history of 
Jesus of Nazareth and his biblical portrayal; and second, 
Whether Christian assertions are potentially falsifiable by 
historical research. Tillich's position is characterized by an 
absolute rejection of any attempt to base faith and ohristologi- 
cal doctrine on the results of historical enquiry. 
II. Our study opens with a detailed exposition of Tillioh's 
semantic analysis of the term 'historical Jesus', and proceeds 
to examine the work of those theologians most responsible for 
the formation of his sceptical position. This survey prepares 
the way for an account of Tillich's notion of the event 'Jesus 
as the Christ'. In Chapter Two, we consider the tfactual' side 
of this event, and show how the ontological concept of ' New 
Being' is employed to emphasize the historical reference of 
christological statements; and in Chapter Three, we turn to the 
'interpretative' side of the event, and here analyse the func- 
tion of the 'biblical picture' in Tillich's thought. The two 
succeeding chapters expand Tillich's argument to embrace his 
discussion of the epistemological character of faith and re- 
search, and his own attempt to resolve the question of whether 
the factual basis of Christianity can be assured by faith alone. 
(iv) 
III. The underlying theme of our concluding chapter is that 
a fundamental inconsistency exists between Tillich' s affirmation 
of the concrete, past-historical nature of the event portrayed 
in the biblical picture, and his subsequent refusal to make this 
event the possible object of critical enquiry. While he is sur- 
prisingly orthodox in seeking to retain faith's decisive relation 
to its historical basis, he compromises this connection by asser- 
ting that the christological claims of the picture are immune to 
research. Tillich's arguments are therefore significant precisely 
because they demonstrate the impropriety, of claiming that the 
foundation of faith's portrait is historical while yet exempting 
it from the possibility of falsification through historical 
enquiry. 
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(v) 
CHAPTER I 
PAUL TILLICH AND THE PROBLEM OF 
THE HISTORICAL JESUS 
I. The meaning of the term 'historical Jesus'. 
The problem with which we are to deal in this thesis can 
best be approached by first examining briefly the meaning of the 
term ' historical Jesus'. Paul Tillich. offers two analyses of this 
expression, the first written in 1938,1 the second in 1957.2 The 
second analysis, however, by virtue of its conflation of the ideas 
originally outlined in the earlier essay, properly belongs to a 
later stage of our discussion. 
3 So, for the purposes of simply 
clarifying the nature of the problem of the historical Jesus, we 
start with Tillich's initial publication. 
In his article of 1938, Tillich begins by saying that the 
phrase 'historical Jesus' is itself ambiguous: a conclusion since 
held by other scholars, 
4 
and one for which there is considerable 
justification since the expression has, our author continues, at 
1SHJ. In IH, Tillich refers to a lecture on the problem 
of the historical Jesus delivered in 1911. 
(Ibid., p. 33) 
2ST, 2: 123 
3See below, PP. 47-50 
4Cf. James M. Robinson, A New 
("Studies in Biblical Theology", XXV, 
p. 26 
at of the Historical Jesus 
London: S. C. M. Press, 1959 
1 
2. 
least three possible definitions. In the first place, Tillioh 
suggests, 'historical Jesus' can signify 'the objective events 
which happened around a man, Jesus of Nazareth, to whom the gospels 
refer in all their writings', 
5 
or rather, as he further explains, 
those events 'which could be photographed, phonographed, and per- 
haps "psychographed". 6 In other words, 'historical Jesus' can 
refer simply to everything that actually took place in the life. of 
Jesus, to all that he did, said and thought. But since this conno- 
tation of the term is made irrespective of the question whether or 
not we possess, or are capable of possessing, any such knowledge, 
we may assume that it thus includes also all that must have happened 
to Jesus but of which we have no evidence: a meaning of 'historical 
Jesus' so broad and general in scope that it rarely merits inclusion 
in any analysis of that term. Normally the expression, in so far as 
it is used to refer to a knowledge of the actual facts about Jesus, 
is limited and defined in either one of two ways; and these, as we 
shall see, provide the second and third meanings of 'historical Jesus' 
cited by Tillich. For the moment, however, it is worth mentioning 
that this first definition is, nevertheless, not without significance. 
Above all, it performs the salutory task of reminding both the be- 
liever and the historian of the incompleteness and limitations of 
their knowledge when compared, for example, with all that has taken 
place in the past. No historical figure can be 
fully recovered or 
described: a fact particularly true of Jesus since not only are 
there 
comparatively few stories and sayings about 
him, but even those that 
we have are largely assigned to the 
last months of his life. 
In addition to this preliminary understanding of 
'historical 
Jesus', there is, Tillich tells us, another and more restricted 
inter- 
5SHJ: 1 
61bid. 
3" 
pretation of the term. In this its second sense, the expression 
refers to that account of Jesus given in the earliest Christian 
traditions. Whereas, therefore, the first definition of the phrase 
'historical Jesus' denoted the objective events surrounding the 
life of Jesus of Nazareth, this second definition refers to 'the 
story of these events as it is told by the gospels including John 
and the later writers-of the New Testament'. 7 
This important meaning of 'historical Jesus' - important 
not least because Tillich himself later depends upon a variant of it 
for the development of his own arguments8 - appears to identify 
knowledge of the actual earthly Jesus with 'Jesus as he is biblically 
portrayed'. As it is normally encountered, this equation is upheld 
by drawing attention, first, to the New Testament as the chief source 
from which any knowledge of Jesus primarily proceeds, and second, to 
a special assessment of scripture which guarantees that the informa- 
tion derived from it is historically reliable. 
Initially, therefore, this second definition of 'historical 
Jesus' evolves with the realization that what is known of Jesus is 
almost exclusively limited to what is said of him in the writings of 
the New Testament. 
9 There is virtually no knowledge of Jesus which 
71bid. 
8Tillich' 
s use of this meaning will be dealt with in Ch. III, 
The Biblical Picture. of Jesus as the Christ'. 
9This 
restriction is not, of course, absolute; it is preclu- 
ded not only by the first meaning of 'historical Jesus', which 
im- 
plied that the discovery of additional information about 
Jesus is 
always possible, but more particularly by the witness 
to him in pagan 
and Jewish sources. For a list of this evidence, see 
Gunther Born- 
'kamm, Jesus of Nazareth, trans. I. and F. MaLuskey, with 
J. M. Robin- 
son (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960) pp. 
27-29; and for an apprec- 
iation of its importance, see: Joseph Klausner, Jesus of Nazareth 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1925); and Roderic Dunkerley, Beyond 
the Gospels (Harmond. sworth: Penguin Books, 1957). Since, however, 
such evidence adds nothing of significance 
to what is already known 
of Jesus through the New Testament, it 
is important only in so far as 
it helps refute those theories, held variously by Bruno Bauer, Alfred 
4. 
does not rely upon that biblical presentation of him which is based, 
Tillich writes, upon 'the immediate impression he made on his 
followers'. 10 And accordingly, just as no past historical event 
can be dissociated from the sources by which it is known, so the 
knowledge any man has of Jesus is, to this extent also, dependent 
upon the early Christian community's own memory of him as it is 
mediated to us through the biblical narratives. 
The basic presupposition here is, of course, that in recor- 
ding their experience of the (immediate impression' Jesus made upon 
them, the authors of the gospels oredited him with features he 
actually possessed. It is assumed, in other words, that a real 
correlation does in fact exist between the objective events concern- 
ing Jesus and the account of them preserved in the gospels. However, 
for our present purposes - and particularly in light of the later and 
final meaning of 'historical Jesus' - this is an assumption still 
more significant because it is sustained without recourse to any cri- 
tical historical methods for establishing the veracity of the bibli- 
cal texts. We find, therefore, that in the period before the devel- 
opment of such methods in the nineteenth century, the interpretation 
of 'historical Jesus' in terms of the 'biblical presentation of Jesus' 
was achieved not through any critical appreciation of the reliability 
of the relevant evidence, but rather through a specific conception of 
scripture which guaranteed its textual inerrancy, and which, conse- 
quently, ensured also the authenticity of the gospels' own memory- 
impression of Jesus. Such a view, held by both Catholic and Protes- 
Drews, J. M. Robertson and others, which reject the actual historicity 
of Jesus. A survey of this view since the Enlightenment is given 
by 
Maurice Goguel, The Life of Jesus, trans. Olive Wyon 
(Londons George 
Allen and Unwin, 1958) pp. 61-69; and a critical discussion of it by 
H. G. Wood, Did Christ Really Live? (New York: Macmillan, 1938). 
10 SHJs 1 
5" 
tant alike right up to the end of the eighteenth century, depended 
pre-eminently on the doctrine of Verbal Inspiration, This doc- 
trine, as Heinz Zahrnt Observes, stipulated that the Bible 
was endowed with a special metaphysical quality and thus 
marked off from the general field of literature. Accor- 
ding to the orthodox understanding of Scripture, it was 
not developed and handed down like any other book; God himself dictated it, and the writers, stripped of almost 
all human individuality, served only as automatic instru- 
ments of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, just as God had seen to the writing of Scripture, so too he made special pro- 
vision for its transmission, so that what he had dictated 
might remain for all time without error or falsification - his care reached right down to the pointing of the H'6brew 
text. Thus by virtue of its miraculous origin, Holy 
Scripture, like Jesus Christ, was figuratively speaking 
exempted from the universal heritage of original sin. ll 
The claim, then, that the 'historical Jesus' and the 'bib- 
lical portrayal of Jesus' are synonymous is thus maintained through 
the dogmatic assumption that the gospels, as canonical Holy Scrip- 
ture, give information about Jesus which, due to the miraculous 
process of its beginning, is necessarily authentic; it is upheld, 
therefore, through a special assessment of scripture which recog- 
nized its content as unalterable truth, and which, accordingly, 
viewed literal historical exegesis as the basis for any exposition 
of scripture's meaning. Because the New Testament is divinely in- 
spired in every part, it is a priori impossible that there should 
be any contradiction either between the gospels themselves or be. 
tween the gospels and the events. - they record. 
12 
11 The Historical Jesus, trans. J. S. Bowden (Londons 
Collins, 1963 p. 30 
12For this reason, New Testament study of the gospels be- 
fore the Enlightenment confined itself almost solely to the task 
of paraphrasing and harmonizing the four gospels. 
Schweitzer 
tells us that Osiander (1498-1552), in his. Harmony of the 
Gospels, 
maintained 'the principle that if an event is recorded more 
than 
once in the Gospels, in different connexions, it happened more 
than once and in different connexions. The daughter of Jairus was 
therefore raised from the dead several times... there were two 
cleansings of the Temple, and so forth'. The Quest of the Histori- 
cal Jesus, trans. W. A. Montgomery 
(2nd ed.; Londons A. & C. Black, 
1922 p. 13. 
6. 
This seoond understanding of 'historical Jesus' introduces 
us principally, therefore, to a particular theological position 
which assumes the Bible to be verbally inerrant, and consequently 
historically accurate: a position which, we should add, although 
dominant especially in Catholic and Protestant orthodoxy prior to 
the Enlightenment, is by no means unknown today. 
13 
Br contrast, 
the third definition - to which we have partially alluded already - 
focuses, Tillich says, upon the 'result of the attempt of scholars 
to find out which elements of the reports of the gospels describe 
objective events... and, beyond this, which conclusions can be made 
beyond the fragmentary reports as we find them in the gospels'. 
14 
By this final use of the term, reference is being made to those 
methods employed by the historian for deciding and testing the au- 
thenticity of the biblical evidence about Jesus. Thus, in its last 
meaning, 'historical Jesus' refers neither to 'all that must have 
happened to Jesus in the past', nor to 'the portrayal of Jesus in 
the gospel narratives', but is, in its most circumscribed use, 
synonymous only with 'the results of the process by which the his- 
torian arrives at a knowledge of Jesus of Nazareth' . In this sense, 
writes James M. Robinson, the phrase 
is not simply identical with 'Jesus' or 'Jesus of Nazareth', 
as if the adjective 'historical' were a meaningless addition. 
Rather the adjective is used in a technical sense, and makes 
a specific contribution to the total meaning of the express- 
ion. 'Historical' is used in the sense of 'things in the 
past which have been established by objective scholarship'. 
Consequently the expression 'historical Jesus' comes to mean: 
'What can be known of Jesus of Nazareth by means of the sci- 
entific methods of the historian'. Thus we have to do with 
a technical expression which must be recognized as such, and 
13See, for example, the views of the German pietist, Erwin 
Reisner, quoted by Gerhard Ebeling, 'The Significance of the 
Critical 
astorical Method for Church and Theology in Protestantism', Word and 
Faith, trans. J. W. Leitch (Londons S. C. I. Press, 1963) pp. 16-19 
14sWr: 1 
7" 
not automatioally identified with the simple term 
'Jesus'. 15 
When used like this, 'historical Jesus' is, in fact, a 
polemical expression with a history of its own; it points to the 
awakening of that highly problematical affair, 'the critical study 
of history' ,a concern which, begun in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century but developed most fully in the nineteenth, 
demands that we make 
a critical distinction between the tradition of history 
and the facts of history, between the picture that has 
been handed down of an event and the reality of the 
event itself. This attitude arose from the general 
revolution in the Western world's understanding of it- 
self when it broke free of the authority of tradition 
and began to subject the tradition to examination in 
responsible historical research of its own. 16 
As these remarks suggest, the growth of 'critical history' 
is just one consequence of the new spirit of autonomy which per- 
waded all aspects of culture after the Enlightenment; 
17 
and, so 
far as the new historiography was concerned, the revolution which 
took place at this time began, R. G. Collingwood states, with the 
discovery that 
so far from relying on an authority other than himself, 
to whose statements his thought must conform, the his- 
torian is his own authority and his thought autonomous, 
15oop. 
cit., pp. 26-27- An enlarged version of Robinson's 
original work appears in Germans Kerygma und historischer Jesus 
(Zurich: Zwingli Verlag, 1960); but the additional material is 
to be found in 'The Formal Structure of Jesus' Message', Current 
Issues in New Testament Interpretation: Essas in Honor of Otto 
A. Piper (New Yorks Harper and Row, 1962) pp. 91-110 
16Gerhard Ebeling, 'The Question of the Historical Jesus 
and the Problem of Chri stol ogy' , op. cit., p. 290 
171n his famous essay 'What is Enlightenment? ' Immanuel 
Kant identified enlightenment with autonomy, and accordingly 
de- 
fined the Enlightenment movement in terms of man's freedom from 
the authority of tradition. See Critique of Practical 
Reason and 
Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, ed. Lewis W. Beck Chicagos 
University of Chicago Press, 1949) pp. 286-292. 
8. 
self-authorizing, possessed of a criterion to which his so-called authorities must conform and by reference to 
which they are criticized. 18 
The aim of the historian is, therefore, to apprehend the 
past as a thing in itself, or rather, in von Ranke'a words, to 
discover 'how it actually happened' (wie es eigentlich gewesen ist), 
independently of what any or all of the sources might say. 
'9 Lord 
Acton tells how Leopold von Ranke began his career as one of the 
founding-fathers of the modern study of history through noticing 
that Walter Scott's picture of Lewis XI in Quentin Durward was in- 
compatible with the original in the Memoires of Philippe de 
Commynes. 20 Such a contrast was typical: no matter how ancient or 
revered the source, its story could not be accepted until it had 
been validated by all the available methods of historical research. 
When explained in the light of this background, it need 
hardly be said that the third definition of 'historical Jesus' is a 
distinctly modern interpretation, one which, by running counter to 
any argument that accepts tradition as a guarantee of truth, would 
have been unintelligible to earlier generations of Christian be- 
lievers; it is the inevitable result of the growth of a more criti- 
cal approach to the biblical material, and the product, consequently, 
18The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1946) P"23 
19Ranke' 
s celebrated phrase occurs in the Preface to his 
Histories of the Latin and Germanic Nations (1824), which Fritz 
Stern has translated and included in his The Varieties of History 
From Voltaire to the Present (New York: Meridian Books, 1956) pp. 
55-58. Stern points out, however, that Ranke 'meant this now 
famous phrase as a modest self-denial, feeling that history ought 
no longer to play the role of philosopher or judge; only later 
was it taken as a boast, as if history could in fact achieve this 
kind of exactitude' (Ibid., p. 16). 
20'_The. 
Study of History', Lectures on Modern History 
(London: 
Macmillan, 1930) p. 19. Quoted by D. E. Nineham, 'Some Reflections 
on the Present Position with regard to the Jesus of History', His- 
toricity and Chronology in the New Testament (London: S. P. C. K. 
Theological Collections, No. 6,1965) p. 2 
9" 
of an increasing awareness that gospel statements can no longer 
be regarded as valid merely because they belong to what is assumed 
to be an authoritative source. 
Defined in these terms, the phrase 'historical Jesus' is 
inextricably related to those techniques of historical research 
by which the historian establishes whether a, particular account of 
Jesus is authentic or not; it is a shorthand term for 'Jesus as he 
comes to be known through historical enquiry', and is, for this 
reason, to be contrasted with any misrepresentations, distortions 
or fictitious accounts of him which may exist in the New Testament. 
If the use of a critical historical method allows the historian to 
see past reality clearly, he naturally assumes that the Jesus he 
speaks of is the 'historioal' figure, namely, the true and real 
man, 'Jesus as he actually was'. In this way, the meaning of 
'historical Jesus' in the third sense employed by Tillich coincides 
with the 'historian's Jesus'. 
In his earliest published essay on the 'historical Jesus', 
Paul Tillich has, therefore, presented us with three possible ways 
of understanding that term. To rehearse them briefly again - the 
phrase may refer to all that occurred in the life of Jesus of Naza- 
reth, even though such complete knowledge is impossible; to the 
picture given of him in the gospels, presuming that an actual 
correlation exists between the gospels and the events recorded by 
them; and to the scientific construction of the life of this man, 
based on the historian's own conclusions on the extent to which the 
gospels do in fact accurately describe objective events. 
The problem of the historical Jesus arises with the third 
of these definitions, that is, it is an issue which emerges only 
10. 
with the post-Enlightenment development of critical historical 
methods for assessing the reliability and authenticity of the 
biblical evidence about Jesus. Indeed, the problem itself has 
been aptly called 'a child of the Enlightenment' , 
21 
since, as we 
have seen, prior to that period no-one appeared to doubt serious- 
ly that a reliable picture of Jesus could be drawn by a prudent 
and sympathetic harmonization or paraphrasing of the gospel data. 
But by contrast, in the final interpretation of 'historical Jesus' , 
the emphatic application of the adjective 'historical' to the name 
of a certain figure of the past is required precisely in order to 
distinguish that actual historical person from any partially in- 
vented or even legendary reports of him which may be within the 
New Testament. This last use of 'historical Jesus' - unlike, for 
instance, the second definition of the phrase - contains, therefore, 
the important presumption that there may in fact be a discontinuity 
between the New Testament's witness to the history of Jesus and 
that actual history itself; it allows, in other words, for a dis- 
tinction between Jesus himself and the statements made about him in 
the gospels, and, in so doing, militates against any dogmatic or 
metaphysical assumptions regarding either the self-evident validity 
of the biblical testimony or the immunity of Christian history from 
any kind of critical analysis. As Tillich remarks: 
"What about the historic truth of Christianity? "... 
This is a problem and a situation which has developed 
to its acuteness through the research for the 'life 
of Jesus' which has been going on for about 150 
to 
200 years. In the time before the start of this 
in- 
quiry, the objective events and the Biblical reports 
were accepted as being identical. 
There was no prob- 
lem about their identity. In reading the gospels, 
21 Joachim Jeremias, 'The Present Position in the 
Controversy 
concerning the Problem of the Historical 
Jesus', The Expository 
Times, LXIX, No. 11 (August 1958) p. 333 
11. 
including John, everybody thought he was reading a 
historical report without any subjective interpre- 
tation. Therefore the problem of the 'historic' 
in our special sense did not emerge in the first 
1500 years of Christian development; but then the 
criticism began and slowly continued in a very 
dramatic way. 22 
The problem here focuses upon the question of 'Jesus as 
he actually was' , and is, for that reason, basically the question 
of Jesus himself. Her attending to the scientific attempt to recon- 
struct what really happened in Jesus' life, the final meaning of 
'historical Jesus' is concerned with what Emanuel Hirsch called 
the 'fateful question'23 of the Christian community: Are the re- 
ports about Jesus as we find them in the New Testament, and parti- 
aularly in the gospels, true or false? Do the gospel documents, 
for example, give a witness to the history of Jesus, his person, 
teaching and message, which is beyond question, or are they simply 
spurious? Is there a continuity between the Jesus confessed as 
the Christ in the New Testament and the Jesus of first century 
Palestine who preached and taught? What, in other words, is the 
connection between Jesus' own proclamation and the proclamation of 
Jesus? Does faith in Jesus as the Christ, as the decisive revealer 
of God's grace, originate with Jesus himself, or does it depend 
upon the faith of the earliest community of Christians? If the 
latter choice is the correct one, if faith in Jesus does rely upon 
the faith and testimony of the primitive Christian community, then 
the possibility cannot be excluded that Christianity 
itself began 
with a mere idea or myth. Again, in 
Tillich's words - 
Does not the acceptance of the historical method 
for 
dealing with the source documents of the Christian 
faith 
introduce a dangerous insecurity into the thought and 
22SHJ 
s4 
23Gesgchichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie 
im Zu- 
o9ischen Den 
menhang mit den allgemeinen Bewegungen 
des e r2 
tersloha C. Bertelemann Verlag, 1954), ,P 
12. 
life of the church and of every individual Christian? 
Could not historical research lead to a complete scepti- 
cism about the biblical records? Is it not imaginable 
that historical criticism could come to the judgment that 
the man Jesus of Nazareth never lived? Did not some 
scholars, though only a few and not very important ones, 
make just this statement? And even if such a statement 
can never be made with certainty, is it not destructive for the Christian faith if the non-existence of Jesus can 
somehow be made probable, no matter how low the degree of 
probability? 24 
All these various questions turn upon the problem of the 
historical Jesus, the issue raised by the emergence of critico- 
historical methods for dealing with the scriptural evidence about 
Jesus,. If the gospel message proclaimed in the New Testament de- 
pends, as it manifestly does, on some reference to an historical 
person, then, according to the third meaning of 'historical Jesus', 
it entails claims which are capable of historical verification. In 
other words, if, as the biblical narratives stipulate, the life of 
Jesus, though endowed with a special spiritual character by disclo- 
sing the divine incursion into history, is nevertheless coincident 
with the lives of men, then the events of his life should be subject 
to the same type of critical analysis accorded the lives of other 
eminent figures of the past. But this in turn involves the theore- 
tical risk that the biblical critic, employing, for example, histori- 
cal methods upon the contentious question of the role played by the 
early church in determining, the precise importance attached to 
Jesus 
in the gospels, may find the actual evidence for christological 
assertions either to be inconclusive, 
inadequate., or indeed, non- 
existent. In attempting, therefore, 
to establish by critical means 
whether or not the New Testament witness 
to Jesus is reliable, the 
historian presumest', only that a discontinuity may exist 
between 
the apostolic picture of Jesus the 
Christ and the earthly history of 
Jesus of Nazareth, but also implies thereby 
that the allegedly valid 
24ST, 2: 130 
13.1 
interpretations of Jesus' significance offered by the early church 
are in principle falsifiable by the techniques of historical 
science. 
II. The development of the problem of the historical Jesus, 
and the growth of Tillich's sceptical position. 
Some explanation must now be given of the development of 
the problem of the historical Jesus.. This is particularly neces- 
sary at this stage in our discussion because, as we shall discover 
presently and as Tillich shall make clear, the actual progress of 
the effort to reconstruct a 'life of Jesus' by historical means, 
and, more especially, the criticisms levelled against this attempt 
in its later stages, largely account for the growth of Tillich's 
sceptical position, and thus determine the precise nature of the 
questions our author has to face when he himself comes to consider 
in detail the problem of the historical Jesus. 
In his own history of nineteenth and twentieth century Pro- 
testant theology, 
25 
Tillich singles out several theologians whom he 
regards as the most important influences in the history of the Life- 
of-Jesus research. The list is not long: Reimarus, Strauss, Ritschl, 
Harnack, Schweitzer and Bultmann emerge as the chief if not sole 
protagonists. ! owever, by recalling such names, Tillich does betray 
one tendency of his exposition which is common also in, and perhaps 
indebted to, Albert Schweitzer' s classic history, The Quest of the 
Historical Jesuss that is, his excessive concentration on German 
theology -a general feature which, we might add, 
is hardly offset 
by Tillich's brief and passing reference to the existence of 
histori- 
cal criticism in the English 
deistic movement. 
26 And yet, though 
25Perspectives. 
261bid., 
p, 137 
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such a preoccupation may certainly be surprising in the work of a 
theologian so concerned with the varieties of cultural and religi- 
ous expression, it becomes less so when regarded as the natural 
attraction to which a former student at German universities before 
the First World War would always be susceptible. 
If one studied theology in the first decade of this 
century at famous theological faculties within Germany, 
such as, those of Tubingen, Halle, or Berlin, one iden- 
tified the history of theology in the last four centu- 
ries with the history of German theology... It was our feeling that only in Germany was the problem of how to 
unite Christianity and the modern mind taken absolutely 
seriously. 27 
Before coming to the details of Tillich' s narrative, one 
further characteristic should be mentioned. As his study proceeds, 
it becomes increasingly apparent that. Tillich is frequently only 
secondarily concerned with the specific developments of historical 
criticism; often his chief intention is simply to delineate those 
changes in philosophical thinking which determine the attitude to- 
wards traditional and dogmatic accounts of Jesus. Thus, when con- 
oentrating upon the Hegelian presuppositions of Strauss' thought or 
the neo-Kantian premises, of Ritsohlian theology, his principal aim 
is to illuminate those prevailing philosophical outlooks by which 
the validity and importance of the biblical picture of Jesus are 
judged. In this respect, it is worth noting that Tillich, by open- 
ing his own account with the work of Reimarus, makes the problem of 
the historical Jesus arise in effect before the age of von Ranke had 
laid the foundations of modern historical enquiry. From this alone 
we may gather that for Tillich an awareness of a 
distinction between 
the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history need not necessarily 
27'The Conquest of Intellectual Provincialism: Europe and 
America', TC: 160-161. This article appeared originally 
in The 
Cultural Mi ation: The European Scholar 
in America, ed. W. Rex 
Crawford (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1953) 
pp. 138-156 
depend upon employing advanced techniques of weighing evidence 
and investigating the past; it may rather be, as in the case of 
Reimarus himself, a symptom of the emergence of historical con- 
sciousness after the Enlightenment, an expression, that is, of 
the new spirit of autonomy over against the acceptance of historia 
sacra, as a self-evident and historically inviolable proposition. 
28 
Indeed, it is precisely this which gives 'historical Jesus' a 
double significance in Till-ich's narratives it is not only a term 
denoting critical investigation into the life of Jesus, but it 1s-- 
15. 
equally one which refers to those modulations of philosophical atti- 
tude which sharpen or hasten historical insight into the nature of 
the source documents of the Christian religion. 
a) The emergence of the problem: Hermann Samuel Reimarus and David 
Friedrich Strauss. 
Like Albert Schweitzer before him, Tillich therefore sets 
an exact date to the beginning of the attempt to extract the 'bare 
facts' about Jesus from the refractory elements of theological in- 
terpretation said to pervade the New Testament reports. It was, he 
says, Reimarus (1694-1768) who 'started this modern search for the 
historical Jesus'. 
29 Between 1774 and 1778, he continues, Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) 'published certain of Reimarus' frag- 
ments of research on the life of Jesus which 
he had conducted by 
applying radical historical criticism'. 
30 The last and. most impor- 
taut of these fragments, entitled 'The Aims of 
Jesus and His dis- 
ciplea', was written specifically 
to show that the earthly Jesus was 
in fact a very different figure 
from that portrayed either in the 
28See 
above pp. 7-9 
29 Perspectives, P971. Von Reimarus zu 
Wrede was the origi- 
nal German title of Schweitzer's 
The Quest of the Historical Jesus. 
30 bid., PP. 
71-72 
16. 
New Testament or in later Christian tradition. 31 'I find', Rei- 
marus says, 'great cause to separate completely what the apostles 
say in their own writings from that which Jesus himself actually 
said and taught, for the apostles were themselves teachers and 
consequently present their own views... '32 Jesus' aim must be 
understood in the light of the Cry from the Cross, 'My God, my 
God, why hast thou forsaken me? ' These words, Reimarus maintains, 
cannot be interpreted otherwise than as an admission that Jesus' 
purpose had failed; that is, Jesus was a Jewish political Messiah 
who sought to establish an earthly kingdom and deliver the Jews 
from political oppression; but this was not achieved, as the Cry 
from the Cross plainly shows. However, the aim of Jesus' disciples 
was altogether different. Presented with this unexpected turn of 
events, with the sudden destruction of their dreams and the pros- 
pest of unemployment, they took matters into their own hands; they 
stole the body of Jesus, hid it, and then proclaimed the message of 
the Resurrection. By these fraudulent means, and by directing 
hopes towards a second coming of the Messiah, the disciples contin- 
ued to gather adherents to their cause. The presentation of Jesus 
as the Christ was nothing less, then, than the creation of those 
whom Jesus had disappointed and almost ruined. 
Reimarus' absolute distinction between the purpose of the 
apostles and what Jesus himself had considered his purpose 
to be 
had in Tillich's view a profound and lasting effect upon the subse- 
quent history of the Life-of-Jesus research. 
By it, he writes, 
tthe whole intellectual climate was irreversibly changed. 
No theo- 
31 'Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Junger' 
(Brunswick, 
i with 
1778)- 
ich 
seventh fragment, togetheiiýto ý 
sixth This 
7 
lieh. 
whSee 
Reimgruss 
Resurrection, has been translated 
Fragmeents$ ®d. C. H. Talbert, trans. 
R. S. Fraser Londons S. C. I. 
Press, 1971 
32 Ibid , p. 
64 
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logian aould thereafter approach the documents of the story of 
Jesus without being aware of the questions asked by Reimars con- 
cerning the reliability of the Synoptic Gospels'. 33 As far as 
Lessings contemporaries were concerned, however, this is an 
exaggeration. Though Tillich is certainly right to say that the 
publication of the fragments 'stirred up one of the greatest 
storms in the history of Protestant theology, , 
34 
it was neverthe- 
less a shortlived controversy, no doubt partly due to the wide- 
spread acceptance of the refutation of Reimarus' thesis by the 
famous Halle theologian John Solomon Semler (1725-1791 . 
35 To 
this we should add also that the studies on the 'life of Jesus, 
conducted by the Rationalists, studies which extended from the 
middle of the eighteenth century to about 1830 and which were 
broadly characterized. by the attempt to explain miraculous events 
by natural causes, developed independently of the ideas promulgated 
by Reimaras. The early Rationalists, for example, men like Johann 
Hess (1741-1828) and Franz Reinhard (1753-1812), were not oonoerned, 
as their discussions on miracles might suggest, with Reimarus' ques- 
tions about the validity of Christianity's origins; their only mo- 
tivation in shifting the significance of miracles from their super- 
natural nature to their ethical teaching was the desire 
to bring 
Jesus nearer to their own time and within the boundaries of rational 
thought; and this they did by presenting him as the great 
teacher of 
virtue, the master of wisdom in whom religion and reason were 
har- 
moniously combined. 
36 Even Heinrich Paulus (1761-1851), who repre- 
33perspeOtivee, p. 72 
341bid*, p+71 
358ee Semler, Beantwortung der 
insbesondern vom Zwecke Jesu und seiner 
36For 
a discussion of Hess and 
Reinhard, see A. Schweitzer, 
©pes., pp. 27-34 
agmente eines 'Ungenannten 
ier (Halle, 1779 
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sents Rationalism in its most developed form, and who, with the 
single exception of the Virgin Birth, eliminated all traces of 
immediate divine agency from the gospel stories as either a mis- 
understanding of exegesis or as a misunderstanding of the repor- 
ters themselves, nevertheless firmly maintained the historical 
truth of the biblical narratives, and even arranged them in one 
consecutive chronological detail of facts. 
37 
In fact, as Tillich indicates elsewhere, 
38 it was over 
sixty years after Lessing's publication of Reimarus' work that 
the question which Reimarus had introduced, of whether the actual 
earthly Jesus and the Christ preached in the gospels were one and 
the same, was directly taken up again by another theologian, albe- 
it in, a modified form. It appears once more in Das Leben Jesu by 
David Strauss (1808-1874), published in 1835.39 Throughout this 
epoch-making book there are innumerable references to Reimarus, 
although it was not until 1862 that Strauss properly acknowledged 
his debt with an account of Reimarus' significance which success- 
fully established the latter's theological reputation in Germany. 
40 
S'trausa, Tillich says, I drew out all the consequences from 
historical criticism when he wrote his Life of Jesus... It came like 
lightning and thunder... ' 
41 Certainly, in the history of the quest 
37See Paulus, Das Leben Jesu als Grundl einer reinen 
Geschichte des Urchristentums (Heidelberg: C. F. Winter, 1828 
38Perspectives, 
p. 137 
39 Das Leben Jesu kritisch bearbeitet (Tubingen, 1835-6). 
E. T., The Life of Jesus critically Examined, trans. from the 4th 
German edition of 1840 by George Eliot, with an introduction by 
0. Pfleiderer (2nd ed.; London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1906). 
40 See Strauss, Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutz- 
schrift für die vernunfti en Verehrer Gottes 
(Bonn: Emil Strauss, 
1862; 2nd ed., 1877. The same material is found in D. F. Strauss, 
Gesammelte Schrifte ed. E. Zeller 
(Bonn: Emil Strauss, 1877) 5: 
229-409. A translation of sections 38-40 of this work is in Re_ a- 
rus: Fragments, ed. C. H. Talbert, PP-44-57 
41Perspectives, p. 137 
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for the historical Jesus, his first Life is a turning-point - to 
such an extent, in fact, that some have suggested that the problem 
itself begins, with its publication. 
42 If Reimarus, provides the 
simplest and most dramatic reasoning for the non-identification of 
the Christ of the gospels with the earthly Jesus, Strauss supplies 
the most comprehensive but no less pronounced argument for its. 
adoption. For him, the connection between the biblical Christ and 
the actual man Jesus is destitute of all historical confirmation 
since the basic form of the New Testament narratives is not that 
of an historical report but that of a' myth' . If, previous to 
Strauss, the application of myth had been confined to the stories 
of Jesus' entrance into and departure from the world, Strauss him- 
self now included also all the stories prior to the baptism, the 
baptism itself, the mission of the seventy, the great majority of 
the miracles of 'healing' and 'nature', the transfiguration and the 
resurrection. None of these stories, he held, can properly be re- 
garded as historical for in them all the mythopoeic process is at 
work; nor can they be considered as the reports of eyewitnesses 
since myths take a considerable time to develop. They arose, Strauss 
suggested, as messianic legends and myths that had become attached 
to Jesus because he was believed to be the Messiah of Jewish expec- 
tation. 43 His was not, therefore, a case of denying the existence 
42See Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer (London: 
S. C. M. Press, 1967) p. 9. Although Strauss' reputation undoubtedly 
rests on this first Life of 1835, a second appeared in 1864 in which 
he attempted to extract from the gospels a more positive picture of 
Jesus. See Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet (Leipzig, 
1864). E. T., The Life of Jesus for the People (London: Williams and 
Norgate, 1879). 
43, In no case', Strauss writes, 'could it be easier for the 
person who first added any new feature to the description of Jesus, 
to believe himself its own genuineness, since his argument would be: 
Such and such things happened to the Messiah; Jesus was the Messiah; 
therefore such and such things happened to him' 
(Ibid., p. 84). His 
treatment of the transfiguration is typical of this method 
(Ibid., 
P-545)- 
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of Jesus but of saying that nothing historically certain could be 
known about him. 
44 Dominated as they are by theological and apolo- 
getic interests, the biblical sources do not narrate what Jesus is 
remembered as having said and done, but what, according to faith, 
he must have said and done as the Christ. 
As Tillich makes clear in his account, this conclusion, by 
which all efforts to construct a biographical picture of Jesus were 
denied, was not determined so much by an exact study of the rele- 
vant material, by questions of precedence or dependence among the 
gospels; it was based primarily upon an impression of the nature of 
the sources, formed through the adoption of certain speculative 
premises in the interpretation of myth, and according to which the 
problems of the historical trustworthiness of the records made 
little difference to the ideas embodied in them. As Tillich ob- 
serves, Strauss was a convinced Hegelian, and thus subscribed to 
the 'view that even though the reports are not historically reliable, 
they do not for that reason lose their religious value. It does not 
matter if there is so much uncertainty regarding the biblical records 
of the life of Jesus, they may nevertheless have symbolic valuer . 
45 
This conception of myth did not therefore renounce history; it was 
rather an interpretation of history in which the historical tform' of 
an event was subordinate to the religious 'idea' expressed through it. 
Strauss accepted axiomatically that religious faith depends not upon 
facts but upon ideas, and that such ideas could be significant even 
though not mediated through visible phenomena. As Tillich continues, 
Strauss had already shown 'that the authors of the Gospels were not 
44 In his own words, he sought 'especially to guard himself in 
those places where he declares he knows not what 
happened, from the 
imputation of asserting that he knows that nothing happened' 
(Ibid., 
p. 92). We should add that he regarded 
the Messianic consciousness of 
Jesus as a fact (Ibid., p. 284) " 
45Pera 
ec. tiye$, p. 137 
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those traditionally thought to be the authors. But more, he 
tried to show that the stories of the birth and resurrection are 
symbols expressing the eternal identity of what is essential in 
Jesus and God. This was felt as a tremendous shock'. 
46 
It 
appeared as if the object of faith had been completely changed. 
Instead of a sensible, empirical fact, the emphasis had been re- 
moved to a spiritual and divine idea, which had its confirmation 
no longer in history but in philosophy. The very reason, there- 
fore, for which the Rationalists had researched into the 'life of 
Jesus' - to have access to and understanding of Jesus as a man - 
was here apparently neglected, while Strauss' actual indifference 
on this matter made it appear as if the man Jesus was in fact in- 
accessible and incomprehensible. In his attempt to separate fact 
from fiction, legend and myth in the New Testament, Strauss had 
thus arrived at a conclusion by which no continuity could be pre- 
sumed between the biblical interpretation and its subject, between, 
that is, the biblical witness to *Jesus as the Christ' and 'Jesus 
as he was in himself I. It is no exaggeration to say that this 
verdict, which again gave prominence to the question of the histori- 
cal value and reliability of the New Testament reports of the 
Christ, ushered in a whole period of scepticism regarding the his- 
tonicity of the gospel story. 'For decades later', Tillich says, 
'scholars tried to refute Strauss' Life of Jesus, and, of course, 
there were many points in it that proved to be invalid in the light 
of more research. But the problem which Strauss raised to the fore 
in the life of the church could never be removed'. 
47 Speaking of 
the post-Strauss period, our author later remarks that the crucial 
issue of this time 'was to gain certainty about the contents of the 
461bid. 
47z_., PP"137-136 
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Christian message, after the critical movements of the eighteenth. 
and nineteenth centuries had arisen. Everything fell under eriti- 
cism. Everything was in doubt... So it was necessary to answer 
this fundamental question: Is there a way of re-establishing cer- 
tainty in the religious realm? '48 
b) The liberal Protestant solution: Albrecht Ritsohl and Adolf 
von Harnack. 
As Tillichs previous remarks rightly suggest, Strauss' 
Life of Jesus of 1835 had a substantial effect upon the subsequent 
history of the Life-of-Jesus research, even though the immediate 
controversy which ensued after its publication was without signifi- 
cant results. 
49 For if Strauss' own conclusions on the validity of 
the biblical sources had undermined any conservative defence of a 
literal interpretation of the texts and the Rationalistic explana- 
tion of miracles as misinterpreted facts, they simultaneously 
forced upon those who would reject them the necessity of ascertain- 
ing the historical value of each of the gospels. His opponents re- 
alined that, apart from a general distinction between the Fourth 
Gospel and the synoptics, Strauss himself had neither adhered to nor 
produced any precise theory on the nature and composition of the 
gospel material; they also recognized that no adequate refutation of 
his thesis would be forthcoming until this question - which Strauss 
had left unresolved - was finally answered; until, 
in fact, it had 
been decided through historical reasoning, and not philosophical 
argument, which of the gospels, or which strands of 
tradition in 
each of the gospels, did provide information sufficient 
for a. 'life 
48, bid., pp. 209-210. For further details on Strauss' Life, 
sees Van A. Harvey, 'D. F. Strauss. 
' Life of Jesus Revisited', 
Church History, XXX (1961) pp. 191-211; Karl Barth, From Rousseau 
Ritschl, trans. R. Cozens (Londons S. C. M. Press, 1959) PP"362-389; 
and A. Schweitzer, op. cit" 9 pp. 
68-120. 
49Cf. Schweitzer, ©p'c=., PP"97-98 
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of Jesus'. 
In defining more precisely the aims of this type of lite- 
racy analysis, which were so largely designed to resolve the ques- 
tion of religious certainty posed by Strauss, Tillich concentrates 
upon the work of a band of scholars who, by virtue of a certain 
family resemblance in their critical and theological outlook, have 
come to be known as the 'liberal Protestant school'. It is true 
that on all the main historical issues dealt with by this movement - 
the priority of the synoptic or Johannine material, the questions 
of the content of Jesus' thought and his Messianic consciousness, 
the problems of eschatology and. mythology - the solutions proposed 
were many and various; but, despite this, a basic pattern yet re- 
mains. Although still 'three-quarters sceptical 
50 in their atti- 
tude towards the gospel tradition, and while thus continuing to up- 
hold the basic distinction between the earthly Jesus and all dootri- 
nal presentations of him, the liberals nevertheless were oonvinced 
that assured results could be reached by the application of those 
methods through which, it was assumed, the past could be narrated 
'as it actually was'. The hope, therefore, was to determine more 
exactly the primary and secondary elements within the New Testament 
sources, so that on the basis of these findings something histori- 
cally positive could be said to support faith's affirmation of Jesus 
of Nazareth as the Christ. This, in part, aooounts for the liberals' 
dominant interest in the synoptic problem. As early as 1835 and 1838, 
Lachmann, Wilke and Weisse had pronounced their theories for the 
literary priority of Mark; 
51 
and increasingly, as the century advanced, 
501b_i do , p. 307 
51See Karl Lachmann, 'De ordine narrationum in evangeliis sy- 
nopticiis', Theologische Studien und 
Kritiken, 8 (1835) ppo570-590; 
C. G. Wilke, Der Urevangelist (Dresden: G. Fleischer, 1838); and C. 
H. Weisse, Die evangelische Geschichte kritisch und philosophisch be- 
arbeitet, 2Vols. Leipzigs Breitkopf und Härte1,1838) 
24. 
liberal scholars, like H. J. Holtzmann (1832-1910) and Bernhard 
Weiss (1827-1918), 52 depended upon the two-document hypothesis 
which this research proposed. This solution, put briefly, main- 
tained that both Matthew and Luke had used Mark, that the non- 
Markan material employed by Matthew and Luke stemmed from a lost 
source, "Q", and that John, the most overtly 'theological' gos- 
pel, should only, if used at all, be utilized sparingly in any 
historical reconstructions. Thus, while "Q", composed of Jesus' 
sayings, oame to be regarded as the primary source for Jesus' 
thought and intentions, the Markan outline (and not Matthew, s, as 
previously believed) came to be considered the basis for a des- 
cription or chronology of Jesus' life. Following this literary 
analysis, all that now remained, wrote Wilhelm Bousset in 1892, 
was to draw a 'life-like portrait which, with a few bold strokes, 
should bring out clearly the originality, the force, the personal- 
ity of Jesus'. 
53 
It was agreed, therefore, that the resolution of the 
question of certainty, which Strauss had raised to acuteness, de- 
pended solely upon an encounter with the historical Jesus Christ; 
that the gospel tradition about Jesus was more trustworthy than 
Strauss had supposed; and that, accordingly, the biblical sources, 
once stripped of their authors' theological interests and inten- 
52See Holtzmann, Die s no tischen Evan elien ihr Urs ru 
und ihr geschichtlicher Charakter (Leipzig, 1863); and Weiss, Das 
Leben Jesu, 2 Vols. (Berlin, 1882), E. T., The Life of Christ, 3 
Vols., trans. J. W. Hope (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1883-4 
53Bousset, Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum. 
Ein religionsgeschichtlicher Vergleich Göttingen, 1892. Quoted 
by Schweitzer, oo. cit., p. 242. The history of synoptic criticism, 
during this period has been chronicled by W. R. Farmer in The 
Synoptic Problem: A Critical Analysis 
(New York: Macmillan, 1964). 
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tions, could be used to procure an historically secure foundation 
for present faith. 
This being the aase, it is all the more surprising to find 
that, despite his undoubted appreciation of the growth of refined 
historical techniques through the liberals' predominant interest 
in history, and though sensible of the significance of such methods 
in illuminating the nature of the biblical picture of Jesus, Tillich 
himself, in his own account of the liberal movement, makes little 
mention of their historical accomplishments. Instead his chief con- 
tern is to indicate the introduction of Kantianism into theology by 
the most influential liberals of this period, notably Albrecht 
Ritschl (1822-1889) and his followers, and to show their theological 
reliance upon an understanding of Kant as the antimetaphysioal mora- 
list who rejected all transcendental reasoning about religion, and 
Who, by limiting an awareness of the divine presence to the individ- 
ual experience of the moral imperative and its unconditional charac- 
ter, deliberately restricted religion to what is capable of being 
practically experienced and translated into an ethical ideal of life. 
To the Ritschlian emphasis upon the importance of scientific histori- 
cal criticism must therefore be added, Tillich tells us, their equal 
insistence that the 'divine appears through the moral imperative and 
nowhere else. The problem of truth was replaced by the moral answer. 
The function of Christianity is then to make morality possiblet, 
54 
If the first characteristic of Ritschlian theology is thus 
its use of objective historical scholarship, its second and no less 
distinctive feature is the disclaiming of all knowledge incomprehen- 
sible within a framework determined by the idea of the experience of 
the moral imperative, as the one valid path to faith in God. This 
in 
54Pers 
eý ctives, p. 217 
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itself betrays a good deal of the liberal attitude towards the his- 
torical Jesus. The point which, for example, emerges immediately 
is that the 'metaphysical agnosticism' inherent within such a 
position necessitates a critical conception of the validity of the 
b-iblical presentation of Jesus. Ritschlian neo-Kantianism requires, 
in other words, the exclusion of all miraculous or supernatural ima- 
genies of Jesus - such as the dogmatic and mythical picture of him 
as the God-man - in favour of what came to be regarded as his purely 
human and historically perceptible attributes, namely, his teaching 
and religious consciousness. It was in accordance with this line of 
thought that Ritschl himself insisted upon an absolute disjunction 
between the authentic substance of Christianity and its alien accre- 
tions; between, in fact, the original message and function of Jesus 
and all those metaphysical considerations of his person which, like 
the Logos doctrine of the Alexandrian Platonists, tended to reduce 
faith to the level of assent to philosophical propositions. 
55 
His 
successor, Adolf von Rarnack (1851-1930), the church historian of 
the Ritschiian school, was even more emphatic. For him, the whole 
development of the early church was a history of the gradual perme- 
ation of the Galilean gospel by Hellenistic ideas, the transforma- 
tion of living faith into a creed to be believed. 
56 Indeed, as 
Tillich points out, it was left to Earnack to give most precise ex- 
55See Rit schl, Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung 
und Versöhnung, 3 Vols. (Bonn, 1870-1874). E. T., The Christian 
Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, ed. and trans. from 
Vol. III of the 3rd German edition of 1888 by H. R. Mackintosh and A. 
R. Macaulay (2nd ed.; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1902) pp. 193-194, 
390-391,437.439 
56Hence Sarnack's famous dictum, 'Dogma in its conception 
and development is a work of the Greek spirit on 
the soil of the 
Gospel'. Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 3 Vols. 
(Freiburg, 1886- 
1889). E. T., History of Dogma, trans. in 7 Vols. from the 3rd Ger- 
man edition of 1893 by Neil Buchanan et al. 
(2nd ed.; London: Williams 
and Norgate, 1894-1899) Vol-I, p. 
17. Cf. Perspectives, pp. 219-222 
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pression to this basic liberal distinction between the gospel of 
Jesus and the gospel about Jesus. 'Not the Son', Harnack says, 
tbut only the Father belongs in the Gospel that Jesus preached'. 
57 
'This', Tillich comments, 'is the classical formula of liberal 
theology: the gospel or message preached by Jesus contains nothing 
of the later message preached concerning Jesus'. 
58 Following this 
view, the desired separation of the real from the legendary or 
mythologized Jesus could only be attained by eliminating from the 
apostolic picture all confessional statements made in the light of 
post-resurrection faith; and, to this extent, Tillich adds, the 
liberal t return to Jesus' is also a movement 'away from Paul' . For 
Hernach' s famous formula, by distinguishing between the original 
image of Jesus and all later interpretations of him, not only pre- 
supposes the reduction of the Gospel to the first three gospels, but 
requires also the exclusion from them of all Pauline influences -a 
requirement which, Tillich reminds us, reflects the earlier work of 
F. C. Baur (1792-1860). 59 He continues: 
Baur's theory of the conflict between Paul and Jesus is re- 
vived here in a more refined, modern way, namely, that Paul 
interpreted Jesus in a way which is very far removed from 
the. actual historical Jesus... Only it is not Paul who is so 
much at the center of the discussion, but the early communi- 
ty, which existed before Paul. This early community, on the 
basis of the resurrection experience, produced the doctrines 
about Jesus, doctrines which cannot be found in the original 
message of Jesus himself. This original message is the mes- 
sage of the coming kingdom, and the kingdom is the state in 
which God and the individual member of the kingdom are in a 
relation of forgiveness, acceptance, and love. 60 
57Das Wesen des Christentums (Leipzig, 1900). E. T., Whams 
Christianity? trans. T. D. Saunders (London.: Williams and 1orgate, 
1901 p. 19 
58Perspectives, 
p. 223 
59See Baur, Kritische Untersuch n über die kanonischen 
Evangelien (Tiibingen, 1847); and Perspectives, pp. 138-139 
Perspectives, p. 223 
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Liberal neo-Kantian convictions in religion thus augment 
the already prevailing scientific interest in the historical Jesus 
by restricting all meaningful statements made about him to those 
drawn from the historically perceptible existence and teachings of 
Jesus within the New Testament. This same tendency is further 
illustrated - though admittedly in a less obvious and more indirect 
way - when Tillich turns to analyze the role of the categorical im- 
perative in Ritschlian theology. 
According to the Ritschlians, Kant has left but one window 
out of our finitude, and this is the moral imperative. The 
real basis of certainty is the moral point of view. We are 
certain of ourselves as moral personalities. This is not 
the experience of something mystical outside of ourselves; 
this is the immediate personal experience, or more exactly, 
the experience of being a person as such. Religion is then 
that which makes us able to actualize ourselves as moral 
persons. Religion is a supporting power of the ethical. 
These defenders of Christianity tried to save Christianity 
with the help of the moral principle, but in doing so they 
aroused the wrath of all those for whom the mystical ele- 
ment in religion- is decisive. So here we have a religion 
argued for on the basis of the ethical experience of the 
personality. Religion is the help toward moral self-reali- 
zation. 61 
Thus conceived, man, realizing that he is subject to an unconditioned 
categorical imperative, perceives within himself an absolute value, 
and thereby a standard by which he may judge the worth of the object 
of his concern as it aids or impedes his moral self-realization. The 
function of religion, as Tillich has mentioned elsewhere, 
62 
is, then, 
to encourage the moral life of each individual, while religious value 
is assigned to those objects which, coinciding with our inner moral 
convictions, practically further the moral unification of the human 
race in the universal-ethical Kingdom of God. 
On the basis of this appreciation of Christianity, it follows 
that the assertion of Jesus' uniqueness stems from an ethical judgment 
on his, practical influence in serving as the pre-eminent 'exemplar' or 
61 
I_ v pp. 216-217 
62See 
above p. 25 
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'pattern' for our salvation; it arises from an awareness of the 
fact that through him, as the 'founder' of the perfectly spiritual 
and ethical religion, the idea of the Kingdom first received his- 
torical shape. The proof of Jesus' divinity, on this view, does 
not depend upon theoretical argument or mystical intuition into 
the nature of his person, but upon the admission that, as the ar- 
chetypal image of the new humanity, his own personal purpose in- 
volved the same content as is contained in the innermost purpose 
of God himself, namely, the establishment of his Kingdom. Just, 
therefore, as knowledge of Jesus in himself is confined to what 
Jesus is for us, so his ultimate religious significance is known 
only by establishing his normative ethical value for our moral de- 
velopment towards the Kingdom of God. 
63 
From the standpoint of this thesis, the absolute value 
that the believer ascribes to Jesus emanates neither from an aware- 
ness of certain transcendental attributes peculiar to him, nor, 
indeed, from a purely critical inspection of the details of the 
narratives. Even though research itself may militate against all 
metaphysical speculations about him, it is also part of the Ritschl- 
ian understanding of the imperative that the insight of faith toward 
Jesus, being dependent upon the practical postulates of the individ- 
ual moral consciousness, is more than historical apprehension. This 
stipulation, however, while clearly requiring that the relation of 
63So 
Ritschl writes: 'This ideal, the true development of 
the spiritual personality, cannot be rightly or fully conceived apart 
from contemplation of him who is the prototype of man's vocation. 
Thus what in the historically complete figure of Christ we recognise 
to be the real worth of his, existence, gains. for ourselves, through 
the uniqueness of the phenomenon and its normative bearing upon our 
own. religious and ethical destiny, the worth of an abiding rule, 
since we at the same time discover 
that only through the impulse and 
direction we receive from him, is it possible for us to enter into 
his relation to God and to the world' 
(off., p. 387). This same 
passage is quoted in B. M. G. 
Reardonts anthology, Liberal Protestan- 
tism (Londons A. & C. Black, 1968) p. 110. 
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the knowing subject to the known object cannot be defined simply 
within scientific limits, 
64 
does not, for that reason, depart from 
the liberals' emphasis upon the historical Jesus, or, as Tillich 
puts it, from their concern that 'the whole religious message, the 
message of Jesus.., be described in historical terms' 665 For if 
subjectively, the revelatory character of Jesus' life is. recog- 
nized as revelation through the impression of his moral influence 
upon us, nevertheless every form of influence exerted by him must, 
if it is to have objective worth, find its criterion in those his- 
torical traits of his temporal existence made available to the 
believer by critical study. 
There are, so Tillich concludes, two sides to Ritschlian 
theologys 'objective, scientific research and the moral principle 
or experience of the ethical personality' ; 
66 
and both sides deter- 
mine that the guarantee of religious certainty in the divinity of 
Jesus arises directly from an ethical judgment of value based on 
historical perception. Ritschlian thought thus reaffirms the fun- 
damental liberal insistence that Christianity is a positive, his- 
torical faith, relying for its quality and character upon our 
apprehension of the earthly figure in whom it originated. The 
certainty of faith, even under the terms of the Ritschlian concep- 
tion of the imperative, still rests upon the objective reality of 
64This, 
in part, explains why it is a dangerous over-sim- 
plification to define the liberal attitude towards the historical 
Jesus only in terms of its so-called 'positivistic historiography'. 
Indeed, the very classification 'positivistic' has been questioned 
by D. E. H. Whiteley, Journal of Theological Studies, XIII, 1To. 2 
(October 1962) p. 392. Cf. T. A. Roberts, 'Gospel Historicity: 
Some Philosophical Observations', Religious Studies, I. No. 1 
(April 
1966) pp. 185-202. 
65perspectives, 
p. 218 
661bid", 
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Jesus' life, preserved and accessible within the New Testament, 
and from which we may gather the ethico-religious significance of 
Jesus' actual existence. 
o) The growth of radical historical criticism: Albert Sohweitzer 
and Rudolf Bultmann. 
This central appeal of the liberals to the 'Jesus of his- 
tory', with their corresponding emphasis upon critical procedure, 
plays a quite decisive role in the formation of Tillich's own 
thinking on the problem of the historical Jesus. It is perhaps 
not inopportune to say here that the eventual collapse of the 
liberal attempt to discover even a minimum of reliable facts 
about Jesus represents for our author the end of the 'quest' as 
such, and thereby demonstrates finally the total inadequacy of all 
efforts to maintain the centrality of Jesus of Nazareth for faith 
in the name of historical science -a verdict which, we should add, 
appears to confirm and reinstate Strauss' historical scepticism. 
Undoubtedly, Tillich's most important single, conclusion on 
the failure of the. liberal enterprise is that it was the consequence 
not of any post-Ritschlian resistance to historical criticism - he 
mentions, for example, the 'biblicistic' reaction of Adolf Schlatter, 
Ermann Cremer, and his own teachers, Wilhelm Lütgert and Martin 
Kähler67 - but that it was the result, ironically enough, of the 
radical development of historical methods themselves. 4`- 
The increase of radicalism in historical criticism under- 
cut the presuppositions of Harnack and the whole liberal 
theology. The presupposition of H'arnack's What is Chris- 
tianity? was that one can arrive at a fairly accurate 
picture of the empirical man, Jesus of Nazareth, guaran- 
teed by the methods of historical science. One can arrive, 
671_ 
, pp. 224-225 
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that is, at a definition of original Christianity by 
deleting all the additions of the early congregations 
and of Paul and John. But it turned out that this 
was not possible. 68 
Although, as Tillich remarks, 'radical historical criti- 
oism began first with the Old Testament' 
69 
- he cites in particular 
the work of Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918), Hermann Dunkel (1862- 
1932) and the Religionsgesohichtlicheechule7° - it was nevertheless, 
he continues, within the area of New Testament study that this radi- 
cal approach had its most acute impact; and here too, Tillich is 
equally precise in naming Schweitzer and Bultmann as the principal 
agents for its growth in this field. 
Be begins with Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965). Tillich in- 
dicates that the radical character of his own standpoint on the 
problem of the historical Jesus has largely been determined by what 
Günther Bornkamm has called elsewhere the tfuneral oration' pronoun- 
ced on the so-called 'Lives of Jesus' by Schweitzer in his famous 
book, The Quest of the Historical Jesus. 
71 Thus Tillich, in essen- 
tial agreement with Schweitzer, writes on the 'quest': 
The attempt was courageous, noble and extremely significant 
in many respects. Its theological consequences are numerous 
and rather important. But, seen in the light of its basic 
intention, the attempt of historical criticism to find the 
empirical truth about Jesus of Nazareth was a failure. The 
historical Jesus, namely, the Jesus behind the symbols of 
68_ 
y pp. 225-226 
691bid., 
p. 226 
7ýTff: 33. 
71 See Bornkamrn, op. cit., p. 13. In Perspectives, referring 
to the biblicism of the t1L tgert type, Tillich adds: 'I myself ex- 
perienced a real crisis in my development after I 
left Halle where 
this kind of biblicism was firmly established, and began independen- 
tly to study the history of biblical criticism. It was especially 
in studying Albert Schweitzer' s, history of research into the 
life of 
Jesus that I became convinced of the inadequacy of the kind of bibli- 
cism in which the historical questions are not taken seriously' 
(Ibid., 
p. 225)- 
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his reception as the Christ, not only did not appear 
but receded farther and farther with every new step. 
The history of the attempts to write a 'life of Jesus'. 
elaborated by Albert Schweitzer in his early work, The 
Quest of the Historical Jesus, is still valid. 72 
Schweitzer, in his history of the attempts between 1778 
and 1901 to reach what Jesus had actually said and done, had casti- 
gated particularly those liberal Protestant scholars who had main- 
tained, like Harnack, that access to the historical Jesus could be 
reached by purifying the biblical narratives of their eschatologi- 
cal and apocalyptic elements. His own position, by contrast, was 
that the idea of the Kingdom of God in Ritschlian thought and in 
Jesus' preaching were two disparate things, the latter having to do 
not with an ethical message immediately applicable to the present 
age but with the very thing that the liberals wished to eliminate, 
namely, with the alien thought-world of Jewish eschatology. 
73 Sch- 
weitzer went still furthers not only is eschatology the primary 
source for an understanding of the Kingdom in Jesus' teaching, but 
'thorough-going eschatology' (konsequente Esehatologie) the key to 
any appreciation of his life as a whole. Tillich summarizes this 
view as follows: 
Jesus considered himself as an eschatological, apocalyptic 
figure, identified himself with the Son of Man in the 
sense of Daniel. Here the Son of Man is an emissary of 
God standing before the divine throne, then leaving it to 
descend into the evils of this eon and to bring in a new 
age. Then Schweitzer goes on to describe the catastrophe 
when Jesus cried out from the cross, feeling that 
God had 
abandoned him. Jesus had expected that God in his power 
72 ST, 2: 117-118 
73This 
argument had already been advanced, 
though indepen- 
dently of Schweitzer, by Ritschl'a son-in-law, 
Johannes Weiss (1827- 
1918). See Weiss, Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche 
Gottes (Göttingen, 
1892) ; E. T. , Jesus' 
Proclamation of the Kingdom of God, ed. and 
trans. by R. H. Hiers and D. L. Holland, with a 
Foreword by Rudolf 
Bultmann (London: S. C. M. Press, 1971). 
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would intervene to save him and the world, but to no 
avail. 74 
Thus Jesus is the product of Jewish apocalypticism, a visionary 
whose whole-existence can be understood only within the context 
of the eschatological assumptions of his age and his own mistaken 
proclamation of the imminent end of the world. The dogmatic in- 
terpretation of Jesus, from which the liberals had so strenuously 
sought to release themselves, was not therefore simply a later 
addition, as they had believed, for Jesus himself had conceived 
his life in terms of an eschatological dogmatic. Accordingly, the 
Ritschlians' presentation of him as the teacher and exemplar of a 
universal ethic had not been achieved by an objective evaluation 
of the biblical data; it had been done by imputing to him their 
own individualistic ideals. The Jesus who emerged, in other words, 
was a modernization, reflecting the respective rationalist, social- 
ist, or romantic presuppositions of each historian. The multipli- 
city and variety of these pictures of Jesus only confirmed Schweit- 
zer in his suspicion that no single portrait was accurate. 
There is nothing more negative than the result of the criti- 
cal study of the life of Jesus. The Jesus of Nazareth who 
came forward publicly as the Messiah, who preached the ethic 
of the Kingdom of God, who founded the Kingdom of Heaven 
upon earth, and died to give this work its final consecration, 
never had any existence. He is the figure designed by ration- 
alism, endowed with life by liberalism, and clothed by modern 
theology in an historical garb. 75 
In this way, Schweitzer's researches lent support to the view that 
the actual historical Jesus whom the liberals had sought was inacces- 
Bible, he being 'to our time a stranger and an enigma, . 
76 Even, 
therefore, the most ancient and reputedly accurate sources are im- 
74erspectives, 
p. 226 
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pregnated with the religious themes and ideas of their own, and 
to us foreign, environment. Consequently, the records about Jesus 
are not historical accounts of his life so much as testimonials to 
what the earliest Christians thought about. him. 
Tillich admits that even if we reject Schweitzerts own 
apocalyptic interpretation of Jesus, we must confess that Schweit- 
zer's, history shows that 'we are in a position where we cannot 
know very much about the historical Jesus' ; 
77 
and though Tillich 
recognizes that the constructive-conjectural attempt of historical 
research to discover the facts of Jesus behind the gospel records 
was motivated by religious as well as scientific desires, he, like 
Schweitzer before him, attacks the intrusion of the historian's own 
'religious or philosophical convictions or prejudices'78 in his 
search for the empirical truth about Jesus. 
There is only one methodological procedure, and that is to 
look at the subject matter and not at one's own looking at 
the subject matter. Actually, such looking is determined 
by many psychological, sociological, and historical factors. 
These aspects must be neglected intentionally by everyone 
who approaches a fact objectively. 79 
In view of this failure of the 'quest' of the historical 
Jesus, Tillich tells us that some later liberal theologians, like 
Wilhelm Herrmann, 'tried to penetrate into the inner life of Jesus, 
into his relation to God, man and himself'. 
80 But this position is 
rejected, for such conclusions can only be drawn from expressions 
77Perspectives, 
p. 227 
78ST, 2: 1.20 
791bid. 
SOST, 2: 143. See W. Herrmann, Der Verkehr des Christen 
mit Gott (Stuttgart, 1903). E. 
T., The Communion of the Christian 
with God, trans. J. Sandys Stanyon 
2nd ed.; New York: G. P. Put- 
nam's Sons, 1906) p. 235. Of. 
Daniel L. Deegan, 'The Theology of 
Wilhelm Herrmann: A Reassessment', The Journal of Religion, XLV, 
No. 2 (April 1965) PP-87-99 
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of Jesus' personality which are ' always questionable'. 
81 Simi- 
larly, Tillich repudiates all efforts to reduce the historical 
Jesus to a picture of 'essentials', to develop a Gestalt 'while 
leaving the particulars open to doubt... ' 
But this is not a way out. Historical research cannot 
paint an essential picture after all the particular 
traits have been eliminated because they are question- 
able. It remains dependent on the particulars. 82 
This methodological impasse, Tillich continues, has led 
others to confine themselves only to the 'words of Jesus'. Since 
few of these words refer directly to Jesus, they can be separated 
from any biographical context. 'Therefore, their meaning is inde- 
pendent of the fact that he may or may not have said them. On that 
basis the insoluble biographical problem has no bearing on the 
truth of the words rightly or wrongly recorded as the words of 
Jesus' . 
83 Tillich goes on to say that usually these 'words of 
Jesus' are treated either ' as general rules of human behaviour' 
(thereby being refined interpretations of natural law or insights 
into man's nature), or they are made 'concrete demands'. 
84 
However, 
for Tillich the first attempt 'reduces Jesus to the level of the 
Old Testament and implicitly denies his claim to have overcome the 
Old Testament context', 
85 
whereas the second, closely associated 
with Bultmann's work, 
86 
though more profound than the first through 
81sT, 2: 143 
82 IÄ , p. 119 
831bid_. 
, p. 121 
841bid., 
p. 122, 
851bid. 
86Ibid. Tillich's criticism of Bultmann on this point will 
be discussed at length in Ch. III. 
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emphasizing the message that the Kingdom of God is Iat hand' (and 
so demanding decision for or against the Kingdom), nevertheless 
does not indicate how the requirement of deciding for the Kingdom 
can be fulfilled. 
Although Tillich's criticisms of these theological attempts 
from Herrmann to Bultmann to overcome the dangers attendant upon 
the construction of a 'Life of Jesus' are important addenda for an 
overall picture of Tillich's position, it is still evident that his 
own radical assessment of the relevance of biblical research to 
faith stems principally from his reaction to liberal Protestant 
theology. As he explains, his viewpoint 'pertains only to liberal 
dogmatics, not to the historical accomplishments of the liberal 
theologians'. 87 Speaking of liberal criticism of the gospels, he 
writes: 
This is the greatness and at the same time the shortcom- 
ing of liberal theology. It is the greatness insofar as 
it dares to apply the historical method to the biblical 
literature; it is the shortcoming insofar as it tries to 
base faith on the results of historical research. That. 
was what they tried to do. There is thus a positive and 
a negative side in this school. 88 
This is, extremely important. It makes quite clear that the 
brunt of Tillich's criticism is not directed against historical 
methodology as such but rather at the incursion of the historian's 
own philosophical or historical prejudices when trying to discover 
the facts about Jesus.. In many ways, our author's protest is 
against the lack, not the presence, of an objective method. Too 
often, the composers of the liberal dives of Jesus' were motivated 
by the subjective desire to see Jesus- as the epitome of Victorian 
871H: 33 
88Perspectives 
, p. 216 
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manners, eminently respectable and unmysterious, and, in conse- 
quence, totally inadequate to account for the faith in Christ-89 
Tillich's attitude to liberal Protestantism can be seen 
best, however, by noting the impact upon him of the work of Rudolf 
Buitmann (b. 1884), the second theologian to whom, after Schweitzer, 
he acknowledges a specific debt. In this respect, Tillich cites 
in particular Buitmann's Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradi- 
tion 90 as being determinative in the formation of his insights in- 
to the character of the biblical narratives. 
91 
It may be suggested that Bultmann, perhaps more than anyone, 
demonstrated that it was the actual historical attainments of the 
liberal movement which validated Tillich's negative opinion of 
liberal dogmatics; for he indicated how the liberal evaluation of 
Jesus I as he actually was' allowed the methodological procedures of 
historical analysis to judge dogmatic presuppositions. In a classic 
Way, Buitmann's famous work on the synoptic tradition illustrated 
S 
how the liberal picture of Jesus was superoeded within liberalism 
itself. Since this book appeared before Biultmann' s acquaintance with 
either 'dialectical' theology or Martin Heidegger, it is generally 
89Strauss' 
second Life of Jesus of 1864 is an example of this 
tendency. 'Here', Tillich says, 'he developed the typical world view 
of the victorious bourgeoisie, not of the great aggressive bourgeoisie 
of the eighteenth century, but of the positivistic materialistic bour- 
geoisie which had become victorious in the nineteenth century, and 
which he represented. This is, characterized by a calculating attitude 
toward the world, a basic materialistic interpretation of reality, and 
moral rules derived from the bourgeois conventions... This had a lot 
to do with Gospel criticism, for from his bourgeois point of view 
Strauss eliminated the in-breaking of the divine into the human, of 
the. infinite into the finite. The infinite was adapted to the finite. 
The image of Christ which Strauss and many later biographers produced 
was that of a domesticated divinity, domesticated for the sake of the 
untroubled life of the bourgeois society in calculating and controll- 
ing the finite reality' (Ibid., p. 138). 
90(Gdttingen, 1921). E. T., The History of the Synoptic Tradi- 
tion, trans. John Marsh (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963 
91IHs 33 
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recognized as emanating from within the liberal tradition. 'Right- 
ly so', comments Walter Schmithals, 'in so far as Bultmann makes 
a historical critical investigation of the Jesus tradition without 
air dogmatic prejudices. Wrongly so, in that this book destroys 
any possibility of writing a "Life of Jesus", the beginning and 
the end of liberal theology'. 92 
It is the second aspect of Bultmann's work, mentioned by 
Schmithals, that clearly had the most immediate effect upon Tillich, 
for it dismissed finally the possibility of getting back to the 
historical Jesus, a fact which is indicated by the character of the 
biblical sources itself. Liberal theology had, as we have seen, 
increasingly structured its account of Jesus' personality upon St. 
Mark's Gospel, thought to be both the oldest of the gospels and his- 
torically reliable. Bultmann., using the 'form-critical' method, 
93 
started with the supposition that the synoptic gospels are all 
collections of small individual units, originally transmitted orally. 
The significance of this approach is not, as B'ultmann states expli- 
citly, that it identifies 'the individual units of the tradition 
according to their characteristics - aesthetic or otherwise', but 
that it recognizes that 
the literature in which the life of a given community, and 
therefore also the primitive Christian community, has taken 
shape, arises from quite definite needs and from expressions 
of the life of this community. The result is a quite 
92An Introduction to the Theol of Rudolf Bultmann, trans. 
ý. Bowden (London: S. G. M. Press, 1968) p. 198 
93The inaugurators of this method within New Testament 
studies are generally considered to be Martin Dibelius and K. L. 
Schmidt, the former with Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums (Tübin- 
gen, 1919), the latter with Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu 
(Berlin, 
1919). 
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definite style and quite specific forms and categories. 
94 
The discovery of the originally individual and pericopic 
composition of the synoptic gospels terminated the liberal 'Life 
of Jesus' movement. To admit that the synoptic account was con- 
strueted of individual traditions, inserted, moreover, into a 
gospel framework designed for that purpose at a later stage, simul- 
taneously destroyed the liberal theological basis of the Markan 
framework, which was thought to belong not simply to the earliest 
stage of the tradition, but to the ' literary' tradition coming from 
the evangelist himself. No longer could the personality of Jesus 
be exposed within a context which now could lay no claim to ulti- 
mate historical reliability. The gospels are not to be read there- 
fore as clear biographical outlines since behind the framework of 
each gospel lies the collective consciousness of the primitive 
Christian community, determined as it was by the practices, concerns 
and apologetic needs entailed in that community's situation. St. 
Mark's Gospel, far from being an historical document, is in fact 
Gemeindetheologie. In this way, Bultmann was radically critical of 
the old liberal quest for the historical Jesus. 
Insofar as the old quest sought... to reconstruct a picture 
of the life and personality of the historical Jesus, and 
in that way to provide historical legitimation for the ex- 
istential decision of faith, Bultmann completely rejects 
that quest. In his view, such an effort is historically 
impossible and theologically illegitimate. The knowledge 
available to us through responsible critical analysis of 
the Synoptic Gospels simply is insufficient for the recon- 
struction of a picture of Jesus' character and inner devel- 
opment. 95 
94'Bultmann, oop. Cit. 9 p. 4 
95Schubert M. Ogden, IBultmann and the "New Quest"', The 
Journal of Bible and Religion, XXX, Ro. 3 
(July 1962) p. 210. Cf. 
G. E. Ladd, 'The Role of Jesus in Bultmann's Theology', Scottish 
Journal of Theology, XVIII, No. 1 
(March 1965) PP-57-68 
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This conclusion is Tillich' s also. Bultmann' s stress on 
'interpretative' character of the biblical narratives could only 
lead Tillich to assert that if Jesus said 'I am the truth', this 
truth may indeed be indistinguishable apart from the historical 
event of Jesus, but it could not be discovered by a methodologi- 
cal approach. Biblical criticism as exemplified by Bultmann had 
shown above all the impossibility of moving out of one's concrete 
historical situation into the situation in which one can meet the 
'historical Jesus'. 'There is no way of meeting the "historical 
Jesus" (i. e., the product of historical criticism) because the 
Jesus of whom we have reports was from the very beginning the 
"Christ of faith" *96 
For Tillich there is no possibility of getting behind the 
kerygmatic Jesus Christ, that is, the Jesus as he was re- 
ceived and interpreted and preached by the believing dis- 
ciples as the Christ of God. It is inaccurate to speak 
of the 'historical Jesus' if we mean by that term the 
life of a person who stands behind the Gospels and can be 
extracted from those witnesses by historical research. 97 
This is a just appraisal of Tillich's position. The fai- 
lure of the liberal ' lives of Jesus' and the abandonment of the 
quest of the historical Jesus - these are the legacies that Tillich 
inherited; and they determine his own negative assessment of the 
attempt made by historical research to find. the Jesus of history. 
Despite the various criticisms levelled against Schweitzer and Bult- 
mann, the methodological situation which they outlined has not 
changed. The result of the critical biblical approach is, Tillich 
96 
'Realism and Faith', PE: 82. This article appeared 
originally in the volume of Tillich's collected writings, 
Religiöse 
Vlcklicý (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1929). 
97jame, 
s C. Livingston, 'Tillich's Christology and Histori- 
cal Research', Paul Tillichs Retrospect and 
Future (Nashville and 
New York: Abingdon Press., 1966) p. 43. Reprinted 
from Religion in 
Life (Winter 1966) 
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conoludes, 
not a picture of the so-called historical Jesus but the 
insight that there is no picture behind the biblical 
one which could be made scientifically probable. 98 
III. Tillich's re-statement of the problem; and his second 
semantic analysis of the term 'historical Jesus'. 
This brief history of the development of the problem of the 
historical Jesus has been presented in order to show that the appli- 
cation of historical methods to the biblical sources resulted in 
Tillich's view that it is impossible to recover anything histori- 
cally certain about Jesus of Nazareth. The processes of historical 
science, once carried to their logical conclusion by Bultmann and 
his fellow form-critics, pronounced, as it were, their own bankrupt- 
cy by revealing that the gospels contain the early church's presen- 
tation of Jesus, not the historical Jesus. Tillich' s inevitable 
reaction to the 'quest' undertaken by the liberals -a quest which 
had produced such a supply of 'lives' and biographies - was, as we 
have seen, an almost total scepticism as to the possibility of ever 
attaining an objective chronicle of Jesus' earthly existence. 
puts his position in this way: 
Albert Schweitzer at the end of his dramatic book, The 
Quest of the Historical Jesus, put the alternative which 
he considered to be the result of Biblical criticism in 
the following words: 'Either consistent scepticism or 
consistent eschatology'. This meant that the mind of 
Jesus is either completely unknown to us or completely 
strange to us. No Christian theology can be built on 
either side of this alternative. And Schweitzer, whom 
many consider the greatest Christian personality of our 
time, did not even make an attempt. 
99 
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Tillich, for his part, does not hesitate to choose between 
Schweitzer's alternatives. The option 
that Schweitzer contrasted with his own is that of 
radical historical skepticism, represented by Wilhelm 
Wrede and later by Bultmann himself. Skepticism here 
does not mean doubt about God, the world, and man, but 
doubt about the possibility of reaching the historical 
Jesus by our historical methods. My own heritage has 
been this school of historical skepticism. l00 
We have suggested before that Tillich's adherence to this 
radical tradition - despite the fact that the tradition itself can 
be traced back through Bultmann. to Strauss and Reimarus - is large- 
ly the result of the unsuccessful search for the 'Jesus of history' 
made by liberal theologian8.101 Here, two features of Tillich's 
assessment of this abortive attempt need to be re-emphasized. 
First, he acknowledged that the liberal quest had been an 
historical failure because, as Bultmann had demonstrated convinc- 
ingly, the keryginatic nature of the gospels did not permit any 
separation between the historical Jesus and the Christ of the 
kerygma. Since the material of the gospels does not provide an 
historian's picture of Jesus but rather an account determined by 
faith's recognition of Jesus as God' a saving revelation in the 
world, it was illicit to make the liberal distinction between the 
man Jesus and Jesus the Christ in order to confine attention to 
the allegedly recoverable 'historical Jesus'. 
100 
Perspectives, pp. 226-227 (my emphasis). This is Tillich's 
only reference to recce (1859-1906). In his work Das Messiasgeheim- 
nis in den Evangelien (Gottingen, 1901), Wrede had delivered two de- 
cisive blows against the liberal portrait of the historical 
Jesus: 
first, in his argument that the structure of Mark was dogmatically 
determined by a faith in Jesus' 'messianic secret'; and second, 
in 
his contention that critical study into 
the life of Jesus suffers, 
from psychological conjecture. 
101 
See above p. 31 
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Second, Tillich accepted that the liberal enterprise had 
been a theological failure. in that it had made the object of faith 
not God's revelation in Jesus Christ but rather a scientific re- 
construction of the life of the man Jesus. The result, as Schwei- 
tzer in particular had shown, was the, production of a figure shorn 
of its mythological and miraculous elements and animated only by 
the injection of the neo-humanistic presuppositions of liberal 
historians into that figure's portrayal. For this reason, Tillich 
rejected liberal theology whereby Christ was drawn 'into the realm 
of universal or highest humanity', and through which he became the 
pre-eminent exemplar of man' 9s possibilities, 'a wave (the largest 
perhaps) in the stream of time, subjected to its arbitrariness and 
ambiguity'. 
102 In the erection of biblical exegesis as the norm of 
faith, the liberals had replaced Christ crucified by the historian's 
Jesus. 
Paul Tillich saw, therefore, in the collapse of the old 
liberal quest an opportunity once more to clarify the relationship 
between critical historical methods and the confession that Jesus is 
the Christ in a way that was theologically and historically apprec- 
iative, as the liberals had not been, of the specific character of 
the biblical accounts about Jesus: theologically conscious that the 
scientific approach could not extract from the gospel narratives a 
biographical picture of Jesus such as would substantiate faith and 
christological doctrine; and historically aware that the gospels are 
the devotional literature of the primitive church, concerned with 
the kerygmatic presentation of Jesus as the decisive revealer of 
God's salvation, and not the primary source-books. for a history of 
'Jesus as he actually was'. 
H 
102 IH4 261 
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At this juncture, it is worth noticing immediately that 
this determination to be both theologically and historically mind- 
ful of the particular nature of the biblical stories has been cri- 
ticized, from the very beginning, for containing a basic confusion. 
iow, it is asked, can the revelation of God through Jesus of Naza- 
reth be presumed theologically imperative if, simultaneously, his. - 
torical scrutiny of the constituent features of this person' s 
existence is deemed to be either impossible or, in extreme cases, 
of no consequence? So, for instance, D. M. Baillie argued that 
Tillich, along with his so-called dialectical or neo-orthodox con- 
temporaries, had over-reacted against the liberal emphasis upon an 
obtainable objective history of Jesus. 'There is no stability', 
he writes, 'in a position which accepts to the full the humanity 
of Christ but has no interest in its actual concrete manifestation 
and doubts whether it can be recaptured at all; which insists on 
the "once-for-allness" of this divine incursion into history, but 
renounces all desire or claim to know what it was really like'. 
103 
Baillie urged, then, a return to the Jesus of history since, 
he maintained, an appreciation of Jesus himself is requisite to the 
Christian conviction that-through his earthly person God was mani- 
fest. But Baillie's reasoning, Van Harvey tells us, was so balanced 
and sane 
that scarcely anyone pointed out that while he had argued 
that knowledge about Jesus was a necessity, it still re- 
mained to be established whether or not such 
knowledge was 
a possibility. Since there is no logical connection 
be- 
tween theological necessity and historical possibility, the 
problem of the fragmentary nature of the sources remained. 
104 
103God 
Was in Christ (London: Faber and Faber, 
1948) p. 28 
1040_., pp. 12-13. The same point is made about Baillie 
by T. A. Roberts, History and Christian Apologetic 
(London: S. P. C. K., 
1960) p. 153 
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Tillich, it is true, does agree that the historian cannot 
discover the 'real Jesus' behind the kerygmatic 'Jesus Christ'. 
That 'there is no picture behind the, biblical one which could be 
made scientifically probable' 
105 is the presupposition of his whole 
discussion of the problem of the historical Jesus, formed by his 
early acquaintance with German biblical criticism. But if, for 
example, this assessment of the historical status of the biblical 
writings dismisses as a priori impossible any effort to arrive at a 
primitive kernel of St. Mark's Gospel, it does not discount, as 
Baillie would have us suppose, the material importance of Jesus' 
earthly existence. Tillich, no less than his critic, appreciates 
that to have no interest whatsoever in the Jesus of history is to 
surrender the reality of the Incarnation which 'occurs only once in 
time and spacet. 
106 He wishes, therefore, to assert the concrete 
significance of Jesus of Nazareth for faith and doctrine, but in a 
way that does not detract from the parallel assertion he would wish 
to make, namely that, given the 'fragmentary nature' of the sources, 
an objective history of Jesus' life is unobtainable. It is this 
important proviso - the inability to reach the historical Jesus by 
scientific means - which, writes Tillich, forms 
the background for my own attempt to answer the systematic 
question how we can say that Jesus is the Christ if his- 
torical research can never reach a sure image of the his- 
torical Jesus. The second volume of my Systematic Theology 
is an attempt to draw out the consequences for systematic 
theology created by this skeptical attitude to the New Tes-107 
tament generally and to the historical Jesus in particular. 
105ST, 2s 118 
106RDI 
= 145 
107perspectives, p. 227 
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Thus far from ignoring, or failing to see, the contra- 
diction of which he and his colleagues are accused, Tillich is in 
fact concerned with its resolution. He endeavours simultaneously, 
first, to preserve the kerygmatic proclamation that in Jesus of 
Nazareth God acted decisively, and second, to maintain an essential 
methodological scepticism as to the possibility of ever reaching 
the actual ' personality' or ' lifel' of Jesus. In conformity with 
this dual intention, Tillich does not, and indeed cannot, approach 
the problem of the historical Jesus in terms of the degree to which 
historical work into the life and teaching of Jesus can corroborate 
the messianic identification which is attached to his ministry. The 
question, as Tillich re-states it, rather is: How can this methodo- 
logical scepticism, which is an essential element in all investiga- 
tions into the facts about Jesus, be united with the assertion of 
faith that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ? This question does not 
annul the importance of the Jesus of history; but it does demand 
that the connection between Jesus and the statements faith makes 
concerning his person cannot be substantiated by historical research. 
As Tillich repeatedly emphasizes, the New Testament narratives cannot 
be regarded as sources for a 'life of Jesus' since the tradition it- 
self was formed for quite different missionary and homiletic purposes. 
Significantly, Tillich's sharp differentiation between the 
procedures of historical science and the historical assertions con- 
tamed in Christian belief is supported by his second analysis of the 
term 'historical Jesus'. He notes that much of the confusion surroun- 
ding the quest for the Jesus of history would have been dispelled if 
more care had been taken over the precise meaning of the expression; 
and indeed, perhaps the most important conclusion that 
Tillich comes 
to from his survey of the ill-fated search for 'Jesus as he actually 
48. 
was' is that the failure of this attempt would have been more 
easily recognized if it had not been 'for. the semantic confusion 
about the meaning of the term "historical Jesus"1,108 Here, how- 
ever, instead of three possible definitions, Tillich restricts 
himself to two. First, 'historical Jesus' denotes, the results of 
the historian's research into the character and life of him who 
stands behind the gospel reports; and second, 'historical Jesus' 
indicates that there is a factual element within, what Tillich 
calls, the event 'Jesus as the Christ'. 
109 Thus, in this later 
semantic analysis, only two meanings are offered. The phrase can 
refer either to the historical evidence about Jesus which is the 
outcome of critico-historical research, or to the factual character 
of the event 'Jesus as the Christ'. 
Tillich's notion of this event 'Jesus as the Christ', upon 
which the second meaning depends, occupies a central and quite de- 
terminative place in his theology, it being nothing less than his 
view of the event upon which the Christian faith is based. 
Christianity is what it is through the affirmation that 
Jesus of Nazareth, who has been called "the Christ", is 
actually the Christ, namely he who brings the new state 
of things, the New Being. Wherever the assertion that 
Jesus is the Christ is maintained, there is the Christ- 
ian message; wherever this assertion is denied, the 
Christian message is not affirmed. Christianity was 
born, not with the birth of the man who is called "Jesus", 
but in the moment in which one of his followers was 
driven to say to him, "Thou art the Christ". And Chris- 
tianity will live as long as there are people who repeat 
this assertion. For the event on which Christianity is 
based has two sides; the fact which is called "Jesus of 
Nazareth" and the reception of this fact by those who re- 
ceived him as the Christ. 110 
108ST, 2: 123 
1091bid. 
110., 
p*112 
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The Christian message is therefore equated with the con- 
fession, first made by Simon Peter at Caesarea Philippi, that 
'Jesus is the Christ'. ill The strange structure of this phrase 
is intentional in that it rejects all liturgical and homiletic 
use of 'Jesus Christ' as a proper name. This form is discarded 
since it tends to unite two elements which are in fact distinct, 
namely that 'Jesus as the Christ is both an historical fact and 
a subject of believing reception'. 
112 
Consequently, as J. Hey- 
wood Thomas explains, 'Jesus as the Christ' is 'simply a short- 
hand expression for the assertion that there is a fact of which 
this event is the name and interpretation'. 
113 In his more ela- 
borate analysis of the second definition of 'historical Jesus', 
Tillich has thus concluded with the principle that there are two 
aspects to the event 'Jesus as the Christ', the first concerning 
a fact which has happened, the second pointing to Jesus' reception 
as the Christ. For this reason, he continues, the 'receptive side 
of the Christian event is as important as the factual side. And 
only their unity creates the event upon which Christianity is 
based'. 114 
111For 
a more detailed account of the scene at Caesarea 
Philippi, see Tillich's sermon 'He who is the Christ' in The 
Shaking of the Foundations (London: Penguin Books, 1966) pp. 143- 
150 
112 ST, 2: 113 
113Paul Tillich: An Appraisal (London: S. C. M. Press, 
1963) p. 81 
114ST, 2: 114. This insistence paves the way for the an- 
swer to the question, 'Would the destruction of mankind 
be a refu- 
tation of the Christian message? ' Tillich answers that 'Jesus as 
the Christ is related to that historical development of which he is 
the centre... It begins the moment human beings start realizing their 
existential estrangement and raise the question of 
the New Being... 
the end is the moment in which the continuity of that history in 
which Jesus as the Christ is the centre 
is definitely broken' (Ibid., 
p. 116). 
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Pausing here for a moment, we oan see that Tillich's 
second semantic study of the term 'historical Jesus' differen- 
tiates more precisely between, on the one hand, historical in- 
vestigations into the gospel reports about Jesus, and, on the 
other hand, the objective facts about this man as they were re- 
ceived and interpreted by the first disciples. In the second 
and, from the viewpoint of faith, more important meaning of 
'historical Jesus' , the event 'Jesus as the Christ' necessarily 
conjoins the objective facts about Jesus with their religious 
reception and interpretation. What we have, then, is a methodo- 
logical distinction between the fact and the interpretation of 
that fact, the former identified with 'Jesus', the latter with 
the 'Christi. In other words to say that there is a factual 
element within the event 'Jesus as the Christ' is to acknowledge 
also that this fact was interpreted as being of special signifi- 
canoe, such as would warrant the title 'Christ'. Consequently, 
the combination of an individual name, 'Jesus', with the title, 
IChrist I, indicates that a certain man, who lived in Nazareth be- 
tween the years 1 to 30, was received as a special figure with a 
special function, that is, as the Messiah - in Greek, Christoo - 
'the "anointed one" who has received an unction from God enabling 
him to establish the reign of God in Israel and in the world'. 
115 
B'it undoubtedly the most important feature of Tillichs s 
discussion at this- point is that he concludes with the claim that 
'historical Jesus', in this its second sense, 'raises the question 
of faith and. not the question of historical research'. 
116 This 
1151_ 
, p, 113 
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crucial proposition, as we first encounter it in Tillich's theo- 
logy, is dependent upon a more exact assessment of the relation- 
ship involved between the fact of Jesus and the interpretation of 
him as the Christ. As Tillich explains: 
The foundation of Christian belief is the biblical 
picture of Christ, not the historical Jesus. The 
criterion of human thought and action is the pic- 
ture of Christ as it is rooted in ecclesiastical 
belief and human experience, not the shifting and 
artificial construct of historical research. 117 
Tillich' s, argument, therefore, is that historical bibli- 
cal enquiry can undermine neither the factual character of the 
assertion that (Jesus. is the Christi, nor the Christian message 
with which that assertion is equated, because 'Jesus is the Christ' 
is essentially an interpretative phrase. 
118 The foundation of 
Christian faith certainly remains a. 'believing confession vis-a-vis 
a faot', 
119 but more specifically it is the 'Christ' (the interpre- 
tation) who provides this foundation. For present faith, the em- 
phasis in the Christian religion lies not on a fact, the interpreta- 
tion of which would be incidental to that fact's efficacy, but upon 
an interpretation of a fact, that which has created and conditioned 
the 'biblical picture of Christ'. It is upon this 'picture' or 
'portrait', which is the product of the act of interpretation made 
by the first disciples in their reception of Jesus as the Christ, 
that faith is based. It is to this biblical presentation of Jesus 
of Nazareth as the Christ, of Which the Caesarea Philippi confession 
1171x: 33-34 
118Al1 those phrases which, like 'Jesus as the Christ', com- 
bine the two elements of 'fact' and 'reception' are called 'inter- 
pretative phrases' by Tillich 
(viz., 'Jesus who is called the Christ'. 
'Jesus who is the Christ', 'Jesus the Christ'). See ST, 2s 113 
119J. Ff. Thomas, oo. oit. , p. 78 
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is the centre, that the Christian believer aligns himself*120 
Tillich's final examination of the term 'historical Jesus' 
has here issued in an argument which, initially at least, has much 
in common with the second of the three definitions proposed in 
121 1938: it too restricts faith's knowledge of Jesus to the bibli- 
cal. picture of him as the Christ. But Tillich's argument is not, 
however, a simple duplication of this early orthodox proposal, for 
it does not depend upon any dogmatic conception of scripture's 
verbal inerrancy, but upon an awareness of the intrinsic 'theologi- 
cal' nature of the sources; it arises, to be more exact, from 
Tillich's insight into the ever-present and necessary relation of 
'fact' to 'interpretation' within the event which the portrait 
portrays and whose composite structure it reflects. 
In order to appreciate this, argument more fully - the first 
to be advanced by Tillich on the problem of the historical Jesus - 
we. must now examine individually the two sides, the 'fact' and its 
'interpretation', which are said to embody the central Christian 
event, the. event 'Jesus as the 'Christ'. In the chapter which 
follows we shall be concerned with the first of these sides, that 
is, with the factual or existential aspect - the 'Jesus' element - I-- 
which is received and interpreted. It is nevertheless important to 
notice beforehand that Tillich, when analyzing either of these two 
elements, maintains throughout that the necessary theological rela- 
tion of the historical Jesus to the kerygmatic Christ is accouödated 
within the event 'Jesus as the Christ' in terms of the conjunction 
120Tillich's distinction between 'fact' and 'interpretation 
of fact' is due, not only to the researches of Schweitzer and Bultmann 
into the nature of the gospel narratives, but also to the famous 
distinction between the two German words for ' history' , Historie and 
Geschichte, first attributed to Tillich's teacher Martin Kahler. We 
have deferred any treatment of this distinction until Ch. III. 
121See 
above PP- 3-5 
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of the fact of Jesus and the interpretation of him as the Christ; 
and, equally consistently, he believes that this relation is not 
to be endorsed by historical analysis of that factual element 
which, he readily agrees, the Christ-event possesses. This may 
be put another way. Within the general scope of his argument, 
Tillich willingly admits a factual element within the event which 
is received and interpreted by faith (the second meaning of 'his- 
torioal Jesus'); but he denies that recognition of its importance 
must issue in an immediate search for the historical characteris- 
tics of it (the first meaning of ' historical Jesus' ). Such a 
denial derives, as we have partially seen already, from a precise 
analysis of the relation of fact to interpretation within the 
event 'Jesus as the Christ', and depends upon the resulting con- 
clusion of that analysis, namely, that the stress in Christian 
faith is upon the interpretation of a fact and not upon that fact 
alone. It is this final judgment which in turn provokes the claim 
that the event reunifies the Jesus of history with the Christ of 
faith in a way whereby critical investigations into the biblical 
records about Jesus can neither corroborate nor devalue the asser- 
Lions of faith concerning him. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EVENT "JESUS AS THE CHRIST" 
Tillich's proposition that the foundation of Christian 
faith is the event 'Jesus as the Christ' contains very positive 
statements about the facticity of the historical side of the 
Christian message. The essential element of the historical re- 
ality of Jesus of Nazareth is maintained throughout: 'Jesus as 
the Christ is both an historical fact and a subject of believing 
reception'. 
' Elsewhere, in his article on the Incarnation 
written in 1949, Tillich explicitly states that the Incarnation is 
an event with all the characteristics of an "event in 
time and space": namely, occurring "but once", unre- 
peatable, possible only in a special situation and in 
a special, incomparable, individual form, a subject 
of report and not of analysis or deduction. 2 
This excludes the view that the Incarnation is either the product 
of man's imagination or the creation of existentialist thought or 
experience. 
3 As Tillich reiterates: 'the New Testament image of 
Jesus as the, Christ is certainly not an "abstraction", but a 
1ST, 2s 113 (my emphasis) 
2_I: 133 
3So Tillich writes: 'Christian theology is based on the 
unique event Jesus the Christ, and in spite of the 
infinite 
meaning of this event it remains this event and, as such, 
the 
criterion of every religious experience. 
This event is given to 
experience and not derived from it. 
Therefore, experience re- 
ceives and does not produce'. 
(ST, 1s 52) 
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portrait of a reality which is presupposed and interpreted'. 
4 
It is with such remarks in mind that A. T. Mollegen can state 
that the first principle of Tillich' s christological thought is 
that 'the Incarnation happened. Put bluntly, the Incarnational - 
events were photographable. A sound-recording cinematograph 
could have captured the physical actions and words of a human 
individual who is the Christ'; 
5 
and Tillich has accepted this 
as an accurate appraisal of his position. 
6 
Tillich is at pains to point out, then, that the inter- 
pretation of Jesus as the Christ must be taken seriously as a 
report about something that happened objectively. But this con- 
dition notwithstanding, we have noted already that Tillich dis- 
engages himself from any critical evaluation of the alleged 
characteristics of this historical occurrence by, in effect, 
creatively reorientating theology away from its foundation on the 
fact of Jesus. This is the turning-point of his discussion of 
the problem of the historical Jesus, and it is in this connection 
that criticism has most frequently arisen. For in view of the 
stress upon the, 'Christ' (the interpretation) as the basis of 
faith, and the consequent insistence that biblical research into 
Jesus' earthly existence cannot invalidate that faith, it is 
hardly surprising that some scholars, like Thomas O'Meara, have 
argued that Tillich's christology, despite our author's own 
4t Interrogation of Paul Tillich', Philosophical Interro- 
gations ed. Sydney and Beatrice Rome 
(New Yorks Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1964) p. 365 
51Christology 
and Biblical Criticism in Tillich, The 
Theolo of Paul Tillich ed. C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall 
New corks Macmillan, 1964) p. 231 
6'Reply 
to Interpretation and Criticism', Ibid., p. 348 
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statements to the contrary, presents us with a 'Christ without 
Jesus 
As one might expect, Tillich has rejected this and such 
objections. 'Even a superficial reading', he writes, 'of the 
chapters of the second volume of Systematic Theol2gZ which deals 
with the "historical Jesus" should silence this criticism'. 
8 
And yet, even though the emphasis upon the factual element with- 
in the event 'Jesus as the Christ' may be partly designed to 
withstand, or at least mitigate, any ensuing attack upon the 
separation between fact and interpretation, it is clear that 
doubt does still remain as to the importance Tillich is willing 
to allow to the factual dimension of the Christian event. For 
example, we must ask whether the functional stress upon the 
interpretative side of the Christian event has rendered the 
factual side of that event historically ambiguous. In other 
words, is the content of the gospel determined by Jesus who is 
the Christ, or by the faith of the Christian community which re- 
ceives him as the Christ? 
The problem which these questions raise is a vital one. 
They succeed in focusing our attention upon the difficulty found 
most frequently at the centre of Tillich's discussion of the 
historical Jesus. If the emphasis upon the interpretative side 
of the event 'Jesus as the Christ' is designed to shield that 
ový 
event's historic element from critico-historical analysis, 
then 
7T. O'Meara, 'Paul Tillich and Ecumenism', Paul Tillich 
in Catholic Thought, ed. T. A. O'Meara and C. D. Weisser 
(London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1965) p. 274 
8'Appreciation 
and Reply', Ibid., p"309 
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we must enquire whether or not the receptive side has indeed, as 
O'Meara alleges, engulfed the factual side to such an extent that 
the traditional location of God's redemptive act through the per- 
son of the man Jesus is obliterated. 
The charge being levelled at Tillich at this point is 
really one of an inherent docetism, a heresy which is always im- 
plied when the kerygma is either overestimated to the apparent 
exclusion of the historical event or emphasized at the expense of 
the saving agent. Because the revelation, which is supposedly 
disclosed in the man Jesus, is discerned and proclaimed only in 
terms of his reception and interpretation as. the 'Christ', the 
temptation is to underestimate the decisive role played by this 
man to the extent that finally the concrete reality of Jesus be- 
comes irrelevant. This, in the opinion of Maria Sulzsbaoh, is a 
temptation to which Tillich succumbs. 
In his Systematic Theology, he (Tillich) distinguishes 
between fact and interpretation. Though Jesus is the 
historical fact on which all interpretation of the 
Christian faith is based, it is of no major importance. 
Not Jesus, but the Christ as the interpretation of the 
'fact!, is the cornerstone of all Christian thought 
and faith. 9 
Sulzbaoh's comment that it is the interpretation (the 
Christ) of the fact (Jesus) which is the foundation 'of all 
Christian thought and faith' is correct. So much is clear from 
Tillich' s statement that it was the Caesarea Philippi confession 
'Thou art the Christ', and not the birth of Jesus himself, which 
saw the beginning of Christianity. 
10 Sulzbach' s mistake is to 
deduce from this the apparently parallel contention that the 
9M. F. Sulzbach, 'The Place of Christology in Contemporary 
Protestantism', Religion in Life, XXIII, No. 2 
(Spring 1954) p. 211 
10See 
above, p. 48 
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fact of Jesus is of 'no major importance' -a conclusion which, 
incidentally, forms the premise for her ensuing statements that 
Tillich believes 'the humanity of Jesus is unimportant', 
1l 
and 
that his christology is 'docetism in a modern garb' wherein the 
'foundation of Christian faith and thought is the Idea symbolized 
in the man Jesus' . 
12 
But if Sulzbach is right, and if there is 
no real emphasis upon the significance of the facticity of the 
man who is called 'Christ', then it would be very hard to discover 
why Tillich should concern himself at all with repudiating any 
gnostic devaluation of the historical dimension of the event 
'Jesus as the Christ', or why he should reject emphatically the 
argument that a docetic tendency is inevitable if historical analy- 
sis of that event is disallowed. Tillich's intention is to im- 
munize the historical basis of christology from the radical his- 
i, - 
torical methods employed by the biblical critics; but this aim is 
dependent upon his desire to guarantee, not devalue, the distinctly 
historical framework of the Christian faith. According to Tillich, 
the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ must be considered as a 
record of an event which had objective status; and it is this (- 
original occurrence which is historically basic to the biblical 
narrative in the sense that it is the necessary presupposition of 
its own interpretation. Such an insistence upon the composite 
nature of the event 'Jesus as the Christ' - upon the interdependence 
of the 'fact' of Jesus and the 'interpretation' of him as the 
Christ - makes clear that Sulzbach's characterization of 
Tillich's 
thought, by assuming a material distinction between the 
two 'sides' 
of the event, is, strictly speaking, 
impossible. There is no 
11o 
. cit., p. 212 
12Ibid., 
p. 213 
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material distinction between these two elements, although Tillich 
is ready to allow, and himself employs,, a formal distinction for 
the purpose of clarifying the structure of the Christ-event. 
However, in order to arrive at a more conclusive answer 
to Sulzbach's criticisms, it is as well to examine Tillich's 
assessment of the historical elements of ohristology from a view- 
point other than that determined by the strictly formal construe- 
tion of the Christ-event. In this connection, it is particularly 
important to see that Tillich's stress on the 'Jesus' element 
within the Christian message proceeds also on 'theological' grounds. 
Christianity, to repeat, concerns an event which has happened; but 
Christian theology also accords this event universal significance, 
and acknowledges that through it, and with its appearance, the con- 
ditions of existence have been transformed generally. The question, 
therefore, we should ask now is this: Does the message that Jesus 
is the Christ convey a particular interpretation of existence which 
would be impossible without the actuality of a personal life within 
the event 'Jesus as the Christ' of which 'Jesus' is the proper name? 
Tillich's answer to this type of question is determined by his cru- 
cial concept of t1New Being', to which we must now turn our attention. 
This is the term constructed precisely in order to interpret the 
event of Jesus as the Christ in terms of the advent of a new state 
of things, and indeed, in Tillich' s christology, it is virtually 
synonymous with the title 'Christ'. In reply to the question "Where 
is the New Being manifest? ", systematic theology answers by saying 
"In Jesus the Christ"; and this formula, we are told, is no more 
than a paraphrase of the ancient baptismal confession of 
Jesus as 
the Christ, that he 'who is the Christ is he who brings the new eon, 
60. 
the new reality'. 
13 If ? Christ' is 'the name Christianity applied 
to the bearer of the New Being in its final manifestation', 
14 then 
to call Jesus tChristi is to say that in him the new state of 
things, the New Being, has appeared. 
I. The New Being in Jesus as the Christ. 
Tillich's argument for the reality of Jesus the Christ as 
the bearer of New Being occupies a quite distinctive, but yet quite 
characteristic position in his theology. Its peculiar significance 
arises: from the fact that it evolves from, and is determined by, a 
perspective which is itself not wholly explicable in terms of the 
biblical witness to Jesus. For, in essence, this argument maintains 
that the totality of man e situation is best explained and resolved 
only in the context of God's redemptive act in the historical event 
of Jesus as the Christ. In other words, the argument employed here 
is one that moves from an analysis of the human predicament to God' s 
act in the earthly Christ as its only solution. Here the question 
posed by the analysis of man's situation under the conditions of the 
'old eon' or 'old being' necessitates the historical ocoursion of 
the Christ, the bearer of New Being, as its only answer. 
It is true that this form of argumentation has precedents in 
the history of theology. We find it, for example, when 
Siren Kierke- 
gaard asserted that the world is meaningful only if its telos is 
that 
subjectivity maximalized by faith in the historicity of 
the God-man. 
15 
It is evident also when Albrecht Ritschl argued 
that there is a 
'necessary concatenation' between the dignity of man, his 
finitude 
13ST, is 56 
145T, 2: 102 
15Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. D. Swenson 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) pp. 142,178,182,185-9 
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and guilt, and the historical redeemer. 
16 But in Tillich's case, 
the argument originates strictly with his use of an adopted theo- 
logical method, the method of 'correlation'. 
17 
This method has as 
its aim the avowedly 'apologetic' concern to relate and adapt the 
Christian message to the modern mind without losing its unique 
character. The hallmark of any 'apologetic' theology, as against 
the 'ker 18 ygm. atic type, is that it is 'answering theology'. 'It 
answers the questions implied in the "situation" in the power of 
the eternal message and with the means provided by the situation 
whose questions it answers'. 
19 
Accordingly, the 'method of cor- 
relation' seeks to explain 'the contents of the Christian faith 
through existential questions and theological answers in mutual 
interdependence '. 20 It recognizes both that man 'cannot receive 
an answer to a question he has not asked', 
21 
and that he 'has 
asked... in his very existence... questions which Christianity 
answers'. 
22 
As a result, the first distinguishing feature of this 
theological method is that it requires that the initial duty of 
the theologian, if he is true to his apologetic task, is to an- 
alyse first the existential situation from which the questions 
arise. This method, therefore, seeks a common ground between the 
one who asks and the one who answers by listening to the questions 
16A 
Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justi- 
fication and Reconciliation, trans. J. S. Black 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1872) p. 540 
17 ST, 1: 67 
18If 
the 'unchangeable truth of the message (kerygma) over 
against the changing demands of the situation' 
is emphasized, then 
that theology is kerygmatic. (ST, 1: 4) 
19ST, I: 6 
20 ST, 1: 68 
21ST, 2: 15 
225TH 1: 72 
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the situation asks before answering them in terms of the message. 
However, to this Tillich adds that analysing the existential situ- 
ation is principally the role of philosophy, philosophy here being 
described as 'that cognitive approach to reality in which reality 
as such is the object'. 
23 Itýrthermore, our author continues, such 
an analysis reveals that the questions asked are essentially onto- 
logical ones, being questions of being and non-being, of ontologi- 
cal anxiety and the ambiguities of life. Consequently, philosophy 
must 'answer in ontological terms'. 
24 
Indeed, philosophy in 
general is identified by Tillich with ontology, which he defines 
as I an analysis of those structures of being which we encounter in 
every meeting with reality'. 
25 The second distinguishing mark of 
this. method is, therefore, that it demands that the theologian, in 
first seeking the questions put by the situation, must work as a 
philosopher, and that, accordingly, he must phrase the answers 
given in Christian revelation in ontological terms if they are to 
be relevant to that situation. 
26 In this sense, then, 'correlation', 
23ST, 1: 22 
241bid., 
p. 24 
251bid. 
26Theology, therefore, is fundamentally an ontological en- 
quiry. 'This makes the division between philosophy and theology 
impossible, for, whatever the relation of God, world, and man may 
be, it lies in the frame of being; and any interpretation of the 
meaning and structure of being as being, unavoidably has conse- 
quences for the interpretation of God, man, and the world in their 
interrelations'. 'Philosophy and Theology', PEs 86. Cf. 'Rela- 
tion of Metaphysics and Theology', Review of Metaphysics, X, No. 1 
(September 1956) pp. 57-63" J. Heywood Thomas, in a series of 
articles, contends that this relation between philosophy and 
theo- 
logy is nothing more than a tautology in the sense 
that 'if any- 
thing is theology then what makes it theology also makes it philo- 
sophy'. 'The Correlation of Philosophy and 
Theology in Tillich's 
System', London Warterly and Holborn Review, Sixth Series, XXVIII 
(January 1959) P"52" See also 'Tillich on Philosophy and Theology', 
Union Seminary Quarterly Review, VIII, No. 3 
(March 1953) pp. 10-16; 
and Paul Tillich: An Appraisal , pp. 
42-43. Cf. H. Veatch, 'Til- 
lich'a Distinction between Metaphysics and Theology', Review of 
Metaphysic X, 'o. 3 (March 1957) PP"529-5339 
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as R. P. Scharlemann has described it, speaks a 'theontological 
language's 27 the questions implied in human existence, and ela- 
borated in ontological terms, determine the meaning and the 
theological interpretation of the answers as they appear in the 
classical religious concepts. So Tillich Writes: 'In respect to 
content the Christian answers are dependent on the revelatory 
events in which they appear; in respect to form they are depen- 
dent on the structure of the questions which they answer'. 
28 
As we have briefly described it, 
29 this theological 
method bears upon chriatology in an extremely significant way. 
27'Tillich's 
Method of Correlations Two Proposed Re- 
visions', The Journal of Religion, XLVI, lTo, l, Part II (January 
1966) pp. 93,102. Tillich, in his 'Rejoinder' accompanying this 
article, accepts this formulation. (Ibid. 9 p. 184). 
28ST, 
1: 72. It is at this point that the difference 
between Tillich and Karl Barth is most instructive. Barth de- 
clares that revelation is in no way dependent upon man, and so 
emphasizes the 'Word of God' which stands over against the human 
situation and is thrown at it 'like a stone'. Tillich, while 
agreeing that the content of revelation is given to man as an 
objective reality and not produced by philosophical or theologi- 
cal reflection, maintains that revelation is dependent upon the 
cultural situation of the day, to which it must relate. No doc- 
trine of revelation, which is divorced from manta reception of 
it, is therefore possible. This basic difference is presented 
in detail in Tillich's 'Die Uberwindung des Religionsbegriffs 
in der Religionsphilosophie', Kant-Studien, XK. VII, No. 3/4 (1922) 
pp. 446-469. Accordingly, Tillich characterizes Barth's position 
as 'undialectical'. See 'Kritisches und Positives Paradox - 
Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Karl Barth und Friedrich Gogartenr, 
Theologische Blatter, II, No. 11 (November 1923) pp. 263-269; and 
tWhat is Wrong with the "Dialectic" Theology? ' The Journal of 
Religion, X7, Nb. 2 (April 1935) pp. 127-145" Cf. E. A. Dowey, 
' Tillich, B'artlz, and the Criteria of Theology' , Theology Today, 
XP, N`o. l (April 1958) pp-43-58 
29For 
more details on the 'method of correlation', see 
Tillich, 'The Problem of Theological Method', The Journal of Re- 
ligion, XXVII, No. 1 (January 1947) pp. 16-26; Bernard M. Loomer, 
'Tillich's Theology of Correlation', The Journal of Religion, 
XXXVI, No. 3 (July 1956) pp. 150-156; Guyton B. Hammond, '00Exami- 
nation of Tillich's Method of Correlation', 
Journal of Bible and 
Religion, XXXII, No"3 (July 1964) pp. 248-251; and Jacob Taubes, 
'On the Nature of the Theological Method: Some Reflections on the 
Methodological Principles of Tillich'a Theology, ', The Journal of 
Religion, XXXIV, No. 1 (January 1954) pp. 12-25. 
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If the question-answer dialectic employed in 'correlation' re- 
quires that the answer contained in the revelatory event of Jesus 
as the Christ cannot be derived from the questions implied in 
human existence, it does acknowledge that man can receive that 
revelation and, moreover, express it according to the way he has 
asked for it. Thus the reception of the New Being is always con- 
ditioned by the 'old being', which is conquered and fulfilled by 
it. In this way, the philosophical-ontological form in which the 
question is put is ultimately related, and not alien, to the 
theological answer given in the Christian message. 
If christology is treated on the basis of this correla- 
tion, then the Christian theological answer to the existential 
question, if it is to be made intelligible to the modern mind, 
must be interpreted in terms of those conceptual idioms or uni- 
versal categories most appropriate to the form in which the ques- 
tion was asked. The Christian claim that a particular event in 
the past has universal significance, concerning and transforming 
the whole of being, must, in other words, be approached and de- 
fined 'ontologically'. Christology requires ontology, or, as 
Tillich himself puts it, the 'name "Jesus the Christ" implies an 
ontology', 
30 for otherwise the event itself would be irrelevant 
to those questions asked by the human situation and exposed by 
ontological investigation. If, then, Christianity's claim to 
universality is to be upheld, the historical event upon which 
this claim is based must be explained 
in such a way that those 
conditions which characterize 
'old being' are seen to be overcome 
with the appearance of 'New 
Being' in Jesus as the Christ. This 
20Biblical Reli ion and the Search for Ultimate Reality 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955) p. 76 
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event must be accepted as the ultimate manifestation of saving 
power in life and history, as the appearance of a 'new reality' 
or 'New Being', conquering those 'demonic' mechanisms which on- 
tological analysis has shown prevail in personal and social 
existence. 
This, of course, does not amount to an independent argu- 
meat for the historicity of Jesus. To call Jesus 'Christ' be- 
cause he is the bearer of New Being still presupposes his his- 
torical existence. Nor, indeed, was the 'method of correlation' 
constructed for this purpose; its aim is not to substantiate the 
truth of Christianity's historical claims in isolation from the 
biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ, which is still accepted 
as the basic source concerning the events upon which faith is 
founded. 'Correlation' seeks rather to express the truth of the 
kerygma - namely, that Jesus is actually the Christ - in terms 
which are at once meaningful and appropriate to the contemporary 
situation. As we have seen, ontology is accordingly employed, 
thereby determining both the form of the questions which theology 
must answer and the form of the theological answers to those 
questions implied in the human situation. 
It is precisely this ontological assessment of the his- 
torical significance of the Christ-event which makes Tillich's 
discussion of the New Being so vital to his argument for the 
actuality of the personal life of Jesus as the Christ. The answer 
given in Christian revelation must be ontologically appropriate to 
the ontological questions of existence, for only 
in this way can 
the dialectic of correlation be sustained. It follows, therefore, 
that the theological necessity of emphasizing the historicity of 
Jesus as the bearer of New Being 
depends upon the need to meet 
66. 
those requirements essential for transformation of the situation 
of 'old being', or rather, upon fulfilling those conditions which 
the situation stipulates are necessary for its own salvation. 
Ontology, in this sense, cannot prove the facticity of Jesus but 
it can demonstrate that the appearance of New Being, in an his- 
torical and personal form subject to the conditions of existence, 
is the only form in which an answer to the questions of existence 
could be given should that answer be possible. To this extent, 
ontology can show that the conjunction of an individual name, 
'Jesus', with the title, 'Christ', is only appropriate if the name 
refers to a personal, historical reality through and with whom the 
new state of things, the New Being, actually appeared. 
The force and scope of this quite specific use of ontology 
can be better appreciated if we now examine it as it practically 
applies to a particular biblical passage which itself seeks to 
express the theological importance of the historic event of Jesus 
as the Christ. Such a passage is 1 Corinthians 15: 45-49, con- 
taming as it does an interpretation of the doctrine of the Christ 
in terms of the historical manifestation of the Man from Above 
after Adam's fall. This is achieved, Tillich tells us, within the 
framework of Paul's mythological use of the three modes of time, 
here employed to exhibit the destiny of a divine being. There is 
`first the heavenly man who before his coming is spiritual and 
immortal; then the physical man, Adam, who is subject to death. and 
brought death into the world, is followed by the heavenly man who 
overcomes death '. 
31 These three temporal stages indicate, there- 
fore, Adam's state before the fall, Adam in the state of 'fallen- 
31RDI: 136 
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nesst, and the appearance of the Christ as the Second (or Last) 
Adam. Christ is a 'new creatures inaugurating a new age or new 
creation; and this idea Tillich directly compares with his own 
conception of Christ as the 'New Being', the one who, by restoring 
under the conditions of existence the relationship which existed 
between God and man prior to the fall, effects a transformation 
of existence as radical as the fall itself. 
32 
We have said that for eaoh of the three stages mentioned 
in 1 Corinthians Tillich's theology offers an ontological reformu- 
lation. The first stage, Adam before the fall, can be dealt with 
briefly. It may be distinguished in terms of a fundamental Chris- 
tiara concept, Esse qua esse bonum eat, which means, "Being as 
being is good", or in biblical mythological form: God saw every- 
thing that he had created, and behold it was good'. 
33 So here 
Tillich speaks of ' man's created goodness' or the 'goodness, of 
man's created nature'. 
34 Expressed in ontological terms, it is a 
state of 'essential being', 
35 
representing man in his essential 
nature, in unity with God. This is not, however, a stage of actual 
human development but rather a state of potentiality, without 
actualisation in any place- or time; as such, it can be known 
neither directly nor indirectly. 'Therefore it is inadequate to 
ask questions concerning Adam's state before the fall; for example, 
if he was mortal or immortal... The verb "was" presupposes actuali- 
32See ST, 2: 137. For a comparison between Tillich and 
Paul at this point, see also David Bill, 
IPaul's "Second Adam" and 
Tillich' s Chri stology' , Union 
Seminary Quarterly Review, XXI, No. l 
(November 1965) PP"13-25 
33' The Theological Significance of Existentialism and 
Psychoanalysis', TC: 118 
34ST, 1: 288 
35ST, 2s 38 
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sation in time'. 36 Consequently, Tillich prefers the psycho- 
logical analogy of the ' state of dreaming innocence' for the 
non-actualised, non-spatial and non-temporal character of the 
state of essential being. 37 'Dreaming' anticipates actuality. 
So, while reality is certainly different from the images of a 
dream, a correspondence yet remains between them in the sense 
that 'the actual is present in the potential in terms of anti- 
oipation'. 
38 
'Innocence' similarly illustrates that the state 
of essential being is one of non-actualised potentiality. It 
is characterized by the absence of experience, responsibility 
and guilt, which, when actualised, result in the loss of inno- 
cence. 
39 
By contrast, Tillich's analysis of the second stage must 
be examined at some length since, in his view, the particular 
nature of the human predicament, here presented by Adam in the 
state of fallen-nees, necessitates the personal and historical 
occurrence of the Christ as its only remedy. 
Tillich considers this stage in. terms of the basic onto- 
logical distinction between 'essence' and 'existence', which has 
dominated the whole of Western ontological thought. Tillich also 
maintains that the duality of essential and existential being is 
reflected in the Christian theological contrast between the 
36 ST., 1: 288 
3TST, 2: 38 
38Ibid. 
39Tillich 
cites the growth of a child's sexual conscious- 
neas as an example of innocence and its loss 
(See ST, 21 41). 
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'created' and the 'actual' world. 
40 
By asserting that existence 
is the fulfilment of God's creation, Christianity emphasizes the 
positive character of existence. The good, therefore, is not 
simply identified with the 'essential' since, in terms of creation 
through God, the created goodness of existent things derives from 
the essential structure of reality in which those things partici- 
pate. But theology does contend also that the 'actual' world has 
'fallen' from its created goodness, and does thereby acknowledge 
that split between the goodness of the 'created' world and the 
distorted existence of the 'actual' world which philosophy recog- 
nizes through its essence-existence distinction. If, therefore, 
'essential being' refers to the 'created' world (Adam before the 
fall), then 'existential being' refers to the distortion of 
'essential being' in the 'actual' world (Adam after the fall). 
Accordingly, the fall itself represents the 'transition from 
essence to existence', 
41 from man in his essential nature to man 
in existence. 
42 
The condition of fallen man, in which he is at odds with 
himself, the world and God, Tillich expounds initially in terms 
of the three 'marks' of estrangement: man in the totality of 
his being turns away from God ('unbelief') and elevates himself 
as the absolute centre of his world (hubris) in order that he 
might draw the whole of his world into himself 
('concupiscence' ). 43 
40STv 1: 226 
41ST, 2: 33 
42For 
a full discussion and history of the meaning of 
the term 'existence', see Tillich's essay 'Existential 
Philoso- 
phy: Its Historical Meaning', TC: 
76-111 
48 See ST, 2: 53-63 
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The existential situation is further characterized by the limi- 
tations of finitude: the anxiety of having to die, suffering, 
doubt and meaninglessness, temptation, despair and condemnation. 
44 
The fall itself represents, therefore, the transition from 
essential manhood to the existential estrangement of man in 
existence, wherein he is subject to the ambiguities, distortions 
and self-destructive structures of estrangement. But the fall is 
not, Tillich continues, a description of certain events which 
happened 'once upon a time' in the life of the first man, Adam. 
Neither Adam, nor human history as a whole, passed at a given 
moment from a state of essential being into a state of existential 
estrangement. The fall of Adam is rather a symbol for the human 
situation universally, and, as such, the meaning of the myth tran- 
scends the temporal setting of Adam's fall as it is narrated in 
the biblical story. 
45 It points to the fundamental condition of 
man, namely, that 'man as he exists is not what he essentially is 
and ought to be. He is estranged from his true being'. 
46 
'Estrangement', then, is a term describing the actual onto- 
logical state of existing man, and indicates that the split be- 
tween essential nature and actual existence is the basic reality 
of the human situation, a condition present in every living being 
and in every time. To exist, therefore, is to be estranged since 
the actual constitution of existence implies the transition from 
essence to existence. So 'creation and the Fall coincide in so 
far as there is no point in time and space in which created good- 
44See ST, 2: 77-90 
45So Tillich speaks of the phrase 'transition from essence 
to existence' as a 'half-way demythologisation' of 
the myth of the 
fall (ST, 2: 33). It removes the 'once upon a time' element but 
still contains a temporal element. 
46 ST, 2: 51 
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ness was actualised and had existence'. 
47 
Just as there was no 
paradise in the past, so there will be no utopia in the future. 
'Actualised creation and estranged existence are identical'. 
48 
As such, the transition is no isolated act but the universal 
state of man and his world. The state of estrangement is the 
only 'actual' state and it has never been otherwise. This is the 
transhistorical meaning of the fall, that which gives it 'univer- 
49 sal anthropological significance'. 
... the transition from essence to existence is a 
universal quality of finite being. It is not an 
event of the past; for it ontologically precedes 
everything that happens in time and space. It sets 
the conditions of spatial and temporal existence. 50 
This, and similar passages, 
51 
seem to suggest, to use 
William Rowe's words, that '"to exist as a man" and "to be es- 
tranged from one's essential nature" are either equivalent or the 
second is presupposed by the first'. 
52 The implication is that 
the process of actualisation of essence inevitably results in 
estrangement from essential being, for potentialities cannot be 
fully realized and essence is distorted in existence. The actuali- 
sation of that which is potential results in estrangement. To 
47 
ST, 2: 50 
48 Ibid. 
49 ST, 2: 33 
50 ST, 2: 42 
51See Tillich, 'Psychotherapy and a Christian Interpreta- 
tion of Human Nature', Review of Religion, XIII, No. 3 
(March 1949) 
where he writes on the fall: 'This almost unusable word points to 
a universal experience of mankind, namely, to man's split within 
himself, to his separation from and enmity toward other beings, 
and to the permanent threat of losing 
the ground and meaning of 
his life. The "Fall" is not an historical event; it is the per- 
manent and universal transition 
from innocence to guilt in every 
human being'. (Ibid., p. 265) 
52Religious Symbols and God (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1968) p. 
203 
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exist, therefore, is to stand out of one's essential being as in 
a' fall' . 
53 
And yet, despite such statements, Tillich argues also 
that estrangement is not simply the universal tragic destiny of 
all finite being; it is in addition the result of individual 
moral freedom. The transition from man in his essential nature 
to man estranged in existence is mediated, our author claims, by 
'finite freedom', of which man alone is the possessor. In this 
sense, man is responsible for his own predicament. 'It is 
finite freedom which makes possible the transition from essence 
to existence'. 
54 Man is free not only by virtue of the fact 
that he possesses creativity and the powers of deliberation and 
decision, but also because he has the power of contradicting 
himself and his essential nature. 
55 It is this final aspect of 
man's freedom which makes possible the transition of man as he 
was created to man as he actually is: 'Man is free even from 
53Tillich 
therefore avoids any Hegelian understanding of 
the dialectical expression of essence by existence. Man is in a 
state of estrangement from his essential nature. The way from 
essential to existential being is neither deductive nor logically 
necessary as it would be in essentialist ontology. By insisting 
that existence is 'estrangement and not reconciliation... de- 
humanisation and not the expression of essential humanity' (ST, 2: 
28), it is the existentialists in particular who have aided the 
rediscovery of the classical Christian interpretation of human 
existence as it is depicted in the myth of Genesis 1-3: that man 
is created good but falls into sinfulness. Tillich also distin- 
guishes between 'existential' and 'existentialist'. The former 
refers to an attitude of involvement, its opposite being detach- 
ment; the latter designates a philosophical school which 
is opposed 
to essentialist philosophy. (ST, 2: 29). Cf. CB: 
123-126 
54 ST, 2: 36 
55Tillich 
also defines freedom as 'that faculty of man by 
which he is able to determine his 
being through history'. 'Free- 
dom in the Period of Transformation', Freedom: Its Meaning, ed. 
Ruth N. Anshen (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940) p. 124 
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his freedom; that is, he can surrender his humanity'. 
56 
Even 
in the prior state of 'essential being' or 'dreaming innocence', 
of uncontested and undecided potentiality in which freedom and 
destiny are in harmony, man experienced the temptation to actu- 
alise his freedom. Even the state of Adam before the fall was 
charged with the possibility of tension and disruption, with the 
'desire to sin', or, as Tillich calls it, 'aroused freedom'* 
57 
In terms of the biblical account, this is illustrated by the 
divine injunction not to eat from the tree of knowledge. It 
presupposes a 'kind of split between creator and creature, a 
split which makes a command necessary, even if it is given only 
in order to test the obedience of the creature'. 
58 But when 
freedom is aroused, that is, when it becomes conscious of itself 
and tends to become actual, man is 'caught between the desire to 
actualise his freedom and the demand to preserve his dreaming 
innocence'. 59 Subjectively expressed, the dilemma is experienced 
as a double anxiety: 'the anxiety of losing himself by not actua- 
lising himself and his potentialities and the anxiety of losing 
himself by actualising himself and his potentialities ... The an- 
xiety of this situation is the state of temptation '. 
60 Man must, 
and does, decide for self-actualisation, or else he would cease to 
be; and this occasions the transition from essential being, and 
56,2: 36 
57ST, 2: 40 
S8Ibid. 
59Ibid. 
6O, 2: 41 
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entails the fall into sin. 
61 
We can see that Tillich wishes to characterize estrange- 
ment as both tragic, arising from destiny, and moral, arising 
from freedom. He agrees that this interpretation of the myth 
of the fall of Adam, with its ontological bias, is not directly 
biblical: there is no explicit ontological thought in biblical 
religion; but, conversely, (there is no symbol or no theologi- 
oal concept in it which does not have ontological implications'. 
62 
So it is with the story of Genesis 3. On the one hand, the myth 
of the fall emphasizes the tragic universality of existence, that 
estrangement is a condition of existence. The tragic element 
which involves the whole cosmos is not dismissed in the biblical 
story: 'the serpent represents the dynamic trends of nature; there 
is the magical character of the two trees, the rise of sexual con- 
saiousness, the curse over the heredity of Adam, the body of the 
woman, the animals and the land'. 
63 
On the other hand, the 
Genesis account, in the story of Adam freely choosing to disobey 
the divine prohibition not to eat of the fruit of the tree, 
stresses 'finite freedom' both as the compulsion and agent for 
61 
Cf. Tillich, The Nature of Man', Journal of Philosophy, 
XLIII, No. 25 (December 1946) p. 676. 'Theology, in dealing with 
man's nature as that of "finite freedom", shows that man's freedom 
drives him into a tragic estrangement from himself, from the other 
beings, and from the ultimate ground and meaning of his existence'. 
62 
5TH 2: 13 
63This leads to the important question of whether nature 
itself is implicated in the fall of man. Tillich rejects the 
idealistic separation of an innocent nature from guilty man, and 
justifies his claim to speak of a 'fallen world' by recent evo- 
lutionary theories and depth psychology 
(ST, 2: 47-48). He ad- 
mits, however, that Schelling's philosophy of nature was 
the de- 
terminative influence in the formation of this doctrine. See 
'Autobiographical Reflections', The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 4; 
and his doctoral dissertation, 
Die religionsgeschichtliche Kon- 
struktion in Schelli a positiver 
Philosophie ihre Voraussetz e 
und Prinzipien Breslau: 
H. Fleischmann, 1910 p. 133 
75. 
man's contradiction of his essential nature, thereby indicating 
that individual moral responsibility participates in the creation 
of the universal destiny of mankind. Existence, therefore, 'is 
rooted both in ethical freedom and in tragic destiny. If the 
one or the other side is denied, the human situation becomes in- 
comprehensible'. 
64 The transition from essence to existence is 
the work of finite freedom, but since it happens universally in 
everything finite it is a condition of existence that man is es- 
tranged. While freedom is not eliminated, it is always in bon- 
dage to destiny. This is the tragic burden of the human situation: 
'of man's freedom to contradict his essential nature, and of man's 
fate to stand under the servitude of this contradic tion'. 
6S This 
is the reason why, Tillich concludes, all ways of self-salvation 
must fail. The polarity of freedom and destiny means that 'no 
act within the context of existential estrangement can overcome 
existential estrangement'. 
66 He points to the failure of all 
legalistic, mystical, sacramental, doctrinal and emotional ways 
of self-salvation within the history of religion. 
67 It is a 
64 ST, 2: 43 
65RDI: 141. It should, however, be pointed out here that 
if, following Tillich, freedom is one of the basic elements 
in man's 
ontological structure, and if it is ontologically 
true that man is 
estranged, then the problem remains: 
how can the exercise of man's 
finite freedom responsibly decide whether to be estranged or not? 
In a similar vein, Reinhold Niebuhr 
has objected that Tillich's 
'ontological speculations' have subtly shifted 
the emphasis in the 
biblical paradox of freedom and fate upon 
'the fatefulness of sin 
rather than upon our responsibility'. 
'Biblical Thought and Onto- 
logical Speculation in Tillich's Theology', 
The Theology of Paul 
219. Cf. Eugene H. Peters, 'Tillich's 
Doctrine of 
Til---=' pý 
Essence, Existence, and the Christ', 
The Journal of Religion, XLIII, 
(October 1963) pp. 298-299 
66ST9 2: 91 
67ST, 2: 92-100 
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history of man's attempt to save himself and his failure to do 
so. All these efforts distort the way of salvation by identi- 
fying the saving power of the ultimate with human inadequacy 
and ambiguity, which are necessarily incapable of reuniting man 
and God or of healing the disruptions of man's state of estrange- 
ment. 
It is precisely in the attempt and failure of self- 
salvation that the universal need for a 'New Being' is recognised 
universally. The quest for New Being is universal 'because the 
human predicament and its ambiguous conquest are universal'. 
68 
This is true not only of every religion but of every autonomous 
culture; here, too, the utopian expectation of a new reality is 
present, one which would conquer and replace the old and estranged 
reality. 
We are thus led to the third stage to which 1 Corinthians 
refers, to the possibility of 'salvation'. This term, originally 
derived from the Latin salvus or salus meaning 'healed' or 'whole', 
alludes to the possibility of something, to a 'third', through 
which the cleavage between essential goodness and actual existence 
is overcome and healed. 
In this sense, healing means reuniting that which is 
estranged, giving a centre to what is split, over- 
coming the split between God and man, man and his 
world, man and himself. Out of this 
interpretation 
of salvation, the concept of the New Being 
has 
grown. Salvation is reclaiming from the old and 
transferring into the New Being. 
'Salvation', therefore, refers directly both to the split 
between essential and existential 
being and to that through which 
68ST, 2: 100 
69 ST, 2: 192 
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the split is overcome. This stage is characterized by the his- 
torical manifestation of the Man from Above after Adam's fall, 
by the appearance of the Christ as the Second or Last Adam, the 
one who, in Tillich's terminology, brings the New Being or new 
reality. The Christian message declares that Jesus is the Christ 
and so proclaims that such is the place in which New Being is 
manifest. It is the Christ who brings the New Being, who saves 
men from the 'old being', that is, from existential estrangement 
and its self-destructive consequences; and if, therefore, Chris- 
tianity calls Jesus as the Christ the 'New Being', it confesses 
that with him, at every moment, essential manhood appeared in 
existence and under its conditions without losing its essential 
character, thereby creating a new reality in existence which has 
the power to transform existence.? 
0 
Already we have here an indication of Tillich's view that 
any theologically viable conception of Jesus as the Christ being 
the bearer of New Being must include that of his actual histori- 
city. The confession that Jesus is the Christ must carry with it 
an admission that this particular individual was the New Being 
and that the being of Jesus, who is called `Christ', is intrinsi- 
cally that of New Being. It is significant that this emphasis is 
particularly apparent when Tillich seeks to maintain the Chalce- 
donian balance of humanity and deity within 'Jesus as the Christ', 
70The 
same idea may be expressed 
in different ways. The 
actual appearance of the New Being signifies 
the conquest of the 
situation 'under the law' 9 the 
law of 'man's essential being 
standing against his existence, commanding 
and judging it' (ST, 2: 
137). His appearance is also 
'realised eschatology... in so far 
as no other principle of 
fulfilment can be expected' (Ibid. 
). 
Lastly, it is the 'end of history' 
in the sense that 'nothing 
qualitatively new 
in the dimension of the ultimate can be produced 
by history which is not implicitly present 
in the New Being in 
Jesus as the Christ' 
(ST, 2: 138). 
78. 
for though the doctrine of the two natures used the 'wrong con- 
oeptual tools,, it raised the 'right question' : 
Any diminution of the human nature would deprive the Christ of his total participation in the conditions 
of existence. And any diminution of the divine nature 
would deprive the Christ of his total victory over 
existential estrangement. In both cases, he could not have created the New Being. His being would have been 
less than the New Being.? l 
So Tillich rejects as redundant the traditional and 
statio assertion that Jesus as the Christ is the personal unity 
of a divine and human nature, and replaces it with the concept of 
'Eternal God-Manhood', 72 which indicates in dynamic and relational 
terms that in Jesus the Christ the eternal unity of God and man 
has become historical reality. 
However, this emphasis upon the necessary subjection of 
Jesus as the Christ to existence is developed most fully in terms 
of the only all-embracing 'paradox' of Christianity, which Tillich 
defines as that which 'contradicts the doxa, the opinion which is 
based on the whole of ordinary human experience, including the 
empirical and the rational'. 
73 Paradox is not, therefore, ir- 
rational or absurd, neither is it reflectively or dialectically 
rational; but it is, in the literal meaning of the term, against 
man' a self-understanding and expectations. In the language of 
Corinthians, the paradox is the manifestation of the original, 
heavenly man as existential man, or, as Tillich translates it, it 
is the 'appearance of the New Being under the conditions of exis- 
tence, yet judging and conquering them' which 
is the paradox of 
the Christian message. 
74 The manifestation of New Being over- 
71ST, 2: 164 
72 5T, 2s 170 
73STv 2: 106 
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coming the contrast between essential and existential being is 
the paradox. It is New Being over against essence because it has 
actual reality; it is a fact, whereas essential being as such is 
potential and not actual. It is New Being over against existence 
because it is the appearance of what man essentially is under the 
structural forms of existence. Consequently, the 'newness' of 
the New Being, that which constitutes the paradox of the Chris- 
tian faith, requires an irreducible existential dimension within 
the event 'Jesus as the Christ', for those who call him 'Christ' 
must assert the paradox that 
he who is supposed to overcome existential estrangement 
must participate in it and its self-destructive conse- 
quences. This is the central story of the Gospel. Re- 
duced to its simplest form, it is the statement that 
the man Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ. 75 
He it was who, as an actual, concrete human being, disclosed in a 
unique, final and normative way what the essential relationship 
between God and man should be under the conditions of existence. 
Thus - to repeat - it is the man Jesus who in a paradoxical asser- 
tion is called the Christ. Without this paradox the New Being 
Would be an ideal and not a reality, and, as a result, incapable 
of conquering that existential estrangement which is the condition 
of existence itself. To this extent, the importance of the 'para- 
dox' lies in its 'factuality'. 
Two things are being said here. First, the New Being in 
Jesus as the Christ is above essential being 
because it is actual 
and not merely potential. Second, the 
New Being in Jesus as the 
Christ is above existential being because 
it brings essential man- 
hood into existence. The New Being is 
'new', therefore, in two 
75ST9 2: 112 
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respects: 'It is new in contrast to the merely potential charac- 
ter of essential being; and it is new over against the estranged 
character of existential being. It is actual, conquering the 
estrangement of actual existence ' .? 
6 It is clear that neither 
of these two statements could be made without presupposing the 
historicity of the New Being as it appears in an actual life sub- 
ject to the conditions of existence. New Being transcends essen- 
tial being because it is essential manhood in existence; it 
transcends existential being because it is the actualisation of 
essential being. Consequently, in so far as his essential being 
is taken into existence and actualised in it, the being of Jesus 
as the Christ is 'New Being'. The life of Jesus of Nazareth, in 
other words, transcends both essential and existential being be- 
cause in him the New Being has historical reality, because in 
him the New Being exists. 
Tillich is concerned to point out, then, that the New 
Being has appeared in a personal life. Indeed, it could not have 
been otherwise, for the only being who has 'finite freedom' is a 
person, and only `where existence is most radically existence - 
in him who is finite freedom - can existence be conquered'. 
77 The 
manifestation of New Being does not, therefore, destroy freedom as 
a basic element in man's ontological structure, but 
it does what 
freedom under the conditions of existence cannot 
do, namely, it 
reunites the estranged. Accordingly, the paradoxical character 
of 
the being of Jesus the Christ is that, while possessing 
freedom 
under the conditions of time and space, 
the state of potentiality 
or essentiality became actualised 
through finite freedom, and, 
76ST, 2: 137 (my emphasis) 
77 ST, 2: 139 
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moreover, actualised against existential disruption. 
It is important to note that it is in the light of this 
understanding of the paradox that, Tillich believes, the concepts 
'Incarnation' and 'Mediator' must be appreciated. The paradox of 
the Incarnation is not that God has literally become man but that 
'God is manifest in a personal life-process as a saving partici- 
pant in the human predicament'. 
78 
This avoids the polytheistic 
connotations of divine beings transmuted into natural objects or 
human beings, which, Tillich adds, even the idea of the 'Spiritual 
Man' or the 'Man from Above' cannot totally avoid. For this 
reason, Tillich prefers the term 'Incarnation' in the Johannine 
sense of the Logos becoming flesh since it signifies not an actual 
metamorphosis or transmutation but rather the self-manifestation 
of God in the concrete and personal life of the man Jesus. In a 
similar way, the 'Mediator' is not a third reality between God and 
man, but is rather the one who represents God to man within the 
situation of estrangement. 
He does not represent man to God but shows what God 
wants man to be. He represents to those who live 
under the conditions of existence what man essenti- 
ally is and therefore ought to be under these con- 
ditions... It is essential man who represents not 
only man to man but God to man; for essential man, 
by his very nature, represents God. He represents 
the original image of God embodied in man, but he 
does so under the conditions of estrangement between 
God and man. 79 
These remarks conclude Tillich's examination of the 
third 
and final stage to which 1 Corinthians refers. 
Throughout this 
analysis, it is clear that, whether 
discussing the classical 
'two natures' doctrine in terms of one 
individual life manifesting 
78 ST, 2: 110 
79ST, 2: 108 (my emphasis) 
the eternal unity between God and man or whether considering the 
concepts of 'Incarnation' and 'Mediator' in terms of the appea- 
rance of essential manhood in one historical and personal life, 
Tillich emphasizes consistently the basic christological require- 
ment that the New Being can only appear in an actual man within 
the area of estrangement. 
Such a view restricts the appearance of New Being to 
historical mankind. As we have seen, essential manhood can mani- 
fest itself within existence only in a human being (thereby being 
subject to the disruptive forces of estrangement), and as a 
personal life possessing 'finite freedom' (thereby being capable 
of contradicting its essential nature). In this respect, the 
assertion that Jesus as the Christ is the bearer of New Being is 
intelligible only in relation to the conquest of that disjunction 
between man's essential and existential nature which ontological 
investigation has shown to be the basis of the human condition. 
To this extent, therefore, the event 'Jesus as the Christ' is 
itself governed by the ontological relation between essence and 
existence, and, by the same token, interpreted in a way whereby 
those conditions, which analysis of the situation of 'old being' 
indicates are necessary for ontological healing to take place, are 
actually fulfilled. From this it follows that the 
title 'Christ' 
is appropriate to the man Jesus only 
if with him essential man- 
hood actually appeared in history, was subject 
to the destructive 
conditions prevalent in the human situation, and 
released the 
power to transform existence 
by actualising his essential nature 
without estranging himself either 
from himself, from others or 
from God. In other words, the distinctive 
theological interpre- 
tation of existence which the gospel offers, 
namely that existence 
82. 
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has been overcome in existence by the undistorted manifestation 
of essential being under existential conditions, is viable only 
in so far as it is based upon the belief that the split between 
what man actually is and ought to be is healed in the one his- 
torical man, Jesus of Nazareth; and Tillich is quite emphatic 
on this point: 
If theology ignores the fact to which the name Jesus of 
Nazareth points, it ignores the basic Christian asser- 
tion that Essential God-Manhood has appeared within 
existence and subjected itself to the conditions of 
existence without being conquered by them. If there 
was no personal life in which existential estrangement 
had been overcome, the New Being would have remained a 
quest and an expectation and would not be a reality in 
time and space. Only if existence is conquered in one 
point -a personal life, representing existence as a 
whole - is it conquered in principle, which means "in 
beginning and in power". This is the reason that 
Christian theology must insist on the actual fact to 
which the name Jesus of Nazareth refers. 80 
This, let it be stressed again, does not amount to a 
separate argument for the historicity of Jesus, independent, that 
is, of the biblical account of him; but in so far as Jesus is 
the Christ, he must bring a new state of things relevant to, and 
at least communicable in terms of, the ontological state of 
existing man. Any other interpretation would be alien to 
the 
modern situation and of no actual concern for us. 
It is in this 
way that Tillich's ontological assessment of 
the historical sig- 
nificance of the Christ-event is so 
important to the problem of 
the historical Jesus. For while Tillich's theological method 
certainly presupposes the historical 
impact of the Christ to 
which the kerygma testifies, 
his apologetic concern prevents an 
exposition of what is accepted 
in the kerygma without producing 
reasons why it should be regarded as 
either coherent or necessary. 
Consequently, Tillich's ontological analysis 
of the structures of 
80ST, 2: 113-114 
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'old being' does not mean that the historicity of the Christ as 
the bearer of 'New Being' is the product of a conceptually 
necessary Christ. His use of ontology neither seeks nor is able 
to demonstrate either that Jesus was in fact the Christ, or that 
such a revelation, as it is proclaimed in the kerygma, did 
actually occur. The existential question, exposed by ontological 
investigation and circumscribed by the split between essence and 
existence, is not the source or guarantor of the revelatory 
answer formulated by theology. 'One cannot derive', Tillich 
writes, 'the divine self-manifestation from an analysis of the 
human predicament'. 
81 But if, however, ontology cannot demon- 
strate that the answer has been given, the mutual dependence of 
question and answer in the dialectic of correlation does imply 
that the form of the question determines the form in which the 
answer would be given. It is on this basis that ontology, though 
providing no extra data to support the claim that New Being mani- 
fested itself in Jesus the, Christ, does provide powerful warrants 
for the historicity of such an event should it happen. For what 
ontology can do is demand that the Christ who overcomes and fulfils 
the conditions of existence must be an actual one. It is to this 
extent that the event 'Jesus as the Christ' conforms to a prior 
soteriological principle demanded by the question-answer of corre- 
lation: the bearer of New Being must be accorded the same degree of 
reality as the actual conditions: he is said 
to overcome. In this 
way, ontology can demonstrate that 
the interpretation of Jesus as 
the Christ is justified only in so far as it relates to an 
histori- 
cal occurrence which is at least commensurate 
with the title given 
81ST9 2: 14 
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to it. To put this another way: the conjunction of an individual 
name, IJesus ', with the title, 'Christ', is tenable only if that 
reality to which the name refers was an historical person, whose 
actual appearance was appropriate to the universal existential 
importance ascribed to him and signified by the title 'Christ'. 
This is the reason why Christian theology must emphasize first 
the actuality of a personal life within the event t Jesus as the 
Christ', in whom the New Being, the new state of things, actually 
appeared. 
II. The Biblical Witness to the New Being in Jesus as the 
Christ. 
We must conclude our discussion of the importance Tillich 
attaches to the facticity of the historical side of the Christian 
message - to the actual fact referred to by the name 'Jesus of 
Nazareth' - with an analysis of those features of the biblical 
picture of Jesus. as the Christ which, Tillich alleges, mark his 
character as that of essential manhood actually participating in 
the disruptive forces of existence while yet remaining unconquered 
by them. It is worth noticing from the outset that Tillich insists 
that 'Jesus as the Christ is the bearer of the New Being in the to- 
tality of his being, not in any special expressions of it'. 
82 So 
neither his words, deeds, sufferings, nor what is called his 
'inner 
life', make him the Christ, for underlying them all 
is the very 
being of the New Being. 'They are all expressions of 
the New Being, 
which is the quality of his being, and 
this, his being, precedes and 
transcends all its expressions'. 
83 The particulars of Jesus' life 
82 ST, 2: 139 
S31bid. 
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do not, therefore, offer deductive proof that his being was the 
New Being, but they do confirm him as such by witnessing to a life 
which contradicts the life of estrangement. 
In the course of our analysis of the concept 'New Being', 
we saw that Jesus as the Christ had to be subject completely to 
existence in order to overcome the estrangement of existence; and, 
Tillich maintains, the 'degree to which the biblical picture of 
Jesus, as the Christ stresses, his finitude is remarkable' . 
84 He 
has to die, and he is portrayed as experiencing the anxiety which 
accrues from the realization of this fact. He appears strange 
and homeless in his world; he is subject to bodily, social and 
mental insecurity, to loneliness, to uncertainty in judgment, 
risks of error, to the limits of power and the vicissitudes of 
life; above all, he feels that he has been abandoned by God. All 
these details belong to the description of the finitude of Jesus 
the Christ, and thereby express the reality of his participation 
in existence. 
85 But to these aspects of his actual finitude, it 
is necessary to add his involvement in the tragedy of human exis- 
tence and the ambiguity of tragic guilt. In so far as he made 
the Pharisees and the leaders of his nation inescapably guilty, 
Jesus was subject to the tragic element of guilt. Similarly, 
Jesus, in his relationship with Judas, is guilty to the extent 
that he is responsible for the guilt of the one who contributes 
to his own death. 
86 In these ways also, the biblical picture 
demonstrates the consequences for Jesus as the Christ which result 
through his tragic involvement in existence. 
84sT, 2: 150 
85ST, 2: 150-151 
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Besides these elements of finitude, the biblical picture 
stresses also the reality and seriousness of the temptations con- 
fronted by Jesus. Being finite freedom, Jesus the Christ en- 
countered possibility, and 'possibility is itself temptation'. 87 
The reality of the temptations, Tillich emphasizes, must be 
accepted seriously since without them Jesus would not represent 
the essential unity between God and man. But if this is acknow- 
ledged, our author continues, one is immediately presented with 
the problem of 'desire'. For example, in the discussion of the 
role of 'aroused freedom' in the transition from essence to 
existence, it was made clear that temptation is only serious 
because there is an antecedent desire towards that which has the 
power to tempt. 
88 
But if this is so, was there not estrangement 
even before the decision whether to give in to sin or not? In 
other Words, does not the emphasis upon the reality of Jesus' 
temptations equally include an acceptance of actual desire on his 
part, and a conclusion that Jesus, like all human beings, was es- 
tranged from God? Tillich resolves these difficulties by showing 
the difference between 'natural self-transcendence, which includes 
the desire for reunion with everything' and 'distorted concupis- 
cence, which does not want reunion with everything but the ex- 
ploitation of everything through power and pleasure'. 
89 Desire, 
therefore, is justifiable only when its object is unity with God. 
This was the desire of Jesus who resisted the sin of 'concupiscence' 
by rejecting the unlimited desire for food, knowledge and power. 
Through hia unbroken unity with God, Jesus resisted Satan's temp- 
87ST' 2: 146 
88 See above, p. 73" 
89sw 2: 147 
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tations. Jesus could have had the gifts of Satan, 'but it would 
have meant surrendering his messianic quality'. 
90 
The character of Jesus as the bearer of New Being is one, 
therefore, in which the conflict between the essential unity of 
God and man and man's existential estrangement is overcome. This 
has already been confirmed by Jesus' victory over 'concupiscence' 
in the biblical story of his rejection of the temptations. But 
it is also evident, Tillich claims, in Jesus' victory over the 
other two 'marks' of human estrangement: 'unbelief' and hubris. 
There are no traces of 'unbelief' for even 'in the extreme situ- 
ation of despair about his messianic work, he cries to his God 
who has forsaken him'. 
91 
Neither are there any traces of hubris 
for Jesus combines the acceptance of the title 'Christ' with the 
'acceptance of his violent death, including the warning to his 
disciples not to make his messianic function public'. 
92 'Point 
by point', 
93 
therefore, the biblical picture of Jesus as the 
Christ contradicts those marks of estrangement which Tillich 
elaborated in his analysis of man's existential predicament. 
94 
90 
ST, 2: 148. Tillich also deals with the problem of 
whether Jesus' rejection of his temptations was a matter of 
contingency. This idea is unacceptable, for if it were true 
'the salvation of mankind would be dependent on the contingent 
decision of an individual man' (ST, 2: 149). The argument for 
contingency does not take into account the polar relation of 
freedom and destiny. If Jesus' decision against Satan's 
tempta- 
tions was an act of finite freedom, then this 
freedom was a 
consequence of his destiny. The decision was 
both a result of 
free individual choice, and of the providence of God. 
In each 
case, the directing creativity of God 
is manifest. 
91ST, 2: 145 
92 Ibid. 
98 ST, 2: 144 
94, This', Tillich adds, 'is not surprising, since the 
analysis was partly 
dependent on the confrontation 
i Bof 
man'sthe 
existential predicament with 
the image of g 
Christ' (I bid. ). 
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In this way, the biblical account testifies to the fact that in 
the event of Jesus as the Christ, the New Being overcomes 'con- 
cupiscence', 'unbelief' and hubris. Jesus, who is called 'Christ', 
was sinless and good, but neither quality can be expressed in 
ethical terms; both are expressions of the New Being which over- 
comes estrangement. The life of Jesus as the Christ does not 
remove the negativities of finitude and anxiety, but accepts and 
transcends them in the power of union with God. The picture of 
the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is not, therefore, one of a 
divine automaton, for it portrays a personal life subject to 
temptation and struggle. The anxiety of having to die is not re- 
moved, neither is his experience of homelessness, insecurity or 
loneliness diminished; rather `he accepts the negativities of 
existence without removing them'. 
95 This is achieved by tran- 
scending them in the power of his unity with God; and this 'is the 
New Being as it appears in the biblical picture of Jesus as the 
Christ'* 
96 
The New Testament picture of the New Being in Jesus the 
Christ concentrates, therefore, upon two basic characteristics: his 
total participation in man's existential estrangement and his 
victory over that estrangement. These represent the two basic re- 
lations of the Christ to existence, and, according to 
Tillich, they 
are further expressed and confirmed by 
the two central symbols 
whereby the biblical narrative expresses 
the universal significance 
of the event 'Jesus as the Christ'. 
The subjection to existence is 
symbolized by the 'Cross of 
the Christ', and the conquest of exis- 
tence is symbolized by the 'Resurrection 
of the Christ'. Both are 
mutually interdependent, 
for the Cross is the Cross of 'the one who 
95ST, 2: 155 
96Ibid. 
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has conquered the death of existential estrangement', 
97 
and the 
Resurrection is the Resurrection of 'the one who, as the Christ, 
subjected himself to the death of existential estrangement'. 
98 
Significantly, and in view of this interdependence, Tillich main- 
tains that they both must be 'reality and symbol. In both cases 
something happened within existence. Otherwise the Christ would 
not have entered existence and could not have conquered it'. 
99 
The story of the Cross must be viewed, then, as the 'myth 
of the bearer of the new eon who suffers the death of a convict 
and slave under the powers of that old eon which he is to con- 
quer' . 
100 But this myth or symbol is based on fact, for 'without 
the factual element, the Christ would not have participated in 
existence and consequently not have been the Christ'. 
101 
However, 
it is impossible, and indeed unnecessary for faith to determine 
the actual nature of the historical reality beneath the often 
contradictory legendary reports of the Crucifixion, or to isolate 
the factual from the symbolic elements. All that is necessary for 
faith is the belief that Jesus was actually subject to the des- 
tractive consequences of existential estrangement. 
The only factual element in it having the immediate 
certainty of faith is the surrender of him who is 
97ST, 2s 176 
98ST, 2: 177 
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central symbols of the 'Cross' and 'Resurrection', 
For the ' Cross' 
Tillich points to the stories of Jesus' birth, 
his flight to Egypt, 
the threats against his life, the climactic events of 
Gethsemane, 
his death and burial; for the 'Resurrection', 
he points to the 
Virgin Birth, the transfiguration stories, the miracles, and the 
symbols of Ascension, the Second 
Coming and ultimate judgment. 
Both sets of subsidiary symbols signify respectively 
the subjection 
to, and conquest of, existence 
by Jesus the Christ. (See ST, 2: 
182-190). 
100Ibid. 
101ST, 2s 178 
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called the Christ to the ultimate consequences of existence, namely, death under the conditions of 
estrangement. Everything else is a matter of his- toriaal probability, elaborated out of legendary in- terpretation. 102 
The Resurrection must be viewed in the same way, that is, 
as fact and symbol, but with this qualitative difference: while 
the stories of the Cross probably point to an event which took 
place in the full light of historical observation, 'the stories 
of the Resurrection spread a veil of deep mystery over the event. 
The one is a highly probable fact; the other a mysterious ex- 
perienae of a few'. 
103 The idea of resurrection is a familiar 
one, and it was almost unavoidable that it should be applied to 
the Christ. Nevertheless, in the case of the disciples, it was a 
real experience which made it possible for them to apply this 
symbol of resurrection to Jesus and so acknowledge him definitely 
as the Christ. This experienced event brought the certainty 'that 
he who is the bringer of the new eon cannot finally have succumbed 
to the powers of the old eon'. 
104 It is this Iexperienoe' of the 
Resurrection Which, Tillich claims, is the decisive test of the 
Christ-character of Jesus of Nazareth. So, just as in the symbol 
of the Cross, a factual element is necessarily implied in the 
symbol of the Resurrection. 
Concerning the exact nature of this event and experience 
upon which the Resurrection symbol is based, Tillich examines I- 
three theories, all of which attempt to make the historical fact 
of Resurrection probable, and all of which are equally 
inadequate. 
105 
102 ST, 2s 178 
103ST, 2: 177 
104aZg 2: 178 
105The theories rejected are the 'physical', the 'spiritual' 
and the, 'psychological'. 
See ST, 2s 179-180 
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His own theory is what he calls the 'restitution theory' 0106 
This, he says, must be understood in terms of the negativity 
which is symbolized as having been overcome in the Resurrection 
stories: that is, not in terms of the death of an individual man, 
but in terms of the disappearance from present experience 'of him 
whose being was the New Being... and his consequent transition 
into the past except for the limits of memory'. 
107 
According to 
Tillich, the power of Jesus' being so impressed itself on the 
disciples as the power of the New Being that, following his death, 
they underwent an ecstatic experience in which 'the concrete pic- 
ture of Jesus of Nazareth became indissolubly united with the 
reality of the New Being'. 
108 
Thereafter, the disciples experi- 
enced the individual life of Jesus as the one which death itself 
was unable to push into the past but which is present wherever the 
New Being is present. 
This event happened first to some of his followers who 
had fled to Galilee in the hours of his execution; then 
to many others; then to Paul; then to all those who in 
every period experience his living presence here and now. 
This is the event. It has been interpreted through the 
symbol "Resurrection" which was readily available in the 
thought forms of that day. The combination of symbol 
and event is the central Christian symbol, the Resurrec- 
tion of the Christ. 109 
Tillich admits that his theory is only a probable one, 
but 
he maintains that it is most adequate to the facts and 
to the bib- 
lical accounts, particularly to the earliest source of 
1 Corinthians. 
It does not, therefore, have the certainty of 
faith. Faith can only 
106ST, 2: 178 
107ST, 2: 181 
108 Ibid. 
109Ibid. 
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provide 'the certainty that the picture of the Christ in the 
Gospels is a personal life in which the New Being has appeared 
in its fullness and that the death of Jesus of Nazareth was not 
able to separate the New Being from the picture of its bearer', 
110 
Reviewing this discussion of the biblical witness to the 
New Being in Jesus. as the Christ, it is evident again that Tillich. 
is careful to avoid the charge that here at least he is offering 
some kind of proof that Jesus was in fact the Christ because the 
biblical presentation of him testifies to a life which at every 
point contradicts the life of estrangement. In no way does he 
intend to depart from his thesis that any attempt to probe behind 
the kerygma for an historical proof of its truth misunderstands 
the nature both of the kerygma and of faith itself. The fact, 
therefore, that the biblical picture depicts Jesus the Christ as 
the one who overcomes the 'marks' of estrangement does not add up 
to an objectively demonstrable argument that his being was New 
Being or that with him essential manhood actually appeared in ex- 
istence, any more than, for example, the message of his resurrec- 
tion enables one to search behind that message to prove the histori- 
cal fact on which it is based. Easter, Tillich remarks, is not 
concerned with I ... the historical 
demonstration that once a man, 
Jesus of Nazareth, rose from the gravet. 
But if it is one thing to reject outright any critical- 
historical attempt to get behind the kerygma 
in order to provide 
110ST, 2= 182. The certainty which faith alone provides 
will be discussed at length 
in Chapter V. 
111'Ostern', Hannoverscher Kurier, LXXLX, Wo. 179 
(April 
1927) P-1- Quoted by A. J. McKelway, 
The S stematic Theology 17th, 
of Paul Tillich 
(Londons Lutterworth Press, 1964) p. 170 
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a legitimation for it, it appears, on Tillich' s. view of the bib- 
lical picture, quite another to insist, for example, that the 
Cross and the Resurrection do indeed refer to incidents which 
actually happened within existence. However hard it may be to 
distinguish the precise nature of these symbols apart from the 
confusing mythological and legendary interpretations to which 
they have been subject, Tillich still finds it necessary to say 
that they are based on facts. The reason for this is not diffi- 
cult to find: the kerygma, as the proclamation of the Crucifixion 
and Resurrection, could not of itself provide the criteria for 
overcoming existential estrangement. Existential ambiguity can 
only be overcome in the earthly existence of the personal life of 
him who is the bearer of the New Being. The statements faith 
makes concerning the person of Jesus, embodied in the kerygmatie 
presentation of him as the Christ, are meaningful, therefore, 
only if an essential correspondence is assumed between the b1bli- 
oal picture and the personal life to which it points. The symbols 
of Crucifixion and Resurrection are intelligible, then, only to 
the extent that there is a connection between them and the per- 
sonal life of Jesus of Nazareth, who did overcome existence in 
existence. This does not imply an attempt to get behind the 
kerygma, if by that is meant a search for objective facts which 
would substantiate the claim that Jesus was actually the Christ, 
but rather a desire to show that those terms employed to express 
his universal existential significance are viable only 
if they 
correspond to that reality which has come to expression 
in the 
kerygma. Christology interprets Jesus as the Christ, but this 
interpretation is meaningful only in the light of his personal 
life, not in abstraction from it. 
As Tillich writes: 'The reli- 
95. 
gious picture of the New Being in Jesus is a result of a new 
beings it represents the victory over existence which has taken 
place, and thus created the picture'. 
112 
However much it may relate to and answer the questions 
implied in the human situation, the biblical picture of the New 
Being in Jesus as, the Christ is not, therefore, a portrait of a 
life deducible from an analysis of the needs arising from man's 
existential predicament. The statements made by faith, such as 
'Jesus is the Christ' or 'Jesus is risen', are understandable 
from faith's point of view only in so far as they are intended 
to be statements about the man Jesus. Thus some actual corres- 
pondence must be presumed between the reality of Jesus and the 
biblical presentation of him as the Christ by faith. The 'in- 
terpretation' of the 'fact' of Jesus is constitutive of the 
kerygma, but if the difference between them is one of contra- 
diction, then the kerygma itself is self-contradictory. If, for 
example, as Tillich has pointed out, the idea of 'Resurrection' 
is a familiar one, employed independently of Jesus and even 
before his birth, then clearly of itself it could not provide 
kerygma. But equally, if the name 'Jesus' is not to become to- 
tally arbitrary or incidental, then some appropriate connection 
must be assumed between the reality signified by that name and 
the desire to interpret it in such terms. Speech about Jesus 
cannot arise from an encounter with abstract historical fact but 
only through an encounter with a situation actually qualified 
by 
the earthly Jesus. It is only through reference to this personal 
reality that kerygmatic statements, become intelligible as 
kerygma, 
112 jI: 146 (my emphases) 
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as the proclamation of God's act in the man Jesus of Nazareth. 
It is only as testimony to what is believed has aotually taken 
place in the historical Jesus that the necessity of kerygma can 
be explained at all. 
113 
113 For further remarks on Tillich's discussion of the 
Cross and Resurrection, see below pp. 108-110,151-152,215-216. 
CHAPTER III 
THE BIBLICAL PICTURE OF JESUS 
AS THE CHRIST 
In view of the preceding discussion of the factual side 
of the event 'Jesus as the Christ', the first thing that must be 
said about the interpretative side, the 'biblical picture of the 
Christ', is that it is in no way intended to replace the earthly 
Jesus. The New Testament portrait of the man who lived two 
thousand years ago cannot supplant the actual fact signified by 
the name 'Jesus'. To suppose otherwise would be to deny both the 
historical claims about Jesus which the kerygma, itself makes, and, 
more specifically, any kind of Incaarnational theology in the Chris- 
tian message. It would also render unintelligible the conjunction 
of name and title within the event 'Jesus as the Christ' since, 
Tillich argues, the actual historicity of the man called 'Christ' 
is presupposed in the meaning of the term by which he is thus des- 
cribed. As we have seen, the term 'Christ' implies, albeit para- 
doxically, that Essential God-Manhood (or essential manhood) has 
become historical God-Manhood through the Incarnation when it is 
applied to the man Jesus. Essential manhood can become actual 
only in existential man; and this is the irreducible humanistic 
element in the doctrine of the Incarnation, upon which the crea- 
tion of New Being depends. If, therefore, what constitutes the 
'newness' of the New Being is 'that it exists', or rather 
that it 
brings essential manhood into existence, 
then equally and by the 
same token, it is analytically true 
to say that its bearer exists. 
97 
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The statement that Jesus is the Christ because he is the bearer 
of the New Being is viable, then, only to the extent that the 
historical reality of Jesus is admitted. It is the earthly Jesus 
who initiates New Being, and the interpretation of him found in 
c the gospels recognizes and proclaims as much when it calls him 
'Christ'. 
A degree of independence must, therefore, be accorded the 
'fact' of Jesus over against the interpretation of him as the 
Christ for only in this way can the stimulus necessary for the 
actual emergence of the kerygma, itself be understood. It is the 
interpretation which must relate to Jesus if only because, by 
acknowledging him to be the Christ, the original disciples were 
confronted with, and recognized, a situation actually and only 
qualified by Jesus himself. The actuality of that upon which the 
biblical picture depends was an historical event which, the inter- 
pretation itself agrees, so changed the existential situation of 
men that the term 'Christ' was both warranted and appropriate. In 
other words, theological interpretation does not create the reality 
of the situation qualified by Jesus; rather, it is that situation 
which alone inspires the interpretation and is its criterion. The 
historical event of the appearance of the New Being, which Chris- 
tians assert took place in the man Jesus, is the prius of the 
interpretation of him as the Christ, and no emphasis upon the bib- 
lical picture can reverse this relationship. The kerygmatic pre- 
sentation of Jesus in the biblical picture of him as the Christ 
cannot, therefore, itself create New Being and thereby initiate the 
conquest of disruptive existence, if by that is meant that the pic- 
ture can overcome existence by portraying a life 
deduced from an 
appreciation or analysis of the existential condition of man. 
To 
repeat - the conquest of estrangement 
can occur only with the 
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appearance, in undistorted, personal and historical form, of 
essential being within the area of estrangement. It is the real- 
ity of this event which is the presupposition and criterion of 
all subsequent theological interpretations made of it. Sere, the 
interpretation does not create its subject but is created by it. 
I. Tillichs Critique of Rudolf Bultmann. 
In seeking to make clear this relationship between the 
interpretation and that which it interprets, Tillich makes some 
interesting criticisms of Rudolf Bültmann's discussion of the con- 
tinuity between the earthly Jesus and the Christ of the kerygma. 
This alone necessitates some mention of B: ultmann's thesis. But 
it is particularly instructive to compare their respective posi- 
tions for two other reasons. Not only does Tillich share with 
Thltmann certain common emphases in his approach to the problem 
of the historical Jesus and in his attempt to reduce historical 
risk; but, still more significant, his critical comments on Bult- 
mann go some way in clarifying still further his own analysis of 
the connection between the kerygma and the event it portrays. 
The moat obvious similarity between Tillich and Bultmann 
lies, of course, in their general acceptance that, given the dis- 
tinctive structure of the biblical sources, the validity of Chris- 
tian faith and preaching neither is nor could be dependent on a 
detached estimate of Jesus. The gospels do not provide detailed 
information about the life of Jesus, his character and inner devel- 
opment. What knowledge is to be gleaned from a critical study of 
the synoptic gospels is simply inadequate for a 
biographical recon- 
struction of Jesus' life. As Bultmann remarks, we cannot 
know, for 
example, how Jesus himself understood 
his approaching death once it 
is admitted that the Passion predictions 
in the synoptic tradition 
100. 
are all vaticinia ex eventu. 
1 
Both Bultmann and Tillich agree, 
then, that any attempt to base faith on a scientifically con- 
structed portrait of Jesus is methodologically impossible: hence 
Bultmann'a subsequent emphasis on the displacement of the histori- 
Jesus by the proclaimed Christ and Tilliah's insistence on the in- 
separable connection between the historical fact of Jesus and his 
reception as the Christ. 
Furthermore, to this we may add that while, broadly speak- 
ing, both men employ existentialist categories for the development 
of their respective christologies in particular and for the clari- 
fication of the Christian faith in general, they carefully stipu- 
late nevertheless that the substance of the gospel cannot be 
deduced from a philosophical doctrine of man. Bultmann, for 
instance, rejects any assumption that man can, by his own initia- 
Live and without the prior act of God, assume his own true nature 
o± 'authentic being'. It is here, Bultmann says, that the exis- 
tentialist philosophers part company with the New Testament by 
confusing $a theoretical possibility with an actual one'. 
2 They 
fail -to see, as the biblical writers do, that man has lost that 
actual possibility with the fall and is incapable of releasing 
himself from his fallen state. Consequently, fallen man can be 
liberated from the despair which accrues from this predicament 
only by the redemptive act of God in Jesus Christ and in the pro- 
clamation about him. 
1'The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus', 
The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christa Essays on the New 
Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. and ed. 
by C. E. Braaten and 
R. A. Harrisville Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1964) p. 23 
2, New Testament and Mythology', Kerygma and the A Theo- 
logical Debate, ed. K. W. Bartsch and trans. R. H. Fuller 
(2nd 
ed.; Londons S. P. C. K., 1964) p. 
29 
r 
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As we have already tried to show, Tillich would fully en- 
dorse this emphasis upon the unique act of God in Jesus the Christ 
as it is highlighted in terms of man's incapacity to realize his 
authentic nature by a deliberate resolve. 'Man', he writes, 'in 
relation to God, cannot do anything without him. He must receive 
in order to act. New being precedes new acting... Only a New Being 
can produce a new action'. 
3 
This betrays not only a similar con- 
cern to safeguard the distinctive revelatory character of the event 
of Christ, but equally an overall sympathy with Bultmann on the 
method of biblical interpretation to be used when discussing it. 
This is apparent not least in Tillich's desire to express, in those 
conceptual forms most adequate for an understanding of human experi- 
ence, the gospel writers' own original concern to embrace and 
communicate a new comprehension of existence; it is evident also in 
his corresponding attempt to go beyond a literal and largely out- 
moded appreciation of the christological language of the New Testa- 
ment. Thus Tillich does designate his purpose as being one of 'de- 
mythologising', if only in the sense that it is a 'fight against the 
literalistic distortion of symbols and myths. This is a necessary 
task of Christian theology. It keeps Christianity from falling into 
a wave of superstitious "objectivisations" of the holy'. 
4 
Accordingly, 
it is hardly surprising to find that Tillich attaches himself to the 
critical wing of the Theologie der Krisel of which, he agrees, 
Bult- 
3ST, 2: 92. See Ch. II, pp. 22-23 
4ST, 2: 176. Tillich agrees substantially with Bultmann's 
thesis regarding the mythological character of 
the biblical narra- 
tives. So he writes: 'Every literally understood myth 
is absurd, 
and therefore I stand completely on 
the side of the famous demytholo- 
gising programme of my colleague and 
friend, Rudolf Bultmann'. 'Das 
Neue Sein als Zentralbegriff einer christlichen 
Theologie', Eranos- 
Jahrbuch, XXIII (Zurich: Rhein, 1955) p. 
263. 
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mann is the outstanding representative. 
5 
And yet these basic and very real points of coincidence 
between Tillich and Bultmann should not blind us to the fact that, 
in the context of their discussions of the continuity between the 
activity of Jesus and the kerygma, one important difference per- 
sists throughout. This relates specifically to the status accor- 
ded the characteristics of the earthly Jesus as functionally 
necessary elements vital to an understanding of the kerygma, or, 
to put this another way, to the 'operative significance' possessed 
by the concrete being of Jesus of Nazareth for any coherent appre- 
ciation of the central revelatory event proclaimed by the gospels. 
Bultmann - to summarize his position briefly - maintains 
that the gospels perform the necessary function of affirming that 
the Christ, the heavenly Lord proclaimed by the church in the 
kerygma, was the earthly Jesus. They are concerned only with the 
'fact' of the historical appearance of Jesus, not with its histori- 
cal form, manner or content. What meets us in the kerygma is Jesus 
as the Christ, as God's eschatological act of salvation; and all 
that is necessary for Jesus to be understood in this way is that 
the fact of his appearance should be proclaimed. Nothing, therefore, 
of theological importance need be known except that Jesus was born, 
lived and was crucified and buried. Only the 'that-ness' 
(the Dass 
of Jesus is sufficient. Neither his character 
(the Wie nor the 
content of his teaching (the Was) are capable of recovery and 
necessary for faith. 
It is in relation to this theological devaluation of the 
importance of the historical 'form' of the earthly Jesus - 
for 
5See 'The Nature and the Significance of Existentialist 
Thought', Journal of Philosophy, LIII, TTo. 23 
(November 1956) pp. 
739-748" 
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which, Bultmann contends, there are Pauline and Johannine pre- 
cedents6 - that he develops his position. Faith's appropriation 
of the kerygma is not only independent of what historical research 
may discover, since 'detached historical inquiry cannot become 
aware of what God has wrought in Christ, that is, of the eschato- 
logical event'; 
7 it is also not even partially determined by a 
'reminiscent' historical account of what happened in the past. It 
is true that historically the first preachers of the gospel were 
dependent upon an actual knowledge of and personal acquaintance 
with Jesus of Nazareth; but this relation is not the form by which 
the New Testament proclaims Jesus as the Christ, 
8 for here 'the 
Christ of the kerygma has, as it were, displaced the historical 
Jesus and authoritatively addresses the hearer - every hearer'. 
9 
The true way of making the historical fact of Jesus present is not, 
in other words, achieved through historical reconstruction or re- 
collection, but through the proclamation of him as the incarnate, 
crucified and risen one. This means that the 'salvation-occurrence 
6For Paul, see particularly 'The Significance of the His- 
torical Jesus for the Theology of Paul', Faith and Understanding, 
ed. R. W. Funk and trans. L. P. Smith (London: S. C. M. Press, 1969) 
pp. 235-246. For John, see Theology of the New Testament, Vol. II, 
trans. K. Grobel (London: S. C. M. Press, 1955) p. 66. Here Bultmann 
writes that the author of the Fourth Gospel understands that Jesus 
'reveals nothing but that he is the Revealer. And that amounts to 
saying that it is he for whom the world is waiting, he who brings 
in his own person that for which all the longing of man yearns... 
John, that is, in his Gospel presents only the fact (das Dass) of 
the Revelation without describing its content 
(ihr Was)'. 
7Jesus Christ and Mythology (London: S. C. M. Press, 1960) 
p. 80 
8See 'New Testament and Mythology', p. S8 
9'The Primitive Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus', 
p. 30 
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continues to take place in the proclamation of the word. The 
J 
salvation-occurrence is eschatological occurrence just in this 
fact, that it does not become a fact of the past but constantly 
takes place anew in the present'. 
10 
The contemporaneity of the 
fact of Jesus does not lie, therefore, in the historical effects 
of his work or in what research may discover about him. Jesus, 
as John, Paul and the New Testament as a whole understand him, is 
not meant to be the 'historical Jesus'. 11 The early church was 
not interested either in the objective historicity of the 'fea- 
tures' of Jesus or indeed in simply continuing Jesus' teaching; it 
rather presented Jesus himself as God's decisive act for men. He 
is the 'Word' and he is encountered 'in the Word of preaching at 
any given time'. 
12 
It is in this sense that the 'Nord of the Chris- 
tian proclamation and the history which it communicates are one. 
While, therefore, it is correct to say that the signifi- 
cance of Jesus Christ for faith depends upon the kerygma which pro- 
claims him as God's eschatological act of salvation, this does not 
imply a denial of the continuity between Jesus and the kerygma -a 
continuity which indeed is affirmed by the very insistence upon the 
Dass rather than upon the Was of Jesus. The fact that the Christ 
of the kerygma has, to use Bultmann's terminology, crowded out the 
historical Jesus does not purposely eliminate the significance of 
10Theolýf the New Testament, Vol. I, trans. K. Grobel 
(London: S. C. M. Press, 1952) p. 302 
11 
This is true, therefore, even of the synoptic writers, for 
whom also the What of Jesus is secondary 
to the That. Even if they 
appear to bring us into historical contact with 
the historical Jesus 
'that is only when they are read 
in the light of the historical 
problems which have arisen since 
their day, not when they are read 
in their original sense'. 'A Reply to 
the Theses of J. Schniewind', 
Kerygma and Myth, Vol. I, p. 103. 
Cf. Theology of the New Testament, 
Vol. II, pp. 125-127 
12 E_y, trans. J. C. R. Grieg 
(London: S. C. M. Press, 1955) 
p. 288 
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the earthly Jesus, any more than it intentionally entails an ab- 
solute discontinuity between the preaching of Jesus and the kerygma 
of the early church. 'Faith', he writes, 'stresses the paradoxical 
identity of an historical event and the eschatological event. If 
the historical Jesus were eliminated, then the paradox would be 
destroyed and the kerygmatic Christ would be reduced to a mythologi- 
cal figure'. 
13 
In this sense, then, the actual 'What' and 'How' of 
the historical appearance of Jesus the Christ are not denied. What 
is repudiated is the assumption that the 'What' and the 'How', 
namely the specific characteristics of this event, have any christo- 
logical relevance, or that they contribute in any way to an under- 
standing of that event's revelatory character. 
Tillich admits that Bultmann's argument is an ingenious 
attempt to avoid the 'historically impossible, namely, to sketch a 
"life" or a Gestalt of Jesus'. 
14 It relies, he continues, upon 
making the 'words of Jesus' the historical foundation of the Chris- 
tian faith; and this, Tillich concludes, Bultmann does by treating 
them not as the 'teachings of Jesus' but as the 'message of Jesus'. 
15 
This second way in which historical research restricts itself to the 
words of Jesus is 
more profound than the first. It denies that the words 
of Jesus are general rules of human behaviour, that they 
are rules to which one has to subject one's self, or that 
they are universal and can therefore be abstracted from 
the situation in which they were spoken. Instead, they 
emphasise Jesus' message that the Kingdom of 
God is "at 
hand" and that those who want to enter 
it must decide for 
or against the Kingdom of God. 
These words of Jesus are 
not general rules but concrete demands-16 
13, Reply', The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. Charles 
W. 
Kegley (London: S. C. M. Press, 1966) p. 
260. (my emphasis) 
14 5TH 2: 122 
15Ib a., pp. 121-122 
16lbid., p. 122 
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Thus, as Tillich understands it, in Bultmann's approach 
one is faced not with the question whether to obey certain moral 
precepts laid down in the teachings of Jesus but rather with a 
demand for a decision for or against Jesus' message itself. By 
this means, Bultmann resolves the problem of the historical Jesus 
by using the 'immediately given', 
17 
that is, Jesus' message about 
the Kingdom of God and its conditions, and by identifying 'the 
meaning of Jesus with that of his message. He calls for a deci- 
sion, namely, the decision for God. And this decision includes 
the acceptance of the Cross, by his own acceptance of the Cross'. 
18 
But having given this brief resume of Bultmann's position, 
Tillich then proceeds to criticize it severely as follows: 
But even this method of restricted historical judgment 
cannot give a foundation to the Christian faith. It 
does not show how the requirement of deciding for the 
Kingdom of God can be fulfilled. The situation of 
having to decide remains one of being under the law. 
It does not transcend the Old Testament situation, the 
situation of the quest for the Christ. One could call 
this theology "existentialist liberalism" in contrast 
to the "legalist liberalism" of the first. But neither 
method can answer the question of wherein lies the 
power to obey the teachings of Jesus or to make the 
decision for the Kingdom of God. This these methods 
cannot do because the answer must come from a new re- 
ality, which, according to the Christian message, is 
the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. The Cross is the 
symbol of a gift before it is the symbol of a demand. 
But, if this is accepted, it is impossible to retreat 
from the being of the Christ to his words. The last 
avenue of the search for the historical Jesus is barred, 
and the failure of the attempt to give a foundation to 
the Christian faith through historical research becomes 
obvious. 19 
This argument is a variant of that type of criticism which, 
like that offered by Paul Althaus, Gdnther Bornkamm and others, 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ib ., pp. 122-123 
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points to the extreme formlessness or abstract character of the 
historical event of Jesus the Christ as Bultmann describes it. 
20 
Tillich is saying that the division Bultmann makes between the 
being of Jesus and his words, and his consequent one-sided in- 
sistence upon the revelatory event as eschatological occurrence, 
as a present actuality encountered through the proclaiming Word, 
cannot avoid, if taken in conjunction with his strictures con- 
cerning the historical worth of the biblical picture of Jesus, 
the replacement of the singular character of the event of Christ 
by what is presently actual and calls men to decision; it cannot 
preclude, therefore, the inevitable dissolution of the constitu- 
tive significance for faith of the actual reality possessed by 
the earthly Jesus in favour of those subjectively valid impres- 
sions 'immediately given' and received through an encounter with 
the Word of preaching. The continual danger of this approach, to 
which, Tillich believes, Bultmann succumbs, is that the assertions 
made by the kerygma thus remain unrelated to that concrete situ- 
ation which the event of Jesus as the Christ, identified as it is 
with the actual appearance of the New Being, radically and quali- 
tatively transformed; they become, in other words, detached from 
their historical source, from that which alone makes them possible 
and meaningful. In this respect, Tillich would agree with Walter 
Ktinneth that revelation 'is not merely "address" in actu, but also 
communication of a factum, the message of a completed event of 
20See Althaus, The So-called Kerygma and the Historical 
Jesus, trans. David Cairns (Edinburgh and London: 
Oliver and Boyd, 
1959) p. 46; Bornkamm, 'Mythos und Evangelium', 
Theologische Existenz 
heute, n. s. XXVI (1951) p. 18, quoted 
by Heinz Zahrnt, The Historical 
Jesus, trans. J. S. Bowden (London: Collins, 
1968) p. 89. Cf. also 
Hermann Diem, Dogmatic: Its Way between 
Historicism and Existential- 
ism, trans. Harold Knight (Edinburgh and 
London: Oliver and Boyd, 
1959) p. 90. 
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salvation, in the past'. 
21 
It is the New Being, then, the being of Jesus as the Christ, 
which must alone be the primary object of theological interest. It 
is tempting to say that this implies simply that Tillich agrees 
that the reception of Jesus as the Christ is viable only in the 
light of Jesus himself, only, that is, in the light of him whom the 
kerygma itself names as its criterion. To do this, however, would 
result in a dangerous over-simplification. For in view of what our 
author has already had to say about what must constitute the charac- 
teristics of New Being if it is to be recognized as such, and in 
view of the biblical portrayal of Jesus in a way in which such 
characteristics are met, Tillich clearly does not agree that the in- 
telligibility of christology depends upon the simple admission that 
the 'bare fact' (das Dass) of Jesus was determinative in the forma- 
tion of the primitive kerygma. 
22 
His discussion of the Cross is a 
case in point. 
2: 3 The Cross, whatever the historical circumstances 
may have been, is a symbol based on fact. On this, Bultmann concurs. 
For him also, the Cross is the central historical event which attests 
to the fact of Jesus' earthly existence; though still offered to us 
as an ever-present reality in the proclaiming Word, that Word itself, 
through which God now reveals himself in the Cross of the Christ as 
the God of forgiving grace, originated in a past historical event: 
the crucifixion of Jesus. 
24 But, Tillich argues, to accept that the 
21'Bultmann's Philosophy and the Reality of Salvation', 
Kerygma and History: A Symposium on the 
Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, 
trans. and ed. C. E. Braaten and R. 
A. Harrisville (Nashville, Tenn.: 
Abingdon Press, 1962) pp. 105-106 
22See Ch. II, pp. 29-42 
23See Ch. II, pp. 36-38 
24See 'New Testament and Mythology', pp. 35-38; Theology of 
the New Testament, Vol. I, pp. 
292-306. Cf. J. C. Weber, 'Jesus and 
the Kerygma in the Light of the 
Law and Gospel in Bultmann's Theology', 
Dialo , III, 
No. 3 (Autumn 1964) pp. 291-293 
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kerygma must presuppose the fact of the Cross of the Christ does 
not mean that the name of the crucified can be invoked apart from 
those concrete expressions or special qualities which compelled 
men in the first place to call the Cross the Cross of the Christ. 
For Tillich, the Cross of the Christ is the Cross of the bearer of 
the New Being who submitted himself to the destructive structures 
of old being. The Cross is the Cross of him who was actually sub- 
ject to, and conquered, the ambiguities of existence. This is en- 
tailed in the meaning of the title 'Christ'. That the Christ 
should exhibit characteristics which confirm his being as New Being 
is necessary to his soteriological function. The proclamation of 
the Cross is meaningful, therefore, only in relation to the per- 
sonal life of him who was crucified. It is not sufficient to say 
that this proclamation is the ground for overcoming existential 
estrangement, for the only ground is the presence of New Being in 
Jesus of Nazareth, mediated to us in the biblical picture of him as 
the Christ. If the kerygma as kerygma is to be intelligible, then 
Tillich insists upon a necessary connection between the biblical 
picture of Jesus as the Christ and the actual personal life to 
which it refers. 
While, then, it may be self-evident that the kerygma demands 
the historical Jesus as its presupposition, it is equally clear that 
Bultmann has not, in Tillich's opinion, defined the nature of the 
continuity which he seeks to uphold. The necessity 
for it may seem 
obvious, but it is by no means obvious what 
is meant by this. If, 
as Tillich has pointed out, Jesus 
is understood only as pure Dass, 
which thus gives the kerygma no concrete expression 
apart from a 
crucifixion which itself has 
become bare fact, and if, therefore, the 
assertion of a close relationship 
between the Easter kerygma and the 
crucified Jesus remains a 
totally abstract statement which receives 
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no specific content in the 'kerygma theology', then it is diffi- 
cult to see how Bultmann can speak intelligibly of this Dass at 
all, and how he can specify Jesus of Nazareth as the 'agent of 
God's presence and activity, the mediator of his reconciliation 
of the world unto himself'. 
25 
How can the Cross be preached and 
explained theologically as offering us a new understanding of our- 
selves and the possibility of 'authentic existence' if no reference 
is made to the character of Jesus' being as New Being, through 
which existence is qualitatively transformed? If the Cross is not 
viewed in intimate and comprehensive relation to that actual life 
of which it was the culmination, how can it be approached as a 
principle element in a new understanding of existence except through 
an arbitrary injunction to believe that here particularly God acted? 
Accordingly, Bultmann has not explained sufficiently why there must 
be a measure of continuity only between the fact of Jesus' Cross and 
the kerygma to the exclusion of equally important aspects of the 
biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ. 
Thus Bultmann is formally correct to say that the conjunction 
of name and title is constitutive of the kerygma, although this alone 
is unexceptionable and indeed, Tillich would argue, contrary to the 
theological meaning of 'Christ' if the title is predicated merely of 
an abstract historical fact. He is also right to say 
that the 
kerygma embodies the meaning of Jesus for the primitive 
Christian 
community, but wrong, Tillich contends, 
in maintaining that this 
meaning is in its substance independent of those events which 
the bib- 
lical picture itself portrays. Finally, 
Tillich similarly acknow- 
ledges the importance of warning against attempts to get 
behind the 
kerygma in order to provide some kind of 
legitimation for it as a 
25, New Testament and Mythology', p. 44 
111. 
focus of faith. But again, the need to emphasize the role and 
function of the historical Jesus vis-a-vis the kerygma depends 
not upon legitimatizing the kerygma prior to or even apart from 
faith, but upon maintaining the intelligibility and viability of 
the kerygma as kerygma: that is, as a particular interpretation 
of Jesus of Nazareth which ascribes to him ultimate existential 
significance, and which is occasioned not by the impact upon the 
first disciples of selected aspects of his life but by the im- 
pression made upon them by his person and work in its totality. 
Carrying this line of thought one stage further, we can 
see from this how surprisingly orthodox are Tillich's intentions 
throughout his discussion of the problem of the historical Jesus. 
Primarily he desires to retain the decisive relationship that 
Christianity has to its historical basis, and which, he believes, 
was jeapordized in Bultmann's theology. It is for this reason 
that he insists that the coherence of christological thinking 
depends substantially upon the extent to which it can express 
what has actually taken, place in Jesus the Christ. Thus the 
situation originally determined and qualified by the earthly man 
Jesus is necessary to any understanding of the kerygma 
itself and 
of the particular concrete form that kerygmatic statements possess. 
The unequivocal significance of the kerygma 
is not, therefore, 
that it contains and pictorially expresses certain ethical and 
religious principles derived from a particular view 
of reality, 
but that it reveals a special understanding of existence which 
is 
itself determined by the decisive appearance of 
New Being in the 
Christ, by what, in other terms, 
'came to expression' in the person 
of Jesus the Christ. The existential 
and ontological form by which 
Tillich seeks to reinterpret 
the meaning of this event for us 
is 
not, then, designed 
to reduce its historical character 
to the level 
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of philosophical abstraction or general truth. On the contrary, 
it is intended to expose the contemporary relevance of the event 
'Jesus as the Christ' which is otherwise obscured by the perplex- 
ing mythological and legendary elements that surround it. By this 
means it is possible to re-affirm today what was already the pre- 
supposition of the primitive kerygma, namely, that without the 
historical Jesus, and without the situation actually qualified by 
him, there could be no kerygma. No understanding of the kerygma, 
Whether it be the meaning of Jesus of Nazareth for the early 
Christian community expressed in substantially mythological lan- 
guage, or whether it be the proclamation of Jesus as the Christ 
here and now expressed by ontological concepts more relevant to 
contemporary existential conditions, is possible without taking 
into account the actual way in which Jesus originally impinged on 
the human situation. The title 'Christ' is appropriate to the name 
'Jesus' only if he to whom the name refers did actually exhibit a- 
life which, at every point, contradicted the 'marks' of estrange- 
ment while yet being subject to the ambiguous conditions of exis- 
tence. So, for example, stories, such as those dealing with Jesus' 
birth in Bethlehem, his flight to Egypt, the early threat to his 
life by the political powere, his agony at Gethsemane, confirm that 
the picture of the Christ found in the gospels is of a personal 
life, subject to existence, in which the New Being appeared. 
26 
II. Tillich and the 'Synoptic Jesus'. 
This mention of the biblical witness to the 
New Being in 
Jesus: as the Christ, to those features which mark 
Jesus' character 
as that of essential manhood participating 
in the disruptive forces 
of existence without being conquered 
by them, points us in another 
26ST, 2: 183 
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direction. What value does Tillich attribute to those biblical 
narratives which appear to attach most importance to the histori- 
cal details of Jesus' life and ministry? 
We remember that symptomatic of Bultmann's strong reaction 
against, any move towards the 'Jesus of history' is his apparent A, 4 
disinterest in the 'synoptic Jesus', in that gospel tradition 
which most particularly connects the claims made by Christianity 
With an historical reality, with the concrete historical form of 
Jesus' life. This depreciation in importance of those characteris- 
tics of the earthly Jesus recorded in the synoptic accounts has 
been seen already in Buitmann's general contention that the synop- 
tic writers were not in fact primarily concerned with the What of 
Jesus:.; but it became more evident with his isolation of the cruci- 
fixion from those events which led up to it in the career, words, 
and works of Jesus. By contrast, Tillich presents us with a 
different conception of the historical worth of the biblical pic- 
ture of Jesus as the Christ - as, indeed, one might expect from 
the previous comparison with Bultmann. Tillich rather begins with 
the basic assumption that, despite the undoubted complexities in- 
volved in biblical study, there is an underlying unity between all 
the books. All unite in asserting that Jesus is the Christ. 
27 ' This 
is necessarily so', he writes, 'because the New Testament is the 
book of the community whose foundation is the acceptance of Jesus as 
the Christ'. 28 For this reason, against the so-called liberal theo- 
logy, there is, he continues, no substantial difference between the 
message of Christ given in the Gospels and Epistles. What difference 
there is between the synoptic account and the remainder of the New 
Testament (including the Gospel of John) lies in the former giving 
2'ST, 2: 135 
28Ibid, 
p-156 
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'the picture on which the assertion that Jesus is the Christ is 
based, while the latter give the elaboration of this assertion 
and its implications for Christian thought and life' . 
29 
But this 
distinction is not exclusive for it is one of emphasis not sub- 
stance. In this sense, the 'New Testament witness is unanimous 
in its witness to Jesus as the Christ. This witness is the foun- 
dation of the Christian church'. 
30 
The New Testament is,, then, for Tillich the basic and 
original source for any knowledge of the New Being in Jesus as 
the Christ. It is this fact, coupled with his insistence upon a 
fundamental homogeneity of interest throughout the Gospels and 
Epistles, which explains why Tillich is not limited to the Gross 
of Christ in his appraisal of what constitutes the significant 
historical elements in the apostolic picture of Jesus. Quite the 
reverse in fact, for he rather assumes that christology is con- 
cerned with the whole Christ of the whole Bible, that is, with the 
New Testament presentation of Jesus in its entirety. Tillich, in 
his systematic treatment of the impact made by the biblical picture 
of Jesus as the bearer of New Being, does not proceed, therefore, 
on the basis of critical or exegetical distinctions between the 
various and contrasting ways in which the confession of Jesus as 
the Christ has been interpreted. 
31 He does not, in other words, view 
29Ibid. 
, p. 135 
30Ibid. 
31This does not imply that Tillich ignores the variety of 
' interpretations which exist in the biblical picture. The principle 
contrast mentioned by him is that between the synoptic emphasis on 
the participation of Jesus in the negativities of existence over 
against the Johannine emphasis on his victory over them. The other 
differences referred to are those between the kingdom-centred 
sayings of Jesus in the Synoptics and the Christ-centred nature of 
his sayings in John, and their varying interpretations of 
the way 
in which Jesus places himself in the eschatological 
framework (ST, 
2: 156-158). Tillich's point is that these divergencies do not in 
any way obstruct the impact made 
by the biblical picture of Jesus 
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the Pauline and Johannine interpretations as isolated and suffi- 
cient in themselves, any more than he can accept the possibility 
of a christology which takes no account of the historical bias 
evident in the synoptic accounts. If, for example, the Johannine 
tradition emphasizes that aspect of the biblical portrait which 
is concerned particularly with the 'victory of the New Being over 
the conditions of existence', 
32 
then the synoptic tradition is its 
concomitant; it focuses predominantly upon the 'participation of 
the New Being in the conditions of existence', 
33 
that is, upon the 
appearance of the New Being in historical reality, and thereby 
provides the second, and equally indispensable, aspect of the bib- 
lical picture of the Christ. We have seen before how Tillich in- 
corporates this, essentially synoptic, stress in his explication 
of the term 'essential manhood'. `hough dominated largely by Jo- 
hannine and Pauline concepts (Logos, Second Adam), his discussion 
nevertheless concluded with the biblical witness to those 'concrete 
details' which 'confirm' Jesus as the bearer of the New Being, as 
the one who brings essential manhood into existence. 
34 Though 
tempted, Jesus sins neither by unbelief, nor by hubris, nor by 
concupiscence; and though offering no deductive proof that the being 
for 'in all cases the substance is untouched. It shines through as 
the power of the New Being in a threefold colour: first and decisively, 
as the undisrupted unity of the centre of his being with 
God; second, 
as the serenity and majesty of him who preserves this unity against 
all the attacks coming from estranged existence; and, 
third, as the 
self-surrendering love which represents and actualises 
the divine love 
in taking the existential self-destruction upon himself. 
There is no 
passage in the Gospels - or, for that matter, 
in the Epistles - which 
takes away the power of this threefold manifestation of 
the New Being 
in the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ'. 
(Ibid., pp. 158-159) 
32ST, 2: 156 (my emphasis) 
33Ibid. (my emphasis) 
34 Ib., p. 144. See Ch. II, p. 32 
116. 
of Jesus was the New Being, such attributes do substantiate the 
act of revelation in Jesus in a way which can inform and struc- 
ture the pattern of faith. So Moody Smith writes: 
Tillich regards this kind of concretely historical (the Wie and the Was) portrayal to be theologically 
indispensable to the biblical picture and to Chris- tology, understood as the explication of the answer to the question of human existence. In Tillich's 
view the development from the earliest kerygma to 
Paul to the second-generation church, which pro- 
duced the synoptic as well as the Johannine gospels, is to be accepted, not uncritically, but neverthe- 
less in its totality, as a necessary movement in 
the right direction. Tillich therefore agrees with 
the "early catholic church" which set the gospels 
at the beginning of the canon in giving particular 
emphasis to the fundamental significance of the 
earthly Jesus-35 
Moody Smith makes one further point which should be 
mentioned here. The extent to which Tillich sees the primary sig- 
nificance of the biblical witness to Jesus as the Christ to be 
the conquest of estrangement within existence, in a personal life 
possessing finite freedom, is indicative also of the degree to 
which he has been influenced by the liberal picture of the histori- 
cal Jesus. 'Such a conception of the biblical picture of Jesus as 
the Christ', Smith says, 'which is so largely informed by the 
synoptic gospels, and particularly by a certain estimate of what is 
historical or at least representative of historical reality, would 
have been unlikely prior to the modern period. It is deeply in- 
debted to the modern effort to understand Jesus as a person and, 
therefore, to understand him historically'. 
36 This is quite true. 
Tillich's theological interest in the 'features' of Jesus' life and 
ministry as they are enumerated in the biblical picture 
does certain- 
ly, for instance, reflect the liberal predilection for the first 
351The Historical Jesus in Paul Tillich's Christology', The 
Journal of Religion, XLVI, No. 1, 
Part II (January 1966) p. 141 
36 I`., p. 140 
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three gospels. He agrees, of course, that, in the case of the 
liberals, such a preoccupation is too one-sided, and that criti- 
cisms may justifiably be levelled against the techniques and 
methods adopted by them for testing the reliability and authen- 
ticity of the synoptic evidence. But however correct these 
criticisms may be, the liberal emphasis does require that the 
concrete historical reality of Jesus cannot henceforth be a matter 
of indifference to the theologian since it is this which confronts 
him in the biblical witness to the New Being in Jesus the Christ. 
True, that Jesus died for us, was buried, and rose again is the 
decisive witness to the appearance of the New Being in him; and 
the Fourth Gospel and the Epistles provide us with the most impor- 
tart and elaborate treatments of its implications. But we are 
concerned with the 'synoptic Jesus' as well, with the realistic 
implications that the identification of the New Being in Jesus of 
Nazareth has for his life as a whole. In Tillich's theology, it is 
this insistence upon the concretely historical Jesus rather than 
upon his sheer historicity, the stress of the particular over 
against the abstract, which is essentially liberal in origin. 
this debt Tillich readily acknowledges: 
Smith says that I am very dependent on the liberal 
Christology of the nineteenth century. If this means 
dependence on its emphasis on the Synoptics and the 
human picture of Jesus he is right; but this emphasis 
is present in all mystical theology and in the per- 
sonal piety of Christians in all periods. 
Without it 
the Pauline-Johannine vision of the drama of salvation 
would be without a historical point of reference, or, 
more probably, it would never have come 
into lasting 
existence. 37 
And 
It is a definite misinterpretation of 
Tillich's thesis to 
say, then, that he is uninterested 
in the concrete historical 
: 37, Rejoinder' to D. Moody Smith, The Journal of Religion, 
XLVI, No. 1, Part II (January 1966) p. 
198 
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reality of Jesus the Christ as it is portrayed in the apostolic 
kerygmatic traditions. 38 The biblical picture of the Christ is 
that of a figure who actually lived in history. Though indepen- 
dent of any objective, methodological appraisal of those 'bare 
facts' about him which the synoptics particularly incorporate, 
nevertheless faith does depend on the figure of Jesus in as much 
as the primitive Christian community does receive him as a cardi- 
nal element not only in its message but also in the creation of 
it. The biblical picture of Jesus the Christ does not, therefore, 
deprive faith of its. historical basis since it is precisely this 
which is included in the kerygma as a fundamental constituent both 
of its formation and construction. Thus there is no other Christ 
than that inextricably linked to the man called 'Jesus', whose 
features the biblical witness presents. The Christian believer may 
not depend on the 'historical Jesus', the product of scientific re- 
construction; but he does rely, however, on the assertion that in 
the fullness of Jesus' life, and not in certain aspects of it, 
essential manhood appeared within the area of estrangement; he does 
require the historical Jesus Christ, Jesus as the Christ in actual 
fact. 'Jesus the Christ' is not, in other words, to be identified 
with the 'historical Jesus', if by that term we are denoting the 
attempt to establish the objective facts about Jesus; it refers. 
rather to the earthly Jesus as the object of faith and the content 
of the kerygma, to him whom the Christian community accepts as the 
38Some 
remarks by W. Norman Pittenger are relevant here. 
'Nor is it fair to say', he writes, 'that Tillich gives up the 
actual historicity of Jesus and is concerned only with 
the total 
"biblical Christ", or the Church's understanding of the meaning of 
that which is asserted in the New Testament about 
the significance 
of Jesus, and in terms of which the story of his 
historic exis- 
tence is conveyed. In fact, Tillich is in many ways 
(as he has 
said to me) a rather conservative 
New Testament scholar, and he 
believes that there is a more accurate portrayal of the man Jesus 
in the gospels than many extreme critics would allow'. 
See 'Paul 
Tillich as a Theologian: An Ap reciation', Anglican 
Theological 
Review XLIII, No. 3 (July 1961) p. 278. 
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bearer of the New Being. 
III. Historie and Geschichte. 
The distinction just mentioned, which hereafter determines 
Tillich's discussion of the biblical picture, depends largely on 
the difference that exists between the two German words for 'his- 
tort'', Historie and Geschichte, a difference which Tillich's tea- 
Cher, Martin Kahler, helped to reveal and Which Tillich himself 
absorbed in his semantic analysis of the term 'historical Jesus'. 
39 
Now, at this important stage in his argument, Tillich introduces it 
again and plays upon it with quite decisive effect. 
These two words have been interpreted into English in a 
variety of ways, but the most common, since Khhler normally employ- 
ed them in their adjectival form, is to translate historisch as 
'historical' and geschichtlich as 'historic' . 
40 By historisch 
Kähler meant the 'past-historical', the dead past established by an 
allegedly presuppositionless historiographical science. The word 
geschichtlich, on the other hand, he defines as follows: 
What is a truly "historic figure", that is, a person who 
has been influential in molding posterity, as measured by 
his contribution to history? Is it not the person who 
originates and bequeaths a permanent influence?... Thus, 
from a purely historical point of view the truly historic 
element in any great figure is the discernible personal 
influence which he exercises upon later generations. 41 
39See 
above, Ch. I, p. 52, n. 120. 
40This is the translation used by R. H. Fuller in Kerygma and 
Myth (see Vol. I, pp. xi-xii ). The terms touter history' and 'inner 
history' are adopted by H. Richard Niebuhr in The Meaning of Revela- 
tion (New York: Macmillan, 1962) pp. 62,76-77; and 'objective- 
historical' and 'existential-historical' by John Macquarrie in An 
Existentialist Theology (London: S. C. M. Press, 1955) pp"166,171. 
41The So-called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical 
Christ, trans. and ed. C. E. Braaten Philadelphias Fortress Press, 
i9 4 p. 63. Kähler's original essay, with the same title, was first 
published in 1892 (Leipzig: A. Deichert). A second edition of 1896 
added three other essays, only the first of which 
is included in the 
English translation. 
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It is this definition which leads Kahler to identify the 
'historic' Jesus with the 'biblical' Christ, for when we ask what 
decisive influence Jesus had upon posterity there can be only one 
answer: 'According to the Bible and church history it consisted in 
nothing else but the faith of his disciples, their conviction that 
in Jesus they had found the conqueror of guilt, sin, temptation, 
and death. From this one influence all others emanate; it is the 
criterion by which all the others stand or fall. This conviction 
of the disciples is summed up in the single affirmation, "Christ 
is Lord"'. 42 
The real presence of the 'historic' Jesus is, therefore, 
actualised only in the effect caused by him, namely, in the faith 
of the apostles. This is the first characteristic of Christ's 
permanent influence: the evocation of faith from his disciples. 
The second characteristic, however, is that this faith was 'con- 
fessed', a confession which brought the Church into being, and 
upon which the believer's faith even now depends. With this in 
mind, KM. hler can proceed to his famous assertion that the 'real 
Christ', the Christ who has exerted such an influence in history, 
'is the Christ who is preached'; 
43 
and the preached Christ is pre- 
cisely the Christ of faith. This means, in effect, that faith does 
not depend upon the bare report of historical facts, but rather 
that the foundation of the kerygma is the faith of, and initial 
proclamation of Jesus as the Christ by, the earliest 
Christian 
community. The event upon which the church 
is founded is this 
preaching and confession, and the only 
'historic' Christ is the 
Christ of this proclamation. It 
is for this reason that the signi- 
ficance of the biblical narratives about 
Jesus is not to be seen 
42Ibid., pp"62-64 (my emphasis) 
43 Ibid., p. 66 
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in the historical material contained in them; it resides in their 
testimony to the church's faith, or, to be more exact, in their 
witness to the earlies-t church's own witness to its faith in Jesus 
as the Christ. The sole avenue of approach to the 'historic' Jesus 
is, therefore, through the picture of the Christ preached by the 
church and given in the New Testament. There can be no access to 
the 'real Christ' which is not finally determined by the biblical 
kerygma. Thus, according to Kähler's thesis, there is, writes 
C. E. Braaten, 
no meaningful recourse to any purely objective facts 
about Jesus which discounts the living continuum of 
historical interpretation effected by him. 
Historical meaning is thus the key to an under- 
standing of the truth and reality of the historic 
figure of Jesus of Nazareth. This meaning has emerged 
in the consciousness of those who live in undisrupted 
historical continuity with the initial, creative, and 
personal thrust of Jesus Christ. All knowledge of 
Jesus, even that of his historical existence, is de- 
pendent upon those who remembered him for no other 
reason than that he acquired the meaning of Christ 
and Savior to them. 44 
K hler's contrast between der historische Jesus (the so. 
called focus of historical-critical research) and der geschichtliche, 
biblische Christus (the content of the kerygma and the object of 
faith) provides us with the clue to Tillich's understanding of the 
biblical picture. When Tillich speaks of the 'fact' of Jesus vis-a- 
vis the interpretation of him as the Christ, he uses the word in the 
quite specific Kählerian sense, and implies thereby a particular 
assessment of the relation between history and the kerygma. The 
kerygma is directly related to Geschichte, to an historically signi- 
ficant event which did, and still does, exert a creative force both 
in each individual's life of faith and in the life of 
the church as 
44, Martin Kahler on the Historic Biblical Christ' , The His- 
torical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christa Essays on the New Quest of 
the Historical Jesus, trans. and ed. C. E. Braaten and R. A. Harris- 
ville Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon 
Press, 1964) p. 97. Cf. D. L. Deegan, 
'Martin Kahler: Kerygma and Gos el History', Scottish Journal of 
ThBoloýXVI, No"1 (March 1963) pp. 50-67. 
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a whole; but it is not related to Historie, to a past-historical 
event which can be resuscitated by historical analysis of the gos- 
pel narratives. This implies that any attempted historical recon- 
struction of the Jesus of history is not simply methodologically 
impossible but also. theologically inappropriate. Tillich's argu- 
ment for the 'irrelevance' of the 'historical Jesus' (the product 
of research) for faith and christological doctrine is not, in 
consequence, derived solely from an awareness of the historical 
unreliability of the gospels and the high improbability of ever 
achieving an objective historical appreciation of Jesus - however 
important such factors may be; it arises, in addition, from the 
realization that what is 'historical' (historisch) in the gospels 
cannot be deduced apart from and prior to faith since the history 
the gospels relate is inherently 'historic' (geschichtlich) in 
character. So, far from depending upon objective evidence, the 
Christian faith is not even concerned with any picture other than 
that of Jesus as the Christ. It is not even partially determined 
by what can be scientifically demonstrated; its only interest is 
in the kerygmatic portrait of Jesus the Christ presented by the 
primitive Christian community of believers. The data of christology 
are not, therefore, historical facts as such but confessions of 
faith regarding them. 
The indispensability of the biblical narrative is thus main- 
tained in the following way. The Incarnation entails an event, 
the 
historical occurrence of which could have been photographed. 
This 
much we have seen in our discussion of 
the factual side of the 
Christ-event in the previous chapter. But no such photograph exists. 
All we have is a portrait, the 
'biblical picture of Jesus as the 
Christ', in which Jesus is regarded as 
the Christ, the Son of God, 
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the Logos. The acceptance and reception of Jesus as the Christ 
resulted in the collection of data about him, in which both the 
activity of the Jewish expectation of the Messiah and of receiving 
faith were manifest. Consequently, the picture we have before us 
of Jesus is one which presents Jesus as the Christ. 'Jesus as the 
Christ' is the assertion of faith, and this is the only picture we 
have of him. Christology is not, therefore, based on determinable 
empirical facts, for the New Testament writers were not interested 
in reporting merely factual data; this, indeed, was a secondary 
concern. They were interested only in transmitting a religiously 
significant picture of Jesus. 'The original picture which existed 
from the beginning', Tillich says, 'was of a numinous and inter- 
preted character, and it was this which proved to have the power 
to conquer existence ', 
45 
In other words, biblical criticism cannot effectually under- 
mine Christian faith because the empirical truth of Jesus cannot be 
distinguished apart from the faithful appropriation of that fact, 
in which the recipient is quite as important as the fact itself. 
In this respect, the relation of fact to interpretation is as 
follows: 
The Christian fact is not formally dismissed. Inter- 
pretation must be interpretation of some actual fact 
else it is not valid interpretation but illusion. 
Yet, functionally speaking, "the Christ" (the inter- 
pretation) becomes the foundation of Christian thought 
and devotion. 46 
We can express the point being made here 
in another way. 
Tillich's christology depends on upholding consistently the 
inter- 
dependence of the 'fact' of Jesus and his 'reception' as the 
Christ 
within the event 'Jesus as the Christ'. 
If this is done, then the 
C- 
45RDI: 145 
46R. C. Johnson, 'The Jesus of History and the Christian 
Faith', Theology Today, X, No. 2 
(July 1953) p. 1? 4 
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implications for the argument at hand are important. In the 
first place, it must be said that Jesus who is called the Christ 
was actually the Christ; in him New Being did really appear. 
Belief is not, therefore, based upon itself or a poetic creation 
but upon an objective, photographable, occurrence which is the 
presupposition of, and impulse behind, its own kerygmatic inter- 
pretation. Christianity depends upon the certainty that this 
isolated fact within time and space did actually happen. Such an 
emphasis upon a concrete historical fact does, of course, provide 
a common point of reference both for the believer and the historian: 
neither can remain indifferent to the central fact to which the 
Christian faith refers. However, in the second place, it must be 
said also that this identity does not mean that the relation that 
faith and historical science have to this fact is similarly identi- 
cal. In contrast to the conclusions reached by historical research, 
the statements of faith, though including references to an histori- 
cal fact, are nevertheless uniformly assertions of faith; they are 
assertions, that is, reached only by faith and not by historical 
observation. Accordingly, so Tillich's argument runs, the 'factual' 
side of the Christ-event is always maintained conjointly with the 
'receiving' side; and, in consequence, it must be admitted that 
there can be no critical assessment of Jesus' significance which is 
independent of the way faith itself interprets him. Thus, for 
example, there can be no objective appraisal of the historical 
appropriateness of the interpretation to the earthly 
Jesus, if by 
that is implied a separation of the historical from the 
interpreted 
elements within the event 'Jesus as the Christ', since, 
indeed, 
2 
Jesus is equally the Christ because he is the Christ 
for the believer. 
The relation of fact to interpretation within the 
Christ- 
event therefore supports two claims: 
first, that Jesus is the Christ 
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for the believer who receives him as the Christ because he actu- 
ally and historically was the Christ; and second, that Jesus is 
also the Christ because he is the Christ for the believer who 
receives him as, the Christ. The mutual relatedness of these two 
assertions, which reflects the necessary association of the two 
elements which determine the structure of the central Christian 
event, explains why Christ is not merely 'the head of the Church, 
47 
but why he and his church are 'necessarily interdependent' 48 for 
without the believing reception of Jesus as the Christ, Jesus could 
not have been the Christ 'even if he had claimed to be the 
Christ' ; 
49 it illustrates, moreover, why the New Testament, the 
original and basic witness to the Christ of the preached message of 
the disciples, is itself 
an integral part of the event which it documents. The 
New Testament represents the receptive side of that 
event and provides, as such, a witness to the factual 
side. If this is true, one can say that the New Testa- 
ment as a whole is the basic document of the event upon 
which the Christian faith rests. 50 
Jesus the Christ as the ground of faith cannot, therefore, 
be segregated from the biblical witness to him, just as no histori- 
cal fact can be disconnected from the sources through which it is 
known. This is the sense in which the biblical picture provides 
the functional basis of Christian thought. This basis is not a 
projection of faith, an imagined portrait produoed by a handful of 
Jews. Rather, the kerygmatio presentation by the New Testament of 
Jesus as the Christ is itself founded upon the reality of the 'his- 
torie' Jesus, that is, the significance which faith ascribes to him, 
and t. o which the Bible bears witness, corresponds to the actual sig- 
47ST9 2: 114 
481bid. 
491b id. 
5OIbid. 
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nificaanoe of the being of the earthly Jesus. Fact and interpre- 
tation are thus inseparable; name and title are likewise strictly 
complementary. 
But these conjunctions themselves imply that no knowledge 
of 'Jesus as he actually was' can independently provide a basis 
for a knowledge of him as the Christ; they endorse the conclusion 
that there can be no interest in Jesus himself which is distinguish- 
able apart from faith's own perception and acceptance of Jesus as 
the, Christ; and they complete the argument that the statements of 
faith regarding Jesus are attained only in connection with faith's 
own testimony in the kerygmatic acounts of him. These are the rea- 
sons why the appearance of the Christ, to which the New Testament 
bears witness, remains and will continue to remain unknowable in any 
scientific sense, and why the implications that the photographable 
nature of this event has for historical enquiry are reduced to unim- 
portance and irrelevance. There can be no successful attempt to go 
beyond the biblical presentation of Jesus in order to supplement the 
religious picture with a photographic picture since, indeed, it is 
the presupposition of faith that the historian's Jesus is not the 
Christ of faith. It is the a priori of faith that Jesus, whom faith 
receives as the Christ, can be known as the Christ only by faith. 
Tillich fully endorses this understanding of his position. 
First, it realizes the implications of the two-fold semantic 
distinction which Tillich made within the term 'historical Jesus'. 
If the factual character of the event 'Jesus as the Christ' is 
presented only within a situation of faith 
(which 'Jesus as the 
Christ' constitutes) then in this sense the question of 
faith is 
raised without reference to biblical criticism. 
Second, the 
coincidence of fact and faith within 
the biblical picture precludes 
historical research from finding the historical 
Jesus because in 
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order to do this research would have to separate two elements 
which are, however, inseparable, namely, the factual from the 
receiving side of the event 'Jesus as the Christ'. Consequently, 
the failure of the 'quest' is not a matter of the preliminary 
shortcomings of biblical research, which could, perhaps, be rec- 
tified at a later date, but is 'caused by the nature of the 
sources itself'. 
51 Third, the essentially interpretative charac- 
ter of the biblical narratives does not imply the dissolution of 
the factual-historical element in the gospels for 'if the factual 
element in the Christian event were denied, the foundation of 
Christianity would be denied'. 
52 This can only mean that a con- 
fessional statement, such as 'Thou art the Christ', must be 
grounded in the factuality of Jesus' earthly existence; and to be 
sceptical of the work of biblical research is not to deny this 
element, for the event 'Jesus as the Christ' would, as we have 
seen, be nothing without it. 
Bearing these points in mind, it is hardly difficult to 
see the constitutive significance the biblical picture has for the 
Christian faith. It is not that through the picture we can know 
Jesus' personality, inner development and the course of his life; 
nor is it that an emphasis is placed on Jesus' consciousness of 
being the bearer of the Word of God to call men to decision in the 
last hour. It is seen rather in Tillich's stress on the mode 
whereby the fact of Jesus is apprehended. 'Jesus is 
the Christ' is 
a kerygmatic proclamation which has meaning only within a 
faith 
encounter-situation. From this, Tillich can 
develop his thesis that 
the historical-critical effort to discover the historical Jesus is 
of little concern for faith because 
from the beginning 'the basis 
51Ib d., p. 118 
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of faith was a certain fruitful confluence of fact and mode of 
appropriation of fact - interpretation, and appropriative appreoi- 
ation' . 
53 As we have seen, this- argument for safeguarding the 
Christian faith from being determined by historical criticism is 
the outcome of the basic semantic distinction drawn by Tillich 
within the term 'historical Jesus'. The only valid meaning of the 
term is that there is a factual element within the event 'Jesus 
the Christ'. However, in view of the distinction between the 'his- 
torical Jesus' of biblical research and the 'biblical picture of 
Jesus as the Christ'. Tillich can conclude that the presence of 
this factual element does not raise the question of historical re- 
search for the only 'historical Jesus' that exists is found within 
the biblical picture. This picture was formed in the situation of 
faith, and, as such, effectually precludes historical investigation 
from undermining that factual element which faith receives and to 
which faith responds. Behind the actual appearance of that reality 
Which has created faith undoubtedly lie episodes and situations 
which the historian will be determined to recover; but, from the 
viewpoint just described, such attempts, however important they may 
be, are, in the final analysis, irrelevant for Christian faith and 
devotion. 
IV. Appendix: The thesis of Thomas M. Dicken. 
At this juncture, it should be said that this assessment we 
have offered of Tillich' s discussion of the relation between ' fact' 
and 'interpretation' within the biblical picture does not remain 
unchallenged. In several important Ways, it 
differs from an 
53 R. E. Cushman, 'The Christology of Paul Tillich', The 
Awri ta-^e of Christian Thought: Essays 
in Honor of Robert Lowry 
Calhoun ed. R. E. 
Row, 1965) p. 176 
Cushman and E. Grislis (New Yorks Harper and 
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alternative view offered by Thomas M. Dicken; 54 and, before con- 
cluding this chapter, it is necessary to make some mention of it. 
Dicken is similarly concerned with discovering precisely 
where Tillich locates the saving event of Christianity. 'Exactly 
where', he asks, 'in Tillich's terminology, is the locus of the 
'SS New Being. He begins by pointing out that the usual conclu- 
lion reached by Tillich's interpreters lies with one of two 
alternatives, both of which correspond to the factual and receptive 
sides of the event 'Jesus as the Christ'. In the first alternative, 
the essence of the Christian claim for Tillich, it is held, is an 
historical assertion about Jesus of Nazareth: 'it is not enough 
that Jesus is called the Christ - he must actually be the Christ ', 
56 
In the second alternative, the 'New Being is actualized not in Jesus 
of Nazareth, about whom we can know nothing with certainty, but 
rather in the faith of the Church which we know immediately'. 
57 
We arrive again, therefore, at the familiar question asked 
of Tillich: Is the gospel located in Jesus as the Christ, or is it 
localized in the Church and its faith? Dicken believes that the 
two directions which are normally taken by commentators, and which 
are reflected in the very juxtaposition of such questions, miss an 
important element in Tillich's presentation which, if realized, 
would in fact obviate many of the difficulties which otherwise 
arise from them. 
Our thesis can be stated very simply. For Tillich, the 
New Being, the event on which Christianity 
is based, is 
"the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ". 
The 
phrase "the biblical picture" must 
be emphasized, because 
54'The Biblical Picture of Jesus as the Christ in, Tillich's 
Theology', The Journal of Religious Thought, 
XXV, No. 1 (1968-1969) 
pp. 27-41 
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the importance of this phrase is precisely what has been 
neglected by Tillich's critics. The biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ has an ontic status which is not re- ducible to either Jesus of Nazareth or the faith of the Church. In other words, "the biblical picture of Jesus 
as the Christ" is not identical with "Jesus as the Christ", though there is a natural tendency to telescope the phrase in this way, and Tillich's critics have tended to do so. The saving event, the New Being, is the biblical picture 
per se, not Jesus of Nazareth or the Church. The bibli- 
cal picture is the unity which has been created by fact 
and reception, by Jesus of Nazareth and the faithful re- 
sponse of his disciples. But it is not reducible to 
either of these. 58 
Only two points made by Dicken are of immediate concern for 
us. First, he maintains that even if Tillich does admit that it was 
the 'biblical picture' which created the Church, he would not deny 
that in some sense the early Church created the New Testament. From 
this, Dicken derives his significant conclusion. 'So we must suggest', 
he writes, 'that Tillich's meaning is that the "picture of Jesus as 
the Christ" created the Church, which in turn embodied this picture 
in the "biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ". Christianity was 
born with the picture of Jesus as the Christ, presumably at the time 
of Peter's confession'. 
59 Taking this as an axiom of Tillich's 
thesis, Dicken proceeds to his second point: it is the 'biblical 
picture' itself which is the Christian saving event. 'If the bibli- 
cal picture of Jesus as the Christ is the event on which Christi- 
anity is based, then the biblical picture must 
itself be the locus 
of the Incarnation ,. 
60 The suggestion is, then, that while Tillich 
makes no kind of historical claim that existential estrangement was 
actually overcome in Jesus of Nazareth, he 
does agree that it is the 
biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ which 
itself conquers the 
58Ibid., 
p. 30 
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negativi ties of existence. 
61 It is only according to the bibli- 
cal picture of Jesus that we find no traces of unbelief, hubris 
or concupiscence in him; and this emphasis is not simply fortui- 
tous since it is only in the biblical picture that New Being is 
manifest. This, Dicken argues, is exactly what Tillich means 
when he says that the 'paradox of the Incarnation is the picture 
of Jesus as the Christ, the picture of essential Godmanhood 
appearing in existence and under its conditions'. 
62 
Perhaps the most direct way of assessing the validity of 
Dicken's analysis is to consider immediately the question whether 
Tillich would agree that the biblical picture possesses a norma- 
tive value for the Christian faith. Initially, his answer appears 
to be quite precise and straightforward: the biblical picture 
presented in the New Testament depicts a two-sided event, the 
actuality of which is the basis of Christianity. 
63 Expressed 
another way, the value of this picture for Christian belief may be 
said to consist in the fact that it portrays the founding of Chris- 
tianity, that is, the moment when Jesus the Christ was received as 
the Christ. As it stands, of course, this reply is misleading, for 
Tillich is here making no suggestion that the picture chronicles 
the history of Christianity's origin. While, therefore, his very 
use of the word 'picture' may indeed presuppose some 
intimate re- 
lationship between the actual Christ-event and its biblical por- 
trayal, recognition of this alone neither could nor 
does sanction 
any search for the objective facts about 
Jesus through scientific 
or historiographic analysis of those 
factual elements which, Tillich 
611bid., 
p. 31 
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admits, the biblical picture contains. We have 
is precluded by the dual character of the event 
entails that no uninterpreted facts relating to 
cernible apart from the way in which he was ori, 
by the disciples. The biblical picture is not, 
cal document, interested only in recounting the 
seen that this 
itself, which 
Jesus are dis- 
ginally accepted 
then, an histori- 
story of a 
uniquely interesting person; it is rather, both in presupposition 
and intention, a 'confessional' portrait, giving the picture of 
him who is the Christ, the one who, accordingly, has a universal 
significance not explicable simply in terms of his own factuality. 
The Christian faith is concerned, therefore, with Jesus 
as he is kerygmatically portrayed by the early Christian community 
of believers; it has no interest in any picture of Jesus other 
than the biblical picture of him as the Christ; it refers only to 
that picture created by, and mediating, the faith of the primitive 
Christian community when receiving Jesus as the Christ. If, then, 
the viability of the Christian position depends upon the actuality 
of the event 'Jesus as the Christ', and if the knowledge we have of 
it is derived basically from its biblical source, then clearly the 
biblical witness to the impression made by Jesus upon the 
first 
disciples is immediately endowed with a certain and quite unimpeach- 
able epistemological significance 
for the believer. 
Tillich's meaning appears to be this: for those not con- 
temporaries of the event, Jesus as the Christ 
is encountered through 
the biblical picture's witness to the original encounter 
between 
Jesus and his apostles; and 
it is in this sense that the New Testa- 
ment becomes part of the revelation 
it records, belonging to the 
substance of the event 
itself. As the only available account of 
that event in which Jesus was accepted 
as the Christ, the biblical 
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picture of him in the New Testament properly belongs, therefore, 
to the receiving side of that event itself, and witnesses to its 
factual side. 
64 
For this reason, it is not merely that nothing 
could be known about the original event if it were not for its 
mediation through the picture created by those who were them- 
selves involved in the event they describe; it is rather that, 
apart from this transmission of the first disciples' experience 
of accepting Jesus as the Christ, no event would exist to be 
known by those not eye-witnesses of its actual occurrence. The 
biblical picture, to conclude, originates with an event; but for 
those not contemporaneous with it, this event becomes significant, 
that is, becomes the event Christians assert it is, only through 
the significance ascribed to it in the biblical picture. 
Tillich's evaluation of the biblical picture's role in 
conveying to us the original awareness of Jesus as the Christ un- 
doubtedly does invest it with a normative authority for the faith 
of each individual Christian. The kerygmatic portrayal of Jesus 
in the New Testament is both the creation of and witness to his 
first reception as the Christ by the early Christian community; 
as such, it is the cause for the continuation and eventual accep- 
tance of this particular interpretation of Jesus through and by 
succeeding generations of Christian believers. The only percep- 
tible 'fact' of the Christ-event is the interpretation made of it 
in its apostolic proclamation in the biblical picture; and 
it is 
in this sense alone that the picture may be appropriately con- 
sidered as the foundation of Christian belief. 
But the question now is whether Tillich is implying 
by 
this that the picture is the saving event, the New Being. 
We 
64See 
above, pp. 124-125. 
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must ask whether Tillich, as Dicken suggests, is wishing to infer 
from the statement that Christian faith depends upon the 'biblical 
picture of Jesus as the Christ, that this 'picture, is itself the 
locus of the Incarnation. The, point at issue here is where Tillich 
intends to place the primal datum of faith. Is it the 'signifi- 
canoe' attached to Jesus in the biblical picture of him as the 
Christ, is it the 'content' of this picture, that which portrays 
essential manhood present in the existential manhood of Jesus? Or 
is it rather 'Jesus as he is in himself', that is, Jesus in whom 
the New Being actually appeared independently of any subsequent 
assessment made of him? 
In fact, neither question is in itself legitimate. During 
the course of this chapter, we have tried to show that both options, 
corresponding as they do to each side of the Christ-event, properly 
belong together and in balance.. The biblical picture communicates 
to us the 'paradox' of the Incarnation; but, according to Tillich's 
own definition of that term, there can be no 'paradoxt without the 
actuality of him who, in his own personal being, overcame existen- 
tial estrangement. This is not simply an abstract statement about 
those requirements which must be fulfilled if the conditions of 'old 
being' are to be transformed - although this is certainly entailed 
in the meaning of ' Incarnation' or ' New Being'; it is, more exactly, 
a statement concerning the necessity of affirming a real correspon- 
dence between the biblical picture and the personal life to which it 
points. The intelligibility of the biblical picture as a picture of 
Jesus as the Christ is sustained only if Jesus 
did actually possess 
characteristics appropriate to the importance 
the picture ascribes 
to him and signifies by the title 'Christ'. 
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The original event of 'Jesus as the Christ' can, there- 
fore, be encountered only in faith and through its biblical pre- 
sentation; but no translation of the event in terms of kerygmatic 
efficacy and existential significance can be upheld at the expense 
of its objectively real and fully concrete character. We remember 
that it was precisely on this point that Tillich criticized Bult- 
mann. Given that we are here dealing with an event which cannot 
be established historiographically, and given that our knowledge 
of it is dependent upon the kerygma, Tillich nevertheless avoids 
Bultmann's judgment that the event possesses no distinctive, in- 
dependent character apart from the 'historical significance' (ge- 
schichtliche Bedeutsamkeit) attributed to it in the preaching of 
the early Church. To suppose, then, with Dicken that Tillich 
wishes to move from the premise that the biblical picture is the 
foundation of Christianity to the conclusion that it is therefore 
the saving event itself is to confuse two elements between which 
Tillich clearly distinguishes: the biblical picture belongs to the 
'receiving' side of the event, and, as such, witnesses to its 
'factual' side. The picture, accordingly, does two things. First, 
it hands down to us the universal importance ascribed to Jesus in 
the disciples' interpretation of him as the Christ; but second, it 
witnesses also to the disciples' own witness to the actual reality 
of Jesus as the Christ, namely, to the real appearance of essential 
manhood in him. Faith, in other words, 
is not simply faith in that 
which faith produced, anymore than the 
'paradox' is the form in 
which the manifestation of New 
Being in the man Jesus is announced: 
if it were, Tillich, to be more accurate, should 
speak of an 'In- 
carnation of the biblical picture'. 
As well as being an interpre- 
tation of the meaning of an event, 
the biblical picture is simul- 
taneously a witness to an actual occurrence, 
and thus refers back to 
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an objective reality with which it is not identified. 
When, therefore, Tillich asserts that the biblical pic- 
ture is the basis of Christian belief, and that it is impossible 
to get behind the teachings of the Jesus proclaimed by the primi- 
tive Christian community to the teachings of 'Jesus as he actually 
was', he has by no means foreclosed discussion of the relation 
between the picture and the event it portrays. His concentration 
upon the picture's value as an expression of the early Church's 
faith over against its value in providing historical evidence 
about Jesus certainly severs the 'historical Jesus' (der historische 
Jesus) from the 'historic Christ' (der geschichtliche Christus); but 
it does not ignore the necessity of identifying the earthly Jesus 
with the Jesus presented in the biblical picture. Clearly, what is 
'historic' (geschichtlich) is distinct from that which can be scien- 
tifically established and verified (historisch); but the former does 
not imply the exclusion of the notion of factuality. 
65 It is true, 
of course, that faith's interest is not in the objective facticity 
of the saving event apart from its kerygmatic proclamation; but 
equally, the stress on Geschichte is not employed to reduce or neu- 
tralize the 'kerygma's role as 'witness' to an event independent of 
it but to which it is retrospectively related. 
It is, therefore, the redemptive act of God in Jesus the 
Christ which is the prior datum extra nos, although perceptible 
to 
us only through the picture's witness to 
it. The criteria for over- 
coming existential ambiguity can only 
be provided by the earthly 
existence of the bearer of New 
Being, not by the proclamation of 
him. The New Being, after all, was not 
incarnate in the story of 
65This is implied already in Tillich's semantic analysis of 
the term 'historical Jesus'. 
The historian's Jesus is distinguished 
from the Jesus faith receives as 
the Christ; but this 
shsepara tton 
in 
no way impugns the 
facticity of the event 'Jesus 
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this event or in the faith of its readers but, as the first d. is- 
ciples perceived, only in the personal reality of Jesus of Naza- 
reth. The early Church did not originate with a response to its 
own '_kerygma but came into existence in the moment when Jesus was 
accepted as the Christ. If, then, the Christ-event is made 
presently actual through the biblical picture, this event yet re- 
mains that Past event underlying and presupposed in all primitive 
Christian confessions. Indeed, in so far as the picture is para- 
doxical, it consists in just this fact: that he who was received 
as the Christ is now received as the Christ through the biblical 
picture. 
66 It is in this sense that the picture, despite its 
various and contrasting expressions of the original experience of 
the Christ-event, retains an unconditional and universal validity 
for the Christian faith. 
as 
discussion 66This becomes even more apparent 
Tillich's 
of the analogla 
imaginis, where the actuality of 
is immediate and present as well as 
being historically indirect. See 
Ch. V. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL ENQUIRY 
AND THE NATURE OF FAITH 
In the previous two chapters, we have been concerned with 
an analysis of the two-fold structure of the event 'Jesus as the 
Christ', with the interrelation between the 'fact' of Jesus of 
Nazareth and. the ' interpretation' of him as the Christ. We have 
tried to show the extent to which the foundation of present be- 
lief - the biblical image or picture of the event - is the result 
and creation of this unrepeatable occurrence, and why, for that 
reason, it not only reflects but actually inherits that event's 
composite character. This much indicates that Tillichs denial 
that the historian can ever obtain an authentic biography or 
chronology of Jesus' life is prompted not so much by a diagnosis 
of the variety and often conflicting ways in which the story of 
Jesus has been treated and handed down, nor indeed by any equally 
valid awareness of the dangers of mistaking psychological conjec" 
tune for historical method, as by his fundamental insights into 
the basic structural complexity of the central Christian event 
testified to by the biblical picture. 
Such considerations suggest that, on the basis of Tillich's 
thesis, an inevitable and mutual antagonism exists between the in- 
terests of theology and historical research: the latter, in attempt- 
138 
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ing to discover who Jesus really was, seeks to distinguish between 
those self-same factual and interpretative elements within the 
picture which faith maintains are necessarily conjoined. But this 
is not the case, for according to the arguments so far adduced by 
our author, a rejection of any 'quest' for the historical Jesus 
finds support within both disciplines. Thus, for example, his 
attack upon the liberal 'lives of Jesus', when taken together with 
his evident sympathy for the work of scholars like Bultmann, makes 
clear that on critical grounds alone a biographical portrait of 
Jesus is considered unfeasible. In other words, Tillich agrees 
that the discovery of the fragmentary and homiletic complexion of 
the sources is in itself a powerful historico-scientific argument 
for the certain failure of such an enterprise. It is here, how- 
ever, that critical findings coincide with theological interests. 
Aa we have remarked elsewhere, for Tillich any prospective con- 
struction of a 'life of Jesus' is not only methodologically im- 
possible but theologically irrelevant. 
1 Far from relying upon an 
objective estimate of Jesus, faith itself is not even partially 
concerned with the implications that the photographable nature of - 
the Christ-event has for historical enquiry, its only interest 
being with that picture which presents Jesus as the Christ. Faith' s 
concern, therefore, is with the portrait formed by faith. Nor, 
Tillich would argue, is this contention born of making a theologi- 
cal virtue out of an unfortunate scientific conclusion. 
It is in 
fact a profound insight into the proper nature of 
faith's relation 
to the Jesus of the gospels. It perceives correctly that 
it is the 
a priori of faith that the Jesus of the 
historian is not and cannot 
be the Christ of the believer. 
1See 
above, Ch. III, p. 122 
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This appeal on Tillich's part to the two fields of theo- 
logy and historical research for support to his opinions concern- 
ing the impracticability, not to say irrelevance, of a i'questt 
for the historical Jesus is met again in the later stages of his 
thesis; and here too we find that the arguments advanced by him 
are, like their predecessors, all the more substantial because 
they proceed on the assumption that only a total attack on the 
attempt to discover the empirical truth about Jesus of Nazareth 
can remain true to what Tillich regards as a proper appreciation 
of the individual nature and scope of each discipline. But if, 
as we have said, his views up to this point have evolved primar- 
ily from an awareness of the structural union of the two elements 
within the event 'Jesus as the Christ' -a union ratified by 
scientific analysis and faith's understanding of the event - 
Tillich now seeks to reinforce his position at a still deeper, 
more fundamental level of argument. He considers accordingly the 
ways in which the very epistemologies of the two disciplines in- 
volved confirm his negative appraisal of any search for the his- 
torical Jesus. Both the areas of religious and scientific- 
historical knowledge are treated individually, the former issuing 
in a discussion of revelation and religious symbols, the latter 
in a discussion of the so-called 'probable' nature of historical 
enquiry to which we now turn. 
I. The Nature of Historical Enquiry. 
Tillich' s, consideration of the epistemological status of 
historical enquiry starts from the basic semantic distinction origi- 
nally drawn by him within the meaning of 'historical Jesus', and is 
distinguished initially by his definition of the word 'historical' 
within that expression. 
2 
On the basis of what has been said so far, Tillich' s pri- 
many use of the word 'historical' clearly relates to his earlier 
statement that the only "historical" Jesus' is that apprehended by 
faith within the biblical picture. 'Historical' here refers only 
to the immediate certainty of faith - the interpretation of the 
factual element within the event 'Jesus as the Christ' - and does 
not involve any type of historical investigation. Faith interprets 
this factual element for faith only, and thereby transfers it to 
the realm of faith. In doing this, faith determines the use of the 
word 'historical', for when employed in this way it can be known 
only through faith. 
But as Tillich' s analysis of ' historical Jesus' went on to 
explain, this first use of the term 'historical' is not to be 
semantically confused with that definition of it which denotes the 
historiographical methods practised by biblical critics. It is 
according to this second definition of the adjective that he de- 
velops his study of the nature of scientific-historical knowledge. 
Tillich begins, however, by noting that if the attempt. to 
141. 
give a foundation to Christian faith and theology through historical 
research has proved a failure, this does not entail the assumption 
that such criticism is irrelevant to Christianity. Thus, for example, 
we find him acknowledging that the 'historical approach to biblical 
literature is one of the great events in the history of Christianity 
and even of religion and human culture'. 
3 
Every historical research criticises its sources, separating 
what has more probability from that which has less or is 
2See 
above, Ch. I, p. 48 
3sT, 2: 124 
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altogether improbable. Nobody doubts the validity of this method, since it is confirmed continuously by its success; and nobody seriously protests if it destroys beautiful 
legends and deeply rooted prejudioes. 4 
Indeed, Tillich goes further and adds that the subjection of 
the biblical literature to this type of analysis is an expression of 
Protestant courage, of which Protestantism can justly be proud. 
5 By 
way of illustration, he proceeds to define the relevance and influ- 
ence of the critical historical approach in three ways: 
First, by giving an analysis of the three different semantic 
levels of biblical literature...; second, by showing in sev- 
eral steps the development of christological symbols; and 
finally, by providing a precise philological and historical 
understanding of the, biblical literature by means of the 
best methods developed in all historical work. 6 
The three 'semantic levels of biblical literature' are des- 
cribed as 'the empirically historical, the legendary, and the mytho- 
logical I. 7 The extent to which each differs from the other is found, 
David Kelsey suggests, tin the extent to which historical fact-claims 
are made when each is used'. 
8 This is a most helpful suggestion in 
explicating a statement that otherwise suffers from its brevity. If 
we accept Kelsey's reading, it is evident that these three levels are 
enumerated in a descending order of 'fact-claims'. Within the 'em- 
pirically historical' narratives, such a claim is essential; legends 
'emphasize the universal quality of particular stories', 
9 
and myths 
are described elsewhere as 'symbols of faith combined in stories 
41bic. 
, p. 117 
51biid. 
, p. 124 
6____ 
Ibid. v p. 130 
71bid. 
8]Kelsey, 
op. cit., p. 90 
9ST9 2: 175 
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about divine-human encounters'. 
10 
Historical research has shown also how symbols develop, and 
in this respect it 'has given systematic theology a tool for dealing 
with the christological symbols of the Bible' . 
11 First, symbols 
appear in a given religious culture and language; they are then used 
both as an expression and self-interpretation of their own existen- 
tial situation; next, they are transformed in their appropriation by 
Christians to interpret the original revelatory event of Christ; and 
finally, they are distorted by popular superstition, supported by 
theological literalism and supernaturalism. Thus, the processes of 
biblical research can reveal what symbols are and how they are used. 
They can help the theologian to 'demythologize' the biblical texts, 
stripping the symbols of their literalistic connotations. 
12 
This positive evaluation of the historical approach to the 
scriptural narratives makes quite clear that Tillich's otherwise 
negative assessment of the relevance of research to Christian faith 
does not move against historical study as such but rather at the in- 
judicious extension of the claims of its exponents in the case of 
Jesus of Nazareth; and it is to support this distinction between 
what he considers to be the proper and legitimate scope of critical 
methods within theology that Tillich gives his most important char- 
acterization of historical research. Here "'historical" for the 
scientific view of things are those events which are verified within 
the limits of every historical verification by special methods of 
10DF: 49 
11 ST, 2: 125. Cf. 'Redemption in Cosmic and Social History', 
Journal of Religious Thought, III, Ro. 1 
(Autumn Winter, 1946) p. 18 
12ST, 2s 125. The christological symbols of Son of David, 
Son of Man, Heavenly Man, Messiah, Son of God, 
Kyrios and Logos 
are cited by Tillich as exemplifying and corroborating 
the validity 
of the historical analysis of symbol. 
See ST, 2t 125-130. 
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research'013 The limitation of which he speaks is prompted by his 
view of historiography as that which 'can only lend probability'. 
14 
It is on this basis that Tillich asserts that historical methodology, 
so defined, is itself inadequate to serve as the criterion of faith. 
Historical research provided probabilities about Jesus of 
a higher or lower degree. On the basis of these probabili- 
ties, it sketched 'Lives of Jesus'. But they were more 
like novels than biographies; they certainly could not pro- 
vide a safe foundation for the Christian faith. 15 
Such a statement does not annul Tillich'a previous. stress on 
the significance of the historical method in considering the trust- 
Worthiness, composition and nature of the biblical records, any more 
than, for example, the failure of the liberal 'quest' cancelled his 
opinions on the scientific accomplishments of the liberal movement. 
Yet it is still clear that whatever the success of this procedure, 
the historian 'never can reach certainty in this way, but he can 
16 
reach high degrees of probability'. 
Tillich is saying that biblical criticism, like all histori- 
cal enquiry, can only achieve probable results of higher or lower 
degree; and 'religious certainty cannot rest on a probability the 
degree of which changes with more enquiry'. 
17 Thus, quite apart 
from the incursion of the historian's own prejudices or the scant 
amount of biblical records, 'probability' as such is inadequate as a 
basis for faith. To identify faith 'with the belief in the histori- 
cal validity of the biblical stories' is, Tillich claims, 'a disas- 
13The Bible and Systematic Theology , an unpublished Ms., 
cited by A. T. Mollegen, op. c. , p. 234 
(my emphasis). 
141H: 265 
15ST, 2: 121 
16 IÄ , p. 120 
17Mo11egen, op. cit., p. 234 
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trous distortion of the meaning of faith'. 
16 Certainly faith 
entails risk, but 'it is wrong... to consider the risk concerning 
uncertain historical facts as part of the risk of faith' . 
l9 
There is nothing new in this contention. Ever since 
Lessing noted a discontinuity between contingent historical truths 
and eternal truths of reason in his famous formula that I accidental 
truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of 
reason', 
20 theologians unwilling to erect a christology upon the 
Jesus of research have pointed out persistently that recorded his- 
tory can never serve as the basis of faith. Since historical judg- 
ments, by their very nature, never attain anything more than a 
degree of probability, they cannot be the media of revealed truth. 
21 
Tillich wholly approves of this type of argument. Biblical 
criticism, he tells us, was 'suspect from its very beginning' be- 
cause it appeared Ito criticise not only the historical sources but 
the revelation contained in these sources... Historical criticism 
seemed to undercut faith itself'. 
22 This, however, is an erroneous 
judgment, and results precisely from the semantic confusion that 
18U 
s 87 
19ST, 2: 134. For further details on the 'risk of faith', 
see below, Ch. IV, p. 196, n. 142. 
200n the Proof of the Spirit and of Power (1777), trans. H. 
Chadwick, Lessi 's Theological Writings Londons A. & C. Black, 
1956) P-53 
21As Barth remarks, Lessing does not denigrate the impor- 
tance of 'accidental truths of history', but seeks only to distin- 
guish between the two classes of truth from which convictions arise 
- the point, indeed, that Tillich 
is also making. (From Rousseau to 
Rit_, pp. 136ff ). Cf. L. De Moor, 'Problem of 
Revelation in 18th 
century Germany: with particular reference 
to Lessing , Evan elioal 
Quarterly, XXXIX, 116.2 (April-June, 1967) pp. 
66-74, No. 3 July- 
September, 1967) pp. 139-1513 Ro. 4 
(October-December, 1967) pp. 205- 
215 
225 
, 2s 117 
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Tillich seeks to overcome. In the first definition of c historical' 
we are concerned with the factual element within the event 'Jesus 
as the Christ', which demands and requires the correlative appre- 
pension by faith alone. In the second definition we are concerned 
with the historicity of the biblical narratives, which is always a 
matter of the degrees of probability reached by historical research. 
These two definitions are utterly distinct, and are never to be 
confused with one another. In the first definition, the 'risk of 
faith is existential', and does not imply the risk of historical 
judgment Which is 'theoretical and open to permanent scientific 
correction'. 
23 
Sere are two different dimensions which should never be 
confused. A wrong faith can destroy the meaning of one' s 
life; a wrong historical judgment cannot. It is mislead- 
ing, therefore, to use the word frisk' for both dimensions 
in the same sense. 24 
Thus, in order to protect the kerygma while yet guaranteeing 
the importance and freedom of the historian, faith and criticism are 
placed in two dimensions, which, Tillich insists, must be kept sepa- 
rate. In one sense, of course, there is a similarity between the two 
dimensions, for historiography, no less than faith, involves an inter- 
preting subject; 
25 but this does not, however, provide the historian 
with the occasion to transform 'historical probability into positive 
or negative historical certainty by a judgment of faith'. 
26 This 
would. illegitimately confuse one dimension with the other by suppos- 
ing that 'faith can guarantee the truth of a questionable historical 
23 1_ , P"134 
241bid. 
25Cf. I)Fs 86 
26ST9 2= 120 
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statement'. 27 Faith cannot so guarantee historical facts because 
this is not faith's concern. 
It is not a matter of faith to decide how much legendary, 
mythological and historical material is amalgamated in the stories about the birth and the resurrection of the Christ. It is not a matter of faith to decide which 
version of the reports about, the early days of the Church 
has the greatest probability. All these questions must be decided, in terms of more or less probability, by his- 
torical research. They are questions of historical truth, 
not of the truth of faith. 28 
In the light of this argument, Tillich can maintain that it 
is not faith' a task to determine the character of the Pentateuchal 
narratives or the degree to which Genesis is composed of myth and 
legend rather than actual history. 
29 These are not questions of 
faith, but are the concerns of problematical historical enquiry. 
Nowhere, of course, is this more evident than in the crisis reached 
when research investigates the biblical sources and so raises the 
dilemma which we have frequently described, namely, the question of 
the historical validity of the biblical image of Jesus who is 
called the Christ. But once again, Tillich's answer affirms that 
the investigations instigated by the historian have no implications 
at all for the certainty of Christian faith. Historical research, 
he says, 
has shown that in their narrative parts the Old and the 
New Testament combine historical, legendary and mythologi- 
cal elements and that in many cases it is impossible to 
separate these elements from each other with any degree of 
probability. Historical research has made it obvious that 
there is no way to get at the historical events which have 
produced the Biblical picture of Jesus who is called the 
Christ with more than a degree of probability. Similar 
research in the historical character of the holy writings 
and the legendary traditions, of non-Christian religions 
27DF: 86 
28lbid. 
, P-88 
291bid., 
pp. 87-88 
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have discovered the same situation. The truth of faith 
cannot be made dependent on the historical truth of the 30 stories and legends in which faith has expressed itself. 
The final sentence in the quotation above is perhaps the most 
important expression of Tillich's two dimensional theory, even if it 
appears highly perplexing. Faith oannot be shaken by historical 
enquiry even if the conclusions reached are critical of those tradi- 
tions in which the Christ-event has been reported by faith! Now if, 
according to Tillich, thistorical truth is first of all factual 
truth' , 
31 
are we to gather from this that a right understanding of 
the nature of faith results in the view that faith itself makes no 
historical, and so no factual, assertions about the man called 
'Jesus'? This, at any rate, is the opinion of one commentator. Thus, 
William Rowe remarks: 
Tillich's reason for concluding that the skeptical results 
of historical research into the life of Jesus should have 
no influence on Christian faith is not that faith guaran- 
tees the biblical portrait of Jesus to be historically 
accurate. Rather, his reason for so concluding is that 
faith, when properly understood, makes no factual claims 
whatsoever ab out some man named 'Jesus' who flourished in 
the years l to 30.32 
The point at issue, and the cause of the perplexity, is that 
Rowels summary, if correct, disallows not simply the claims of criti- 
cal historical methods upon faith, but equally prohibits any consider- 
ation of the factual basis of the event 'Jesus as the Christ' -a 
contradiction of the emphasis discussed in Chapter II. This, however, 
is not the case, and is a misreading of the argument Tillich is em- 
ploying here. He does not deny. that the actual concrete appearance 
of the New Being within our temporal order, which Christians assert 
30Ibid, 
p P"87 
31I_ 
, p986 
32op. 
cit. , p. 212 
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took place in Jesus of Nazareth, is the prius of the interpreta- 
tion of him as the Christ, the necessary existential prerequisite 
for the truth of that confession. The distinction that Tillich is 
wishing to make is not, to be more exact, between the fact of Jesus 
as the basis of the event and its reception by faith, but between 
knowledge of the way in which that event took place and faith. 
33 
The question whether the event 'Jesus as the Christ' in fact happen- 
ed in the way it is reported to have happened exists in a dimension 
which cannot come into conflict with the assertion of faith that 
'Jesus is the Christ'. Nor is this a contradiction in terms, but, 
as we have seen, a conclusion derived from the semantic analysis of 
'historical Jesus'. It is all the more interesting to find, there- 
fore, that Rowe, in the next page of his bock, makes ne attempt to 
determine which of the two senses of 'historical Jesus' is being 
used. 
Faith, on Tillich'a view, cannot be upset by historical 
skepticism concerning Jesus, because faith in Christ does 
not imply or require the truth of any factual claims about 
the life, character, and activities of the historical 
Jesus. Thus the stories about Jesus which speak of his 
virgin birth, his sayi s (the Sermon on the Mount, etc. 
his deeds (the miracles), his death on a cross, and his 
physical resurrection are, when taken as reports of facts 
and events in history, not, for Tillich, matters of faith 
at all. 34 
331t is true that, in one passage, Tillich appears to sup- 
port Rowe's interpretation. Speaking of revelation, he writes: 
'Knowledge of revelation, although it is mediated primarily through 
historical events, does not imply factual assertions, and it is 
therefore not exposed to critical analysis by historical research' 
(SP, 1: 144)" However, as we shall discover 
net. intend by this revelation and religious symbolic , 
type of statement to impugn the objective reality of 
the revelation 
in Jesus the Christ, but is seeking to show instead that the factual- 
historical accuracy of the biblical witness is irrelevant 
to the 
truth of its meaning as a record of an actual revelation* 
The 'know. 
ledge of revelation' communicated by the picture 
is not, in other 
terms, equatable with the 'historical truth' of 
the picture's asser- 
tions about Jesus. See below, pp" l'T8-1? 
9,183-186,188-189,194ff. 
34®_ 
.9 p"213 
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If q as is most likely, 'historical Je su. s' is here referring 
to the results attained by the historian in his search for evidence 
about Jesus, then Rowe' s remarks are correct. Whatever aspects of 
the biblical story the historian may be examining, faith cannot de- 
pond upon him for its authentication because faith is not an act of 
knowledge that either has a high or low degree of probability, nor 
is it trust in that authority which makes a statement probable for 
use However, if faith does not affirm or deny what belongs within 
the dimension of historioal enquiry, this does not imply, as Rowe 
supposes, the total absence of all factual claims within faith' s 
own, well-defined working limits. Indeed, the distinction between 
the two meanings of 'historical Jesus' was drawn precisely in order 
to prevent this assumption. According to the second understanding 
of ' historical Jesus' 9 the actuality of that upon which the event 
'Jesus as the Christ' depends - its 'factualt side - was a physical 
occurrence which so changed the estranged condition of humanity that 
the term 'Christ' was appropriate to it. To call Jesus 'Christ' is, 
therefore, to make certain assertions about his actual existence, 
for if, as faith assumes, Jesus was the Christ, then through him 
Essential God-Manhood became actual in existential man. This is the 
irreducible 'factual' claim made by faith about Jesus, presupposed 
by its application of the title 'Christ' to him. Moreover, 
if it 
is the fundamental premise of Christian belief that this christelogi- 
cal designation is valid, then the admission 
that Jesus was the New 
Being has realistic implications for the nature of 
his life as a 
whole. As we saw in the comparison with 
Rudolf B'ultmann, for Tillich 
the attachment of the title 'Christ' 
to Jesus is meaningful only in 
relation to the totality of his 
being, not in abstraction from it. 
35 
To qualify as the New Being, Jesus 
had to exhibit these character- 
35See above, Ch. III, pp. 108-112 
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ietics which ontological analysis has shown must pertain within the 
being of the bearer of New Being. He had to enter existence and 
conquer it, had, that is, to experience the anxieties, temptations 
and guilts which determine the finite situation,, while yet lacking 
any 'mark' or 'soar' which would show an estrangement from God; and 
to the extent that faith accepts the Christ-character of Jesus, it 
also agrees that these conditions were actually fulfilled by him. 
This, however, does not entail that faith's picture of Jesus is 
exaot in detail, or that it provides independent evidence from which 
one may deduce the Christ-hood of Jess. We remember, for example, 
that it was in this sense that Tillich regarded the Cross and Resur- 
rection as symbols based on fa_s. 
36 Here it was not a question of 
faith wishing to maintain the accuracy of the biblical accounts of 
how Jesus was crucified or how he rose from the dead, or even of it 
assuming that a cross and a resurrection figured in. any real inei- 
dents within the history of Jesus. It was rather a case of faith 
believing in the factuality of that which is expressed in mythologi- 
cal and symbolic form within these accounts, namely, that Jesus the 
Christ experienced death under the conditions of 'old being' (the 
factual content of the symbol of the Cross), and that as the bearer 
of New Being he did not succumb to, but overcame, the powers of es- 
trangement (the factual content of the symbol of the Resurrection). 
Faith's only claim, made within its own dimension, is, therefore, 
that the factuality of the event portrayed in the New Testament pre- 
sentation of Jesus as the Christ means that a human individuality 
existed, and that the actual nature of his being was such as would 
support the significance ascribed to it in the biblical symbols of 
'Gross' and 'Resurrection'. To put this in another and more general 
Way - it is the basic assertion of 
faith that, if a photographic 
36See above, Ch. II, pp. 90-91 
152. 
record of all the words and deeds of Jesus did exist, this record, 
while perhaps contradicting the biblical image on points of detail, 
would not destroy but would confirm faith' s assessment of their 
me as expressions of the New Being in him. This underlines 
Tillich's former distinction between der historische Jesus and der 
geschichtliche Christus. 
37 The only continuity that faith requires 
and asserts between the picture and the Christ-event is that the 
existential significance that faith accords Jesus in the biblical 
portrait corresponds to the significance his being in fact possess- 
ed. The meaning of the event within this picture is not, therefore, 
deduced from any specification of a scientifically observed 'his- 
torical Jesus'; it is derived solely from the soteriological impli- 
cations that Jesus has for estranged humanity as perceived by 
faith's recognition that in him the Mew Being actually appeared. 
Bearing these remarks in mind, we may conclude that for 
Tillich a statement is 'historically true' if it purports to des- 
cribe what in fact happened; and that to accept its truth is to 
adopt an hypothesis which, though tested by scholarly methods, 
is nevertheless corrigible with every new discovery made by them. 
We have seen also that our author does not equate a 'truth of 
faith' with the truth of an historical assertion of this kind, 
which is always. questionable; nor, indeed, on the evidence of 
the preceding paragraph, does he make it equivalent to all those 
claims which could be made truthfully about the actual 
form taken 
by the life of Jesus of Nazareth. But these requirements 
do not, 
however, suggest that faith's statements about the 
'factual' side 
of the Christ-event are mere invention; rather 
they imply that 
faith itself, by its denial of any scientific method's capacity 
to verify or falsify the t interpretation' offered 
in the biblical 
37See above, Ch. III, pp. 121-126. 
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picture, is not concerned with the 'historical truth' of its narra- 
tive of Jesus. The only claim that faith makes about the 'factual' 
side of the event 'Jesus as the Christ' is that the picture it pre- 
sents of it embodies the meaning that that 'fact' had for those who 
first called Jesus 'Christ'. Thus, when Tillich holds that faith 
does not depend on the 'historical truth' of its own biblical pic- 
ture of Jesus, he is not saying thereby that faith includes no 
factual claims about Jesus, but that faith qua. faith does not in- 
tend by its portrait of him to be empirically informative in the 
way that historical enquiry seeks to be. Faith cannot guarantee 
the 'historical truth' of its assertions, for that is not its con- 
tern; but faith can and must interpret the meaning of facts within 
the context of its confession that Jesus was the Christ. In so 
doing, it transfers the factual claims made about Jesus of Nazareth, 
which would otherwise be the interest of 'historical truth', into 
the dimension of the 'truth of faith'. 
On the basis of this distinction between the 'truth of faith' 
and 'historical truth', we can see that Tillich does not view the 
problem of the historical Jesus in terms of any necessary antagonism 
between. faith and historical enquiry as such, but in terms of a con- 
filet between a. faith and an enquiry each of which is unaware of its 
own valid dimension, and, consequently, of the legitimate ways it 
can employ the term ' historical Jesus' . Indeed, by his contention 
that the I truth of faith' is not the sum total of all that could be 
known about Jesus, Tillich has placed the issue outside any 'histori- 
oal-scientifict disagreement on whether certain events did or did not 
occur. The difference between the two dimensions is not 'factual' in 
this sense, but arises from the kind of attitude towards historical 
events which each dimension requires. Historical research, as 
Tillich has already remarked, involves an interpreting subject; 
38 
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and it is the presence of this element which is the principal factor 
in distinguishing 'historical truth' from 'scientific truth'. His- 
tory, he adds, 
does not only tell a series of facts. It also tries to 
understand these facts in their origins, their relations, their meaning. History describes, explains, and under- stands. And understanding presupposes participation. This is the difference between historical and scientific truth. In historical truth the interpreting subject is involved; in scientific truth it is detached. 39 
According to this definition, historical enquiry thus takes 
on an (existential form' since the frame of reference within which 
the historian evaluates the weaning of events will be consciously or 
unconsciously determined by his own frame of thought. The direction 
in which he asks the questions and the preference he gives to special 
types of answers about the meaning of historical events for human 
existence will, in other words, be governed by his own interpretation 
of human nature, or more precisely, by his own view of existence as 
formed within the life of the community to which he belongs. 
40 
Tillich argues that it is because of this inevitable existen- 
tial relation between the historian and his subject-matter that the 
dimension of historical study has been confused with the dimension of 
38See 
above, p. 146 
39DFs 86 
40This 
conception of the nature of historical enquiry, as 
Tillich is the first to admit, owes much to the work of Wilhelm Dil- 
they. In RS Tillich writes: 'He (Dilthey) discovered the concept of 
"historical understanding" and applied the method of historical under- 
standing with an unexcelled mastery. To understand means to enter 
into the nature of a strange, living structure. This concept is also 
fundamentally a polemical weapon, directed against the analyzing and 
generalizing method of the natural sciences which does not seek to 
understand but to explain' 
(Ibid., p. 66). For an introduction to 
Dilthey's philosophy of history, see H. P. Rickman's anthology, Mean- 
ing- in Histor s Wilhelm Dilthey's Thoughts on History and Society 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961). 
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faith. 'Since the truth of faith means total involvement, histori- 
cal truth has often been compared with the truth of faith'. 
41 This 
similarity does not, therefore, exclude tensions between the two 
areas, but gives rise to them. It is because the dimensions are so 
close at this point that conflicts arise. And yet, Tillich con- 
tinues, he who seeks for that reason to identify 'historical truth' 
with the 'truth of faith' fails to realize the affinity that his- 
torical enquiry, despite its ' existential form' , still retains with 
science. He 'forgets that in a genuine historical work detached 
and controlled observation is as much used as in the observation of 
physical or biological processes'. 
42 This recalls the primary defi- 
nition of 'historical truth' , namely that it is 'first of all factual 
truth'. 43 While it is true to. say, then., that, in terms of the 
application of his enquiry, the historian becomes, as it were, part 
of the enquiry itself, nevertheless, in terms of the chief purpose of 
his research, his main concern is to discover how something actually 
happened apart from his existential situation as the enquirer. 'His- 
torical science' is not, therefore, a meaningless expression since 
'historical truth', unlike the 'truth of faith', can, be understood in 
a 'non-existential' way; it can be appreciated, that is, in the sense 
that the historian is an histcr ian because he seeks to stand outside 
his enquiry, and so to adopt a point of view that is 'detached' from 
his own existential situation. 
It is this degree of detachment when considering historical 
events that distinguishes the attitude of historical research towards 
41DFs 86 
42Ibid. 
43See 
above, p. 148 
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Jesus of Nazareth from that of faith. Any understanding of him, 
whether it be from the standpoint of critical enquiry or faith, 
will, to some extent, involve an interaction between he who ru 
asses-ses and that which is assessed. So much is entailed in the 
nature of both dimensions. But in the case of historical research, 
the level of this involvement is reduced significantly through its 
primary function of discovering not the meaning of facts but the 
facts themselves. In this respect, as Tillich has observed, cer- 
tain questions asked of the historian 'can be answered in an "ob- 
jective" way without necessary interference of negative or positive 
prejudices'. 
44 
The basic characteristic of 'historical truth', as 
against the (truth of faith', is thus the fundamental priority of 
its 'non-existential form' over its 'existential form'. In the 
case of faith, however, the existential component is determinative. 
Here there is a total lack of any 'dissociation' from the object of 
faith, Jesus. This suggests, therefore, that the contrast between 
the two dimensions is not simply a contrast in emphasis but a differ- 
ence in structure. The man of faith, unlike the historian, is in- 
capable of observing Jesus dispassionately, for it is in the nature 
of his situation that he accepts the ultimate existential importance 
ascribed by faith to Jesus in its biblical picture of the, Christ. 
The meaning that faith attaches to Jesus demands, in other terms, an 
a priori of valuation which cannot be provided by the function of 
critical studies, namely that Jes'uss, in both name and act, was the 
Christ. Faith, in this sense, assumes its own presence within the 
portrait to which it refers; and this, accordingly, determines the 
decisive difference in attitude between the two dimensions of his- 
torical enquiry and faith. In the former, any understanding of an 
44ST' 2: 120, 
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existential relation to Jesus is placed in the background, whereas, 
in the latter, it is not only in the foreground, but what is actu- 
ally aimed at and implied. 
II. The Nature of Faith. 
According to the analysis of the two dimensions of histori- 
cal enquiry and faith so far presented by Tillich, the Christian 
believer neither does nor can frame the question of the truth of 
the event 'Jesus as the Christ' in the same way as an historian 
examining other historical incidents. From the viewpoint of pre- 
sent faith, the event originally attested to by the first disciples, 
and to which faith now responds through their portrait of Jesus the 
Christ, is not sought or met behind that picture, as if it were a 
reality discoverable through the biblical texts but finally dis- 
sociable from them by critical and detached evaluation of its im- 
portance; on the contrary, it is encountered only in the witness of 
the biblical portrait itself, and hence can be found only within 
that testimony. As Tillich has often remarked, within the area of 
faith the fact of 'Jesus' is inseparable from the meaning accorded 
it in the interpretative title 'Christ'. Indeed, within this di- 
mansion, the only history of Jesus is the history of Jesus as the 
Christ. It is in the nature of faith, therefore, that it accepts 
the meaning of Jesus' being as asserted in the biblical picture of 
him as the Christ, and that it thus recognizes the ultimate existen- 
tial implications that his being had and has for mankind generally. 
Faith, in consequence, does not distinguish between two aspects in 
judging the validity of the event to which it refers, that is, be- 
tween the question of the historical 'fact' as such and that 
fact's 
'meaning'. On this basis, it is impossible for faith to sanction 
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any attempt to work out the significance of Jesus by an unpre- 
judiced summary of all the historical and scientifically dis- 
cernible effects he brought about in his own lifetime; for if it 
did so, it would not only contravene the original structural com- 
plexity of the event I Jesus as, the Christ ', but would, more 
specifically, contradict its own attitude towards that event. 
This is the conclusion which, in the context of the two dimen- 
sional theory offered by Tillich, derives from the examination 
of those differences which are said to exist between 'historical 
truth' and the 'truth of faith'. Thus, quite apart from any re- 
alization of the preliminary character of scientific-historical 
knowledge, a proper assessment of the contrasting relations of 
the historian and the believer to Jesus of Nazareth has an equally 
terminal effect upon the issue of whether research can undermine 
faith's assertions about him. And yet, while this conclusion 
certainly strengthens Tillich' s, case for the impossibility of a 
valid resumption of a 'quest', it is not, for that reason, drawn 
from an intentional denigration of the critical point of view per 
se. It stems instead from his desire to establish clearly the 
boundary between, what he considers to be, two qualitatively dis- 
parate phenomena, namely, historical research and faith. Tillich 
does not, therefore, disparage critical study of scripture; but he 
does reject an: historicism which regards. its findings: as essential 
to the validity of Christian belief, and which seeks thereby to 
impinge upon the dimension of faith. 
By making such distinctions between the dimension of re- 
search and the dimension of faith, Tillich has gone some way 
in 
clarifying his understanding of, what we might 
term, the ' esoteric' 
nature of faith's knowledge of Jesus, the 
Christ through the bibli- 
cal picture. No statement, which purports 
to convey a knowledge 
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of Jesus as the bearer of New Being, can be made which either 
precedes or is isolated from faith's confession of him as the 
Christ within that portrait. We have seen that, for Tillich, 
this claim in itself represents a conclusive argument against 
the discovery of the empirical Jesus. It does not, however, 
reflect a comprehensive line of reasoning. In order for this 
to be achieved, our author adopts a final avenue of approach to- 
wards showing the exclusivism and invulnerability of faith's 
dimension, one which depends upon a still more exact apprecia- 
tion of the distinctive character both of the event (Jesus as 
the Christ' and of faith's assertions about Jesus within its 
picture of him. At the beginning of this chapter, it was said 
that Tillich' s attack upon any 'quest' for the historical Jesus 
is all the more substantial because it draws support from a 
study of the two epistemologies involved within the areas of re- 
search and faith. 
45 This indicates the direction that his argu- 
ment is now to take. It is no longer the 'probable' form of 
historical enquiry which determines the necessary immunity of 
biblical testimony to critical analysis, but, conversely, the 
special and extraordinary type of knowledge that it is in the 
nature of faith to provide about Jesus. Indeed, if the complex- 
ity of this last argument is any indication, one may hazard a 
guess that it is primarily Tillich's view of the nature of 
faith, 
and not of historical science, which leads him to maintain 
that 
faith is independent of the preliminary results of gospel research. 
This final approach thus runs parallel to Tillich' s earlier 
discussion of the epistemological character of historioo-scientific 
statements. It concentrates upon the singular epistemological 
45 5ee above, p. 140 
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status that faith' s claims attain by virtue of the unique quality 
of the event to which they refer. In this respect, two factors 
stand at the centre of his theological doctrine of knowledge: a 
conception, first, of the I revelatory' nature not only of the 
Christ-event but also of its biblical portrayal, and second, of 
the 'symbolic' form in which all such 'revelations' are expressed 
and communicated. 
a) Faith and Revelation. 
One of the most important features of Tillich'a analysis 
of the event 'Jesus as the Christ' and its New Testament presen- 
tation is that both event and biblical picture are regarded as 
'revelations'. This relation first emerges in his discussion of 
'original' and 'dependent' reveiations. 
46 An 'original' revela- 
tion is one 'which occurs in a constellation that did not exist 
before'. 47 Thus, for example, Peter's confession at Caesarea 
Philippi was original in that both sides of it - the 'objective' 
side (the manifestation of the revelation, the actual appearance 
of New Being in the man Jesus) and the 'subjective' side (the re- 
ception of the revelation in the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ) 
- are joined 'for the first time. Both aides are original'. 
48 
However, in a 'dependent' revelation, namely in one which is re- 
oeived by following generations of Christiaans, the focus is upon 
'the Jesus who had been received as the Christ by Peter and the 
other apostles'. 
49 Tillich concludes from this that there is a 
continuity of revelation and a continuous revelation, since in the 
46ST, is 140-142 
47, bid. , p. 140 
48Ib id. 
491bid (my emphasis). 
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original revelation the faot and the reception of the revelation 
are the two correlated elements, whereas, in the dependent reve- 
lation, these formerly distinct elements conjoin to form the 
'giving side, while the receiving side changes as new individuals 
and groups enter the same correlation of revelation' . 
50 
The biblical picture, by combining the 'objective' and 
' subjective' sides of the original revelation of Jesus the Christ, 
functions, therefore, as the 'objective' side of a dependent reve- 
lation. In other terms, the character of the New Testament image 
of Jesus is synonymous with the fact that it incorporates the ori- 
ginal witness to, and response towards, the revealing event. The 
gospel portrayal, that is, becomes the 'giving' side of a dependent 
revelatory occurrence because the original revelation - Jesus' 
actual appearance and his reception as the Christ by the first dis- 
ciples - can only be (dependent revelation within the Christian 
community'. 
51 For this reason, writes Avery Dulles, the New Testa- 
ment 'is not merely a collection of documents about revelation; it 
is also itself revelatory. The biblical writers were themselves 
involved in the revelatory events they deserihe; they wrote as wit- 
nesses to revelations . 
52 
We have said that, in Tillich's view,. revelation entails a 
special and extraordinary type of knowledge, one which, according 
to the account he has already given of revelation, is applicable, 
therefore, both to the 'original. ' event, and to the 'dependent' 
50Ibid. 
51Leon J. Putnam, 'Tillich, Revelation, and Miracle', Theo- 
logy and Life, IX (Winter, 1966) p. 365 
52Avery R. Dulles, 'Paul Tillich and the Bible', Paul Tillich 
in Catholic Thought, p. 112 
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biblical picture, of Jesus as the Christ. The 'knowledge of 
revelation', Tillich maintains, is not ordinary knowledge, nor 
is it an addition of it. 
53 Revelation, that is to say, is ex- 
perienced in an attitude which contradicts that of ordinary 
cognition. More exactly, it is not bound to the epistemological 
subject-object distinction implied in all normal cognitive acts. 
In every act of knowledge, this basic separation is necessary, 
because 'in order to know, one must "look" at a thing, and, in 
order to look at a thing, one must be "at a distance'1.54 But, 
in revelation, the fundamental schema of rationality, the subject- 
object structure, is 'superseded' and I transcended'. 
55 This means 
that 'knowledge of revelation does not increase our knowledge 
about the structures of nature, history, and man&. 
56 It is inde- 
pendent, for instance, of the physicist's description of the natu- 
ral structure of things, and has nothing to do with the psycholo- 
gist's analysis of the dynamics of the human soul. In the case of 
the historian - in Which, as we have seen, the relation of knower 
to known, of subject to object, is equally evident - 'the revela- 
tort' interpretation of history as the history of revelation neither 
confirms nor negates any of his statements about documents, tradi- 
tions, and the interdependence of historical events'. 
57 Knowledge 
53Tillich 
uses the phrase 'knowledge of revelation', in- 
stead of 'revealed knowledge', in order to show that the knowledge 
given in revelation cannot be separated from the revelatory situa- 
tion in which it is received (ST, is 143n)" 
541_ 
9 p. 105 
55_ 
, pp. 121 & 124 
56____ Ibid. 9 p. 143 
571bid. 
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of revelation, consequently, is unrelated to either scientific 
or practical knowledge: it cannot interfere with or supplement 
them, and theT, likewise, cannot interfere with or supplement it. 
Revelation, so Tillich concludes, lean be revealed only in the 
situation of revelation, and it can be communicated - in contrast 
to ordinary, knowledge - only to those who participate in this 
situation' . 
58 
Further examination of two of the so-called 'marks' of 
revelation - 'ecstasy' and 'miracle' - reinforces this distinc- 
tion betweeg 'knowledge of revelation' and ordinary knowledge. 
'Ecstasy' and 'miracle' are, respectively, the technical terms 
used by Tillich to denote the subjective and objective sides of 
revelation. Ecstasy is not over-excitement or enthusiasm. It is 
that state of mind 'in which reason is beyond itself, that is, 
beyond its subject-object structure'. 
59 But ecstasy, Tillich 
insists, is not irrational or anti-rational: it rather 'tran- 
scends the basic condition of finite rationality, the subject- 
object of structure'. 
60 
To this extent, the ecstatic state is 
similar to demonic possession, for in both tthe ordinary, subject- 
object structure of the mind is. put out of action', 
61 
Demonic 
possession, however, destroys the rational structure of the mind, 
whereas ecstasy affirms and elevates it, even though transcending 
it. 
58lb i d. 
591biclo 
, p"124. According 
to Tillich, the etymological 
root of the term 'ecstasy' - "standing outside one's self" - 
points to the extraordinary state of mind in which the mind 
transcends its ordinary situation (Ibid. 
). 
ouIbid. 
61, 
bid 9 P, 127 
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Essentially the same considerations determine Tillich's 
examination of the objective side of revelation, called 'miracle'. 
A miracle does not designate a supranatural happening which con- 
tradicts the laws of nature; but it is not, for that reason, iden- 
tifiable with the natural structure of events. A miracle is a 
'sign-event' which 'produces astonishment' ; 
62 
it is 'unusual' and 
'shaking '. 
63 
Just, therefore, as ecstasy does not destroy the 
rational structure of the mind by which it is received, so the 
'sign-event' does not destroy the rational structure of the rea- 
litt' in which it appears, even though it cannot be simply equated 
with that structure. Indeed, such is the correlation between 
'ecstasy' and 'miracle', it is possible to interchange these terms. 
'One can say that ecstasy is the miracle of the mind and that 
miracle is the ecstasy of reality'. 
64 
Tillich' s final remarks on 
the two concepts are significant: - 
Since neither ecstasy nor miracle destroys the structure 
of cognitive reason, scientific analysis, psychological 
and physical, as well as historical investigation is 
possible and necessary. Research can and must proceed 
without restriction. It can undercut the superstitions 
and demonic interpretations of revelation, ecstasy, and 
miracle. Science, psychology, and history are allies of 
theology in the fight against the supranaturalistic dis- 
tortions: of genuine revelation. Scientific explanation 
and historical criticism protect revelation; they cannot 
dissolve it, for revelation belongs to a dimension of 
reality for which scientific and historical analysis are 
inadequate... It is independent of what science and history 
say about the conditions in which it appears; and it can- 
not make science and history dependent on itself. No con- 
flict between different dimensions of reality is possible. 
Reason receives revelation in ecstasy and miracles; but 
reason is not destroyed by revelation, just as revelation 
is not emptied by reason. 65 
62IÄ 
, p. 128 
63Ibid., 
p. 130 
641bid. 
651biid. 
, pp. 
13Or131 
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According to this understanding of revelation, it be- 
comes clear that Tillich's discussion incorporates one further 
version of the two dimensional theory already advocated by him. 
Structurally, however, the present argument, if reaching the 
same conclusion, is different and more exhaustive. The two 
points which formerly determined the distinction between the 
'truth of faith' and 'historical truth' do not, for example, 
immediately apply. In this case, the contention that faith is 
immune to critical research into the gospel narratives: is not 
dependent either upon the epistemological status of historical 
enquiry, or, indeed, upon the differing attitudes of the belie- 
ver and the historian towards the scriptural evidence about 
Jesus. Instead, the argument now relies exclusively upon the 
contrast said to exist between the knowledge provided in revela- 
tion and all types of ordinary knowledge - including, therefore, 
the knowledge gained from the verifying techniques of historical 
science. This absolute distinction centres on Tillich's claim 
that revelation, both in terms of its appearance in 'miracle' 
and 'ecstatic' reception, belongs-to a different dimension of 
reality, one which is not determined by the subject-object form 
Which otherwise governs the cognitive relation of the finite mind 
to all aspects of its environment and world. Why this should be 
so is indicated when our author turns to consider the last 'markt 
of revelation, ' mystery' . 
A revelation, Tillich writes, 'is a special and extra- 
ordinary manifestation which removes the veil from something 
which is hidden in a special and extraordinary way. This hidden- 
66 
The distinguishing feature ness is often called t'mystery"... ' 
66jbid 
I p*120 
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of mystery is that it 'cannot lose its mysteriousness even when 
it is revealed' . 
67 
Initially, the reasons given for this view 
of mystery follow a familiar pattern of argument. 'Mystery 
characterises a dimension which "precedes" the subject-object 
relationship,. 
68 
As such, it is incapable of description or 
analysis in terms of the subject-object dimension to which both 
the processes of practical and theoretical enquiry, and the 
forms of normal discourse, are bound. 
69 
This does not imply 
that the revelation of mystery is without cognitive elements: it 
means rather that the revelation of the essentially mysterious 
entails 'the manifestation of something within the context of 
ordinary experience which transcends the ordinary context of ex- 
perience'. 
70 
Even when revealed, mystery cannot, therefore, be 
reduced to the level of the normal cognitive approach, for (to 
use Marcel's distinction) while a 'problem' is in principle solu- 
ble, a 'mystery' is that which is in principle concealed. 
71 
The crucial stage of this discussion is reached, however, 
when Tillich goes on to say that the genuine mystery appears 
only when 
reason is driven beyond itself to its "ground and abyss", 
to that which "precedes" reason, to the fact that "being 
671bid. 
, p. 121 
68Ibid. 
69Here 
too, Tillich argues that the derivation of the word 
'mystery' - from muein, "closing the eyes" or 
"closing the mouth" - 
corroborates this understanding of, the term 
(Ibid., pp. 120-121). 
70Ibid. 
9 p. 121 
71See Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existence (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery, 1952). For an analysis of Marcella understanding of 
'mystery', see John B. O'Malley, The Fellowship of Being 
(The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) pp. 16-17,24-59; and for a more general 
discussion of the concept, I. T. Ramsey, Models and Mystery 
(London: 
Oxford University Press, 1964)" 
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is and non-being is not" (Parmenides), to the original fact (Ur-Tatsache) that there is something and not no- t hý" 
Two points are involved here, the one negative, the other 
positive; and they refer respectively to the 'abyss and 'ground' 
of being and reason just mentioned. The negative or abysmal side 
of the mystery is revealed by the "'stigma" of finitude... which 
appears in all things and in the whole of reality', and by the 
"'shock" which grasps the mind when it encounters the threat of 
non-being'. 
73 Now according to Tillich, finitude is 'being, limi- 
ted by non-being' 
74 
-a' dialectical' definition which requires 
that the problem of finitude, posed by the basic ontological ques- 
tion of why there should be something and not nothing, must be 
approached also in terms of this inescapable dialectical relation 
between being and non-being. 
75 Non being, that is to say, is not 
the absolute negation. of being, but the negation of being within 
being, appearing as the 'not yet' and 'no more' of being. 'It 
confronts that which is with a definite end (finis ' . 
76 With this 
in mind, Tillich can proceed next to a metaphorical description of 
being. 'Being', he says, 
72 ST., 1: 122 
731bid. 
74The term 'being' in this context does not designate our 
physical existence in time and space, but 'the whole of human rea- 
lity, the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence. All 
this is threatened; it can be lost or saved' (Ibid. , p. 17). 
75For his dialectical understanding of non-being, Tillich_ 
appeals to the Greek philosophic concept of me on, to Augustine's 
notion of 'sin', to the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of man's crea- 
tureliness, and to the work of the modern existentialists. Hei- 
degger and Sartre (Ibid., pp. 209-210). 
76mid. 
9 p. 210 
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is the power of being! Power, however, presupposes, even in the metaphorical use of the word, something over which it proves its power... What can that be which tries to negate being and is negated by it? There is only one answer possible: That which is conquered by the power of being is non-being. 77 
'Non-being', then, is that 'quality of being by which 
everything that participates in being is negated' ; 
78 
and 'being' 
is the power of being which overcomes non-being. This explains 
the relation between 'abyss' and 'ground'. Nön-being is related 
to being only in the sense of resistance to it; but the ontologi- 
cal question raised by looking into the 'abyss' of possible 
nothingness can be answered only in terms of being. For this 
reason, the 'abyss' of being points dialectioally to the 'ground' 
of being, which is the positive side of the 'mystery of being', 
to that which resolves the question of the continual ontological 
threatenedness of the finite situation. Consequently, the 'my- 
stery of being' made manifest in the situation of revelation is 
called the 'power of being', or the 'ground of our being', 
79 be- 
cause it is that which ultimately determines our being or non- 
being by infinitely resisting the threat of non-being. 
8° 
7TLove, 
Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1960) p. 37 (my emphasis). Cf. Christianity- and the Prob- 
lem of Existence (Washington, D. C.: Henderson Services, 1951 pp. 
30-31 (mimeographed). 
78Love, Power, and Justice, p. 38 
79 ST, 1: 122-123 
80 It should be mentioned here that Tillich's dialectical 
interpretation of 'ground' and ' abyss' (partially indicated by the 
German words, Grund and Ab und has puzzled many scholars. For_ 
example, J. Heywood Thomas, in 'Some Comments on Tillich's Doctrine 
of Creation', The Scottish Journal of Theology, XIV, No. 2 
(June 
1961), argues that Tillich_ has made the ""nothing" out of which we 
come a something with fatal power', so that 'we are once more faced 
with Dualism' (p. 118). On the other hand, Kenneth Hamilton, in The 
System and the Gospel 
(Londons S. C. M. Press, 1963), rejects this 
view, and cites Tillich's words that 
'Non-being belongs to being, it 
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From the viewpoint of the discussion concerning 'know- 
ledge of revelation', the most important feature of Tillich's 
analysis of 'mystery' is that he regards the revelation of it - 
the appearance of the 'power of being', conquering non-being - 
as the revelation of God as 'being-itself'. Thus, knowledge of 
revelation is essentially knowledge of God or being-itself. The 
concept of 'being-itself', he continues, 'points to the power 
inherent in everything, the power of resisting non-being. There- 
fore, instead of saying that God is first of all being-itself, it 
is possible to say that he is the power of being in everything 
and above everything, the infinite power of being. 181 The same 
point is made in Tillich's use of his famous phrase, 'ultimate 
concern'. t Revelation is the manifestation of what concerns us 
ultimately, op 
82 
and 'our ultimate concern is that which determines 
our being or non-being'. 
83 "God", therefore, is the 'name for 
that which concerns man ultimately', 
84 being applicable only to 
the mystery revealed as the infinite tpower of being', 'being- 
itself'. Elsewhere, however, our author is even more emphatic. 
The element of 'power', so understood, is the 
basis of Godhead, that which makes God God. It is the 
root of his majesty, the unapproachable intensity of 
his being, the inexhaustible ground of being in which 
cannot be separated from it' (p. 194). Despite this, however, 
Heywood Thomas' point is a fair one, for if the only power of 
non-being is its resistance to being, then there is a dualism if 
both being and non-being are taken as co-eternal - which Tillich 
appears to imply. 
81ST 
, 1: 2 
61 
82 IÄ , p. 123 
831bid., 
P"17 
841bid. 
9 p"234 
17'0. 
everything has its origin. It is the power of being infinitely resisting non-being, giving the power of being to everything that is. 85 
Revelation, therefore, is the appearanoe of our 'ulti- 
mate concern', 'being-itself' as the (power of being' in which 
everything exists, actual in the creative process in all its 
forms. Put differently, it is the manifestation of that which 
is the necessary infinite 'quality' implied in and constitutive 
of the finite structure of reality, participating in all that 
'is', and creating that in which it participates. 
86 All the 
metaphors used by Tillich in, his analysis of the meaning of God 
are interpreted with this connotation of 'power'. For instance, 
God is the 'ground of being' or 'depth of existence', that which 
is the supporting power of being in every conditioned actuality, 
its very root of being. 
87 This means that 'everything finite 
participates in being-itself and in its infinity. Otherwise it 
would not have the power of being. It would be swallowed by non- 
being, or it never would have emerged out of non-being'. 
88 God 
is also the ' abyss of being' , that which cannot be ' exhausted by 
any creation or by any totality- of them..; 189 and this, in turn, 
implies that the 'being of God cannot be understood as the exis- 
tence of a being alongside or above others' . 
90 God, in other 
851bid, 
9 p. 278 
86Cf. 'The Protestant Principle and the Proletarian Situ- 
ation', PE: 163 
87See the sermon, 'The Depth of Existence', The Shaking 
of the Foundations, pp"59-70" 
88ST, 1: 263 
891bid., p. 88 
90Th1d. 
0 p. 261 
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words, as the (power of being', is not subject to the finite 
destiny not to be, but is above every being and the totality of 
being threatened by non-being. 
91 
As these remarks suggest, God 
thus has a positive and negative relation to everything existing, 
primarily indicated by the terms 'ground' and 'abyss'. Positive- 
ly, all that has being is sustained by the ' power of being' that 
is God. Negatively, all that exists lacks the absoluteness of 
Godts infinite power, so that, to this extent, his unconditional- 
ity stands over against the relativity of the whole structure of 
being. According to Tillich, the true meaning of the relation- 
ship, therefore, is that God is the power of being in all that 
is, acting as its creative 'ground', but at the same time tran- 
scending every finite being infinitely as the 'abyss' of being. 
92 
If we relate what Tillioh has said so far about the 
nature of revelation to his opening statements about the function 
91 The view that God does not exist as a being accounts 
for the charge of atheism sometimes made against Tillich. In 
fact, he acknowledges that 'it is as atheistic to affirm the ex- 
istence of God as it is to deny it (Ibid. , p. 263), and means by 
this that both the assertions 'God exists' and 'God does not 
exist' are atheistic because both accept the premise that God 
could exist. It is then that the premise is judged in a positive 
or negative way. For Tillich, the possibility of God's existence 
or non-existence is inconceivable because the notion of existence 
itself is incompatible with the concept 'God'. John Hick, in 'The 
Idea of Necessary Being', The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, LIV, No. 
2 (November 1960) pp. 11-21, argues that this is another formulation 
of the distinction between the necessary being of God and the con- 
tingent being of man. Cf. Sidney Hook, 'The Atheism of Paul Til- 
lich', Religious Experience and Truth, ed. S. Hook (New York: New 
York University Press, 1961 pp. 59-64. 
92In 
seeking to express this two-fold relation in terms of 
man's religious experience of it, Tillich adopts Rudolf Otto's ter- 
minology, and speaks accordingly of the encounter with the 
' Holy' 
as tremendum and fascinosum. These terms signify 
'the experience 
of "the ultimate" in the double sense of that which is the abyss 
and that which is the ground of man's being 
(ST, 1: 239). See 
also 'Die Kategorie des "Heiligen" bei Rudolf Otto', Theologische 
Blätter (Leipzig), II, No. 1 (January 1923) pp. 11-12. Cf. Otto, 
The Idea of the Holy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923). 
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of the event and biblical portrayal of Jesus as the Christ, we 
may conclude that, as 'original' and Idependentt revelations 
respectively, each serves to reveal that which transcends them 
infinitely - namely, God as 'being-itself', overcoming the onto- 
logical threat of non-being - and that both act as ' sign-events' 
for those who perceive through, them the self-disclosure of that 
which concerns us ultimately. Expressed more specifically in 
terms of the relation between the New Testament portrait and the 
Christ-event depicted in it, we may say., that the revelatory 
character of the narratives is identical with the fact that it 
contains the I ecstatic' response of those grasped by the mystery 
of being in the original 'miracle', the appearance of New Being 
in Jesus of Nazareth. For this reason, Tillich adds that it is 
even legitimate to speak here of 'inspired' writing, although he 
is careful to avoid any supernaturalistic idea of 'divine dic- 
tation' . 'Inspiration', he tells us, is the 'name for the cog- 
nitive quality of the ecstatic experience'. 
93 The inspiration 
of the biblical writers thus consists in their acceptance and 
creative witness to the saving act of God in Jesus the Christ, 
through. which that past event is continued and made available to 
those not contemporaries of it. In this way, Tillich concludes, 
the New Testament portrait of Jesus functions both as an expres- 
sion of the 'ecstatic' (or 'receiving') side of the original 
revelation, and as the 'miracle' (or 'giving') side of a depen- 
dent revelation. It is both a document and an event, witnessing 
to that of which it is a part. 
94 
93sT, 1: 127 
941_ 
, P-40 
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As a revelation testifying to a revelation, the biblical 
picture acts, therefore, not only as a record of the self-mani- 
festation of God in Jesus the Christ, but itself transmits to us 
the reality of that divine disclosure. 95 In both cases - whether 
it be the original event or the interpretation of it in the 
scriptural witness - what is revealed in 'miracle' and received 
in 'ecstacy' is strict 'mystery', that which cannot be subject to 
an attitude or-language bound to the subject-object scheme. The 
believer, that is, in his experience of Jesus as the bearer of 
New Being through the picture, encounters an actual revelatory 
happening, one which opens up to him a new dimension of knowledge, 
relative only to his ultimate conoern and to the double relation 
of everything finite to 'being-itself'. More exactly, both event 
and biblical portrait act as the media, through which the mystery 
of being, 'being-itself', manifests its 'creative' and 'abysmal' 
relation to us and to the structure of being as a whole. In call- 
ing this relation 'creative', we remember that Tillioh is pointing 
to the fact that everything participates in the infinite 'ground 
of being' ; and that, in calling it ' abysmal' It he is pointing to 
the fact that all things are infinitely transcended by their crea- 
tive ground. As we now shall see, it is this double characteristic 
of God - the mystery which appears in revelation as 'ground' and 
'abyss' - which accounts for the important contrast between 'know- 
ledge. of revelation' and ordinary knowledge, and which therefore 
provides the reason why the significance attached by faith. to the 
Christ-event and its biblical portrayal is not, and cannot be, 
governed by the conclusions of historical or philological research. 
95The 
view that the believer experiences the actual Christ- 
event through the biblical picture is developed 
fully by Tillich 
in his discussion of the analogia imaginis. See Ch. V. 
174. 
We begin with the 'abysmal' side of God, since it is this 
which, Tillich maintains, makes revelation mysterious. 
96 
Alter- 
natively, we may say that, in holding that revelation is the 
communication of that which is in principle inaccessible to the 
cognitive consciousness, Tillich is re-emphasizing the infinite 
qualitative distinction between the unconditioned and the condit- 
ioned, or, more precisely, the radical 'abysmal' character of God 
as the 'power of being', as that which infinitely transcends both 
the finite structure of being grounded in him, and that split be- 
tween subject and object which is the precondition of all know- 
ledge subject to that structure. Being-itself does not participate 
in non-being, and thus is 'beyond' or 'before' the contrast of 
subject-object which characterizes the finitude of man's cognitive 
reason. God, in other words, as the f abyss of being' is not an 
'object' of knowledge among other objects, for that which is man's 
ultimate concern cannot be found 'within the entire catalogue of 
finite objects which are conditioned by each other'. 
97 
This parti- 
cular distinction between the unconditioned (or unconditional) and 
the conditioned is better expressed if we recall briefly the German 
translation of 'ultimate concern'. In the German edition of Syste- 
matio Theology, 'ultimate concern' is was uns unbedingt angeht, 
twhat concerns us unconditionally'. 
98 In his 'Religionsphilosophie' 
96ST, 1: 173. Strictly speaking, of course, a separate 
discussion of the 'abysmal' over against the 'creative' notion of 
God is impossible, given the dialectical relation between them; but, 
for the purpose of clarifying their significance in the present con- 
text, such a division is unavoidable. 
971_ 
9 p*238 
98 Systematische Theologie, M. I, trans. Renate Albrecht et 
al. (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1956) p. 
19 
175. 
of 1925, faith is defined as die Richtung auf das Unbedingte, as 
'directedness toward the Unconditional'. 99 In both works, the 
meaning of the German word for 'unconditional' (unbedingt) ex- 
plicitly excludes all sense of the limitation of das Unbedingte 
by being made into a 'thing' (Dim). God, accordingly, is not 
the 'object' of faith, if by that is meant that faith's concern 
is with a concrete object established in the temporal order. 
That which is man's ultimate concern is in no way dependent on 
man or on any finite being or concern, for the unconditioned 
cannot be equated with either a single form or with the totality 
of all forms of conditioned reality. As Tillich insists: 'Only 
that which is unconditional can be the expression of uncondi- 
tional concern. A conditioned God is no God'. 
100 
In this discussion of God as the 'abyss' of being, all 
objective thinking is thus ruled out, for, as that term signi- 
fies, what is under consideration is not an object which can be 
found alongside, above, or simply within 'things'. The notion 
of 'abyss' is rooted in an understanding of God which does not 
identify him with 'objective' being in any of these senses; and 
it was this, we remember, which provided the substance of Til- 
lick's case against the 'blasphemous' arguments for the existence 
of God, namely that 'a God about whose existence or non-existence 
you can argue is a thing beside others within the universe of 
99Gesammelte Werke, Bd. I, ed. R. Albrecht (Stuttgart: 
Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959) p"331. 'Religionsphilosophie' 
appeared originally in Lehrbuch der Philosophie, ed. Max Dessoir, 
Bd. IIs Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten (Berlins Ullstein, 
1925) pp. 765-835. This important essay is now available in Eng- 
lish in Tillich's What is Religion? trans. and ed. James Luther 
Adams (New York, Evanston, and Londons Harper and Row, 1969) 
pp"27-121. 
100ST, 1: 275 
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existing things'. 101 These conclusions do not, of course, pre- 
vent Tillioh from realizing that, logically speaking, everything 
toward which the cognitive act is directed is considered an ob- 
ject, whether it be God, inanimate matter, the self or a mathe- 
matical definition. 'In the logical sense everything about which 
a predioation is made is, by this very fact, an object', 
102 In 
this respect, then, the theologian cannot escape making God an 
object, just as he cannot avoid a tendency to use objectivating 
concepts when speaking of him. But, Tillich continues, the basic 
point to be grasped here is that this continual danger of ' logi- 
cal objectification' is never merely logical: 'it carries onto- 
logical presuppositions and implications'. 
103 
If God is brought into the subject-object structure of 
being, he ceases to be the ground of being and becomes 
one being among others (first of all, a being beside 
the subject who looks at him as an object). He ceases 
to be the God who is really God. 104 
Notwithstanding the fact, therefore, that everything which becomes 
real within the cognitive realm enters the subject-object correla- 
tion, theology must always reaffirm the t abysmal t character of 
God - the divine transcendence over the subject-object structure 
of reality - and, in so doing, 'remember that in speaking of God 
it makes an object of that which precedes the subject-object struc- 
ture and that, therefore, it must include in its speaking of God 
the acknowledgement that it cannot make God an object'. 
105 
101, Religion as a Dimension in Dian' s Spiritual Lifet , TC s 
5. See above, p. 171 
102 5,1: 191 
1031bid. 
1041bid (my emphasis). 
1051bid. 
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ýy applying these remarks to Tillich's previous state- 
ments about the revelatory status of the event and biblical por- 
trayal of Jesus as the Christ, we can draw more specific conclu- 
sions about the type of knowledge gained by faith in its relation 
to these revelations. As we have seen already, it is part of the 
function of the event and picture that, as revelations, they 
should manifest God in his attribute of absolute concealment. But 
we may now go further and say that faith, whether it be in its 
original response to Jesus himself or in its response to him 
through the gospel image, thereby enters a situation, unique to 
the dimension of revelation, wherein the normal cognitive corres- 
pondence of subject to object is affirmed and denied simultaneous- 
ly. It is affirmed because man is a centred self to whom every 
relation involves an object; and it is denied because God, as the 
'abyss' of being, can never become an object for man's knowledge. 
Through its acceptance of the event and picture as media by which 
what is hidden is revealed, faith thus imputes to each a particu- 
lar meaning which cannot be evaluated in terms of, or drawn into, 
the subject-object correlation because it is a meaning relative 
only to that which infinitely transcends that correlation and is 
not an element within it. In other words, the a priori of valua- 
tion implied in faith's attitude to Jesus and the biblical portray- 
al of him precludes any subject-object approach towards them be- 
cause the significance that they have for faith is, in this in- 
stance, derived from faith's own perception of their manifestation 
of the 'abysmal' character of God. Here, no law and no category can 
be applied which is taken from an approach to 
finite being, since 
the structure of the content of revelation infinitely 
transcends 
the whole subject. -object structure of reality. 
This is why the 
actual meaning faith ascribes to the 
'original' event and' dependent' 
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picture must, for Tillich, issue in a re-definition of the normal 
cognitive connection between subject and object, between the know- 
er and the known. The 'abysmal' aspect of God recognized by faith 
through these revelations requires that faith, in this perception, 
leaves behind the totality of finite relations and enters a dimen- 
sion which, in the categorical understanding of the word, contains 
no 'relation' at all. This important conclusion establishes Til- 
Lich' s contrast between 'knowledge of revelation' and ordinary 
knowledge, and, accordingly, reinforces his distinction between 
the dimensions of faith and historical research. Revelation is 
the disclosure of that. which remains hidden despite being revealed. 
It is the manifestation to the oonsoiousness of that 'mysterious' 
side of God which, by his infinite power of being, transcends ab. 
solutely the whole finite structure of being grounded in him. Such, 
then, is the disjunction between revelation's 'mystery' and exis- 
tent being that there can be no justification of the content of 
any revelation on the basis of a knowledge which is itself depen- 
dent on the finite form of reality. Thus, historical science - 
given the subject-object distinction as its own precondition of 
knowing - cannot impinge on the dimension in which faith lives and 
operates. In this present case, however, this is so not because 
of the preliminary character of its assertions, but because it is 
in the nature of the knowledge given to and received by faith in 
the situation of revelation that there can be no demonstration or 
verification of revelation except to and for faith itself. The 
dimension of faith, that is, involves a particular knowledge un- 
available and unattainable outside a particular disposition of the 
human subject, evinced in his acceptance of revelation as the 
appearance of the ' abyss' of being within the natural order of 
being. This is the reason why any allowance made by faith for a 
X79. 
oritioo-historical evaluation of the Christ-event through an 
examination of its presentation in the New Testament would dis- 
affirm the meaning that faith in fact attributes to both event 
and picture as revelations. It would contradict, in other terms, 
faith's own acceptance of them as expressions of the ultimate 
concern which. transcends the cleavage between subject and object. 
Historical enquiry cannot, then, devalue or undermine the 
knowledge communicated to and received by faith through, revela- 
tions in the situation of revelation. Neither science nor biblical 
criticism can dissolve revelation because the structure of the con- 
tent of revelation belongs to a dimension for which the subject- 
object structure of scientific and historical research. is inade- 
querte. This same conclusion is upheld in Tillich' s discussion of 
the 'creative' aspect of God, to which we now turn. Here, however, 
we meet a different form of argumentation. The division set up 
between 'knowledge of revelation' and ordinary knowledge - and 
hence the separation made between the areas of faith and research - 
is not, in this instance, sustained by the negation of any identi- 
ty between the finite subject and infinite 'object' in revelation, 
but by its affirmation. Tillich. does not, of course, intend by 
this to impugn the radical transcendence of God as the 'abyss of 
being', but is referring instead to its dialectical counterpart, 
namely, to the creative side of God as the 'ground of being, ' im- 
plied in and constitutive of all existent being, and by which 
reality resists non-being. The affirmation of an identity between 
the human subject and the divine f object I of faith's knowledge 
depends, therefore, upon that immanent quality of God as the 
depth' of existence in which all things finite participate. 
The way in which this emphasis upon the 'creative' aspect 
of God affects the relation between research and faith can be seen 
180. 
best if we turn again to examine Tillich's use of the expression 
'ultimate concern'. Up to this stage, the term has been employed 
chiefly to characterize the 'objective' side of faith, that to 
which faith is directed, namely, the unconditional and 'abysmal' 
nature of God as being-itself or the infinite power of being. And 
yet the meaning of the phrase varies in Tillich' s theology, for 
it is used also to delineate the 'subjective' side of faiths the 
act of faith itself. Thus, for example, Tillich speaks of ulti- 
mate concern as the 'infinite passion... passion for the infinite' 
experienced by each and every individual in the totality of his 
personality. 
106 It is hardly surprising to find, therefore, that 
this use of 'ultimate concern' has been thought highly ambiguous. 
107 
Does the phrase apply to an attitude of concern or to the object 
of that attitude? Does it refer to the individual's own acceptance 
of revelation in faith, or to the content of that received by faith 
through revelation? For our purposes, however, the significant 
point to be made here is that, elsewhere in his work, Tillich does 
resolve this difficulty by explicitly identifying the attitude of 
ultimate concern with its object. 'The ultimate of the act of 
faith and the ultimate that is meant in the act of faith are one 
and the same'. 
108 
Expressed in abstract language, this entails 
'... the disappearance of the ordinary subject-object scheme in the 
experience of the ultimate, the unconditional'. 
109 Thus the term. 
'ultimate concern' 
106 DFs 9 
107See John Flick, Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963) p. 68. Cf. his 'Article Review' of Til- ' 
lich's Systematic Theology, Vols. I& II, Scottish Journal of Theo- 
129Y-, XII, No. 3 (September 1959) pp. 288-289. 
108 DF s 11 
1091bid. 
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unites the subjective and the objective side of the 
act of faith - the fides qua creditur (the faith through which one believes) and the fides guae oredi- tur (the faith which is believed). The first is the 
classical term for the centered act of the personali- ty, the ultimate concern. The second is the classical term for that toward which this act is directed, the 
ultimate itself, expressed in symbols of the divine. 
This distinction is very important, but not ultimately 
so, for the one side cannot be without the other. There is no faith without a content toward which it is directed. 110 
In Tillich's view, therefore, ultimate concern provides 
the place in which the subject-object dichotomy is removed. It is 
for this reason that he refuses to speak of 'knowledge' here, 
since that term 'finally presupposes the separation of subject and 
object, and implies an isolated theoretical act... ' 
ill That is to 
say, ultimate concern is not an expression of the attitude of one 
reality toward another, for the ultimate, being-itself as the 
prius of our own being, can be no object for us as subjects. There 
can be no self-affirmation of a finite being, and no interaction, 
therefore, between the human subject and any object, in which the 
'ground of being' and its power of conquering non being is not 
effective. Accordingly, Tillich adopts instead the word 'aware- 
ness', a 'neutral' term which may be defined as tmystical' to the 
extent that it can be compared to the mystic's experience of the 
identity of subject and object in relation to God., 
112 Hence, ulti- 
mate concern is the ' awareness' of the ultimate itself, the esse 
ipsumt which precedes all differences between subject and object, 
or, to use St. Augustine's terminology, of the veritas ipsa, the 
'truth-itself'. 113 Thus, faith, as the state of being ultimately 
110 Ibid. , po10 
111' The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion', TC t 23 
112 DF: 11 
113See Tillich, 'The Problem of Theological Method', The 
Journal of Religion XXVII, No. l 
(January 19471-p. 23 
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concerned, is not a matter of objective knowledge, of empirical 
research or rational inference, but is the immediate awareness 
of the presence of the unconditional element in ourselves and 
our world, the basis of religious experience. It is rooted in 
a 'mystical a priori' , namely, in Ian awareness of something 
that transoenda the cleavage between subject and objest'. 
114 
Following this analysis of ultimate concern, we may say 
that, for Tillich, the content of that which is received in the 
situation of revelation is identical with the structure of him 
who receives its identical, that is, in the sense that what is 
received is the necessary quality implied in the being of the 
recipient. The implication of this understanding of revelation 
as the appearance of God as the 'depth' of being is, then, that 
faith receives and accepts that which excludes, by its creative 
power, any observer who is not himself conditioned by it in his 
Whole being. The finitude of the human subject implies non- 
being, but is in fact more than non-beings it carries within it- 
self the power of being, and this power of being issues from its 
participation in God as being-itself, the oreative 'ground' of 
being. Indeed, the meaning that faith attaohes to revelations 
revelations implies this ontological relation. The revelatory 
significance perceived in, and ascribed to, certain elements of 
reality by faith entails faith' e awareness that by them is mani- 
fested that infinite 'power of being' which is its own 'depth' or 
I ground' of being. 
In aaknowledging both the event 'Jesus as the Christ' and 
its biblical portrayal to be revelations, the man of faith there- 
fore recognizes that through them appears something which is iden- 
tical with him even though it transcends him absolutely: something 
114ST, 11 12 
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from which he is estranged by the finitude of his own existence, 
but from which he cannot be separated by virtue of his own limited 
power of being. Thus, in calling them 'revelations', faith not 
only announces its own witness to the manifestation of the 'crea- 
tive' attribute of God through the Christ-event and its picture, 
but, in so doing, specifies the unique cognitive value of their 
meaning for faith. 'Knowledge of revelation' involves no 'know- 
ledge' at all - if by that term one is referring to the capacity 
of the human subject to know the divine 'object' as distinct from 
himself. In revelation, our author writes, 'God remains the sub- 
ject, even if he becomes a logical object'. 
115 In the situation 
of revelation, the knowing subject is ontologically determined by 
that which is the logical object of his concern; and it is this 
relation that accounts for the fundamental difference between re- 
search and faith. The distinction between the two dimensions here 
consists in the fact that, whereas in historical science the act 
of knowing proceeds on the basis of the knower' s initial and in- 
tended detachment from the object of his enquiry, in faith that 
which is known through revelation is the prius of the knower, the 
necessary presupposition of every being, and so, of every thought. 
'God can never be reached if he is the object of a question, and 
not its basis'. 
116 In 'knowledge of revelation', therefore, what 
115ST, is 191. An affinity with Karl Iarth's theology 
is evident here. Thus Barth writes: 'The Subject of revelation 
is the Subject that remains indissolubly Subject. We cannot get 
behind this Subject. It cannot become an ob-ject'. The Doctrine of 
the Word of God trans. G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1949) Vol-I, Part 1, p. 438. For an analysis of Barth's position, 
see James Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theolo (Londons 
S. C. M. Press, 1955 PP"140-167. 
116' The Two Types 
follows from this that God 
question of God' 
(Ibid. ) - 
mind to the Absolute which 
contained in the so-called 
of Philosophy of Religion', TO: 13. It 
is also 'the presupposition of the 
an insight into the relation of our 
is, Tillich adds, the essential truth 
'ontological argument'. The question 
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is communicated to faith is implied in, and precedes, every rela- 
tion between subject and object, and thus involves no knowledge 
which is itself dependent on that correlation. The meaning given 
to the Christian revelations is drawn from faith's immediate and 
personal awareness in them of that quality of ' ultimacy' implicit 
in the structure of existence as a whole, of that which, by its 
infinite power of being, precedes and governs all practical and 
theoretical distinctions made between subject and object. This 
meaning is not, accordingly, an opinion either derived from, or 
accessible in terms of, the cognitive relation of subject to 
object entailed in the oritico-historical approach. 
With this discussion of revelation, we may conclude that 
it is in the nature of faith that, by its original response to the 
revelation of Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ, and by its subse- 
quent response to him through the biblical picture presented in 
the New Testament, faith enters a unique situation in which the 
epistemological contrast made by the historian between the knower 
and the known is no longer applicable. To summarize Tillich' s 
position briefly, the reason why this should be so is as follows. 
Within the dimension of faith, the meaning given to these revela- 
tions as revelations originates with faith's own perception that 
through them appears God in his double characteristic of 'abyss' 
and 'ground'. It is a meaning, that is, relative only to that 
which, by its power of being as being-itself, both transcends and 
determines the subject-object scheme implied in not only historical 
judgments but in all normal cognitive acts. The distinction be- 
tween historico-scientific knowledge and the knowledge communicated 
to the human consciousness by these revelations thus depends on 
recognizing two things: first, that what 
is revealed by the event 
of God can be asked because there 
is an unconditional element im- 
plicit within the very act of asking any question 
(ST, 1: 227-231). 
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and its picture is no 'object', but the ultimate, the absolutely 
hidden, that which cannot be approached by a form of knowledge 
appropriate to known or knowable reality; and second, that what 
does manifest itself through them is known, not by detached ob- 
servation or evaluation, but by each individual's 'awareness' of 
its identity with that which is the 'subject' of his own finitude, 
governing the being or non-being of his own existence. 
117 On 
both counts, therefore, faith's knowledge of the Christ-event and 
its biblical image as revelations is incapable of being subject 
to, or drawn into, the subject-object structure of historical 
knowledge. Faith is not an act of cognitive affirmation within 
the subject-object form of reality, and, as such, is not deter- 
mined by the verifying methods of the trained historian. To sup- 
pose otherwise is to confuse the one dimension of knowledge with 
the other. So, Tillich concludes, 
Theologians need not be afraid of any historical con- 
jecture, for revealed truth lies in a dimension where 
it can neither be confirmed nor negated by historio- 
graphy. Therefore, theologians should not prefer some 
results of historical research. to others on theologi- 
cal grounds, and they should not resist results which 
finally have to be accepted if scientific honesty is 
not to be destroyed, even if they seem to undermine 
the knowledge of revelation. Historical investiga- 
tions should neither comfort nor worry theologians. 118 
117With Tillich's translation of 'revelation' in this 
way, one is able to understand faith in terms of the ultimate 
itself, namely as man' a concern about that which is revealed as 
the ultimate, and to understand the ultimate in terms of 
faith, 
namely as that about which man is ultimately concerned in the 
situation of revelation. This double possibility, which, 
Tillich 
maintains, preserves the ultimacy of the ultimate 
but which 
allows for a conception of the ultimate 
from the viewpoint of 
man's awareness of it in the depth of his 
being, constitutes for 
him a third and superior position 'beyond naturalism and supra- 
naturalism' (ST, 2s 5-9)9 
118 1: 144 
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b) Faith and Religious Symbols. 
The last aspect of Tillich's theological doctrine of know- 
ledge with which we are concerned - his theory of religious sym- 
bolism - is an extension of his analysis of revelation; and thus, 
in so far as it reinforces the contrast drawn between the nature 
of faith and historical enquiry, it too relies on the differences 
said to exist between 'knowledge of revelation' and ordinary know- 
ledge. Because of this dependence, the notion of 'religious sym- 
bol', despite remaining one of the most complex and pervasive 
features of Tillich's entire theology, has only limited additional 
use for the argument at hand. 
119 Nevertheless, its importance for 
us is that, in underscoring the distinction already made between 
the finite media of revelation and what is revealed by them, the 
doctrine of religious symbolism details still more exactly the 
particular status of these media under the power of that which 
they express, the ultimate of being, being-itself. To clarify the 
point being made here - Tillich tells us that, because every per- 
son and thing necessarily participate in the infinite power of 
being, 'there is no reality, thing, or event which cannot become a 
119 For further details on Tillich's discussion of 'reli- 
gious symbol', see: R. F. Aldwinckle, 'Tillich's Theory of Reli- 
gious Symbolism' , Canadian Journal of Theology, X. No. 2 
(April 
1964) pp. 110-117; W. P. Alston, 'Tillich's Conception of a Reli- 
gious Symbol', Religious Experience and Truth, ed. S. Hook, pp. 
12-26; Bowman L. Clarke, 'God and the Symbolic in Tillich', Angli- 
can Theological Review, XLIII, No-3 (July 1961) pp. 302-311; John 
Y. Fenton, 'Being-itself and Religious Symbolism', The Journal of 
Religion, XLV, No. 2 (April 1965) pp. 73-86; Lewis S. Ford, 'The 
Three Strands of Tillich' s Theory of Religious Symbols', The 
Journal of Religion, XLVI, No. l (January 1966) pp. 104-130; H. D. 
McDonald, 'The Symbolic Theology of Paul Tillich. ', Scottish Jour- 
nal of Theology, XVII, No. 4 (December 1964) pp"414-430; Michael 
Simpson, 'Paul Tillichs Symbolism and Objectivity', The Reythrop 
Journal, VIII, No-3 (July 1967) pp. 293-309; and, both by Paul L. 
Holzer, 'Paul Tillich and the Language about God', Journal of 
Religious Thought, XXII, No. 1 (January 1965-66) pp. 35-50, and 
'Paul Tillich: Language and Meaning', Journal of Religious Thought, 
XXII, No. 2 (April 1965-66) pp. 85-106. Rowe's Religious Symbols 
and God remains the only full-length analysis 
of Tillich's theory 
of religious symbolism. 
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bearer of the mystery of being and enter a revelatory correla- 
ý 120 tion He adds, however, that 'nothing has become the bearer 
of revelation by its outstanding qualities.. 91 
121 While all 
objects thus have, in principle, an equal ontological status be- 
cause all participate in being-itself, no element of reality can 
serve as the medium of revelation unless it manifests to the 
consciousness the mystery of being. No natural thing or process 
subject to the structure of being can become, therefore, a vehi- 
cle of revelation through what it is in itself, but only through 
its manifestation of that which is both implicit within and dis- 
tinot from it as the 'ground' and 'abyss' of its own being and 
meaning. It is not, for example, the historical significance or 
personal greatness of the medium's individual characteristics that 
make it revelatory. This stipulation, in Tillich's view, avoids 
the danger of a 'natural theology' in revelation. 
Revelation through natural mediums is not natural reve- 
lation. "Natural revelation", if distinguished from 
revelation through nature, is a contradiction in terms, 
for if it is natural knowledge it is not revelation, 
and if it is revelation it makes nature ecstatic and 
miraculous... Natural theology and, even more definitely, 
natural revelation are misnomers for the negative side 
of the revelation of the mystery, for an interpretation 
of the shock and stigma of non-being. 122 
It is precisely this same affirmation and negation of the 
object's own concrete qualities which stand at the centre of Til- 
lich's theory of religious symbolism. According to him, the form 
of the religious symbol is such that it simultaneously affirms 
the necessity of using material taken from finite reality in order 
120 ST, 1: 131 
121Ibid. 
122IÄ 
, p. 133. Cf. 
tNatural and Revealed Religion', 
Christendom I, No. 1 (Autumn 1935) PP"159-170. However, for an , 
alternative opinion, see Lewis S. Ford, 
'Tillich's Implicit Natu- 
ral Theology', Scottish Journal of Theology, XXIV, 
No. 3 (August 
1971) pp. 257-270- 
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to give content to the cognitive function in revelation, and 
negates the normal cognitive use of these finite materials by 
expressing that. which both 'transcends' and 'precedes' the struc- 
ture of being to which these materials properly belong. Here, the 
negation of the functional importance of the medium's specific 
characteristics in determining the revelatory significance attri- 
buted to it by faith evolves from the necessary denial that such 
characteristics are in any way attributes of what the medium re«- 
veals. The doctrine of religious symbolism advocated by Tillich 
is designed, in other words, to avoid the danger of subjecting 
the ultimate mystery of being to the subject-object structure of 
being from which the media of revelation are drawn; and, for this 
reason, the theory requires that no finite element can be regarded 
as a vehicle of revelation simply on the basis of a critical 
evaluation of its individual properties. If the contrary is the 
case, then the meaning of the object as a medium of revelation 
becomes self-contradictory, since, being now dependent on that 
which is capable of analysis or description, it is no longer re- 
lated to our ultimate concern, being-itself. In this way, there- 
fore, Tillich's notion of 'religious symbol' upholds the distinc- 
tion already made between the dimensions of research and faith. 
It implies that the validity of the interpretation of an object as 
a revelation is not governed by any analysis of the correspondence 
between the meaning ascribed to the object and that object's own 
factual-historical mode of being; and this is in direct contrast 
to the process of knowing presupposed in historical science. 
In all the various accounts Tillich has given of his 
theory of religious symbolism, he contrasts religious symbols with 
189. 
' symbols' generally. 123 The function of ' symbols' may be sum- 
marized briefly in four propositions: 124 
1. Symbols are figurative, that is, they point beyond them- 
selves to something for which they stand; they are 
' self-transcendent' . 
2. Symbols participate in the reality of that which they 
symbolize. 
3. Thus symbols cannot be replaced arbitrarily or according 
to expediency; they grow and die, but are not invented 
or abolished. 
4. Symbols open up levels of being and levels of the soul 
Which symbols alone can open; they disclose dimensions 
of reality which cannot be experienced except through 
symbol a. 
The religious symbol, while possessing all these oharao- 
teristics of 'symbol', has, however, its own special features. 
1231n 
all, Tillich has written six essays on religious 
symbolism: 1) 'Das religit3se Symbol' , Batter für deutsche Philo- 
sophie (Berlin), I, No-4 (January 1928 pp. 277-299. This has been 
translated and revised in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. S. 
Hook, pp.. 301-321; 2) 'Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God', 
Christian Scholar, XXX`TIII, No-3 (September 1955) pp-"189-197, and 
reprinted as 'The Nature of Religious Language' in. TC: 53-67; 3) 
'Theology and Symbolism' , Religious Symbolism, ed. F. Ernest John- 
son. (New York: Harper & Bros., 1955) PP- 107-116; 4), 'Existential 
Analyses and Religious Symbols', Contemporary- Problems in Religion, 
ed. H. A. Basilius (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1956) PP-35- 
55, and reprinted in Four Existentialist Theologians, ed. Will 
Herberg (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, No. 141,1958) pp,. 
277-291; 5) 'The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols', 
Religious Experience and Truth, ed. S. Hook, PP. 3-12; 6) 'God as 
being and the knowledge of God', ST, 1: 264-268. 
124This 
summary depends on Tillich's own resume of his 
theory of symbolism in 'The Word of God', Language: An Enquiry 
into its Meaning and Function ed. Ruth N. Anshen 
(New Yorks Harper 
& Bros*, 1957) pp. 12,2-133* 
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Religious symbols point to the deepest level of being which is 
not a level but the creative 'ground' in all levels; they are 
representations of that which is man's ultimate concern. 
They must express an object that by its very nature transcends everything in the world that is split in- to subjectivity and objectivity. A real symbol points to an object which never can become an object. Religi- 
ous symbols represent the transcendent but do not 
make the transcendent immanent. They do not make trod 
a part of the empirical wor]d. 125 
The distinctive function of religious symbols is, therefore, to 
point to the ultimate level of reality, being. -itself. That IGod 
is being-itselft is the only direct, non-symbelic affirmation 
open to theology, and is implicit in every, religious thought 
abut God. 
126 For if Tillich ar guess the question, 'Is there a 
noneymbelic statement about the referent of religious symbols? t 
cannot be answered affirmatively, then I the necessity of symbolic 
language for religion could net be proved and the whole argument 
would lead into a vicious circle'e127 A religious symbol is, in 
125'The Religious Symbol', p. 303 
126 ST, is 264-265. 
127'The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols', 
p. 6. We should add here that the question of the non-symbolic 
status of the assertion 'God is being. itself' is one of the most 
perplexing issues in Tillich's theology, if only because he 
appears to have reversed his position at least twice. His non- 
symbolic doctrine, advocated primarily in ST, 1, differs from his 
earlier, pan-symbolist view that tall knowledge of God has a sym- 
bolic character' ('The Religious Symbol', p. 316). This change, 
Tillich says, followed upon Wilbur Urbang criticism that 'in 
order to speak of symbolic knowledge one must delimit the symbol- 
ic realm by an unsymbolio statement' 
(I Reply to Interpretation and 
Criticism', The Theology of Paul Tillich, P-334)- However, in ST, 
2s 9, our author maintains that the only nonsymbolic statement is 
'the statement that everything we say about God 
is symbolic. Such 
a statement is an assertion about God which 
itself is not symbolic'. 
Yet this position is not only closer to that which 
Urban criticized 
- namely that no positive, 
literal characterization can be made of 
God as the unconditioned - but is also self-contradictory. 
The 
statement that 'everything we say about 
God is symbolic? should, on 
its own terms, be symbolic and not 
the literal assertion Tillich 
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other words, symbolic because it represents that which is uncon- 
ditionally beyond its own conceptual sphere, the ultimate reality 
implied in the religious act; and 'God is being-itself' is not 
symbolic because, as the fundamental and most abstract ontologi- 
cal concept, it points to no higher mode of being beyond itself. 
'It means what it says directly and properly; if we speak of the 
actuality of God we first assert that he is not God if he is not 
being-itself. Other assertions about God can be made theologi- 
cally only on this basis'. 
128 
Thus, every statement about being-itself - other than 
the statement that God is being-itself - is symbolic. 'To speak 
unsymbolically about being-itself is untrue'. 
129 
The pivotal 
point of Tillich's argument here is that the ultimate level of 
reality to which religious symbols refer is not subject to the 
finite structure of reality and its limitations. God, as being- 
itself, is the ground of the ontological structure of being with- 
out being determined by this structure himself. 'Therefore, if 
anything beyond this bare assertion is said about God, it no 
longer is a direct and proper statement, no longer a concept. It 
wishes to affirm. From the standpoint of this thesis, to accept 
the view that 'God is being-itself' is a literal identity state- 
ment has, to use William Rowe's words, the important consequence 
'that the ontological status of God and the ontological status 
of being-itself are not two different questions but one and the 
same' (op. cit. , pp-30-31). This 
has been our own underlying 
position in the previous interpretation of Tillich's concept of 
'revelation' (see above, pp. 169-171). Cf. Wilbur M. Urban, 'Til- 
lich's Theory of the Religious Symbol', Journal of Liberal Reli- 
gion, II, fo. 2 (Summer 1940) pp. 34-36; John Y. Fenton, 'Being- 
itself and Religious Symbolism', The Journal of Religion, XLV, No. 
2 (April 1965) pp. 73-86; and Lewis S. Ford, 'Tillich's One Non- 
symbolic Statement: A Pry of a Recent Study by Rowe' , Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion, XXXVIII, No. 2 
(June 1970 pp. 
176-182. 
128 
t 1: 265 
1'o-90B 
: 175 
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is indirect, and it points to something beyond itself. In a word, 
it is symbolic'. 
130 A statement is symbolic, that is, in so far 
as it uses a segment of finite experience in order to say some- 
thing about God; but since Good, as the transcendent absolute, 
being-itself, is a reality beyond the subject-object structure of 
being, no element of being therein discovered can be literally 
applied to him. Accordingly, no literal assertion concerning the 
laws and structure of nature, the biological and psychological 
character of man, or the facts and processes of history can be 
identified with religious symbols. Conversely, religious symbols 
are immune to the criticisms of non-symbolic language, since they 
are not circumscribed by any law, process or fact concerning man 
and his world. Such oritioisms are not only confusions of literal 
and symbolic language, but are, since language expresses reality, 
oonfusion8 also of the dimensions of reality to which these dif- 
ferent kinds of language refer. 
Aa a basic oharacteristic of all religious symbols, this 
non-literal form is evident in each of the various types of reli- 
gious symbol. Briefly put, Tillioh distinguishes between two 
classes of religious symbol, the 'primary' and the 'secondary', 
the former pointing directly to the referent of religious symbol- 
ism, being-itself, the latter supporting or artistically re- 
symbolizing the primary. 
31 We shall be concerned only with 
primary religious symbols. These Tillich further subdivides into 
two levels: 'the transcendent level, the level which goes beyond 
the empirical reality we encounter, and the immanent level, the 
13OST,, 1: 265 
131, The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols', 
p. 8 
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level which we find within the encounter with reality'. 
132 Pri- 
mary-transcendent religious symbols consist in the central symbol 
of a 'highest' being to whom certain qualities are attributed 
(v_ 
, personality, power, love, justice, etc., and encompass 
also those symbols which characterize the divine actions (viz., 
creation, providence, judgment, etc. ). Primary-immanent religi- 
ous symbols, on the other hand, live in the realm of 'appearances 
of the divine in time and space', 
133 
and so include all events, 
things or people through which the unconditioned transcendent has 
been manifested. Thus, while this second type involves primarily 
those historical personalities who have become the object of the 
religious act (e. g., the Christ or the Buddha), it extends to 
every element of reality which has occasioned an awareness of the 
ultimate, whether it be, for example, the sacramental materials 
of the Lord's Supper, or even the 0: ruoifi . 
134 
Following this classification of the types of religious 
symbol, we may oonolude that all the finite media of revelation, 
in so far as they are aooepted by faith as the vehicles through 
Which the absolute and transcendent appears within the natural 
order of being, are 'primary-immanent' religious symbols. Thus, 
both the event 'Jesus as the Christ' and its New Testament presen- 
tation, as the 'miracle' or 'giving' sides of original and depen- 
dent revelations respectively, belong in this category, it being 
a level of religious symbolism appropriate only to the 'manifesta- 
tion of the divine in things and events, in persons and communities, 
132 
k 61 
133 1!, p. 63 
1341_ 
9 pp. 64-65 
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in words and documents'"135 Significantly enough, this suggests 
in turn that, as symbols of this type, the Christ-event and its 
biblical picture conform to the non-literal structure of religi- 
ours symbols generally, and are, for that reason, independent of 
any empirical criticism. In the case of the original Christian 
event, this point is underlined when Tillich, speaking of those 
historical personalities that have become 'primary-immanent' 
eymbole, both affirms their '©bjeotivity' and negates their 
'rational objectivity'. 
136 His acceptance of the necessary fae- 
ticity of the figures regarded as media of revelation is, in 
other terms, contrasted here with his denial that any practical 
or theoretical process could establish their historical reality 
as media of revelation. This signifies 'that these objects that 
possess a holy character are not empirical, even if they can 
only be conceived as existing in the empirical order'. 
137 That is 
to say, the personalities that have become the focus of a religir. 
ous act are empirical to the extent that they belong to the 
subject-object structure of being; but they are not empirical in 
that the meaning attributed to them in that act cannot be valida- 
ted within the sub jeot-ob jecat schema of rationality-138 This 
being so, then faith's picture, by claiming to be based on the 
actual revelation in Jesus the Christ, claims also to portray an 
event, the original nature of which precludes any judgment of its 
truth as a revelation on the basis of a oritical assessment of 
its factual-historical mode of being. For the theory of religious 
135DF: 48 
136 'The Religious Symbol', P. 316 
1371, P-317 
138This 
view we remember; accords with Tillich's dis- 
cussion of the nature of 'miracle. See above, p. 164. 
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symbolism indicates that while such 'primary-immanent' symbols 
have historical elements - in that the peculiarity of these 
symbols 'depends precisely upon their historical reality, their 
reality in the objective sense'139 - they do not mediate any 
literal truth about themselves from which their meaning as sym- 
bole may, be deduoed. If the meaning of any element of reality 
as a 'primary-immanent' religious symbol depends on its revela- 
tion of the ultimate to the human oonsoiousne®s, then the cri- 
tenon of its truth as a symbol cannot be a non-symbolic aoapari. - 
son between its own individual qualities and the ultimate reality 
to which it refers. This is because the reality thus pointed to 
by the religious symbol transcends infinitely the structure of 
being to which every finite segment of reality, and every, episte- 
mological distinction between subject and object, are bound. It 
is, so Tillich remarks, 
the first step in the deterioration of religion when it 
identifies symbols with the world of finite interrela- 
tions which furnishes the material of the symbols - 
which are the material and not that. which is signified. 
That which is signified lies beyond the symbolic mater- 
ial. This is the first and last thing we must may about 
religious symbolism. 140 
Since, therefore, no person or event which manifests the 
absolutely hidden can be equated with the mystery it reveals, so 
the truth of the event 'Jesus as the Christ' as a 'primary- 
immanent' religious symbol is not governed by any historico- 
scientific evaluation of the literal correspondence between the 
139'The Religious Symbol', p. 316. Tillich adds that it 
would be 'entirely contradictory to the religious consciousness 
if one characterized these personalities, or what they did and 
what happened to them, as symbols... The use of symbolism with 
regard to this world in which the holy is supposed to be really 
present would involve a denial of its presence and hence the 
destruction of its existence' (Ibid. ). 
140'Theology 
and Symbolism', p. 116 
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quality or character of its finite material (the man Jesus of 
Nazareth) and the revelatory significance ascribed to it by 
faith. 141 The importance of this symbol depends on its expres- 
sion of the ultimate in its unoonditionedness; but this require- 
ment is not met if the conditioned reality which here serves as 
the vehicle of revelation is elevated to the dignity of the un- 
conditioned. That which is perceived by faith manifests itself 
through the medium; but the medium is the agent and not the 
source of the manifestation. Hence revelation is not the commu- 
nication of knowledge concerning the ultimate based on any 
analysis of the intrinsic properties of the medium. To suppose 
otherwise is 'idolatry', the substitution of the unconditioned 
by the conditioned, the attribution of divine predicates to a 
finite reality. 
142 
This same pattern of argument is evident when we turn to 
consider the biblical picture as a religious symbol. The picture 
functions as a 'primary-immanent' symbol in that it conveys to 
present faith the original response and witness to the revelation 
of the ultimate in Jesus the Christ. For those not contemporaries 
of that event, faith's apprehension of the ultimate of being, God 
as being-itself, in the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth is 
here made available through the form of the biblical portrait, 
the language of which is the human expression of the state of 
141'Although 
not directly linked to his dootrine of religi- 
ous symbolism, this point is implicit in Tillich's contention that 
the revelation witnessed to by the biblical picture is the 'final 
revelation', namely, the revelation which contains the medium's 
own rejection of all ultimate claims for itself. See Ste, 1: 147-153. 
142 his further explains the meaning of the 'risk of faith' 
(see above, pp. 143-146). This risk is the tendency within faith 
to identify the religious symbol with the ultimate it reveals; it 
has nothing to do, therefore, with the risk of accepting uncertain 
historical facts. See TC s 60-61, and ST', 2: 134. 
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revelatory ecstasy originally experienced by the biblical writers. 
It is therefore correct to say that, according to Tillich, the 
particular category of symbolism to which the Christian event be- 
longs, and to which the New Testament refers, is distinguished by 
the fact that it embraces at the same time historical and trans- 
cendent aspects: this event represents for faith's picture a mani- 
festation of the unconditioned within the order of conditioned 
being. To this we should add, however, that since the ultimate 
stands, by its very nature, beyond the subject-object structure of 
being, the meaning of every statement about the unconditioned is 
in principle different from the meaning of every statement about 
the conditioned. We may conclude, then, that the distinctive 
feature of the biblical picture is that, in seeking to portray an 
event belonging to the class of 'primary-immanent' symbols, it 
simultaneously includes assertions about the concrete form of 
Jesus' historical existence which. are fundamentally incompatible 
with its assertions expressive of his meaning as a religious sym- 
bol, namely, with those relative to faith's perception of the 
ultimate in him. This incompatibility derives from the different 
dimensions of reality to which each group of assertions refers. 
We remember, for example, that on Tillich's understanding of the 
Christ-event as a religious symbol, this event's manifestation of 
the ultimate reality lying beyond subject and object cannot be 
validated by a critical analysis of the finite characteristics of 
the medium through which that reality appears within the subject- 
object order of being. The biblical picture, as a revelation 
testifying to a revelation, contains this same symbolic structure. 
Thus, in similar fashion, the truth of the picture's statements 
regarding the biblical writers' own witness to the revelation in 
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Jesus the Christ cannot be guaranteed by any scientific-historical 
evaluation of the truth of its statements about the actual form of 
Jesus' earthly existence. The truth of a religious symbol, our 
author maintains, 'has nothing to do with the validity of factual 
statements concerning the symbolic material. However problematic 
the symbolic material in its literal meaning may be, its symbolic 
character and its validity as a symbol are not determined by 
it, * 
143 It is accordingly, a disastrous misunderstanding of the 
function of the biblical portrait as a religious symbol to identi- 
fy the validity of the meaning it attributes to Jesus of Nazareth 
as the medium of revelation with the historical accuracy of its 
stories about him. Faith's portrayal of him as the Christ cannot, 
therefore, be falsified by historical research, even if such re- 
search criticizes the narratives in which the occurrence of the 
Christ-event is presented. 
144 
While the historian may be able to 
speak with scientific precision about the worth of the biblical 
picture as a report about an assumed revelation, he cannot speak 
of it as a witness to an actual revelation, and hence can contri- 
bute nothing to the knowledge of revelation mediated by it. In 
such a hermeneutic, writes Gustave Weigel, 
it is postulated that the Bible as a record of revela- 
tion does not teach history, for history is not a matter 
of ultimate concern... As a record of revelation, the 
Scriptures make no historiographic statements, and to 
look for such betrays a misunderstanding of their nature. 
143tThe Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols', 
p. ll. Elsewhere Tillich writes: 'The truth of a religious sym- 
bol has nothing to do with the truth of the empirical assertions 
involved in it, be they physical, psychological, or historical' 
(ST, 1: 266). 
144This 
view goes some way in further explaining our 
author's attitude to 'demythologization' 
(see above, Ch. III, p. 
101, n. 4). For Tillich, myths are symbols of faith expressed in 
terms of events in time and space. The truth of myths depends, 
therefore, on their adequacy in expressing the revelations to 
which they point, and is not determined by the literal truth of 
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If a historian uses the Bible as something less than a record of revelation, he is using a document of dubious trustworthiness, because any historiographic value in the books is completely irrelevant to the real signifi- cance of the reports. The Bible is a record of revela- tion and not the historiographic presentation of secular events. The symbolists make much of the meaning of his- tory, but as theologians they ignore on principle any historiographic validity of the Bible-P145 
Tillich thus draws a distinction between the value of the 
biblical picture as a religious symbol and its importance as an 
historical document. It is symbolic by manifesting to receiving 
faith the original revelation irr. Jesus the Christ through the 
medium of its language, and is true only in so far as it incor- 
porates the original meaning of the revelatory situation it is 
intended to reflect; but to the extent that it contains details 
of Jesus' life - what he did and what happened to him - its pro- 
positions are fallible, as certain as the evidence on which they 
are based. The significance of this portrait lies, in other 
words, in the meaning it attributes to the person of Jesus of 
Nazareth, but concerning whom it can make no definite, critically 
evaluable, judgments. This does not entail, however, that the 
non-literal form of the biblical picture either impugns the real- 
ity of Jesus as an actual individual or denies that his interpre- 
their empirical references. He thus agrees with Hultman in the 
tdeliteralization' of myths, but denies that one can 'demytholo- 
gize' (i. e., do away with myths altogether) since 'there are no 
substitutes for the use of symbols and myths: they are the lan- 
guage of faith' (DIS: 51). So Tillich argues: 'Myth is more than 
a primitive world-view with which H'ultmann wrongly equates it; 
it is the necessary and adequate expression of revelation. In 
this I agree with Barth, who for some questionable terminological 
reason calls it "Sage" (Saga)'. 'The Present Theological Situa- 
tion in the Light of the Continental Development', Theology Today, 
VI, No-3 (October 1949) p9306. Of. Perspectives, pp. 227-228. On 
this difference between Tillich and Buitmann, see Klaus Rosenthal, 
'Myth and Symbol', Scottish Journal of Theology, XVIII, No. 4 
(December 1965) PP"431-432; and Robert A. Ayers, "'Myth" in Theo- 
logical Discourse: A Profusion of Confusion' I Anglican Theological 
Rte, XLVIII, No. 2 (April 1966) pp. 204-211. 
145'Myth, Symbol, and Analogy', Paul Tillich in Catholic 
Thought, p"l90 
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tation as the Christ implies certain claims about the nature of 
his being as New Being; it is rather designed to show that the 
truth of the christological importance ascribed to Jesus' being 
by faith is unrelated to any literal-scientific verification of 
the 'historical truths of its assertions about him. 
146 While 
the historian is at liberty, therefore, to seek the 'historical 
Jesus' in the soriptural witness to Jesus' life and work, his 
findings, so Tillich concludes, can neither confirm nor deny any.. 
thing of relevance to the theological truth about Jesus revealed 
in the picture. For, according to the theory of religious syn- 
bolism, the pictorial presentation and consequent acceptance of 
this historical figure as a revelation raise this figure, as it 
were, to a dimension in which his actuality as the Christ derives 
from faith's perception of his relation to the unconditional tran- 
soendent and not from an analysis of his empirical form. The bib- 
lical portrait as a religious symbol is, in this respect, indepen- 
dent of any empirical criticism oi its own empirical statements 
about Jesus of Nazareth; it speaks of history but not historiogra- 
phically, since the meaning faith attaches therein to Jesus is 
relative only to its awareness through him of that which precedes 
and transcends the subject-object, level of rationality to which 
historical science belongs. 
146This 
same point is made most forcefully in Tillich's 
later discussion of the historical accuracy of Jesus' name. See 
below, Ch. V, pp. 213-217. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CERTAINTY OF FAITH AND 
TILLICH'S CONCEPT OF THE 
ANALOGIA IMAGINIS 
Thus farr, Tillich' s discussion of the problem of the 
historical Jesus has brought him to the conclusion that the 
biblical picture cannot provide either trustworthy or adequate 
material for an historico- aoientifio reconstruction of Jesus' 
life and work which would be of relevance to chrietology. At 
the risk of oversimplification, we may say that the reasons 
given for the adoption of this position fall essentially into 
two forms of argumentation. The first has to do with certain 
critical observations made by Tillich into the special nature 
of the biblical sources, which correspond in turn to his own 
particular understanding of the structural character of the 
event to which these sources refer. While it is accepted that 
virtually all information about the oareer of Jesus is to be 
found in the New Testament, it is argued nevertheless that any 
attempt to create an 'historical Jesus' from this information 
firstly ignores the valid literary-critical conclusion that 
even the moat ancient and reputedly accurate narratives are 
determined by, and impregnated with, the theologioal require- 
ments and intentions of the communities in which they arose, 
and secondly, and still more fundamentally, betrays an ignor- 
201 
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ance of the factual-interpretative nature of the event portrayed 
by them. 
. Ae we have suggested before, here is a basic agreement 
with Rudolf Bittmann that, given the kerygmatio character of the 
gospel e, no distinction can be made between the man Jesus and 
Jesus the Christ in order to discover the empirical truth about 
Jesus of Nazareth - an argument which is, we recall, later do- 
veloped by our author in terms of the original and necessary con- 
junction of 'fact' and 'interpretation' within the event 'Jesus 
as the Christ'. There can thus be no legitimate encounter with 
a scientifically observed 'historical Jesus' , for not only were 
the scriptural reports about Jesus constructed for quite defin- 
ite missionary and homiletic purposes, but even the Jesus about 
whom we have reports was from the first the Christ of faith. In 
neither oase, therefore, is the evidence given about the life of 
Jesus in any way diasociable from the context in which it is re- 
oeived, namely, from that situation presupposed, and witnessed 
to, by the biblical picture in which Jesus is confessed as the 
Christ . 
The second pattern of argument is designed to complement 
the first since it seeks to show that only an absolute rejection 
of all efforts to find the 'historical Jesus' by critical methods 
can remain true to what Tillich regarded as the proper interests 
and functions of both research and faith. As we saw in the pre- 
vious chapter, the argument employed here proceeds from an analy. 
eia of the preliminary and subject-object form of historical en- 
quirt' to the conclusion that, such being the relation between 
faith and the form of knowledge aommunioated and expressed in 
revelation and religious symbols, the validity of faith'a accep- 
tanne of Jesus as the Christ cannot be determined by any seienti. 
fio discovery of the actual manner or content of Jesus' earthly 
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existence. Indeed, Tillich goes further and rejects the view 
that at least a minimum of historically certified facts are 
essential to the veracity of faith's claims, insisting instead 
that the truth of the christological interpretation of Jesus is 
not equivalent to all those factual-historical statements which 
could be made truthfully about his life. The problem of the 
historical Jesus is not, on this line of reasoning, an issue 
circumscribed by the question of whether or not certain inci- 
dents narrated in the New Testament actually happened in the way 
they are reported to have happened. Faith alone is the neces- 
sary presupposition of any knowledge of Jesus as the Christ be- 
cause this knowledge is relative only to faith's own perception 
of the ultimate in him. No historical science can govern the 
authenticity or inauthenticity of this claim because it is a 
claim born of the awareness of that which infinitely transcends 
the subject-object order of rationality to which historical 
science and all other forms of ordinary knowledge adhere. Bib- 
lical criticism cannot, accordingly, invalidate the meaning 
attributed to Jesus of Nazareth in the situation of revelation 
because the content of that in which an ultimate meaning is 
perceived by faith belongs to a dimension for which the subject- 
object structure of scientific and historical research is inade- 
quate. Tillich also adds that this theological theory of knowledge, 
which denies the legitimacy of every human claim concerning the 
revelation of the ultimate of being in Jesus the Christ, parallels 
the Pauline-Lutheran doctrine of justification by grace through 
faith alone. 
1 In requiring that faith's understanding of the 
1This 
connection is suggested by our author in the 
following passages 'I managed to reconcile the 
doctrine of justifi- 
cation with radical historical criticism 
by developing an interpre- 
tation of the idea of justification that has been of the greatest 
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Christ-event must be released frone all historicist objectifica- 
tions of its meaning in terms of historical facts, this theory 
stipulates, that is to say, that the revelation of the tmystery' 
of being, God as being-itself, in the Christian event precludes 
any view of it formulated on the basis of the preparatory acts 
of man. The division made between faith and all forms of ordi- 
nary knowledge, like the doctrine of justification, therefore 
destroys not only every false security in the 'historical truth' 
arrived at by the application of the critical-historical method: 
it also, ancd more generally, affirms the independence of the 
'truth of faith' from the truth of any particular intellectual, 
scientific, or philosophical conclusion reached by the human 
subj eat. 
ý 
importance to me, both personally and professionally. I applied 
the doctrine of justification to the sphere of human thought. 
Not only human acts but human thinking as well stand under the 
divine "No". No one, not even a believer or a Church, can boast 
of possessing truth, just as no one can boast of possessing love. 
Orthodoxy is intellectual pharisaism. The justification of the 
doubter corresponds to the justification of the sinner. Revela- 
tion is just as. paradoxical as the forgiveness of sins. Neither 
can become an object of possession'. On the Boundary, (London: 
Collins, 1967) pp. 50-51. Here Tillich cites two early essays in 
which these ideas are developed: 'Rechtfertigung und Zweifel', 
Vorträge der theologischen Konferenz zu Giessen, 39 (Giessen: 
Alfred TBpelmann, 1924) pp. 19-32; and %Die Idee der Offenbarung', 
Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche (Tübingen), N. F., VIII, No. 
6 (1927)9 pp"403-412" 
2 An exploration of the epistemological significance of 
the principle of justification is, as Van A. Harvey maintains, a 
common feature among the dialectical or neo-orthodox theologians 
(op. cit., pp. 127-159). In Tillich's case, however, his particu- 
lar application of the doctrine to the problem of the historical 
Jesus: most nearly reflects the work of his teacher, Martin Kfhler. 
In his 'Foreword' to The So-called Historical Jesus and the His- 
toric Biblical Christ trans. and ed. C. E. Braaten), Tillich 
acknowledges the importance of Kahler' s use of 'the principle of 
the Reformation to the situation of modern man between faith and 
doubt. He taught us that he who doubts any statement of the 
Bible and the creed can nevertheless be accepted by God and can 
combine the certainty of acceptance with the actuality of even 
radical doubt. This idea made it possible for many of us to be- 
come or remain Christian theologians' 
(Ibid., p. xii). To this 
our author adds that one other emphasis in K hler's answer 'is 
20 5. 
Taken together, these two forms of argumentation make 
clear that Tillich' s assessment of the biblical picture as a 
biographical source for a 'life of Jesust is primarily negative. 
They also suggest, however, that the kind of historical scepti- 
cism which Tillich demonstrates is, for the most part, more 
thoroughgoing and more acute than the scepticism of earlier 
theologians. Whereas, for example, the older Rationalist and 
liberal Protestant positions sought, by the removal of all 
miraculous or supernatural imageries of Jesus, to arrive at an 
historical Jesus who would remain a moral and religious guide or 
pattern, this later scepticism recognizes, on the one hand, the 
kerygmatic and fragmentary nature of the gospel evidence, and 
produces, on the other, epistemological reasons why no critico- 
historical statement about the past can impinge upon the 'truth 
of faith'. 
In our opening chapter, we remarked that Tillich's ob- 
jeotion to the liberal Protestant resolution of the problem of 
the historical Jesus appears to confirm, or at least give weight 
to, the radically sceptical conclusions of David Strauss which 
the liberals sought to overcome. 
3 
We remember that Strauss, un- 
like Reimarus before him, did not attempt to make any definite 
judgments on- the real purposes of Jesus and his disciples, but 
was concerned to show rather the mythical structure of the 
sources, albeit on the basis of Hegelian premises. Now while it 
decisive for our present situation, namely, the necessity to 
make the certainty of faith independent of the unavoidable in- 
certitudes of historical research. Finding the way in which 
this can be done for our time is one of the main tasks of con- 
temporary theology' (Ibid. ). Essentially the same points are 
made in Perspectives, pp. 213-215. 
3See 
above, Ch. I, p. 31 
206. 
is certainly true that Tillich equally upholds the view that 
the historian cannot penetrate the narratives to discover the 
empirical facts about the earthly Jesus, his scepticism on this 
point, unlike that of Strauss, does not extend either to a dis- 
interest in Jesus himself or to a depreciation of the biblical 
picture's importance as a picture of the Christ-event. Indeed, 
the distinctive feature of Tillich's discussion is that it is 
not purely critical. For while insisting that historiography 
oan neither give nor take away the foundation of Christian faith, 
he is nevertheless just as persistent in arguing that the bibli- 
cal portrait provides this foundation for present belief, and 
that it is a picture of something that happened objectively. 
Tillich asserts a continuity between the picture and the origi- 
nal act of interpretation made by the first disciples in their 
reception of Jesus as the Christ; and maintains also that a 
necessary connection exists between the meaning attached to 
Jesus in the biblical testimony and the meaning Jesus' person 
possessed in itself. According to him, therefore, the signifi- 
canoe initially ascribed to Jesus of Nazareth, and to which the 
New Testament now bears witness, corresponds to the actual sig- 
nificance of the being of 'Jesus as he actually was'. Behind 
Tillioh's negative evaluation of the biblical picture's capacity 
to supply material sufficient for a biographical account of 
Jesus thus lies a positive view of its function in providing an 
authentic knowledge of that 'historic' 
(geschichtlich) figure. 
'What we are given here is, in other words, no photographic re- 
production of that life, but a portrait which witnesses both to 
the ultimate existential meaning of Jesus in the original apos- 
tolic interpretation of him as the bearer of New Being, and to 
the actual reality of Jesus as the Christ, to 
the real manifesta- 
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tion of Essential God-Manhood in him. As we have noted else- 
where, the intelligibility and validity of the kerygma as 
kerygma rests upon its correspondence with the reality of that 
event of which it is the result; and, to this extent, all 
statements made by the kerygma are a posteriori judgments about 
the Christ-event in its actuality and ultimate existential 
meaning. 
4 For Tillich, therefore, the assertion that histori- 
cal enquiry cannot affect the authenticity of the biblical 
image as a portrait of the event 'Jesus as the Christ' does not 
entail the refutation of the claim that Christianity is based 
on an actual occurrence from which the biblical picture was 
'created': it does not destroy the connection of the Christian 
message to a definite point in history or its essential depen- 
dente on this historical substratum. 
The juxtaposition of these negative and positive ele- 
ments in Tillich' s argument determines the final stage of his 
examination of the problem of the historical Jesus. For if, 
according to the preceding methodological and epistemological 
requirements, it is in the nature of the aase that a negative 
conclusion will inevitably result from the application of his- 
torical-critical techniques to the biblical picture, how, we 
may ask, is it possible for Tillich to affirm positively the 
significance of Jesus of Nazareth for faith and christological 
doctrine? How, to be more exact, can this fundamental histori- 
cal scepticism - which is accepted as a necessary insight into 
the status of all investigations regarding the facts about 
Jesus - be united with the parallel statements 
Tillich would 
wish to make: that the original Christian event contained a 
4See above, Ch. III, pp. 97-99,131-137 
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'factual' and personal side named 'Jesus', to which the title 
'Christ' was appropriate; and that a real correlation exists 
between the New Testament portrait of Jesus as the bearer of 
New Being and the actual, past event on which Christianity is 
based? The reason why Tillich maintains that faith is indepen- 
dent of research as the final court of appeal concerning the 
truth of its picture is clear enough: the alternative is to in- 
volve faith in the doubts attendant on the preliminary character 
of biblical criticism. What is not so clear, however, is how 
he can argue that faith does not imply assent to certain pro- 
positions of a scientifically certifiable type while simultan- 
eously insisting that faith does require some apprehension of 
Jesus' meaning through the form of the picture. How, in other 
terms, can the: validity of this meaning be guaranteed without in 
some way taking account of the historian's conclusions about the 
life of him to whom this meaning is ascribed? Certainly, on the 
evidence of the following quotation, Tillich shows that he, is 
aware of these difficulties. Commenting on the work of his 
teacher, Martin Kahler, he writes: 
What is the relationship between the historical Jesus 
and the Christ of faith? Can we separate them? Must 
we accept the idea that Christ can never be reached 
by us apart from faith? Is there anything that can 
be done about the doubts produced by historical re- 
search into the biblical writings? Kahler himself 
did not believe that the two must be separated. For 
Kahler the Jesus of history is at the same time the 
Christ of faith, and the certainty of the Christ of 
faith is independent of the historical results of the 
critical approach to the New Testament. Faith guaran- 
tee& what historical research. can never reach. How 
can faith do this? What can faith guarantee? There 
lies the problem today, a problem which has been 
sharpened in the meantime by people like Bultmann and 
his whole school. 5 
1 g'ers ectives, pp. 214-215 
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Tillich's discussion of the certainty of faith and his 
subsequent use of the concept of the analogia imaginis are de- 
signed to answer these questions. They seek to guarantee a con- 
tinuity between the biblical portrayal and the reality of the 
event 'Jesus as the Christ' in a way whereby critical investiga- 
tions into the New Testament record of Jesus' life can neither 
confirm nor disconfirm the truth of faith's statements about the 
meaning of his person. To this extent, they represent Tillich's 
own constructive attempt to resolve the basic historical problem 
of Christianity. 
He begins, however, by first rejecting a deficient and 
misleading answer to the question of whether historical scepti- 
cism can affect the foundation of Christian belief. 'It is', he 
says, 
inadequate to point out that historical research has 
not yet given any evidence to support such scepticism. 
Certainly, it has not yet! But the anxious question 
remains whether it could not do so sometime in the 
future! Faith cannot rest on such unsure ground. The 
answer, taken from the "not-yet" of sceptical evidence, 
is insufficient. 6 
Elsewhere, our author is more specific and cites Emil Brunner as 
one theologian who subscribes to this compromise approach. Accor- 
ding to sections of Brunner' s book The Mediator, 'faith is confi- 
dent that any conclusions of research which are unsatisfactory 
to 
it will themselves eventually be given up'. 
7 This solution, 
Tillich continues, 
appears to me to be wholly unsatisfactory. 
A thing 
which cannot be accomplished today may 
be accomplished 
tomorrow. Faith, however, cannot await in fear and 
trembling the latest results of historical investiga- 
6s2' 2t 130-131 
7'Disciple and Critic of Barth', Christian Century, LI, 
90- 49 (Deo-5,1934) P"1555" Cf. Brunner, 
The Mediator, trans. 
Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 
1934 PP"153-198. 
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tion. Brunner himself very clearly rejects such a 
thing in other parts of his book. It is possible 
for faith to be without fear only if it guarantees 
through itself all facts that are essential to it, 
and so protects itself from the attack of historical 
research. Another way would be for faith wholly to 
abandon research, because it has nothing to do with 
its historical facts. The first of these two methods 
leads merely to the isolation of a specific complex 
of facts over against all remaining facts, to the 
selection of a section of reality that is withdrawn 
from historical contact; in other words, to that 
which Brunner himself calls supernaturalism and which 
he seeks to avoid. The second method leads to the 
proposition that the actuality with which faith has 
to do lies on a level fundamentally different from 
that with which historical investigation deals. But 
once this is acknowledged - and I think that it must 
be acknowledged - then the uniqueness of the external 
fact is no longer decisive for faith, but what is 
decisive is the fundamental transformation of our 
historical existence by means of the Christian event. 
And in respect to the latter's actuality, nothing 
further can be said than this, namely, that it has 
produced the transformation of human, historical ex- 
istence. This, however, is an expression of faith 
and of faith alone. The corollary of this idea is 
that the antitheses set forth by Brunner are not an 
adequate description of the Christian position. It is 
curious and yet easily understandable that Brunrner, 
who is otherwise so clear and radical in his formula- 
tions, becomes obscure and conservative at this point. 
It indicates a compromise not based on his own pre- 
suppositions. 8 
In contrast to the position advocated by Brunner, there 
is, Tillich tells us, another possible answer to the problem of 
religious certainty. The sharp distinction drawn between the 
dimensions of faith and historical science does not result in 
the loss of the factual basis of christology because there is, 
he says, a final sense in which faith itself can overcome his- 
torical scepticism about the factual element in the event 'Jesus 
as the Christ'. This alternative solution proposes, in other 
terms, that 
the historical foundation of Christianity is an essen- 
tial element of the Christian faith itself and 
that 
8'Disciple and Critic of Barth', p. 1555 
211. 
this faith, through its own power, can overrule scep- tical possibilities within historical criticism. It 
can, it is maintained, guarantee the existence of Jesus of Nazareth and at least the essentials in the biblical picture. 9 
The factual basis of the central Christian event can, 
therefore, be assured by means of faith alone. Tillich, how- 
ever, is the first to admit that this argument, which he has 
partly suggested already in his review of Brunner's thesis, is 
ambiguous. He proceeds, accordingly, to define more precisely 
what it is that faith can guarantee. That which is assured by 
faith is 'only its own foundation, namely, the appearance of 
that reality which has created the faith'. 
10 Tillich identi- 
fies this reality with the New Being 'who conquers existential 
estrangement and thereby makes faith possible. This alone faith 
is able to guarantee - and that because its own existence is 
identical with the presence of the New Being'. 
11 Faith, then, 
is the 'immediate (not mediated by conclusions) evidence of the 
New Being within and under the conditions of existence'; 
12 
and, 
as such, it cannot be investigated or determined by the methods 
of historical enquiry. Referring to the Augustinian-Cartesian 
refutation of radical scepticism - which 'pointed to the immedi- 
acy of a self-consciousness which guaranteed itself by its par- 
ticipation in being'13 - Tillich stresses equally that it is 
faithful participation, and not historical argument, which 
'guarantees the reality of the event upon which Christianity is 
9ST' 2: 131 
10Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
131bid. 
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based' . 
14 
It would appear that the argument here employed by 
Tillich revolves round the familiar two-fold structure of the 
event 'Jesus as the Christ', namely, its 'factual' and 'recep- 
tive' character. Jesus as the Christ is the bearer of the new 
reality, the New Being, and he is received as such by faith. 
These are the two components that make the Christ-event the 
event it is. Now as we have also seen on numerous occasions, 
for Tillich the concept of New Being is itself intelligible 
only in so far as it includes the actuality of a 'personal' 
life in all its concreteness, since, it is held, the ambigui- 
ties of existence can be overcome only by the participation of 
the bearer of the New Being in existence. Existential ambigui- 
ty - which ontological analysis has shown characterizes the 
conditions prevalent under the 'old eon' or 'old reality' - can 
alone be conquered in the earthly existence of the personal life 
of him who is the bearer of the New Being in the totality of his 
own being. 
15 It follows, therefore, that faith necessarily re- 
ceives the 'personal' reality of the New Being when it accepts 
and receives 'Jesus as the Christ'. Consequently, to say that 
a man. has faith entails that he has received that which has 
overcome existence in existence. In this sense, so the argu- 
ment runs, faith does guarantee the historical basis of Chris- 
tianity, for it guarantees that 'someone' conquered existence. 
But it does not ensure, Tillich adds significantly, that 'Jesus 
of Nazareth. ' is that 'someone'. While faith, in other words, 
may be able to affirm in this way 'a personal life in which. the 
141bid. 
1 58ee 
above, Ch. II, pp-77-85 
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New Being has conquered the old being', it does not (guarantee 
his name to be Jesus of Nazareth. Historical doubt concerning 
ý 
the existence and the life of someone with this name cannot be 
overruled. He might have had another name'. 
16 This, our author 
agrees, is the historically absurd but logically necessary con- 
elusion resulting from his appreciation of the preliminary or 
'probable' epistemological nature of the critical-historical 
technique. The 'Jesus' element in the event 'Jesus as the 
Christ' indicates only the personal and factual foundation of 
that event: it is not, however, to be equated with the particu- 
lar details concerning, or the particular incidents surrounding, 
the life of him who is called 'Jesus of Nazareth'. This impor- 
tant distinction immediately recalls the earlier semantic dis- 
tinction made between the two uses of the expression 'historical 
Jesus: 1) to specify the fragmentary and hypothetical claims 
made about the character and existence of Jesus which have re- 
suited from historical research into the biblical reports; 2) to 
denote the factual side of the event 'Jesus as the Christ', the 
reality of which is not available to the tests of the critical 
method. 
17 Following this division of meaning, Tillich recognizes 
the logical possibility of an historian concluding that the man 
'Jesus of Nazareth' never lived; but he also admits that faith, 
even though it could not legitimately deny this conclusion on 
critical grounds, can nevertheless guarantee the appearance of 
the New Being in an historical and personal form irrespective of 
it. 
Faith cannot even guarantee the name 
"Jesus" in res- 
pect to him who was the Christ. 
It must leave that 
1 6ST, 2: 131 
17See 
above, Ch. I, pp"48-50 
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to the incertitudes of our historical knowledge. 
But faith does guarantee the factual transformation 
of reality in that personal life which the New Tes- 
tament expresses in its picture of Jesus as the 
Christ. No fruitful and honest discussion is possi- 
ble if these two meanings of the term "historical 
Jesus" are not clearly distinguished. l8 
As David Kelsey remarks succinctly, in this argument 
'the fact named by Jesus of Nazareth turns out to be different 
from the fact pointed to by Jesus of Nazareth'. 
19 In other 
Words, whereas the fact 'named' is subject to historiographic 
examination - it being one of those details in the biblical 
narrative which could conceivably be false - the fact to which 
the name refers - the actuality of a personal life through which 
Essential God-Manhood entered existence and transformed it - is 
subject only to faith's apprehension of it. Since the relation 
between faith and the factual element which it interprets within 
the Christ-event is such that the interpretation does not ac- 
quire validity by understanding precisely the way in which this 
fact occurred, so the statement that 'Jesus is the bearer of New 
Being' does not assert an identity between the fact called 
'Jesus' and the fact referred to by that name. For Tillich, we 
should emphasize again, the denial that the Christ received and 
proclaimed by faith was 'Jesus of Nazareth' is historically ridi- 
culous; but the logical possibility that this was not his name 
is nevertheless an important exemplification of the principle 
1- 
that the truth of faith neither can nor does depend on the literal- 
historical truth of any detail of its picture of the Christ, even 
to the point of its naming of him. Faith cannot guarantee the 
empirical accuracy of the biblical portrait of Jesus as the Christ 
18ST, 2: 123 
19oo. 
c_i_t., p. 93 
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since faith's nature is such that it does not contain detailed 
historical information about the precise manner in which the 
event occurred. But faith does, however, involve a certainty 
about the actual meaning of the event on which it is based and 
to which it responds: it does, that is to say, include certi- 
tude about its own foundation on the 'Christ'-event, and can 
thus assert the reality of a personal life in the past which, 
by its manifestation of Essential God-Manhood, conquered the 
estranged condition of old being. Essentially the same point 
of view is, we remember, suggested in Tillich's analysis of 
the Crucifixion and Resurrection as symbols based on facts. 
20 
Faith cannot ensure the accuracy of its biblical stories con- 
cerning the particular Crucifixion and Resurrection of a man 
'Jesus of Nazareth'; but it can, for all that, guarantee the 
subjection to, and conquest of, existence by him who is called 
the 'Christ' - of which these biblical stories are the symbolic 
representations. This crucial distinction follows the line of 
argument already drawn by the theory of religious symbolism, 
namely, that the truth of the meaning ascribed by faith to the 
being of the Christ is independent of the literal truth of any 
aspect of faith's own account of his life in the biblical pic- 
ture. 21 According to it, faith cannot guarantee that the 
Christ was named 'Jesus', that, he in fact died on a cross at 
Golgotha or rose again on the third day; but it can neverthe- 
less guarantee that he whom the picture calls 'Jesus' was the 
Christ, and that he therefore did surrender himself to the 
finite consequences of existence, and did overcome the death of 
\1 
20See 
above, Ch. II, pp"89-93. 
21See 
above, Ch. IV, pp. 196-199 
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existential estrangement. It is the a priori of faith that 
these conditions were fulfilled by him whom faith receives and 
proclaims as the bearer of the New Being. 
22 
More exactly, 
faith's reception of the Christ entails its correlation with 
the ' giving' side of a revelatory event in which the disrup- 
tions of existence were simultaneously experienced and healed 
in one individual human life. Faith is the subjective res- 
ponse to that objective happening which fulfils those require- 
ments necessary for the transformation of the situation of old 
being: its own existence is, in other terms, identical with 
the existence of essential manhood within the area of estrange- 
went. For Tillich, these are analytically true statements 
concerning the nature of faith; and it is on the basis of them 
that faith can continue to assert the presence of New Being in 
the person portrayed by the New Testament, irrespective of his 
original name or circumstances. 'Whatever his name, the New 
Being was and is actual in this man'. 
23 And yet, though- photo- 
graphable, no photograph exists of this event, for neither 
faith itself nor the probabilities of research can provide such 
a photograph. It is for this reason that historical science, 
while it may be able to bring to the fore certain critical 
F- 
doubts about the life of someone named 'Jesus of Nazareth', can- 
not thereby violate faith's dependence on the actual appearance 
of New Being in the person presented by the biblical picture. 
Faith can say that something of ultimate concern has 
happened in history because the question of the ulti- 
mate in being and meaning is involved... Faith can say 
that the reality which is manifest in the hew Testa- 
ment picture of Jesus as the Christ has saving power 
22 See above, Ch. IV, pp. 151-152 
23ST, 2: 131 
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for those who are grasped by it, no matter how much 
or how little can be traced to the historical figure 
who is called Jesus of Nazareth. Faith can ascertain 
its own foundation, the Mosaic law, or Jesus as the 
Christ, Mohammed the prophet, or Buddha the illumina- 
ted. But faith cannot ascertain the historical con- 
ditions which made it possible for these men to be- 
come matters of ultimate concern for large sections 
of humanity. Faith includes certitude about its own 
foundation - for example, an event in history which 
has transformed history - for the faithful. But faith 
does not include historical knowledge about the way 
in which this event took place. 24 
Tillich's brief discourse on the name of 'Jesus of Naza- 
rette' is perhaps the most extreme example of his own use of his 
distinction between the dimensions of historical research and 
faith. By-it, our author makes clear that the non-literal form 
of the biblical picture - which here allows even the logical 
possibility that Jesus might have had another name - does not 
invalidate the ultimate existential significance faith attri- 
butes to the being of the person called 'Jesus'. Since the 
truth of faith's interpretation of Jesus as the Christ is inde- 
pendent of all critical judgments which either are or could be 
made by the historian, so the truth of such empirical conclu- 
lions is irrelevant to the meaning of the reality perceived by 
faith in and through the picture. Following this view, we may 
say that Tillich's discussion of Jesus' name is, therefore, an 
instance of his contrast between the contingency of the picture's 
factual-historical statements about the concrete form of Jesus' 
existence and the certainty of its assertions expressive of 
faith's perception of the ultimate in him. On the basis of this 
difference, one cannot infer from the conceivable inaccuracy of 
'Jesus' as the actual name the possible inappropriateness of the 
title 'Christ' to the personal reality referred to by that name. 
24DF 
I 88»89- 
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Despite its possible inaccuracy on matters of histori- 
oal detail, faith can, so Tillich argues, guarantee by its own 
power and within its own dimension the real transformation of 
existence in the life portrayed by the biblical picture of Jesus 
as the Christ. As we shall see presently, this position - 
Which thus stipulates that the very existence of faith certifies 
its own basis on an event that is the Christ-event - is further 
clarified and extended by Tillich's later use of the analogia 
imaginis. But before dealing with this concept, it is worth 
pausing here for a moment to indicate that a special problem 
arises from the preceding argument, one which, indeed, the ana- 
login. imaginis is specifically designed to resolve. The nature 
of the problem originates from the clear circularity of the 
position so far advanced by our author. According to Tillich, 
faith cannot ensure the exactitude of the biblical picture's. 
narrative concerning the historical conditions under which the 
NNew Being appeared in., Jesus the Christ - and even, therefore, 
that 'Jesus' was his name; but it can nevertheless guarantee an 
actual correlation between the meaning faith attaches to the 
person called 'Jesus of Nazareth' in its picture and the meaning 
faith first attributed to him in the original event 'Jesus as 
the Christ'. Faith, in other words, recognizes Jesus to be the 
bearer of New Being through the medium of the biblical portrait; 
but it interprets him in this way only on the basis of that 
initial interpretation made by the first disciples which is in- 
oorporated within the portrait. Present faith thus involves a 
knowledge of Jesus dependent on faith's original knowledge of 
him as the Christa it relies, that is to say, on the personal 
reminiscence of those for whom the man named 'Jesus' acquired 
t 
the meaning of Christ. This clearly shows the circularity of 
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the argument employed. The event 'Jesus as the Christ' becomes 
a reality for present faith through faith's expression, in pie- 
torial form, of its own original experience of this reality. To 
this extent, the biblical image of Jesus the Christ is the 
creation of faith's actual perception of New Being in the man 
called 'Jesus of Nazareth': it is, following the Kählerian the- 
sis, the result of faith's recognition of the impression this 
man exerted upon those who encountered him within the situation 
of faith. 
25 
It is here, however, that the problem becomes 
evident. Jesus as the Christ is known by faith only through 
the apostolic memory-impression which created faith's portrait; 
but, according to Tillich's previous remarks, the truth of the 
picture's empirical statements about Jesus' life is irrelevant 
to the truth of those claims it also makes about his ultimate 
significance as the Christ. This being the case, then how is 
it possible for him to assert a continuity between a figure of 
the past in which the New Being in fact appeared and the New 
Testament presentation of Jesus as that person? As we have 
noted before, Tillich admits that any rejection of this identi- 
ty implies a radical docetic idealism which has no foundation 
on that historical reality which is the prius and criterion of 
christology. While the biblical picture is certainly the basis 
of contemporary belief in Jesus as the Christ, nevertheless the 
assurance of the essential facticity of this Christ remains ay 
necessary and irreducible feature of faith' s own understanding 
of the event it depicts. 
26 But again., how can this viewpoint be 
sustained if no concrete characteristic of the Christ's actual 
25See 
above, Ch. III, pp. 119-121 
26See 
above, Ch. II, pp"57-58, and Ch. III, PP. 97-99 
existence, or if no single detail of the conditions under which 
he lived and worked, can be historically verified by faith? As 
George Tavard points out : 
It is not enough to state that the original fact is 
the Apostles' interpretation of Jesus. For how can 
we accept an interpretation if we do not know what is to be interpreted? How can we share the Apostles' 
interpretation if we choose to doubt the identity of 
whom and what they interpreted? 27 
Put differently, the problem may be said to stem from 
Tillich's juxtaposition of two, seemingly incompatible, argu- 
ments. On the one hand, he subscribes to the view that the 
kerygmatic interpretation of Jesus as the Christ is unintelli- 
gible apart from an appreciation of the way the earthly man 
called 'Jesus' transformed existence in the totality of his 
being. According to this position, the biblical interpretation 
has, therefore, realistic implications for the nature of this 
man's life as a whole, since the title 'Christ' is appropriate 
to the name 'Jesus' only if he to whom the name refers did 
actually exhibit a life which contradicted the 'marks' of es- 
trangement at every point. And yet, on the other hand, Tillich 
maintains equally that the validity of this christological 
interpretation cannot be guaranteed by the 'historical truth' 
of those biblical stories which are said to ' confirm' the ab- 
sence of such 'marks' in the man 'Jesus of Nazareth'. But if 
this is so, then it is difficult to see how our author can 
justify his claim that the picture is an image of the Christ- 
event, that it is in some way analogous to its subject and not 
an idealistic reconstruction of a life deduced from an analysis 
of man's estranged predicament. On the basis of his division 
between the dimensions of research and faith, how can Tillich 
27G. 
(New York: 
H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Nies 
Charles Scribner's. Sons, 1962) p. 109 
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demonstrate, first, that the New Testament does manifest to 
faith a fully concrete, past and personal, reality with which 
it is not itself identified; and second, that the reality thus 
revealed is the Christ-event, the existentially independent 
presupposition of the portrait through which it is now manifes- 
ted and made presently actual to Christian faith? 
Tillich is well aware of the importance of these ques- 
tions. For him, the historical reality of the New Being' s 
appearance in existence entails the actual presence of certain 
concrete features in. the life of him through whom it appeared. 
Hie rejects, therefore, Sýren Kierkegaard's argument that 'it is 
sufficient for the Christian. faith nakedly to assert that in 
the years 1-30 God sent his son'. 'Without the concreteness of 
the New Being', Tillich adds, 'its newness would be empty. Only 
if existence is conquered concretely and in its manifold aspects, 
is it actually conquered'. 
28 However, notwithstanding this 
claim, if historical research is unable to provide a concrete 
picture of Jesus the Christ, how can faith maintain that its 
foundation is not an abstract historical fact but rather a. con- 
crete encounter with a real figure whose individual characteris- 
tics inspired faith's picture of him as the New Being? If, in 
other words, all that can be said about the factual basis of 
Christian faith is that a personal life existed, then the final 
problem, as Tillich himself states it, is: 'How can the New 
Being who is called "the Christ" transform reality if no con- 
crete trait of his nature is left? ' 
29 
285T, 2: 132. Cf. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 
trans. David F. Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1936) P"87 
29_ 
, p. 131 
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It is in answer to this question that Tillich introdu- 
ces his concept of the analogia imaginis, wherein he claims an 
analogy between the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ and 
the concrete, personal life from which the biblical picture has 
evolved. 'There is', he writes, 'an analogia. imaginis, namely, 
an analogy between the picture and the actual personal life 
from which it has arisen. It was this reality, when encountered 
by the disciples, which created the picture'. 
30 
Thus, as A. T. 
Kollegen expresses it, the New Testament confession of Jesus as 
the Christ 'means not only that a human individuality existed, 
but that he was such as supports the Biblical picture'. 
31 Faith, 
that is to say, can guarantee not only the factual basis of 
Christianity, but also an actual personal life whose concrete 
characteristics were such as to give rise to the biblical pic- 
ture. We have seen already why the first guarantee which faith 
provides is not open to historical criticisms the only factual 
element which exists is found within the biblical portrait; it is 
therefore known and guaranteed by faith alone, and not by the 
approximations of historical knowledge. We must now ask how it 
is that faith can also guarantee the analogia imaginis without in 
some way involving the verifying processes of critical research. 
The analogia imaginis represents the last stage of 
Tillich's discussion of the relevance of biblical criticism to 
christology. By it, he seeks to assert 'the unity of a histori- 
cal existence and the kerygmatic witness while at the same time 
claiming immunity from any form of historical test'. 
32 Tillich 
30 
9 P. 132 
31A. T. Mollegen, Dop. cit. , p. 234 
32James C. Livingston, off., p. 48 
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himself is adamant on this point. The analogia. imaginis is 
independent of biblical research because the analogy itself is 
not determined by the adequacy of its historical representa- 
tion of the actual life portrayed in the biblical picture of 
the event 'Jesus as the Christ'. The significance of the ana- 
logy lies rather in the continuance of the (transforming power 
of the New Being, 
33 between that picture and that event. It 
is this 'transforming power' which vindicates the analogy, so 
that the theologically important character of the biblical 
picture does not reside in its historical detail concerning 
the an called 'Jesus of Nazareth. ', but in the power which it 
mediates. 
The power which has created and preserved the communi- 
ty of the New Being is not an abstract statement about 
its appearance; it is the picture of him in whom it 
has appeared. No special trait of this picture can be 
verified with certainty. But it can be definitely 
asserted that through this picture the New Being has 
power to transform those who are transformed by it. 34 
Tillich's argument, therefore, is that, despite the un- 
reliability of the biblical narratives - an unreliability which 
extends, we remember, even to the naming of Jesus - the biblical 
portrait of Jesus as the Christ is nevertheless analogous to its 
subject because the 'transforming power of the New Being', which 
the first disciples encountered when they met Jesus and which 
led to them calling him 'Christ', is similarly encountered by 
present faith through the medium of the picture. In this sense, 
so the argument runs, there is an analogy between the personal 
life of him who was received as the Christ and the New Testament 
portrait through which the New Being is now received. 
None of 
33ST, 2: 132 
34Ibid. 
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the traits of the image of Jesus to which this portrait refers 
can be verified beyond any reasonable historical probability. 
All that faith can guarantee - and this is implied both in the 
disciples' original interpretation of Jesus and in faith's 
later acceptance of this interpretation through the New Testa- 
meat's presentation of it - is the immediate encounter with a 
personal life that has grasped and transformed the faithful; 
and 'no historical criticism can question the immediate aware- 
ness of those who find themselves transformed into the state of 
faith'. 35 In his published conversations with students, Til- 
lieh clarifies the point he is making here. 
STUDENTS Suppose, somehow or other, science could 
come and expose St. Paul, Christianity, and all these 
things as just a big hoax. My understanding of your 
theology would be that this would in no way invali- 
date Christianity as a religion. 
DR. TILLICHS Now what do you mean by "a big hoax"? 
STUDENT: If they could prove that Christ, or Jesus 
never existed. 
DR. TILLICH: Oh, then he had some other name! That 
wouldn't matter. I want to say that if we were able 
to read the original police registers of Nazareth, 
and found that there was neither a couple called Mary 
and Joseph nor a man called Jesus, we should then go 
to some other city. The personal reality behind the 
gospel story is convincing. It shines through. And 
without this personal reality Christianity would not 
have existed for more than a year, or would not have 
come into existence at all, no matter what stories 
were told. But this was the great event that produc- 
ed the transformation of reality. And if you your- 
self are transformed by it, you witness to the reali- 
ty of what happened. That is the proof . 36 
According to this view, the analogia imaginis is there- 
fore independent of historical enquiry because it is confirmed 
by each individual's participation 
(in faith) in the 'trans- 
35_ 
9 P-131 
36Ultimate Concerns Dialo es with Students, ed. D. Mac- 
kenzie Brown London: S. C. M. Press, 1965) PP. 146-7 (my emphasis), 
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forming power of the New Being'. This experience of the New 
Being's power is based on the actual encounter with the new 
reality which was and is mediated through the event 'Jesus as 
the Christ'; and it thus includes 'the affirmation of the event 
and of the way in which it is continuously effective, namely, 
through the biblical picture, however the event came empiri- 
cally into existence as fact and in its interpretation' . 
37 In 
this respect, Tillich's use of the analogy undergirds and 
evolves from his earlier position that faith can, of itself, 
guarantee the factual basis of Christianity. If the power of 
New Being can be actualised only in and by an historical indi- 
vidual whose being exhibited no 'mark' of estrangement, and if 
this power is made apparent to faith through the biblical pic- 
ture of Jesus the Christ, then there must have been an actual 
person whose concrete characteristics correspond to the meaning 
attributed to Jesus in that picture, even though 'Jesus' might 
not have been his name. While faith cannot therefore guarantee 
the empirical factuality of the concrete biblical material, it 
can, by this means, ensure that this material is an adequate 
expression. of the transforming power of the New Being in Jesus 
as the Christ. 'Only in this sense does faith guarantee the 
biblical picture of Jesus'. 
38 If faith implies response to him 
who, as the bearer of the New Being in existence, has the 
'power' in him to conquer existential disruption and ambiguity, 
then to say that a man now has faith through the biblical por- 
trait of the Christ entails that this portrait is a sufficient 
and satisfactory expression of the New Being's transforming 
371 Interrogation of Paul Tillich', Philosophical Inter- 
rogations, ed. Sydney and Beatrice Rome, p. 
366 
38ST' 21 132 
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power, and sso, in turn, of the reality of the New Being's bearer 
upon which this power depends. It is faith's present experience 
of the healing power mediated by the picture that guarantees the 
New Testament's adequate representation of a past life in which 
old being was actually transformed into new being. Again, our 
author is quite emphatic on this point: - 
If I am asked s "Does Christian faith guarantee that 
the synoptic picture of this man is guaranteed as 
historically correct - including his name? " I would 
say "No: " If I am asked: "Does Christian faith 
guarantee that this picture is an expression of the 
bearer of the Spirit who, through this picture, 
creates and recreates human beings spiritually? " I 
would say "Yes! " 
If the Christian faith can guarantee as much as 
this it does not need to call for the support of 
human work, namely, historical research. And it 
does not need to be afraid of it. Suppose the 
bearer of the Spirit had another name than Jesus and 
did not come from Nazareth., and the New Testament 
picture of Jesus is essentially a creation of Mark 
(as has been said), then "Mark" was the bearer of 
the Spirit through whom God has created the church 
and transformed (in terms of "in spite of") many in 
all generations, somehow including myself. Then this 
"Mark" has expressed the inner events he has experi- 
enced in the symbolic image of the Christ story. All 
this is an historically absurd but logically neces- 
sary consequence of the attempt to liberate Christian 
faith in its very center from the bondage to scholar- 
ship. Theology, of course, is very much in this bon- 
dage, and it is the glory of scholarship that it has 
produced the question of the "historical Jesus". And 
insofar as theology has an indirect influence on the 
formulation of faith, it has influence on the life of 
the church. But there is one point where faith can- 
not be influenced by scholarships the state of being 
grasped personally by the personal bearer of the crea- 
tive Spirit through the message of Bible and church 
through his living picture. For without this picture 
the assertion that God has sent his Son to die for 
our salvation is an intellectual statement which 
could be accepted only by an act of wilful subjection 
to authority. Rut this is far away from what faith 
means. 39 
Tillich compares his use of the analogia imaginis with 
the analogic entis, which he describes as not 'a method of 
39'Rejoinder' to D. Moody Smith, The Journal of Religion, 
flJVI, No. 1, Part, II (January 1966) pp. 192-193 
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knowing God' , but I a. way (actually the only way) of speaking 
about God' . 
40 
He maintains that these two analogies are com- 
parable to each other because in both cases 'it is impossible 
to push behind the analogy and to state directly what can be 
stated only indirectly, that is, symbolically in the knowledge 
of God and mediated through faith in the knowledge of Jesus'. 
41 
It appears, then, that historical investigation cannot get 
behind the biblical picture to discover the empirical truth 
about Jesus of Nazareth because the analogic imaginis does not 
provide the means for such an approach. 
This "picture analogy" is, like the analogy of being, 
not a way given to man whereby he may "naturally" or 
empirically know the Christ, but a way through which 
he may speak about the one who makes himself known 
through that picture. 42 
Thus, just as ' symbol' is the determinative form through which 
God is cognitively approached by means of the analogic entis, so 
faith is the form through which a knowledge of Jesus as the 
Christ is mediated through the analogia imaginis. Consequently, 
4O 
, 2: 132 
41Ibid. Tillich. often refers to this equation of the 
analogia entis with 'symbol'. Cf. ST, 1: 266; 'Reply to In- 
terpretation and Criticism', The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 239; 
'Reply' in Gustave Weigel' s 'The Theological Significance of 
Paul Tillich', Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, p. 23. In a let- 
ter to Weigel, cited in Weigel' s' Contemporaneous Protestantism 
and Paul Tillich', Theological Studies, XI, No. 2 
(June 1950, 
Tillich writes: 'I speak of symbolic knowledge and mean by it 
exactly what St. Thomas means with analogic entis'(p. 201). How- 
ever, J. Heywood Thomas argues that, in omitting many ontological 
distinctions made by Aquinas, Tillich 'is quite wrong when he 
says that he means by symbolic knowledge what St. Thomas meant by 
analogy'. Paul Tillich: An Appraisal, p. 198. In holding this 
view, Heywood Thomas largely follows Edward O'Connor, 'Paul Til- 
lichs An Impression', Paul Tillich. in Catholic Thought., pp. 25-41. 
For an extensive comparison between Tillich. and 
Aquinas, see 
Donald J. Keefe, Thomism and the Ontological Theology of Paul 
Tillich (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971)o 
42A. J. MaKelway, op. cit., p. 159 
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it is faith's reception and experience of the 'transforming 
power of the New Being' which alone vindicates the analogy be- 
tween the individual existence of the bearer of the New Being 
and the biblical portrait of him. It is not substantiated by 
the 'historical truth' of the correspondence between the de- 
tails of the picture and the form originally taken by the 
Christ-event. The biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ is, 
that is to say, analogous to its subject, not because it pro- 
vides information about what 'actually took place', but because 
the power encountered through it by faith here and now is the 
same power mediated by the man called ' Jesus of Nazareth' to 
those who first acknowledged him to be the Christ. While there 
is therefore no certainty in the accuracy of the New Testa- 
ment's narration of past happenings which can go beyond proba- 
bilism, there yet remains an absolute certainty in the analogic 
imaginis on the part of those who experience, through the 
medium of the picture, the transforming power of New Being in 
their own being. It is, in other terms, the power thus mediated 
which guarantees the picture as an image of the Christ for those 
who are themselves consciously aware of their own transformation 
by it. So Tillich concludes: 
The assertion that the New Testament portrays Jesus as 
the Christ is a matter of immediate awareness. It is 
actually a tautology. There is no possible doubt, 
conjecture, alternative to this assertion. It is logi- 
cally completely different from statements about the 
actual occurrence of some events told in the New Testa- 
ment. These statements are more or less probable or 
improbable and never can become certain. The stories 
concerning the foundation of Rome in a book which has 
come to us under the name of Livius are largely impro- 
bable. But that the book which I have in my hand tells 
these stories is a matter of immediate awareness. 43 
43, Interrogation of Paul Tillich', Philosophical Inter- 
rogations, p. 365 
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Tillich extends his analysis of the analogia imaginis 
to include a refutation of the claim that, since the biblical 
picture is not an empirical description of an historical per- 
son., then it must be a work purely of the. imagination. It is 
not, he says, in the 'idealistic style of art' 
44 
whereby we 
would have to interpret the 'New Testament picture as the 
painted projection of the experiences and ideals of the most 
religiously profound minds in the period of the Emperor Augus- 
tue'. 45 It is not an imaginary picture but a 'real picture'. 
46 
The word 'real' here points to the necessary 'reality' of the 
bearer of New Being, for, as we have noted already, according 
to Tillich the experience in faith of the 'transforming power 
of the New Being' must presuppose an individual life in which 
the ambiguities of existence were overcome. Faith also, then, 
guarantees the so-called 'realism' of the biblical portrait, 
since the personal reality to which it refers must have existed 
independently of the picture. A picture imagined by Jesus' 
contemporaries 'would have expressed their untransformed exis- 
tence and their quest for a New Being. Rat it would not have 
been the New Being itself. That is tested by its transforming 
power', 
47 
The biblical picture of Jesus is that of a unique 
event. Jesus appears as an individual beside others, 
but unique in his destiny, in every single trait of 
his character, and in his historical setting. It was 
just this concreteness and incomparable uniqueness 
of the "real" picture which gave Christianity its 
44ST, 2: 133 
451bid. 
46Ibid. 
47Ibi&. 
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superiority over mystery cults and Gnostic visions. A real, individual life shines through all his 
utterances and actions. In comparison, the divine figures of the mystery cults remain abstract, with- out the fresh colours of a life really lived and 
without historical destiny and the tensions of finite freedom. The picture of Jesus as the Christ 
conquered them through the power of a concrete 
reality. 48 
Thus, the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ, through 
which the 'transforming power of the New Being' is received, 
is neither a photograph nor an imaginary work. It is a por- 
trait of an individual who existed apart from his own pictor- 
ial presentation. If present Christian faith is that condi- 
tion of man in which the New Being's transforming power has 
been encountered through the biblical picture - even though 
the original manifestation of New Being remains unknowable in 
any photographic sense - then, conversely, the statement that a 
man now has faith entails that the picture mediates this power 
and that its image of the Christ is, for that reason, analogous 
to the 'reality' of him in whom this power first appeared. If 
the portrait of New Being in Jesus the Christ had been the 
creation of existentialist thought or experience, then, Tillich 
asserts, 'it would be as distorted, tragic and sinful as exis- 
tence is itself, and would not be able to overcome existence'. 
49 
48Ibid., 
p. 174 
49RDI: 146. It is, therefore, the 'power' it mediates 
which guarantees the biblical picture as an image of the 'real' 
Christ. We should add here that a similar pattern of argument 
is followed by Martin Kähler in his The So-called Historical 
Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ. He denies that 'such a 
realistic picture of the sinless One could be a poetic creation' 
Ibid., p. 79), and later maintains that the 'historic' 
( eg schi- 
chtliche) Christ is encountered 'within a tradition which 
possesses the inherent power to convince us of its 
divine authen- 
ticity'(I_., p. 122). It is this power which not only makes 
the reality of the Christ 'directly accessible', 
but which also 
renders any differentiation of the 
'historic' from the 'biblical' 
Christ impossible (Ibid. ). 
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For Tillich, therefore, the theological significance of 
the biblical picture is that it mediates to faith the trans- 
forming power of New Being in him to whom the name 'Jesus of 
Nazareth' refers. This, according to the concept of the analo- 
gia imaginie, confirms the New Testament portrait as a portrait 
of that past and personal reality in and through which Essential 
God-Manhood appeared, despite the fact that it can provide no 
historically certain information about the man thus regarded as 
the original bearer of New Being. 
The position advanced above is, as we shall see, sus- 
tained in the concluding phase of Tillich's discussion, which is 
in part designed to explain still further what is implied when 
the 'picture analogy' is used in relation to the gospel records 
of Jesus the Christ. In this final section, our author coneen- 
trates upon a comparison between the form of the scriptural 
image and a particular style of art. The biblical picture of 
Jesus as the Christ, if it is neither a literal nor an imaginary 
picture, is, he writes, an "expressionist" portrait' 
50 
- the 
adjective 'expressionist' referring to 'the predominant artistic 
style in most periods of history - rediscovered in our period'. 
51 
Exactly what Tillich intends by this description may be gathered 
from his analysis of those universal characteristics which are, 
he maintains, implicit in every work of art. In his early and 
n 
important lecture of 1919, 'Uber die Idee einer Theologie der 
Kultur', - the first essay published by him after the 
First 
World War - Tillich suggests the presence of a 
triad of elements 
in all cultural creativitys namely, 'content', (form' and 'eub- 
S0sT, 2: 133 
51Ibid. 
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stance' (or 'import'). 52 Content - called elsewhere 'subject 
matter'53 - is drawn from the inexhaustible multitude of en- 
countered objects: it denotes the external factuality of ob- 
jects and events. Form, the decisive component in any cultural 
creation, makes the artistic product what it is through. the use 
of certain materials such as sounds, words, line and colour. 
The third element, substance, is that which, by its spiritual 
power, gives form significance or meaning. 
By content we mean something objective in its simple 
existence, which by form is raised up to the intel- 
lectual-cultural sphere. By substance or import, 
however, we understand the meaning, the spiritual 
substantiality, which alone gives form its signifi- 
cance. We can therefore say: Substance or import is 
grasped by means of a form and given expression in a 
content. Content is accidental, substance essential, 
and form is the mediating element. 54 
Any cultural-artistic entity that exists must, therefore, have 
form, and every form has a subject matter; but within and be- 
yond both there is a meaning-import. Within this conceptual 
triad, however, content or subject matter is of least impor- 
tance. Form, Tillich continues, can lose its necessary relation 
to content because the latter can itself recede in the face of 
the preponderance of the substance. By this means, form can 
acquire a quality of detachment from content, being now relative 
to substance alone: it can become, that is, form in a 'paradoxi- 
cal sense by allowing its natural quality to be shattered by the 
substance'. 
55 
52Philosophische Vorträ 
(Berlin: Reuther und Reichard, 
Idea. of a Theology of Culture', 
53STP 3: 63 
-e der Kant-Gesellschaft ITo. 24 
1919) pp. 28-51. E. T., 'On the 
What is Religion? pp. 165ff. 
5410n the Idea of a Theology of Culture', p. 165 
55+ 
, p. 166 
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The various relations which exist between the elements 
within this tripartite arrangement determine Tillich's ensuing 
classification of the major typologies of art. Though each 
element appears in every work of art, normally only one pre- 
dominates. Thus, for instance, there are within the visual 
arts 'naturalistic' styles, according to which the primary task 
is the representation of the objectively real; other Iimpres- 
sionistic' styles in which both the content of the artistic 
creation and its expressive power are subservient to such 
formal properties as shape and light; and 'expressionistic' 
styles in which the artist seeks to expose the inner signifi- 
canoe or import of his subject matter rather than to picturize 
its external appearance. 
56 
Of these three types, Tillich regards the third, ex- 
pressionism, as theologically the most important. While ad- 
mitting that every style can include the artistic expression of 
man's ultimate concern - for the ultimate, as the unconditional 
' abyss of being', cannot be limited to any specific finite 
being or concern57 - he maintains nevertheless that it is the 
expressive element alone which is 'essentially adequate to ex- 
press religious meaning directly, both through the medium of 
secular and through the medium of traditional religious subject 
matter'. 
58 The reason for this is that expressionism, as de- 
56 See RS: 85-93. Tillich introduces further stylistic 
classifications in his essay,, 'Religiöser Stil und religiöser 
Stoff in der bildenden Kunst' , Das neue 
Deutschland (Gotha. ), IX, 
No. 9/12 (February-March, 1921) pp. 151-158. 
57See 
above, Ch. IV, p. 175 
58 'Protestantism and Artistic Style', TCs 73. A cri- 
tique of other, so-called 'religious art' 
is contained in 'Kult 
und Form', Die Form 
(Berlin), V, 1o. 23/24 (December 15,1930) 
pp"578-583. 
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veloped particularly in the late nineteenth century onwards, 
possesses a religious character which is independent of its 
choice of subject. Here, in other words, it is not the mater- 
ial element, the content of the artistic creation, which is 
decisive for the discernment of theological significance in 
any work of art, but the substance-import which comes to ex- 
pression in it. The existential meaning perceived in a thing 
is not governed by the naturally given appearance of the sub- 
ject portrayed. Following this view, Tillich can claim that 
it is 'not an exaggeration to ascribe more of the quality of 
sacredness to a still-life by C zahne or a tree by van Gogh 
than to a picture of Jesus by Uhde'. 
59 
It is this relative 
disinterest in the objective adequacy of art that makes the 
expressionistic style most appropriate for the expression of 
the ultimate concern of a human group or period, since the ul- 
timate itself is not bound to any special form of things or 
experiences. This, in turn, accounts for the dominance of the 
'expressive element in the style of all periods in which great 
religious art has been created... ' 
60 
59RS: 89. In 'ReligiEiser Stil und religioser Stoff in 
der bildenden Kunst', p. 156, Tillich adds that 'it is possible 
to see in a still-life by Cezanne, an animal picture by Marc, a 
landscape by Schmidt-Rottluff, and an erotic picture by Nolde, 
the direct revelation of an absolute reality in these relative 
things. The world-import, experienced in the artist's religious 
ecstacy, shines through the things; they have become 
"holy" ob- 
jects. ' (trans. J. Luther Adams, Paul Tillich' s Philosophy_ of 
Culture, Science, and Religion, p. 81). 
60 
'Protestantism and Artistic Style', P-74. For further 
details on Tillich's analysis of the relation between artistic 
styles and religion, see: 'The Four Levels of 
the Relationship 
between Religion and Art', Contemporary Religious Art 
(New York: 
Union Theological Seminary, 1952) pp. 1-16; 'The Nature of Reli- 
gious Art' , Symbols and 
Society ed. Lyman Bryson et al. (New 
York: Irarper, 1955) pp. 282-284; and 'Existentialist Aspects of 
Modern Art', Christianity and the Existentialists, ed. Carl 
Michalson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956) pp. 128-147. 
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In the light of these aesthetic considerations, it is 
hardly surprising to find, therefore, that, Tillich calls the 
biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ an texpressionistt 
portrait. For according to this particular style of art, a 
painter, he says, 
would try to enter into the deepest levels of the 
person with whom he deals. And he could do so only 
by a profound participation in the reality and the 
meaning of his subject matter. Only then could he 
paint this person in such a way that his surface 
traits are neither reproduced as in photography (or 
naturalistically imitated) nor idealised according 
to the painter's ideal of beauty but are used to 
express what the painter has experienced through 
his participation in the being of his subject. This 
third way is meant when we use the term "real pic- 
ture" with reference to the Gospel records of Jesus 
as the Christ. 61 
As this passage makes clear, the validity of the biblical pic- 
ture as a 'real picture' is, in conformity with the express- 
ionistic style of portrait painting, determined not by the 
objective accuracy of its biographical content - by the corres- 
pondence between the historical information it provides and the 
actual life of the man it interprets as the Christ - but by its 
effective mediation of that, ' power of New Being' originally 
perceived in the being of this individual by those who created 
the scriptural image. 
62 
Those subsequently transformed by this 
power through the picture can thus certify the truth of the 
ultimate meaning therein ascribed to the person pointed to by 
61ST, 2: 133 
62On 
the basis of this position., David Kelsey calls the 
biblical picture a 'verbal icon' :a term used to denote the pic- 
ture's artistic form and its function as the medium 
through 
which the transforming power of New Being is experienced 
(o 
. cit, 
pp. 107-113). The word 'icon' is, however, misleading 
in this 
context, since it tends to suggest that the 
theological value of 
the picture is relative to its own 
being in itself rather than 
to that which is expressed through it. Further reference to 
Kelsey's analysis will be made in Ch. 
VI. 
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the name 'Jesus of Nazareth', even if they cannot guarantee the 
objective factuality of the picture's content. As John Clayton 
explains: 
Just as it is not content or subject matter which 
makes a piece of art a medium of religious meaning, 
it is not the specific content which makes the bib- 
lical picture of Jesus as the Christ a medium of 
the power of new being. This then is. the signifi- 
cance of the aesthetic model employed by Tillich in 
his analogia imaginis: it is intended as a means of 
holding together the claim that the foundation of 
Christian faith is historical and the claim that 
that foundation is in principle unfalsifiable. For 
falsification of any aspect of the specific, factual 
content... of the biblical picture would not entail 
the falsification of the picture itself, as long as 
'power' continued to be mediated through it. 63 
ain we can see here that the determining factor with- &5 
in Tillich's concept of the analogia imaginis is that the pic- 
ture should express and communicate the transforming experience 
of participation in Jesus as the bearer of the New Being. That 
is. to say, our knowledge of Jesus is not dependent upon knowing 
simply the historical facts about him, but is occasioned only 
by faith's acceptance and experience of the 'transforming power' 
of his being, which is the New Being. Following this, our author 
can assert that, while 'in terms of historical documentation we 
do know many people better than Jesus', yet 'in terms of personal 
participation in his being, we do not know anyone better because 
his being is the New Being which is universally valid for every 
human being'. 
64 
It is by this means, therefore, that the factual basis 
of the Christian faith is appropriated and certified 
by faith 
63John 
Powell Clayton, 'Is Jesus Necessary for Christo- 
logy?: An Antinomy in Tillich's Theological Method', Christ, 
Faith and History, ed. S. W. Sykes and 
J. P. Clayton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972) p. 154 
64§T, 2: 134 
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itself. We know that Jesus as the Christ lives in the biblical 
picture by virtue of the anaiog_a imaginis: the power of the 
New Being is expressed in and through the picture. We know 
also that the actual figure, referred to by the name 'Jesus of 
Nazareth' and called the 'Christ', lived apart from the bibli- 
cal picture: the transforming power now experienced by the 
faithful must have a correspondence to the real life of him 
whose power it was to overcome existence in existence. 
With this treatment of the analogia imaginis, Tillich 
concludes his discussion of the problem of the historical 
Jesus. For him, the question whether historical research can 
erode the factual basis of Christianity is resolved by his 
radical reappraisal of the nature of faith in relation to the 
event 'Jesus as the Christ'. Faith, in one crucial sense, 
enables contemporaneity with a past happening. This does not 
imply participation in the historical details of Jesus who is 
the bearer of the New Being, but rather the immediate, existen- 
tial awareness of the 'power of New Being'. This power, origi- 
nally mediated by Jesus to the first disciples, is now express- 
ed through the biblical picture of him as the Christ. In this 
way, 'we can say that we know nobody as well as Jesus' 
65 
and 
if faith can do this, then clearly there is no need to have the 
event 'Jesus as the Christt corroborated by critico-scientific 
research. Certainly faith cannot know everything about this 
event - not even that Jesus was called 'Jesus' - but it can 
guarantee that which is sufficient and necessary for christology, 
despite the scepticism engendered by biblical criticism. Faith 
can certify that the transforming power of the New Being, which 
651 
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is expressed through the scriptural portrait and experienced in 
faith by succeeding generations of Christian believers, evolves 
from the reception of the man 'Jesus' as the Christ by the ori- 
ginal disciples. Consequently, this picture is not one created 
by an 'hypothetical description of what may lie behind the bib- 
lical picture', 
66 
but is based on a concrete, human individual- 
ity, whose actual charaoteristic. s were such as to support the 
christological interpretation ascribed to him. This, in essence, 
constitutes the analogia imaginis. 
In view of this argument, Tillich can reiterate the 
fundamental principles of his thesis. However much research may 
indicate the unreliability of those New Testament narratives 
upon which the historical claims of Christianity are based, the 
factual foundation of the event 'Jesus. as the Christ' can be, 
and is, affirmed. It is assured by faith itself. For this 
reason, therefore, the historical basis of the Christian reli- 
gion - the appearance of Essential God-Manhood in a personal 
life subject to the ambiguities of existence - is guaranteed 
within a dimension which, at the same time, immunizes that basis 
from any type of historical examination. 
66 Ibid., p-i32 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION :A CRITICAL 
APPRAISAL 
During the course of this thesis, we have seen that the 
history of the problem of the historical Jesus is coextensive 
with the poet-Enlightenment development of scientific-critical 
methods for assessing the veracity of the scriptural evidence 
about Jesus of Nazareth. We have noted too that while, to put 
it briefly, the problem may originate with the strictly histori- 
cal question of the continuity between Jesus and the New Testa- 
meat picture of him, with the matter of whether the gospels can 
be accepted as a kerygmatic tradition which incorporates an 
authentic image of the earthly Jesue, it extends also to the 
more theological issue of the degree to which faith's affirma- 
tions are dependent on, or independent of, the findings of his- 
torical research. In terms, however, of contemporary replies to 
the question, 'Can we reach the Jesus of history through critical 
analysis of the biblical representation of him as the Christ? ' 
modern scholarship provides. complex, and at times disconcertingly 
ambivalent, answers. iNroadly speaking, there are those who, for 
example, continue to affirm the significance of Jesus on lines 
reminiscent of the old liberal Protestant quest. for the historical 
Jesus, even though they remain sceptical of the liberal attempt to 
239 
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reoonetruot the real Jesus by means of an objective critical 
method which would establish his religious or moral superiority 
and absoluteness. Thus M. S. Enslin maintains that 'while we 
cannot write a biography, we can know the man, can see him en- 
gaged in a life-and-death struggle, in the midst of real men, 
enemies and friends alike... '1 There is then another group of 
scholars - largely composed of those directly or indirectly in- 
fluenced by the work of Rudolf Bultmann - which believes that, 
while the liberal Protestant approach was both naive and illegi- 
timate, a 'new quest' in possible, distinguished from the old 
by its procedures and objectives. So James L. Robinson, though 
critical of the original quest's application of 'positivistic 
historiography' to the gospels, 
2 
nevertheless still holds that 
ta new quest cannot take place without the use of the objective- 
philological, comparative-religious, and social-historical re- 
search indispensable for historical knowledge'. 
3 
Although. a detailed exposition of the present state of 
biblical research into the problem of the historical Jesus lies 
beyond the limits of our study, such contributions, however 
't'he Prophet from Nazareth (New Yorks McGraw-Hill, 1961 
p. 14. Cf. Enslin's 'The Meaning of the Historical Jesus for 
Faith' , Journal of Bible and Religion, XXX, Nio. 3 
(July 1962) pp. 
219-2339 A continuity with the old quest is also upheld by W. D. 
Davies, 'A Quest to be Resumed in New Testament Studies',, Christ- 
ian Origins and Judaism (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1962) pp. 1-17. Davies prefers 'to advocate resumption of the 
old quest on a new level, because the recovery of the intention 
of Jesus and his understanding of existence... is inseparable from 
the recovery of what Be did and said' (I bid. , p. 16). 
2A New 
. est of 
the Historical Jesus, p. 35 
31bicd., 
p. 96. Cf. Robinson' s' The Recent Debate on the 
"New Quest"' , Journal of Bible and 
Religion, XXX, No. j (July 1962) 
pp. 198-208; and his review of Enslin's The Prophet from Nazareth. 
in Journal of Bible and Religion, XXX, No. l January. 11962) pp. 46. 
48. 
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briefly they may be described, 4 return us to the basic theologi- 
cal issue found at the centre of the problem. Whatever the new 
criteria of biblical scholarship, it appears, as Harvey and 
Ogden have suggested, that a profound difficulty remains in 
separating completely and successfully any new quest from the 
old; 
5 
and that to acknowledge the importance, even residual im- 
portance, of the historical Jesus for faith is to pose yet again 
the unsettled, but nonetheless crucial, theological question of 
the extent to which New Testament criticism can affect christo- 
logy by examining the one historical fact to which christology 
is inextricably linked, namely, the fact of Jesus of Nazareth. 
How, in other words, can it be consistently maintained that the 
event of Jesus the Christ is the foundation of Christian faith 
when research has eroded away any total belief in the historical 
reliability of those biblical narratives which tell of this 
event? 
The subject of our discussion, Paul Tillich, stands with 
those theologians - amongst whom we may number Rudolf B)iltmann, 
Friedrich Gogarten and Karl Barth - who content the legitimacy 
of any resumption of a quest for the historical Jesus. 
6 
This 
4For 
a source book of views of leading contemporary au- 
thorities, see Harvey K. McArthur (ed. , In Search of the His- 
torical Jesus (London: S. P. C. K., 197,0 . 
5See Van A. Harvey and Schubert M. Ogden, 'How new is the 
New Quest of the Historical Jesus? ' The Historical Jesus and the 
Kerv atia Christ i Essays on the New Quest of the Historical 
d! _, trans. and ed. C. E. Braaten and R. A. Harrieville (Nash- 
ville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1964) pp. 197-242 
6See 
Logarten, Demythologizing and Historyp trans. N. 
Horton Smith (Londons S. C. M. Press, 1955); and The Reality of 
Faith trans. C. Miahalson set 1. (Philadelphias The Westminster 
Press, 1959). For references to Barth's work on the problem of 
the historical Jesus, see Joseph C. Weber, 'Karl Barth and the 
Historical Jesust , The Journal of Bible and Religion, XXXII, go, 
4 (October 1964) PP"350-354" 
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third group seeks, accordingly, to resolve the theological prob- 
lem research has created by, in effect, reorientating the veri- 
fication of christological claims about Jesus away from any 
reliance upon the historian's reconstruction of the past made on 
the basis of the documentary tradition. Its members admit that. 
the Christian faith must be understood historically and not meta- 
physically, that the reality which underlies Christianity had an 
objective-historical status which is the necessary presupposition 
of its own biblical interpretation; they argue, however, that the 
historical character of this occurrence is to be sought not in a 
scientific substantiation of the actual details of its tbare 
faotuality', but in the original event's meaning, signifioanoe or 
intentionality as expressed in the gospels by those who first en- 
countered it. This acute scepticism about, or lack of interest 
in, the quest does not imply, therefore, 'docetic leanings or an 
intentional diminution of the importance of the earthly Jesus, 
but rather a refusal to allow Chrietology to be dominated by the 
changing results of historical research'.? On the view adopted 
by these theologians, the historicity of Jesus is considered only 
in relation to the ultimate existential interpretation of him as 
the Christ. Consequently, every objective, impersonal, critical 
assessment of the reality of his existence is rejected as mis- 
leading and illegitimate. Following this line of argument, faith 
is not concerned with the Jesus of history produced by historical 
science, but with the Jesus of the tkerygmatic witness and proala- 
mation' or "biblical picture' which attest to God's divine action 
in him. Thus, under the terms of this hermeneutic, questions of 
historical-factual truth are distinguished from questions' of theo- 
7D. Moody Smith, off., p"132 
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logical truth. While the critical method oan therefore help to 
make vivid the concreteness of the Christ-event, or to expose 
the essential kerygmatic nature of the sources and uncover the 
various strata in the development of the gospel tradition, it 
can say. nothing about the event's ultimate meaning as a revela- 
tion. For the meaning that faith perceives in Jesus, and which 
it communicates to present belief through the New Testament 
narratives, does not belong in any way to that realm in which 
scientific research aims to discover truth. According to this 
school of thought, the historical Jesus of the biographers is 
not, in other terms, the Jesus whom scripture presents as the 
Christ: he is not the Christ of faith. 
Before entering into a detailed evaluation of Tillich'a 
argument, it is useful to remind ourselves briefly of some of 
the reasons which have induced him and his neo-orthodox col- 
leagues to adopt a position which iss on the evidence of the 
preceding paragraphs, co clearly at odds with the views of 
other participants in the debate on the historical Jeans. Fore. 
most among them is, of course, the reason already mentioned: the 
desire to secure for faith' a factual-historical foundation a 
total immunity from critical investigation. As we have just 
seen, this in itself suggests that, the refusal to make faith sub- 
ject to research is not intentionally docetic. For these theo- 
logians, therefore, a quest, for the historical Jesus is not only 
inappropriate, since the gospels do not have the kind or amount 
of historical information needed for a biography: it is also 
irrelevant precisely because it is the creation of historicism:, 
because, that is to sag, it necessarily restricts any theological 
appreciation of the reality of Jesust existence to that sphere of 
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history which can be established by critical methods. 
8 Close to 
this- motive is the equally familiar neo-orthodox aim to refute 
any search for the 'objective' ground of faith or for the 'real 
actuality' of the founding event of Christianity. Several fac- 
tors have contributed to the development and strength. of this 
position. One has been the reaction, seen primarily in the work 
of BBultmann and other form-critics, against the liberal overcon- 
fidence in the historical reliability of the Markan framework. 
Another has certainly been the influence of the Enlightenment 
controversy about history and revelation and the celebrated argu- 
ment that the movement from history to revelation is a metabasis 
eis allo genos. From this has grown an increasing awareness 
that historical knowledge, since it is concerned with the past, 
can achieve at best an approximate knowledge; and that the writ- 
ing of history, far from being a verifiable science, is an art 
containing an irreducible element of subjectivity. But perhaps 
the most important factor, largely contributed by the neo-orthodox 
themselves, has been the application to epistemology of a radical 
conception of revelation, according to which faith must relinquish 
any wish for a security founded on objectifying knowledge. For a 
movement so conscious of the infinite qualitative difference be- 
tween the reality of the human existential situation and the reali- 
ty of God's transcendence, no divine incursion into history for 
our redemption could be appropriable or calculable in terms of the 
subject-object antithesis: implicit within all historically demon- 
strable knowledge. It was this rediscovery of the revelatory signi- 
ficance of the historical in Christianity which led, probably more 
than any other factor, to the total repudiation by the neo-orthodox 
school of a quest for the historical Jesus as a search for the so- 
8See 
above, Ch. II, PP. 54-59 
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called 'facts of our salvation'. 
In common with the position adopted by his neo-orthodox 
oontemporaries, Paul Tillieh's analysis of the problem of the 
historical Jesus begins. also with the recognition that the nine- 
teenth_ century liberal quest was incapable of supplying, in the 
earthly man Jesus of Nazareth, a cause adequate to account for 
the emergence of the community of New Being. During our study, 
we have noted that this conclusion is, for Tillich, supported 
by a number of arguments, not least among them being the form- 
critical view that the only Jesus we know is Jesus as the Christ 
and Lord of the community of faith, and his own elaborate dis- 
tinction between the dimensions of faith and research, according 
to which religious certainty cannot rest on the probabilities of 
biblical enquiry. The task before him, therefore, was to demon- 
strate how the Jesus of history could be reunited with the 
Christ of faith. We have seen that our author's solution is 
determined, in the first instance, by his use of the expression 
'historical Jesus' to refer to the presence of a factual element 
within the event 'Jesus as the Christ' rather than to the his- 
torical evidence about Jesus produced by the historian. 
9 It is 
this redefinition which, by asserting the necessary conjunction 
of 'historical fact' and 'believing receptiont, allegedly over- 
comes the problem. of historical scepticism. For according to it, 
Tillich recognizes that an 'objective' quest for the historical 
foundation of Christianity is in principle misconceived, if not 
impossible, since the only historical event of which we can 
speak lies within the community of faith. tIf the Christian 
faith', he writes, 
9See above, Ch. I, PP. 47-53 
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is based even on a 100,000 to 1 probability that Jesus 
has said or done or suffered this or that; if Christi- 
anity is based on possible birth-registers of Nazareth 
or crime-registers of Pontius Pilate, then it has lost 
its foundation completely. Then the historical event, 
that a new reality has appeared in mankind and the 
world (a reality which is reflected in the picture of 
Jesus as the Christ), has become a matter of empirical 
verification, ideally through a competent reporter, 
armed with a camera, phonograph, and psychograph. 
Since such a reporter, unfortunately, was not avail- 
able in the year A. D. 30, we have to replace him by 
more or less probable conjectures. But this is not 
the historical character of Jesus as the Christ. It is 
regrettable that one of the greatest events in the his- 
tory of religion - the radical criticism of the holy 
legend of Christianity by Christian theologians, which 
destroyed a whole system of pious superstition - has 
been abused for the purpose of giving a pseudo-scienti- 
fie foundation to the Christian faith. The historical 
foundation of theological method does not mean that 
the theologian has to wait, with fear and trembling, 
for the next mail which may bring him a new, more cri- 
tieal, or more conservative statement about some impor- 
tant facts of the "life of Jesus" according to which 
he has to change his faith and his theology. But it 
does mean that his theology is determined by the event 
of the appearance of the new reality in history, as 
reflected in the full biblical picture of Jesus as the 
Christ and as witnessed by all biblical writers and by 
the whole tradition of Christianity. 10 
Initially we may say that this argument concerning the 
question of the christological place and function of the con- 
trete historical fact of Jesus appears very alluring. The in- 
s: istence that it is the 'biblical picture of Jesus as the 
Christ' on which contemporary belief is based, and that the his- 
torical details of Jesus' life play no decisive role in. deter- 
mining the present faith of Christians, certainly leaves little 
incentive to probe 'behind' the New Testament portrait to dis- 
cover the empirical truth about Jesus of Nazarreth. Similarly, 
if all that can be said about the factual foundation of the 
truth of faith is that a 'personal life' existed through which 
New Being appeared, and if biblical research can achieve only a 
proximate knowledge, then, on this view, it could never be 
10'The Problem of Theological Method', pp. 21-22 
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proved conclusively that this so-called 'factual foundation' 
did or did not exist. In this way, the whole problem of the 
critical validation of the historical correspondence between 
the biblical picture and the existence and personality of Jesus 
is resolved. The question of the unreliability of the scriptu- 
ral sources need not be raised, and the scepticism engendered 
by historioal-soientifio study is done away with. For faith, 
it is held, can guarantee by its own power not only the person- 
al reality of the New Being but also an actual continuity 
between that reality and the riblieal presentation of Jesus as 
the Christ. 
When we consider this position, we are struck immedi- 
ately by the positive content of Tillich' a analysis. Undoubt- 
edly, modern critical research. into the gospel narratives is 
very differerat from what it was in the nineteenth century; and 
Tillich, by, taking, the entire kerygma into account, is at one 
With the present biblical standpoint. The positive signifi- 
canoe of this is extremely important, not least in containing, 
as Cameron points out, " a, refreshing and valid emphasis upon 
Christology as living existential faith rather than and theo- 
retical speculation'. 
11 Nevertheless, there are grave dangers, 
as well as assets, in accepting this argument. For if it is 
the biblical picture, and not the past reality of Jesus, that 
is of central importance for Christian faith today, then are we 
not in danger of surrendering the affirmation 'the Word became 
flesh' , and of discarding finally 
the salvation-history of 
God'a activity in the man Jesus of Nazareth? As Cameron con- 
tinuee: 
lce J. R. Cameron, 'The Historical Problem in Paul 
Tillich's Christology', Scottish Journal of Theology, XVIII, No. 
3 (September 1965) p. 257 
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If... existential participation in the Christ as known 
through the biblical picture is the authority for the 
truth of faith to the exclusion of historical truth, 
the insignificance of historical fact in Tillich' s 
Christology would seem difficult to deny. If the 
historical truth of the biblical material is not even 
partly that which guarantees the truth of faith, of 
what significance is the historical basis that Tillich 
claims for his Christology? If faith is more than 
historical probability, is it therefore completely 
independent of the truth of history? 12 
It is at this point that a large question mark must be 
placed over Tillich's discussion of the problem of the histori- 
cal Jesus. This, indeed, has been done in a series of interro- 
gation: by John Baillie, Gordon Kaufman, Allen 0. Miller, Albert 
Outler and D. Moody Smith-13 Baillie's acute remarks are repress- 
entative of their criticism. 
Tillich appears to imply that Christian faith would 
not be affected by however great a degree of skepti- 
cism regarding the historicity of Jesus of Nazareth. 
Yet he makes the idea of incarnation central in his 
understanding of the Christian faith. But surely the 
idea of incarnation is a false idea if no incarnation 
actually took place on the level of ordinary history. 
Or to put it otherwise, how can Christ be 'the center 
of history' if he was not himself a real historical 
person, but only an idea? An idea can indeed be the 
center of a system of ideas, but only an actual his- 
torical figure can be the center of history. l4 
As we saw in our second chapter, Tillich does, of 
course, insist that the name 'Jesus' denotes an historical in- 
dividual, and that 'Jesus as the Christ' is eternal God-manhood 
appearing in existence. In this respect he cannot be accused of 
the naive hermeneutioal position of the liberals who did not 
take sufficient account of the relation between the historical 
reality of Jesus and. the biblical picture of him as the Christ, 
12Ibido 
9 p. 2 
62 
13' Interrogation of Paul Tillich', Philosophical Inter- 
rogations, ed. S. & B. Rome, pp. 357-409 
14, bid", p"363 
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but who instead substituted the picture for the reality. Never- 
theless, Tillich has not, we suggest, taken the implications of 
this historical emphasis seriously enough, and consequently con- 
tinuing doubt and perplexity remain concerning the degree of im- 
portance he allows the historioal dimension in Christianity. 
His semantic analysis of the term *historical Jesus' is certain- 
ly significant, and is, by its distinction between fact and 
interpretation, useful in overcoming some of the confusions 
which arise when the New Testament critic investigates the his- 
torical foundation of faith. And yet, despite Tillich's empha- 
eis on the factual side of the event 'Jesus as the Christ', this 
semantic distinction also requires that he cannot substantiate 
his claim historically. Thus, however such he may stress a 
'personal life' in which essential manhood has appeared, he can 
provide no single historical instance of this actually happening. 
If research for an historical Jesus is irrelevant to the Christo- 
logical interpretation of Jew' being as New Being, then how can 
it be simultaneously maintained that the biblical picture of the 
Christ is not the product of the imagination? To this extent, 
Baillie's criticism is appropriate. Our author is overstating 
his case when he holds that historical enquiry is irrelevant to 
the assertion that 'Jesus is the Christ', since otherwise it is 
difficult to see why Jesus is a reality and not an ideal category. 
If this conclusion is alien to Tillich' e theologioal intentions, 
then, to avoid it eucoesefully, something more should be said 
concerning the historical Jesus. 
Tillich's opening reply to this type of criticism is de. 
pendent on his aoneeption of the kerygmatic character of 
the 
soriptural soureses. It; is impossible to penetrate 
behind the 
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gospels, and so discover the 'real Jesus', because the histori- 
oal Jesus exists only in the kerygma. The earthly Jesus oannot 
be examined critically apart from his reception as the Christ 
by the first disciples. The biblical picture of Jesus as the 
Christ can be understood only as a document of faith and not as 
a source of strictly historical value. What Tillich calls the 
' necessary iiiterdependenoe' 15 of historical fact and receiving 
faith within the Christian event means, therefore, that na 
material difference can be established between the message 
given by Jesus and the message given about Jesu, or rather, to 
put the matter another way, that faith itself - that is, the 
faith of the community created by its participation in the 
power of the New Being - is the sole datum of knowledge we have 
of Jesus as the Christ. As Tillich sees correctly, it was this 
conjunction of fact and reception which, doomed to failure the 
original quest of the historical Jesus. 
Our concern with this analysis of the structural form 
of the New Testament picture does not evolve from Tillieht s 
premise - by now hardly contested - that the gospel image is 
kerygmatic, but from the conclusion he draws from this premise, 
namely, the sharp distinction made between the dimension of 
faith (to which the portrait belongs) and the dimension of his- 
torical research. In this connection, two primary questions 
must be asked and answered. First, does the failure of the 
original quest of the historical Jesus mean that we can never 
know anything of Jesus through biblical enquiry? And second, 
does the methodological failure of that, quest mean that it is 
logically impossible for historical knowledge to serve as the 
basis of Christian faith? 
15ST, 2: 114. See above, Ch. III, pp. 125-128. 
251. 
I. The Use of the Biblical Picture as an Historical Docu- 
meat 
The first of these two questions centres on our author's 
assertion that, since the historical Jesus exists only in the 
kerygmatic picture of' him as the Christ, the factual foundation 
of Christian belief lies outside the dimension occupied by New 
Testament research. This argument revolves round the supposi- 
tion that to admit the kerygmatic nature of the gospel portrait 
is to deny its use as an historical document, and results, as we 
have seen, in the view that tthere is no picture behind the 
biblical one which could be made scientifically probable'. 
16 
The uncertainty of this judgment has, however, been shown in the 
work of a number of New Testament scholars engaged in at new 
quest' of the historical Jesus. 
17 Hans Conselmann has stated 
their position clearly: 
It is still being argued that the intent of the Gos- 
pels is not to offer historical records; therefore, 
they should not be used as historical sources. Again, 
an impossible conclusion is being derived from a true 
insight of form criticism; ... the intention of the 
Gospels does not automatically decide how I should 
use them today. The question is not whether they in- 
tend to be sources but whether they are such.. "and18 
whether they can be used as such by the historian. 
16 2s 118. See above, Ch. I, p. 42. 
17Because 
of the brevity of the following analysis of 
the 'new quest', the impression may be created that the move- 
ment in unified in its conclusions. This, however, is not the 
case, as is indicated by James M. Robinson, 'Basic Shifts in 
German Theology', Interpretation, XVI, No. 1 (January 1962) pp. 
76-97, and by J. B. Bedenbaugh, 'The First Decade of the New 
Quest of the Historical Jesus', Lutheran Quarterly, XVI, No. 3 
(August 1964) pp"239-2677. 
His- is$The Method of the Life of Jesus Research', The 
torical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ: Essays on the New 
Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. and ed. C. E. Braaten 
and R. A. Karrieville, pp. 56-57. Quoted by James C. Livingston, 
©o"_" , p" 44" 
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The advent of this new approach to the biblical material 
can be traded to a lecture delivered at Marburg in 1953 by Ernst 
Käsemann, 19 Reacting against the position of his teacher, Rudolf 
B ltmann, that the message of Jesus is a presupposition, not a 
part, of New Testament theology, 
20 Käsemann held that unless some 
real connection is established between the Jesus of history and 
the Christ of faith, Christianity would not be able to defend it- 
self from a docetie elimination of Godts decisive aot in the man 
from Nazareth. From the first, however, he admitted that the 
kerygmatic character of the gospels shows that they were not do- 
signed to impart historical information about Jesus; they do not 
provide us with the opportunity to write a chronological account 
of him. But the significant question raised by Käsemann was 
this: assuming the form-critical view that the gospels are com- 
munity proclamations of the risen Christ, should this lead to a 
total scepticism regarding the earthly Jesus? Or, to put it 
differently, can we arrive at the pre-Crucifixion life of Jesus, 
and thereby ascertain to what extent the kerygmatic 'biblical 
picture' is a reliable representation of the historical Jesus? 
This, as Klsemann makes clear, is not arg attempt to probe behind 
the kerygma in order to reach the historical Jesus, but rather an 
effort to determine the 'continuity of the gospel... and the vari-- 
ation of the kerygma. t. 
21 
19'Das Problem des historischen Jesus', Zeitschrift für 
Theologie und Kirche LI (1954) pp. 125-153. E. T., 'The Problem 
of the Historical Jesus' , Essays on New Testament Themes, trans. 
W. J. Montague ("Studies in Biblical Theology, "`, XLI, Londons 
S. C. M. Press, 1964) PP"15-47" 
20 See above, Ch. III, pp. 102-105. 
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The criteria for establishing those authentic features 
of the gospel tradition which oan properly be applied to Jesus 
are stringent. 
22 R. H. Fuller has outlined three basic steps 
commonly employed by I, semann and his colleagues. 
23 The major 
task is, he says, the elimination of anything that has a keryg- 
matic tone - namely, those elements which. reflect the post- 
Easter life of the church rather than the life of Jesus himself 
- from the sayings and deeds of Jesus. Next follows the eaclu- 
lion of all material that has parallels either in contemporary 
Judaism or in Rabbinic tradition and Jewish apocalyptic. And 
finally, all authentic sayings should exhibit Aramaic features, 
and, to increase the chance of authenticity, the structure of 
Aramaic poetry. 
24 On this basis, the residue of historical 
material left after this process can be reasonably assured au- 
thentic, and, as euch, may justifiably form the basis of his- 
toric:. al investigation. 
The results of this use of the non-kerygmatic material 
of the gospels have been manifold. Using the valuable criteria 
provided by form-criticism, Hans Conzelmann maintains that the 
Reign of God, although still in the future, was already engaging 
22Cf. N. A. Dahl, 'The Problem of the Historical Jesus', 
Kerv na and History A Symposium on the Theology of Rudolf Bult- 
mann, trans. and ed. C. E. Braaten and R. A. Harrisville (Nash- 
ville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1962) pp. 138-171; and Harvey K. 
McArthur, 'Basic Issues: A Survey of Recent Gospel Research', 
Interpretation, XVIII, No. l (January 1964) pp. 39-55" 
23The New Testament in Current Study (New York: Charles 
Scribner' s Sons, 1962 pp. 32-34 
24guller 
stipulates that the Aramaic criterion can be 
used only in conjunction with the first two criteria. The rea- 
son given is that 'the earliest Aramaic-speaking church could 
also have used poetic forms, and certainly its creation would 
undoubtedly exhibit Aramaic linguistic features, just as the 
authentic logia of Jesust 
(Ibid. 
, P-33)* 
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men in the word of Jesus himself. 
25 Ernst Fuchs substantiates 
this by viewing Jesus' conduct in dining with publicans and 
sinners, and his parables and teaching (which reflect his con- 
duct) as a special redeeming activity of the Reign making it- 
self felt in advance. 
26 Gunther Bornkama stresses the ministry 
as a sign calling for decision, so that the vital hour was 
already present in Jesus. He too considers impressions made by 
Jesus as authentic: his humble submission to God, his authority, 
and his acceptance of the sinful. 
27 Finally, Gerhard Ebeling 
distinguishes 'elements in the message of Jesus - the nearness 
of the rule of God, the clarity of his will, and the simplicity 
of discipleship with joy, freedom, and lack of anxiety', 
28 
and 
concentrates particularly on Jesus' teaching about faith. 
29 
In the light of this work done by the scholars of the 
'new quest' of the historical Jesus, 
3° 
we must seriously ques- 
25'Jesus Christus', Die Religion in Geschichte und Ge- 
genwart Card. ed. ; Tübingen: J. G. B. Mohr, 1959) Bd. III, p. 62 
26 'The Quest of the Historical Jesus', Studies of the 
Historical Jesus, trans. A. Scobie ("Studies in Biblical Theo- 
lo&I, XLII, London: S. C. M. Press, 1964) PP-11-31 
27Jesus 
of Nazareth, PP. 53-63 
28The Nature of Faith, 
Collins, 1961) p. 56 
trans. R. Gregor Smith (London* 
29'Jesus 
and Faith', Word and Faith, trans. J. W. Leitch 
(London: S. C. M. Press, 1963) pp. 236-238 
30We 
should add here that interest in the 'new quest' 
is not restricted to members of the so-called 'Bultmannian 
school'. See Joachim Jeremias, The Problem of the Historical 
Jesus, trans. Norman Perrin (Philadelphias The Fortress Press, 
1964); Ethelbert Stauffer, Jesus and His Story, trans. R. and 
C. Winton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960); and Oscar Cullmann, 
'Out of Season Remarks on the "Historical Jesus" of the Bült- 
mann School' , Union Seminary 
Quarterly Review, XVI, No. 1 (Jan- 
uary 1961) pp-131-148. Extracts from all three works are given 
in In Search of the Historical Jesus, ed. R. K. McArthur. 
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tion Tillich's assumption that the biblical picture of Jesus as 
the Christ cannot be used as an historical source because it is 
kerygmatic. When these theologians propose that research should 
now go behind the kerygma of the resurrected Jesus Christ, they 
admit that they are unable to give a bare chronological account 
of 'what actually took place'; they also accept that they are 
using the biblical narratives in a way foreign to the intentions 
of their authors. But if, they argue, the Evangelists employed 
historical or biographical material in their apostolic witness, 
then it is legitimate to probe the kerygma in order to discover 
the authentic traditions and logic of Jesus. According to this 
view, therefore, history known through the historical method has 
something of importance to say to faith; and it is in this res- 
pact that we must agree with Livingstones appraisal of Tillich's 
thesis: 
Certainly there is no logical connection between 
saying that "there is no picture behind the biblical 
one" and the belief that such a condition of the 
sources implies that the Gospels are not historical 
sources which serve as historical bases or founda- 
tions of faith (the fides uae creditor which serves 
as the object of the fides qua . 31 
In some ways, of course, Tillich's own position corres- 
ponds to the intentions of the 'new questers'. He too seeks a 
fuller appreciation of the earthly Jesus within the New Testament 
account, and likewise repudiates the dependence of faith upon 
historical research. 
32 However, in his assumption that there is 
a continuity between the kerygma and the historical Jesus - in 
the sense that 'historical fact' and 'believing reception' are 
inseparable within the picture - Tillich has insulated faith from 
310p_. 
, p. 44 
32Cf. Bornkamm, oho, p. 9; and James M. Robinson, A 
New Quest of the Historical Jesus, P- 44. 
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any serious examination of its factual foundation in a way that 
is clearly not intended by members of the 'new quest'. The 
scholars engaged in this enterprise seek to show not that the 
kerygma is true - that is beyond proof and does lie in the dimen- 
lion of faith - but that the New Testament account is a reliable 
representation of Jesus; and this does have important implica- 
tions for Christianity. For as Ebeling has remarked, if it oould 
be shown that the Christ of faith was a misunderstanding of the 
real significance of the historical Jesus, then the ground would 
be removed from under Christian belief. 
33 Therefore it is simply 
insufficient to say with Tillich that nothing can militate 
against the object of faith, because it still leaves unresolved 
the crucial question of whether existential participation in the 
'biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ' is existential partici- 
pation in the actual individual to which the name 'Jesus of Naza- 
reth' refers. In other words, Tillich' s totally sceptical 
approach to the historical problem of truth - that is, to the 
issue of the historical continuity between Jesus and his inter- 
pretation within the kerygmatic history - cannot escape the con- 
elusion that the Christ who encounters us through the scriptural 
portrait might not be the earthly Jesus but a mythological repres- 
entation of past human aspirations. In this conneotion, Barnackte 
famous question to Karl Barth is still relevant. If one refuses 
to study the Jesus of the gospels by means of critical-historical 
methods, how can one arrive at anything but a dreamed-up Christ 
in place of the real one? 
34 
33The Nature of Faith, p. 46 
34Kar1 Barth, 'Ein Briefwechsel mit Adolf von Harnaek', 
Theologische Fragen und Antworten (Zollikon/Zürichs Evangelischer 
Verlag, 1957) P"9 
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It is in answer to this type of criticism that Tillich 
draws attention to the difference between the two German words 
for 'history', Historie and Geschichte; 
35 
and in this respect 
his defence parallels Barth's own reply to Harnack. 
36 The 
Christ to whom faith aligns itself is not, our author says, der 
historische Jesus (the object of critical research) but der 
geschichtliche Christus (the content of the kerygma and the 
focus of faith). Properly understood, the latter does not 
refer to the former, namely to the 'historical Jesus' whom the 
historian seeks-behind the gospels, but to the 'historic Jesus' 
of the gospels, to the Jesus to whom faith has ascribed an ul- 
timate meaning in its biblical picture of him as the Christ. 
Now while Tillich's use of this linguistic peculiarity makes 
clear that he, like Barth before him, found Martin Kahlert s ter- 
minology helpful in overcoming the objection commonly voiced at 
this point in his theology, we should add that essentially the 
same form of argumentation is implicit within Tillich's later 
discussion of revelation and religious symbolism. 
37 For there 
too the basic requirement is that the veracity of faith's inter- 
pretation of an object as a revelation or religious symbol is 
not verified in terms of the literal correspondence between the 
meaning faith has attached to the object and that object's own 
factual-historical mode of being. The validity of the biblical 
portrait's presentation of Jesus as the Christ is relative only 
to faith's 'ecstatic' experience through him of that which pre- 
cedes and transcends the subject-object schema entailed in all 
355ee 
above, Ch. III, pp. 119-122. 
36Cf. Barth, tEin Briefwechsel mit Adolf von ! arnaok', 
p. 23. 
37See above, Ch. IV, pp. 177-185,194-200. 
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historical judgments: the ultimate of being, being-. itself; it 
is not, accordingly, governed by the 'historical truths of its 
statements about the empirical form of Jesus' life. In this 
argument also the fundamental assertion is therefore made: 
Christianity upholds the 'theological truth' of its picture of 
Jesus as the Christ independently of the processes of scienti- 
fie verification. 
This position represents a new development in Tillich's 
polemic against scientific estimates of Jesus, for by it he 
moves from a discussion of the methodological impossibility of 
a quest for the historical Jesus to a consideration of its theo- 
logical irrelevance. The arguments employed in this case no 
longer depend primarily upon an appreciation of the fragmentary 
and homiletic nature of the scriptural material - for example, 
that the narratives of Jesus' history are in fact a fusion of 
account and interpretation, and that the gospels are permeated 
with the developing christology of the early church. Here it 
is not simply a question of establishing a necessary correlation 
between acknowledging the structural complexity of the gospel 
tradition and denying their status as historical sources. In- 
stead, these arguments begin with the, allegedly more profound, 
percept ion; that the only history with which faith is concerned 
is the salvation-history of Jesus as the Christ, and that it is 
the a priori of faith that the Jesus of the historian is not, 
and cannot be, the Christ of faith. According to them, no 
statement that purports to convey a knowledge of Jesus as the 
bearer of New Being can be made which either precedes or is iso- 
lated from faith's own understanding of him as the Christ. On 
this line of reasoning, the implications that the photographable 
nature of the Christ-event has for historical enquiry are com- 
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pletely irrelevant to the truth of the ultimate significance 
faith imputes to Jesua in its biblical picture of him as the 
Christ. 
Now in this thesis that we must make our theologioal 
beginning with faith's interpretation of a fact as the funda- 
mental datum of the biblical portrait, there is undoubtedly 
very real insight into the character of Christian references to 
the past history of Jesus of Nazareth. Thus it must be agreed 
that, critical research is in no position to confirm or legiti- 
mate faith's own distinotive understanding of Jesus' life and 
ministry as the 'miracle' or 'sign-event' of divine activity 
within the temporal order - nor for that matter does it intend 
to do so. Indeed we should add here that historical study it- 
self, notably through its development of form-criticism, has 
been one of the chief factors in exposing the metaphysical 
nature of christologioal statements by its insistence that the 
language used in these statements cannot be reduced simply to 
r 
assertions of objective historical faut. Taken in this sense, 
therefore, our author's ban on research into the historical- 
factual foundation of the kerygma represents a valuable witness 
to the impropriety of seeking an historical proof of God's reve- 
1. ation within the historical Jesus of Nazareth, and provides an 
important refutation of the claim that historical reasoning can 
supplant faith or reduce God's action to the level of everyday, 
verifiable occurrence. In this respect, Tillich is surely right 
when he says that the kerygmatic confession 'Jesus is the Christ' 
cannot be regarded as a statement made on the sort of evidence 
that historical science provides. 
38 
38To 
suppose otherwise, Gerhard Ebeling writes, is to 
misunderstand the nature of both faith and research. 
'We shall 
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And yet, despite the clear validity of this aspect of 
Tillich's argument, his position remains very puzzling; and it 
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he is in fact making 
christological capital out of a quite proper distinction between 
faith and research which will not, on further reflection, sus- 
tain the kind of absolute distinction he actually requires. Let 
us look again at Tillich's understanding of the use of history 
in Christian theology. According to the notion both of 'history' 
as Geschichte and the non-literal structure of religious symbols, 
faith's preoccupation with the meaning of history, though cer- 
tainly distinct from a consideration of that which can be scien- 
tifically established or verified, does not exclude the notion 
of factuality. Put differently, the kerygmat s proclamation of 
the ultimate meaning of Jesus as the Christ does not neutralize 
or reduce its role as witness to that definite past-historical 
reality signified by the name 'Jesus of Nazareth'. The biblical 
picture has a double content held in inseparable unitys it in- 
volves reference to an historical event that has happened at a 
determinate place and time, and the preaching of this event's 
significance for our salvation. 
39 
Now Tillich is the first to 
hardly prove Jesus' messiahship by demonstrating his messianic 
consciousness; we shall not be able to get back behind the mes- 
sage of his resurrection to prove the historical fact on which 
it rests; nor will we be able to show by means of any other 
' objectively demonstrable' facts in Jesus' ministry, that he was 
the Son of God or that he died for us. Quite apart from the 
questions of historical detail which this raises, such a proce- 
dure would run counter to the logic of historical judgments. 
Messianic consciousness says nothing about actual messiahship... 
And apart from the impossibility of making historically valid 
judgments about Jesus' own attitude to his death, knowing his 
attitude to it would still not relieve me of the responsibility 
of deciding how I myself stand in relation to itt. Theology and 
Proclamation, trans. J. Riches. (London: Collins, 1966) pp. 56-57. 
395ee above, Ch. II, pp. 81-85,94-96; Ch. III, pp. 97-99, 
134-137; and Ch. IV, pp"194-196. 
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admit that the intelligibility of ohristologioal thought depends 
on the correlation of these two elements. Faith, he says, does 
make factual claims about Jesus, for in calling him 'Christ' it 
maintains that New Being was actual in him. In other terms, the 
meaning that faith ascribes to Jesus' being implies the prior 
existence of certain real qualities or characteristics in his 
person which warranted the subsequent biblical interpretation of 
him. The necessary continuity, therefore, that faith demands 
and asserts between the picture and the historical figure it de- 
pacts is that the significance faith therein attributes to Jesus 
corresponds to the significance his being in fact possessed. 
40 
It is here, however, with Tillich's contention that research is 
irrelevant to the validity of this correlation, that our present 
difficulty arises. Following the requirements of the distinction 
between the areas of faith and historical criticism, faith's 
only claim is that its portrait embodies the meaning Jesus had 
for those who first called him 'Christ', not that it contains 
accurate information about his life and work. The biblical pic- 
ture represents for the believer a continuity of 'historic signi- 
ficanoe' between narrative and past event, not a continuity of 
'historical detail'. And for Tillich this contrast is absolute. 
As he expresses it most forcefully in his theory of religious 
symbolism, the truth of the christological assertions faith makes 
concerning Jesus' being as New Being is unrelated to the literal- 
scientific verification of the 'historical truth' of those self- 
same assertions. Thus, while the historian can contradict the 
biographical details offered in faith's picture, he cannot there- 
by confirm or deny anything of relevance to the 'theological 
4OSee 
above, Ch. IV, pp. 148-153" 
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truth' about Jesus which that portrait reveals. 
41 
Unpacking this argument, we can see that it depends on 
maintaining two propositions simultaneously: - 
a) Belief in the truth of the biblical picture of 
Jesus as the Christ requires the belief not 
only that a human being, signified by the name 
'Jesus of Nazareth', has existed in the past, 
but that his being was such as would support 
the christological interpretation which the 
picture ascribes to it. 
b) Belief in the truth of the biblical picture of 
Jesus as the Christ does not require belief in 
the factual-historical accuracy of its stories 
about the man 'Jesus of Nazareth' whom it pre- 
sents as the Christ. All that is, required is 
that these stories should be understood as con- 
veying a meaning equal to the meaning that man 
actually had. 
In the first proposition, Tillich asserts that the Christian 
confession of the biblical picture' s truth as a picture of the 
Christ demands acceptance of certain factual statements about 
the nature of Jesus' historical existence; but in the second, 
he refuses to stipulate what past state of affairs would count 
for or against the central claim that 'Jesus was the Christ', 
since according to him no empirical evidence concerning Jesus' 
life could conceivably confirm or disconfirm the Christian 
interpretation. Clearly, both these propositions cannot be 
held at one and the same time. If all possible empirical evi- 
deuce, whether adverse or not, is irrelevant to the truth of 
faith's interpretative statements about an event which faith 
itself agrees had an unquestionably empirical character, 
then 
all such statements are completely empty in that 
they imply no 
understanding of the circumstances which would verify or 
falsi- 
fy the interpretation, and so no real appreciation of the 
nature of the event to which that interpretation 
is attached. 
41See above, Ch. IV, pp. 196.. 200. 
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And if this is so, on what grounds can Tillich claim that. we 
would ascribe to a tphotographed Jesus' the same degree of 
importance as faith now ascribes to the 'portrayed Jesus' in 
its picture of him as the Christ? Either this is unwarranted 
speculation, or our author is here introducing a metaphysical 
assumption regarding the self-evident validity of biblical 
testimony which he has not hitherto admitted. 
Tillich's confusion undoubtedly arises from trying to 
get the best of both worlds. He wants, that is, to affirm the 
fully concrete, past-historical nature of the event proclaimed 
in the gospels, while yet refusing to make this event the 
possible object of critical study. Now while it may be one 
thing to warn correctly against improper attempts to get back 
behind the biblical picture in order to secure some 'historical 
proof' of its truth as a portrait of the real Christ, it remains 
quite another to insist upon the necessity of such undertakings 
for the purpose of making intelligible the continuity which is 
said to exist between the man Jesus and the picture's existen- 
tial interpretation of him. For if, following Tillich, the 
search for an historical Jesus behind the christological meaning 
of his being is truly irrelevant to theology, how can it be then 
maintained that the New Testament representation of that man is 
not a fiction? Equally, how can it be argued that a material 
correlation exists between the earthly career of Jesus and the 
biblical portrait when it is also held that the whole of the 
historical evidence for such a correlation is subsumed within 
scripture's 'interpretation'? 
42 Tillich, indeed, has here so 
42Ebeling 
makes the same point very neatly. 'If the 
difference between the kerygma of Christ and the historical 
Jesus disappears, we shall not only have to fear that the church 
may usurp the position of the historical Jesus, we shall also 
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divorced the meaning of the kerygma from all questions concern- 
ing the kerygma's historical validity as a portrait of Jesus' 
actual life that, in the end, it becomes uncertain what histori- 
cal claims, if any, he is making when he speaks of Jesus as the 
Christ. For if his assertion of an essential correspondence 
between 'historical fact' and 'biblical interpretation' is not 
a tautology, whereby the form of Jesus' existence has been pre- 
supposed in faith's definition of his meaning as New Being, then 
what we must have, and what Tillich never gives us, is the evi- 
Bence on which this assertion is made, the independent justifi- 
cation for the truth of that claim. In similar vein, Reinhold 
Niebuhr writes: 
For him (Tillich) the center of faith and history is 
Christ and not Jesus. He insists that it is not pos- 
sible to go behind the faith of the Early Church that 
Jesus was Christ and the faith that this Christ was as 
He is described in the Gospels. He is not interested 
in any rediscovery of the 'historical Jesus', since 
the basis of the Christian religion is the faith that 
the Christ is the revelation of the eternal meaning in 
time. That, to speak analogically, seems to me like 
accepting the biographers' estimate of a person's par-- 
ticular significance too uncritically. There was, 
after all, an historical Jesus who had a gospel which 
fitted remarkably well into a life which ended on the 
Cross. Humanly speaking, this life could not have been 
accepted in faith as the revelation of God had its in- 
tention not been in such remarkable conformity with its 
destiny. I wonder whether Tillich. does not allow his 
natural theology to become too thin at this point. The 
faith of the Church in Jesus as Christ is like the 
effort of an artist to express the depth of a personal- 
ity in a portrait. The portrait is not the man but the 
symbol of the quintessential character of the man. We 
can accept it only if we have corroborative evidence 
that the portrait is true. 43 
have to ask whether in the end, in spite of the assertion of the 
real presence of Christ in the kerygma, it may not rather be the 
case that the kerygma has taken the place of something which is 
absent'. Theology and Proclamation, p. 77. 
43, The Contribution of Paul Tillich', Religion in Life, 
VI, 10.3 (Autumn 1937) P"578 (my emphasis). Quoted by Robert H. 
Ayers, 'Biblical Criticism and Faith in Tillich and Niebuhr', 
Journal of Bible and Religion, XXXI, No. 4 
(October 1963) p. 316. 
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Tillich, as we have said, does admit that the New Testa- 
ment image of Jesus is not the product of the imagination: it is 
a combination of 'historical fact' and 'believing reception'. But 
this conjunction, if we take Niebuhr's criticism, implies not only 
that a relation to the earthly Jesus is a requirement of the gos- 
pel message, but, more importantly for the argument at hand, that 
the authenticity of the gospel's historical references to that man 
is part of its credibility. The truth of the picture's testimony 
to what has happened is, that is to say, one element by which its 
validity as kerygma is judged; and, to this extent, the tradition 
Which tells of Jesus of Nazareth must be examined to see if it is 
reliable. Historical evidence could, then, be relevant to the 
question of the kerygma's validity. If a discrepancy could be est- 
ablished between Jesus and his biblical portrayal - for example, 
that 'unbelief', hubris and 'concupiscence' were after all present 
in him - then the christological claims of the New Testament would 
be challenged. So long as Tillich insists that the event on which 
Christianity is based is a union of fact and reception, he cannot 
avoid the conclusion that the risk of faith is both existential 
and historical, namely, that faith's response to Jesus could be 
idolatrous in so far as it might have imputed to him oharaoteris- 
tics he did not possess in real life. 
A similar difficulty stands at the heart of Tillich's dis- 
Gussion of revelation and symbols. Here too he begins by emphasi- 
zing the importance of the empirical aspect of a finite entity 
which is taken as a 'sign-event' or 'primary-immanent' religious 
symbol. The use of material taken from finite reality is neces- 
vary, he says, in order to give content to the cognitive function 
in revelation. But to this. Tillich adds that the finite media of 
revelation are not empirical in that the meaning 'ecstatically' 
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perceived in them cannot be validated within the subject-object 
schema of rationality. 'Knowledge of revelation', although 
primarily communicated through historical events and people, 
transcends the basic condition of historical knowledge, the 
subject-object antithesis, and so entails no factual assertions 
evaluable by historical science. 
44 Now quite what our author 
means by transcendence of the subject-object structure of know- 
ledge is hard to see. If he is saying that faithts assertions, 
as utterances of the ecstatic reason, are simply expressions of 
! numinous astonishment' - more like "0h, how wonderful! " than 
like "Caesar crossed the Rubicon", to borrow Dorothy Enunetts 
example45 - then clearly they do not imply factual statements. 
Yet Tillich himself rules out this possibility when he classi- 
fies the empirical content of a revelation or 'primary-immanent' 
religious symbol as the 'objective$ side of a revelatory oon- 
stellation, of which ecstasy is the t sub jective' side. Ecstasy 
is not, then, an expansive feeling or mystical experience, but 
the individual response to an awareness of the ultimate through 
the contemplation of certain events and certain personalities. 
This, however, multiplies the confusion. For if the objective 
status of the medium is accepted as one element in a revelatory 
event, how can knowledge of it as the vehicle of revelation be 
dissociated from the retrospective and historical question of 
whether this event actually occurred in the manner prescribed 
by faith? In this connection, it is surely necessary for theo- 
logy to take empirical evidence into consideration., even though 
44 8ee above, C'h. IV, pp. 187-188. 
45'Epiat. 
emology and the Idea of Revelation', The Theo- 
logy of Paul Tillich, ed. C. W. Kegley & R. W. Bretall, p. 212. 
Cf. J. Heywood Thomas, 'Some Notes on the Theology of Paul 
Tillich', Hibbert Journal, LVIII (April 1959) pp. 255-256. 
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we may agree with Tillich that this information can never add 
up to knowledge of revelation. But conceding even this point 
does not require the complete disjunction of this knowledge from 
the subject-object form of knowing normally associated with any 
'knowledge of past events', since otherwise it becomes difficult 
to understand how the purely factual assertions involved in the 
statements about revelation can be justified. If research, for 
instance, could demonstrate (per impossibile) that Jesus protes- 
ted against the judgment of Pontius Pilate, or indeed that the 
Crucifixion never happened, would this not seriously impugn 
faith's claim that Jesus, as the 'final revelation' and pre- 
eminent religious symbol, 'remained transparent to the divine 
mystery until his death, which was the final manifestation of 
his transparency'? 4ý If this conclusion is disallowed, then it 
would appear that we are once more faced with a tautology, 
according to which the allegedly historical statements about 
Jesus' denial of all ultimate claims for himself follow from 
faith's definition of him as a revelation and religious symbol. 
While it may be true, therefore, that the revelatory 
nature of Jesus' life cannot be known through research alone, 
the question nevertheless remains as to whether it can be pro- 
perly understood without it. Though it may be correct to say 
that the assertion 'Jesus is the Christ' is not equivalent to 
all those historical claims that could be made truthfully about 
46ST, 1: 149-150. Lewis Ford argues that Tillich's 
use of the word 'transparent' is in itself confusing. 'If the 
medium is purely transparent, how can we speak of its intrinsic 
affinity with that which it reveals? Transparency entails the 
negation of all visible properties. Retaining this visual meta- 
phor, we must say that any affinity between the medium and that 
which it reveals will consist in visible similarities; but the 
medium, being transparent, has none'. 'The Three Strands of 
Tillich' s Theory of Religious Symbols', The Journal of Religion, 
XLVI, No. 1 (January 1966) p. 115. 
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the history of Jesus of Nazareth, this does not entail that 
nothing historically true needs to be known for faith's asser- 
tion to be true. At the very least we must surely aooept that 
faith here requires grounds for maintaining the historical pro- 
position that there once was a man called 'Jesus of Nazareth', 
whose words, and deeds did not belie his acceptance as- the New 
Being. If the facticity and nature of this person belong to 
those things which concern faith, then it cannot dispense with 
the way of historical verification. So long as it remains an 
essential ingredient of Christianity that Jesus was an actual 
figure encountered by the first disciples, and not a philoso- 
phical abstraction personalized in the legends of the apostolic 
kerygma, then Christian belief cannot remain indifferent to the 
enquiries of the historian, but must, to use Bornkamm's famous 
phrase, tseek the history in the Kerygma of the Gospelst. 
47 
The biblical picture purports to be a portrait of Jesus as the 
Christ; and for that reason alone, without any detriment to its 
character and original purpose as a witness of faith, it must 
also be shown to be an historical document having its source in 
a genuine history. 
II. Certainty and Historical Judgments 
These considerations. lead us to the second of our two 
main questions. Whatever the necessity of research may be from 
the viewpoint of christology's intelligibility and coherence, 
does not the failure of the original quest of the historical 
Jesus mean that all subsequent attempts must fail because his- 
torieal knowledge is logically inadequate as a foundation of 
47 Jesus: of Nazareth, p. 21 
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Christian faith? The problem involved here has to do with the 
so-called 'preliminary' or 'probable' nature of biblical study, 
a characteristic almost always referred to by those who seek 
the emancipation of faith from historical enquiry. 
48 It comes 
as no surprise to find, therefore, that it is on the basis of 
this argument that our author rejects the implications of the 
historical findings of the 'new quest'. The scholars thus en- 
gaged, writes Tillich, 
are obviously more optimistic with respect to the 
probabilities, but no change results for the syste- 
matic situation. Our knowledge of the historical 
Jesus never gets beyond probabilities of one kind 
or another. 49 
Nothing, however, in Tillich's theology is more perplexing than 
this characterization of the methodological results of histori- 
cal research; and one wonders what he means when he says that the 
historian can. never reach certainty. As Haywood Thomas remarkss- 
... it is obvious that of any historical or empirical 
statement we must admit that it is in one sense pro- 
bable, namely that it is not necessarily true. But 
the opposition is not between certainty and probabi- 
lity; it is between two kinds of truth, the truths 
of fact and the truths of logic. We can indeed des- 
cribe the former as contingent, but this in no way 
removes them from the possibility of verification. 
All we can mean if we say they are probable is that 
when they are verified they are not verified in the 
same way as the propositions, which are necessarily 
true. Similarly, if we describe the historian's 
statements as probable all that, can properly be 
meant by this is that they are not necessarily true 
statements. 50 
In other words, Tillich has confused two statements about 
48See 
above, Ch. IV, p. 145. For contemporary. uses of this 
argument, see F. Gerald Downing, The Church and Jesus 
("Studies 
in Biblical Theology", Second Series, X, London: S. C. M. Press, 
1968) pp. 184-187. 
49Pers 
ectives, p. 227 
50Paul Tillichs An Appraisal, p. 86 
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historical criticism. The first concerns the logical status of 
historical assertions, namely the truism that they are contingent 
and, as such, probable. The second, on the other hand, is an 
illicit deduction from the first, namely that the historian can 
never reach certainty. But since the opposite of 'probable' is 
'necessarily true', we can only assume that Tillich. is. here 
suggesting that the historian can never possess a certainty which 
would be impossible for him anyway! What he does not see is, 
first, that if truths of fact do resemble truths of logic then 
they make no assertions about existence at all, since necessary 
propositions (the propositions of logic and mathematics) are 
essentially hypothetical and unrestrictive, being applicable to 
any state of affairs whatsoever; second, that the verification of 
statements concerning matters of fact is not equivalent to logi- 
cal proof, since as existential assertions they all express con- 
tingent propositions and accordingly admit the possibility of 
error (i. e. they are not of such a kind that it is logically im- 
possible for them to be false); and third, that the admission of 
the logical possibility of error does not in itself establish 
grounds for doubting the veracity of the statements of fact in- 
volved. For if it did, says John Hick, 
no empirical proposition could ever be verified, and 
indeed the notion of empirical verification would be 
without use and therefore without sense. That we 
rightly seek, when we desire the verification of a 
factual proposition, is not a demonstration of the 
logical impossibility of the proposition's being 
false (for this would be a self-contradictory demand, 
but such weight of evidence as suffices, in the type 
of case in question, to exclude rational doubt. 
5l 
, 
51' Theology and Verification', The Philosophy of Religion 
ed. Basil Mitchell (London: Oxford University Press, 1971 p. 58. 
In an essay in the same volume entitled 'An Empiricist's View of 
the Nature of Religious Belief', R. B. Braithwaite writes: 'Philo- 
sophers of religion who wish to make empirical facts relevant to 
the meaning of religious statements but at the same time desire 
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The suggestion here that one can possess complete 
assurance with regard to historical propositions, even while 
acknowledging the logical possibility of their being false, re- 
quires further explanation. On Tillich' s view, as we have seen, 
complete verification is unattainable because of the inherent 
corrigibility of all historical results. That is to say, our 
author infers from the logical status of all empirical claims 
(namely, that they are contingent and so 'could be this or 
that') that one can never rule out the possibility that our 
present historical judgments will be refuted later, either 
through the discovery of new evidence or through the further 
testing of old evidence. 
52 
This possibility is, moreover, held 
to be unlimited, since otherwise one could conceive of a time 
when, with the collection of all relevant data to corroborate 
an historical statement, complete verification, and so absolute 
certainty, would be achieved. In order, therefore, to justify 
the argument that all empirical assertions are probable, one 
must also admit the permanent possibility of their future cor- 
rection. 
Here, however, we must refer to a recent article by 
Peter Carnley which demonstrates most ably the impropriety of 
Tillich's claim that every historical judgment is permanently 
to hold on to these statements whatever the empirical facts may 
be are indulging, I believe, in a sort of doublethink attitudes 
they want to hold that religious statements both are about the 
actual world (i. e. are empirical statements) and also are not 
refutable in any possible world, the characteristic of state- 
ments which are logically necessary'. (Ibid., pp. 75-76). 
52Cf. ST, 2: 130-131: 'It is inadequate to point out 
that historical research has not yet given any evidence to sup- 
port such scepticism. Certainly, it has not yeti But the an- 
xious question remains whether it could not do so sometime in 
the future: ' See above, Ch. V, pp. 209-210. 
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uncertain. 
53 During the course of his discussion, Carnley makes 
a series of distinctions between knowing and claiming to know, 
between the validation and justification of a claim, and between 
kno= and being certain. 
54 While the discovery of fresh evi- 
dente, he says, may show that a person of the past did not know 
that an event occurred, since his claim to know is not validated 
by present evidence, this does not mean that he was uncertain of 
its occurrence or that he was unjustified in claiming to know of 
it. 
Consequently, it is possible that the Christian may 
have justification for making certain claims to know 
particular facts about Jesus. If at a future time 
it is discovered that the claims are untrue (not va- 
lidated) this would then entail that the Christian 
of the past cannot have known these facts. But it 
would not mean that he was not justified in claiming 
to know them, nor that he was not certain about them. 
Thus, it is possible to be certain, and to make 
claims to know facts of the past which turn out to be 
wrong in the final analysis. 55 
Dr. Carnley tells us that the important point here is that, while 
'certainty' and 'knowing' are not synonymous, 'certainty' is a 
necessary condition of 'claiming to know'. Accordingly, the 
view of historical scepticism entails that 'one is never really 
justified in claiming to know a fact of the past'. and that all 
historical statements 'must be tentatively asserted'. The argu- 
went advocated by Tillich is, therefore, 'that we can never 
really make claims to know facts of the past, thereby expressing 
certainty, or claim to be certain about the facts of the past, in 
53, The Poverty of Historical Scepticism', Christ, Faith 
and History, ed. S. W. Sykes & J. P. Clayton 
(Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972) pp. 165-189. 
541_ 
9 pp. 180-181 
551 
, p. 181 
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the face of the permanent possibility of correction ', 56 
It is precisely this contention that Carnley shows to 
be erroneous. 
57 
Let us suppose, he continues, that the possi- 
bility of new evidence becomes a reality. At time T2 evidence 
is forthcoming which provides grounds for doubting that a cer- 
tain event, E, occurred. Following Tillich, this means that at 
no previous time, fl, can it have been known with certainty 
that. E did occur. The discovery at T2, in other words, entails 
that the occurrence of E could not have been known for certain 
at Ti; and to assert the conjunction of these two propositions - 
that the occurrence of E was known with certainty at Tl and 
doubted at T2 - involves self-contradiction. But according to 
Carnley, this argument is unjustified. Grounds for doubting that 
E occurred does not entail that it did not, and so does not ex- 
elude the possibility that it did occur. ffence, it must be ad- 
mitted that an historian at T1 could have known with certainty 
that E occurred. 
... if it is not entailed that E did not occur, then it 
is logically possible that E did occur and therefore 
we must admit that it could have been known with abso- 
lute certainty at Ti that E did occur. Despite the 
fact that there are reasons for doubting at T2, if it 
is possible that, E did occur, then it is possible that 
somebody could have made absolutely certain that E did 
occur. Clearly, it just does not follow from the fact 
that because somebody discovers evidence to suggest 
561bid. 
57Here Carnleyy's thesis follows Norman Malcolm's in Know- 
ledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963) 
PP. 1-57. Malcolm in turn was refuting the ' fallibilistic' argu- 
ments of C. I. Lewis and Rudolf Carnap that every empirical 
statement is uncertain and so not factual, Cf. . Lewis, An Analy- 
sis of Knowledge and Valuation 
(La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1946) 
p. 180, and Mind and the World-Order 
(New York: Charles Soribnert s 
Sons, 1929) PP-279-282; also Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syn- 
tax, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935) pp"11-13, and 'Testa- 
bility and Meaning, ', Philosophy of Science, III 
(1936) pp. 419-471, 
IV (1937) pp"1-40. 
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that E might not have occurred, that no person at a 
previous time can have known with absolute certainty 
that E did occur. 58 
Saving said this, however, Carnley suggests a way in 
which Tillich's position can be strengthened. It may be that, 
the evidence discovered at T2 provides not merely evidence to 
s_ that E might not have occurred, but absolutely conclu- 
sine grounds for inferring that it did not. This being so, it 
would indeed be illegitimate to claim that at Tl an historian 
knew with complete certainty that E did occur. Yet Carnley 
maintains that even this possibility does not prove the seep- 
tic's argument. For while the evidence at T2 will constitute 
proof for a particular case, it does not prove the thoroughly 
general thesis that no statement about the past can be known 
with absolute certainty, since a basic premise of that argument 
asserts precisely what needs to be proved! In order 
to assert that nobody in the past can have known 
with absolute certainty that E occurred we need to 
know for certain that E did not occur. But those 
who use the argument for historical scepticism 
assert that we can never know any statement about 
the past for certain. 59 
In other terms, if Tillich claims that any particular empirical 
statement is 'probable' or 'uncertaint because the acceptance of 
its 'historical truth' today (at Ti) does not preclude the possi- 
bility of its falsification tomorrow (at T2), then he is in fact 
admitting that an historian at T2 could show conclusively that 
the original assertion made at Ti was false; and this is exactly 
what he denies when he says that no statement about the past can 
be known with certainty! Thus, by strengthening Tillich' s arges-. 
went, C: arnley has demonstrated its complete circularity. And the 
580]20Cit., p. 184 
591_ 
, p. 165 
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dilemma is, he continues, that unless the argument is reinforced 
in this manner it becomes 'logically incorrect'. For if at T2 
we only have grounds for doubting that E might not have occurred, 
and not conclusive evidence, 'then the proposition that E did 
not occur is not entailed, and we are able to assert without 
self-contradiction that at Ti somebody can have known for certain 
that E did occur'. 
60 
Accordingly, the claim which has led Til- 
lieh and other theologians to assert the necessary independence 
of faith from historical enquiry - namely, that complete assu- 
rance with respect to historical judgments can never be achieved 
- is, so Carnley concludes, a 'faulty one '. 
61 
We may pursue the problem of historical probability in 
relation to the crucial question of whether faith can, of itself, 
guarantee the factual basis of Christianity. The nodal point of 
Tillich's argument is that if a man has faith then it is analyti- 
cally true to say that he has received the reality of a 'personal 
life', that which has overcome the estrangement of existence in 
existence. As he puts it: faith's own existence 'is identical 
with the presence of the New Being'. 
62 
Thus, while empirical 
research can never ensure with any degree of certainty the fact 
that the bearer of the New Being was a man named 'Jesus of Naza- 
reth', and while it is impossible to be sure that any detail of 
the biblical narrative about him is true, faith can, and does, 
guarantee the sheer tthatness' of the man oalled 'Christi. 
Our immediate difficulty with this argument evolves from 
our author's insistence that while an 'historical' fact is 
60Ibid. 
61jbid} 
p. 166 
62 
ST, 2: 131. See above, C'h. V, p. 211. 
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assured by faith - here the normal meaning of 'historical' is 
implied: 'something which happened in the past' - it is not the 
object of problematic historical investigation. In order to 
clarify the confusion at this point, let us examine two state- 
ments, both vital to Tillich's christology. 
A) A man, denoted by the name 'Jesus of Nazareth', 
lived, had disciples, and died. 
B) Je sua as the Christ is the bearer of the New 
Being in existence. 
The relation between these two assertions is complex. The truth 
of A does not show that B is either true, probable or even mean- 
ingful. To this extent, one can agree with Tillich that faith's 
knowledge of Jesus as the Christ is not simply historical know- 
ledge. That is to say, B is not the product of research, nor is 
the assurance it provides scientific. The historian has nothing 
to say about B since it belongs entirely within the realm of 
theology. 
The difficulty before us arises with the status of A. 
While it is certainly true that christology is not implied by 
historical statements (A does not demand B), christology does 
nevertheless imply certain factual statements (B does demand A). 
Thus we find that each of the three parts of A is crucial to 
Tillichs exposition of B. 'A man' is important because the 
bearer of the New Being must be a concrete individual; he must 
have 'disciples' since the only record we have of him is a 
record of his reception as the Christ; and he must 'die' because 
only by his death can he be said to have participated in the 
finitude of existence completely. We may conclude, therefore, 
that the elements of A. if found to be false, would require that 
B is inappropriate. 
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For Tillich, however, to accept that historical know- 
ledge is always 'probable' knowledge is to admit that A can 
never be, falsified with any degree of certainty. But if re- 
search into A is indeed always a matter of probabilities, then, 
as Moody Smith observes, since 'any single item of the tradition 
may be false (i. e., unhistorical or misleading), it is logical- 
ly that all may be false'. 
6 
yp If no statement is more 
true than another, then all statements could be equally true. 
And if this is so, then all could be equally false - and so 
meaningless. For this reason, to agree with Tillich that his- 
torical assertions can never be verified with certainty is 
simultaneously to deny any trule of interpretation or criticism'. 
If all statements about A are probable, then it seems impossible 
to distinguish more appropriate statements about the 'thatness' 
of the individual mentioned in A from the less appropriates did 
he have disciples, did he die? Again, if we are prevented from 
saying anything about that 'man' (other than that he existed) 
then it appears difficult to see how one could prevent, or even 
determine, contradiction. It would be a hard task, in fact an 
impossible task, to distinguish how or in what way two asser- 
tions about that 'man' differed - while for Tillich he is the 
New Being, for someone else he could equally be a puppet of the 
disciples or even a murderer. Though one could perhaps distin- 
guish between them in terms of intent, one could not separate 
them in terms of their 'appropriate relation' to their subject. 
In this way we arrive back at the questions posed by the 'new 
quest' for the historical Jesus. What guarantee has one for 
63 
op` it, p. 137 
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saying that the biblical picture is appropriate to its subject, 
or that our reception of the New Testament portrait is appro- 
priate to Jesus' reception by the first disciples? Tillich's 
rejection of the 'new quest' on the grounds that all historical 
knowledge is probable knowledge does not elude these crucial 
and quite legitimate problems. 
As we have seen, Tillich counters these objections with 
the statement that faith can guarantee not only the factual 
element in the event EJesus as the Christ' but also the 'essen- 
tials in the biblical picture'. 
64 
Now presumably, at a bare 
minimum, the reception and death of the concrete person men- 
tioned in A would constitute such 'essentials'. But, given 
illich's own thesis, can these items be verified as being his- 
torical? Here at least one cannot avoid the suspicion that our 
author wants to have his cake and eat it. At one moment, the 
assertion that the biblical picture was forged in the situation 
of faith is used to prevent it from being examined historio- 
graphically. But at the next, the biblical picture makes his- 
torical claims. To this extent, we must agree With. Kelsey that 
this use of the picture fails to obey the rules set up by 
Tillich's own theory. 
... the comparison of the biblical account of Jesus 
with a picture is self-defeating because it is used 
to make contradictory claims. On the one hand, it 
is used as a way-of denying that historical fact- 
claims are part of the biblical picture's meaning. 
On the other hand, it is used as the basis for an 
argument about what "must have been" the nature of 
that personal life (pointed to by Jesus of Nazareth) 
of which the picture is a picture - and that is an 
argument making historical fact-claims, albeit on 
improper grounds:. 65 
64ST, 2: 131, See above, Ch. V, p. 211. This claim will 
be examined in more detail during our critique of the analogia 
imaginis. 
650n. 
0it.. p. 10, 
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In this way, therefore, the argument that faith's 
guarantee of the factual foundation of Christianity belongs in 
a dimension altogether distinct from that of biblical research 
flounders in the face of the distinction itself. If no detail 
of the historical tradition (A) can be guaranteed either cri- 
tically (given the probable nature of historical enquiry) or 
by faith in such a way that historical doubt is overcome (given 
that faith cannot trespass into the dimension of historical 
knowledge), then how can any item of the gospel tradition be 
guaranteed as historically true,? And how then can we proceed 
to the christological assertion (B)? We may take an example. 
Tillich repeatedly describes existence as distorted and ambigu- 
ous. But how can he know of an actual undistorted being at a 
particular time in the past other than through the historical 
claims of the New Testament narrative? An even more important 
example suggests itself. Tillich admits that the concrete 
being of Jesus (the 'fact') created the biblical picture (the 
'interpretation'); the biblical picture concerns an individual 
who existed apart from the portrait. Rut how can he be sure of 
this? If neither the historian nor the man of faith can verify 
the accuracy of the scriptural image in relation to the event 
it is said to depict, how can it be maintained that the picture 
was not a work of fiction? Thus we may conclude that when 
Tillich states that faith can guarantee a personal life, but 
not the name 'Jesus of Nazareth', 
66 
he has not followed his own 
argument to its logical end. Given the preliminary nature of 
historical investigation, and given that faith cannot verify a 
fact which lies outside its own domain, Tillich's argument de- 
66See 
above, Ch. V, pp. 214-217. 
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mands not only that the 'personal life' of the New Being may 
have, had another name., but that the life itself may be unhis- 
torical. Tillich cannot guarantee either that the bearer of 
New Being was not somebody else totally different from the 
figure portrayed in the biblical picture, or that that picture 
was not a product of the imagination. 
III. The Concept of the Analogia Imaginis. 
The final strand of Tillich's argument, in which he 
introduces his concept of the analogia imaginis, is open to the 
self-same objections. This is hardly surprising since it too 
depends on the claim that faith alone can guarantee the his- 
torical basis of Christianity. The basic tenet of the analog 
is that faith assures the reality of its object because faith 
participates in the being of the object of its concern. This 
may be expressed as a syllogisms 1) Men of faith are 'trans- 
formed' by the biblical picture; 2) the New Being is the source 
of all 'transforming-power'; 3) therefore it is the New Being. 
which 'transforms' men of faith through the biblical picture. 
The circularity of this is clear but, as it stands, compara- 
tively inoffensive since as yet it implies no factual asser- 
Lions about the man signified by the name 'Jesus of Nazareth'. 
However, in Tillich' s use of the analogy, the 'transformation' 
of people today is said to entail the existence of somebody in 
the past, living nearly two thousand years ago, as its only 
possible cause. His suggestion appears to be that faith can 
infer from its, present experience of the transforming power 
mediated by the picture the reality of that which has caused 
the. transformation and which lies behind the picture. More 
exactly, t to be transformed' means that one has an immediate, 
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pre-scientific relationship to the person portrayed in the 
gospels, and that the awareness of this relationship carries 
in itself, as it were, the absolute certainty that the 'con- 
orete biblical material is... an adequate expression of the 
transforming power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ'. 
67 
Now, as others have noted before, this argument pre- 
sents us with a whole nest of problems. 
68 
Our initial criticism, 
however, can be stated briefly. According to Tillich, it is 
the a priori of faith that its reception of the power of New 
Being is correlated with a finite event in which estrangement 
was simultaneously experienced and healed in one individual 
human life. 
69 
Faith, admittedly, cannot guarantee that it was 
Jesus of Nazareth who instantiated the concept of New Being his- 
torically, since this is a probable historical judgment; but it 
can know with certainty, and know by its own response to the 
man pictured in the gospels, that New Being was realized in him, 
whatever his. name. In other words, from the definition that 
faith is the subjective state of one to whom the transforming 
power of New Being has been mediated through an objective and 
personal occurrence, Tillich has here deduced that the affirma- 
tion of faith - the expression of one's self-awareness of 
transformation - in relation to the figure portrayed as the 
Christ by the biblical picture implies the historical appearance 
of New Being in him. As he has remarked already, the 'realism' 
67 
, 2: 132 
68Cf. 
John Y. Fenton, 'Faith and Facts', Journal of 
Religious Thought, XXIII, No. 2 (April 1966-1967) PP-107-110- 
See also my own article, 'The Certainty of Faith and Tillich's 
Concept of the Analogia Imaginis', Scottish Journal of Theology, 
XXV, No. 3 (August 1972) pp. 279-295. 
69See 
above, Ch. II, pp. 94-96; Ch. III, pp. 97-99,134- 
137; and Ch. V, pp. 212-216,223-226. 
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of the scriptural image is 'tested by its transforming power' . 
7° 
But what he fails to see is that this is a tautology -a deduction 
of a conclusion already implioit within the previous definition of 
faith - and so quite empty. On Tillich'a argument, to respond in 
faith to the person presented in the New Testament narratives is 
to identify him as the actual bearer of New Being because faith 
itself, as the individual self-consciousness of transformation by 
the power of New Being, presupposes the factuality of the human 
life in which the ambiguities of existence were overcome. Thus X 
is Y because by X we mean Y. 
This, however, is not the only objection to be voiced 
against Tillich's definition of faith. For further study reveals 
that this definition is itself determined by the ontological re- 
quirements of our author's own correlative method. That is to say, 
his claim that faith's response to the picture entails a corres- 
pondence between the picture and the concrete historical existence 
of the Christ is governed by his prior ontological analysis of 
those existential conditions which must have been fulfilled by the 
person whose portrait has occasioned faith's experience of the 
transforming power of New Being. As several commentators have 
observed, and as we shall now show, this use of ontology to sub- 
stantiate the historical claims of faith constitutes one of the 
most serious defects in Tillich's christology. 
71 
Briefly put, Tillich's argument proceeds as follows. 
According to his discussion of the function of ontology within the 
'method of correlation', ontological judgments cannot yield an 
independent account of that which is manifested to faith in the 
70ST, 2s 133. See above, Ch. V, pp. 229-230. 
71Cf. Kelsey, op. cit., PP"91-101; Hamilton, o-. ait., pp. 
158-173; and Tavard, op. cit., pp. 169,172-173. 
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situation of revelation. 
72 That ontology can show, on the other 
hand, is that the appearance of New Being, in historical and 
personal form within the area of estrangement, is the only form 
in which salvation could occur; it can, that is, provide warrants 
for historical conclusions about the concrete nature of that 
revelation should it happen. Since, therefore, faith's present 
experience of transformation through the biblical picture proves 
that it is the Christ-event which is portrayed there, 
73 this ex- 
perienee also implies that in this event all those existential 
conditions necessary for the transformation of reality were ful-- 
filled. For if, as faith asserts, New Being was present in the 
man referred to as 'Jesus of Nazareth', then he must have exhibi- 
ted those characteristics which ontological analysis has shown 
are essential for the conversion of 'old being' into 'new being'. 
It is in this sense that faith can guarantee that the 
concrete biblical material, if not historically accurate on 
points of detail, is yet analogous to its subject inasmuch as it 
depicts a 'personal life' which, though encountering serious 
temptation, real struggle and the tragic ambiguities of life, 
lacked any tmark' of estrangement from God. 
74 Precisely the 
same form of argumentation was used, we remember, to establish 
the factual element in the gospel accounts of the Crucifixion 
and Resurrection. 
75 Faith cannot ensure the historical truth of 
those stories which tell of Jesus dying on a cross and rising 
from the dead; but it can guarantee that underlying these stories 
72See 
above, Ch. II, pp. 60-66,82-85. 
73See 
above, Ch. V, p. 224. 
74See 
above, Ch. IV, PP. 150-152; and Ch. v, pp. 225-226. 
75See 
above, Ch. II, pP. 89-93; and Ch. V, PP. 215-216. 
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is the historical fact that the man pointed to by the name 
'Jesus of Nazareth' did surrender himself to the finite conse- 
quences of existence, and did conquer the death of existential 
estrangement. This claim is similarly justified by appeal to 
ontological analysis of what must have been the case for New 
Being to have entered the temporal order. Since these two sets 
of stories symbolically express what ontology has shown to be 
the two essential prerequisites for the transformation of 
reality, faith's immediate awareness of the power of New Being 
mediated by the biblical picture constitutes irrefutable evi- 
dence of the fact that these requirements were realized in the 
personal life it portrays. If Christian faith, in other terms, 
is the experience of being grasped by the power of New Being, 
then it is analytically true to say that these existential 
conditions, whatever the specific historical circumstances may 
have been, were fulfilled in the person whose portrait has 
evoked the response of faith. 
76 
The first, and undoubtedly most problematic, feature of 
this argument consists in Tillich's view that ontological judg- 
ments can warrant historical judgments about the concrete nature 
of the bearer of New Being. From ontology's utterly general 
observations about the form of man and his world, our author has 
here deduced a few, but nevertheless quite definite, criteria of 
authentic revelation - his assumption being that the knowledge 
76This is implied, for example, when Tillich speaks of 
the factual element in the symbol of the Resurrection: - 'Faith 
can give certainty only to the victory of the Christ over the 
ultimate consequence of the existential estrangement to which 
he subjected himself. And faith can give this certainty because 
it is itself based on it. Faith is based on the experience of 
being grasped by the power of the New Being through which the 
destructive consequences of estrangement are conquered'. (ST, 2: 
179 - my ermphasis 
). 
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gained from contemplating the universal human situation can 
provide they key for understanding the 'factual content' of the 
biblical symbols. For example, since ontological analysis has 
demonstrated that the New Being must be without 'unbelief', 
hubris or 'concupiscence', and that he must 'suffer and die', 
such claims are therefore made about the person whose portrait 
has successfully mediated the power of New Being to the faith- 
ful. 7 Equally, since the bearer of the final revelation must 
become 'completely transparent to the mystery he reveals' and 
must 'surrender his finitude', so tin the picture of Jesus as 
the Christ we have the picture of a man who esesses these 
qualities... ' 
78 
Yet it is precisely this form of argumentation 
which brings us to the principal christological difficulty that 
emerges from Tillich's correlative method. The difficulty is 
that the concept of New Being, if derived from a study of the 
universal predicament of man and his quest for salvation, can- 
not specify that actual historical event in which New Being 
appeared, for the study of history, dealing as it does with the 
order of becoming and contingency, is not amenable to discourse 
in terms of universals. Thus, even if we accept that faith's Y 
experience of the power of New Being can guarantee the picture's 
reference to the historical Christ -- and this itself is a highly 
dubious assumption to which we shall return presently - ontologi- 
cal reflection on what must have been the concrete character of 
the human source of that power can provide no single historical 
instance in which the conditions necessary for its creation were 
77See ST, 2: 144-1459 
785T, 1: 148 (my emphasis). 
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realized. Here we must agree with Tavard that the main de- 
ficieney in Tillich's discussion of 'New Being' is that this 
concept 'conceived as a universal... can never fully and ex- 
elusively be identified with any particular event'. 
79 
This criticism, which iss certainly one of the most 
common amongst Tillich's readers, exposes the extreme form- 
lessness of his interpretation of the Mew Testament picture as 
a portrait of an 'event in time and space'. 
80 That is to say, 
our author's use of the ontological category of 'New Being' is 
characterized by a distinct lack of specificness concerning 
the so-called 'bearer of New Being'. Though faith, it is held, 
may be able to guarantee the actualization of New Being in a 
person, it cannot ensure the historicity of any occurrence of 
which the existence of Jesus of Nazareth, or of any specified 
individual, was a constituent. On this reasoning, therefore, 
the notion of 'New Being' has become so generalized that it 
appears possible for faith to experience its religious trans- 
formation by the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ with- 
out recourse to any determinate and exclusive claim that any 
particular man, such as Jesus, was the one and only Christ. 
81 
T9Tavard, 
op. cit., p. 172 
80Cf. Wilfred 0. Cross, 'Some Notes on the Ontology of 
Paul Tillich' , Anglican Theological Review, XIV, x'0.4 
(October 
1957) pp. 297-310; and Thomas E. MoCollough, 'The Ontology of 
Tillich and Biblical Personalism', Scottish Journal of Theology, 
XV, NO-3 (September 1962) pp. 266-281. A more general, but less 
critical, discussion of this problem is found in Nels Ferri's 
article review, -'The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology', Scot- 
tish Journal of Theology, XXI, No. 2 (June 1968) pp. 157-169. 
81This lends weight to Killen's warning that there is a 
treal danger... that some of his (Tillich's) successors may find 
some other religion just as compatible with his ontology while 
rejecting the Christ whom he represents'. See R. Allen Killen, 
The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich (Kampen, Netherlands: 
J. L Kok, 1956) p" 5. 
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But if that, is the-case, then this argument not only denies the 
scriptural assertion that the one whom God has made 'both Lord 
and Christ' is 'this Jesus whom ye crucified'; 
82 it also impugns 
those elements of factuality and uniqueness which Tillich him- 
self sought to maintain in his discussion of the 'given' or 
t miracles side of the Christian revelation. 
83 For if, as we 
have said before, he cannot specify the particular individual 
in whom essential manhood is! alleged to have entered existence, 
if he cannot know of any historical instance in which New Being 
appeared, then what possible justification can there be for 
the claim that estrangement has been conquered in 'a personal 
life' ? 
84 At this point, moreover, we should also ask whether 
there is not an implicit contradiction between Tillich's empha- 
sis on the incomparable, unrepeatable form of this 'sign-event' 
and his subsequent derivation of its concrete characteristics 
from speculative conclusions about the nature of reality as such. 
For instance, should we not rather say that, inasmuch as this 
event signifies the advent of a 'new creation', it actually 
abrogates the ontological status of all prior levels of the 
created order as it transforms them? 
85 Indeed, this suggestion 
indicates the most obvious fault in Tillich's juxtaposition of 
philosophical questions and the answers of revelation. It is 
p. 161. 
82Acts 2: 36 (my emphasis). Quoted by Hamilton, op. cit., 
83See 
above, Ch. IV, pp. 160-164. 
84See 
above, p. 249. 
85Thi This is Bonhoeff er' s criticism of Tillich! s method: 
t If revelation is essentially an event brought about by the free 
act of God, it outbids and supersedes the existential-ontological 
possibilities of existence'. Act and Beingý trans. Bernard Noble, 
with an Introduction by Ernst Wolf London: Collins, 1962) p. 75. 
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that his correlative method has here so determined what, the 
'final revelation' can and cannot be that the skandalon of the 
gospel message is severely compromised. More exactly, it is 
that Tillich' s conception of this revelation has been so con- 
trolled by the exigencies of his ontology that it is no longer 
compatible with his own notion of the Christian 'paradox' as 
that which tcontradicts the opinion derived from man's existen- 
tial predicament and all expectations imaginable on the basis 
of this predicament'. 
86 For if it is ontology that warrants 
faith's historical judgments about the concrete nature of the 
Christ-event, then this event has: become, in effect, the 
tansyer' already presupposed in, or anticipated by, man's 
existential 'questions' apart from revelation. This makes it 
very hard to accept Tillichts claim that philosophical questions 
determine only the 'form' of the theological answers, but not 
their 'content' which is derived from revelation. 
87 For surely 
when Jesus is called the 'bearer of New Being' a quite definite 
'content' is thereby ascribed to him -a content wholly governed 
by ontological analysis of those conditions required for the 
reunion of the estranged. 
From this we may conclude, therefore, that Tillich' s 
analogia imaginis, far from involving a continuity between the 
86For 
similar criticism, see John C. Bennett, 'A Protes- 
tant View of Authority in the Church', Theology Digest, XI, No. 4 
(October 1963) p. 212; Gordon D. Kaufman, tCan a Man Serve Two 
Masters? - Philosophy and Theology in the Thought of Tillich', 
Theology Today, XV, No. 2 (April 1958) p. 64; Rfendrik Kraemer, 
Religion and the Christian Faith (London: Lutterworth Press, 
1956) PP, 437-439,445; and Josef Schmitz's comprehensive study, 
Die apologetische Theologie Paul Tillichs (Mainz: Matthias- 
Grinewald-Verlag, 1966) p. 271. 
87ST, 1: 72. See above, Ch. II, p. 63. 
biblical material and the historical manifestation of New Being 
in Jesus as the Christ, actually consists in no more than a 
correspondence between faith's picture and our author's own, 
ontologically derive., conclusions about what the concrete 
nature of the Christ-event must embody. This suggests in turn 
that Tillich' s ontological interpretation of revelation has 
resulted in a position directly opposite to that intended. For 
though seeking to distinguish theology from anthropology, he 
has yet remained bound to a preconceived philosophical doctrine 
of man's predicament, from which he has deduced the concrete 
form in which Yew Being must appear; and though clearly con- 
cerned to uphold the universal validity of those 'concrete and 
special elements' in the Christian message, 
88 his own subsequent 
use of ontology has not sufficiently safeguarded Christian 
thought against the substitution of the distinctive historical 
existence of the Christ for an idealistic notion of what the 
agent of salvation 'must be like' to effect the transformation 
of reality. For this, reason, Gustave Weigel can still ask, 
Is this an objective explanation of Christianity as it 
was and as it is, or is it a subjective reconstruction 
of a historical phenomenon? Does Professor Tillich 
explain what Christianity is, or does he propose to us 
what he would like it to be? Subjectivity is a golden 
word in existentialism, but objectivity has not lost 
its appeal for the human mind, and more objectivit and 
less subjectivity is the desideratum of our time. 85 
Not surprisingly, Weigelts charge of subjectivism becomes 
even more substantial when we move from Tillich's use of ontology 
to another, and equally questionable, feature of the analogia 
imaginis, namely, the role assigned to religious experience. Our 
88ST, 1: 12 
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89'Recent Protestant Theology', Theological Studies 
(Baltimore), 1953, P"576. Quoted by Heywood Thomas, Paul Tillich: 
An Appraisal, p. 194" 
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author's claim is that the authenticity of the New Testament 
image as a portrait of the real Christ can be guaranteed by 
faith's experience of the power of New Being mediated by that 
portrait. According to him, therefore, the gospel does offer a 
picture of the actual historical appearance of the Christ, to 
those who are transformed by the power of New Being communicated 
through. it. 90 However, here we must say that this appeal to 
faith's experience, while it may direct attention to some human 
psychological state induced by the literary skills of the evan- 
gelists, remains totally unsatisfactory as an argument for the 
historicity of the actual character depicted in the biblical pic- 
ture. For, remembering Peter Carnley's thesis, it does not 
follow that an historical judgment is true simply because some- 
body is convinced it is. 
91 A statement such as 'X is certain 
that E occurred' may be true in so far as it is a statement 
about the particular, subjective disposition of X when he claims 
to know of E's ocaurrenoe. But the truth of the assertion that 
X was certain in this respect does not entail that he was correct 
in his judgment about E, that it did in fact occur. Subjective 
certainty is not, in other words,, the measure of objective truth, 
90Given Tillich's earlier criticism of Wilhelm Herrmann 
(see above, Ch. I, pp. 35-36), it is interesting that Herrmann em- 
ploys a similar argument in his book Faith and Morals, trans. D. 
Matheson and R. Stewart (Londons Williams & Norgate, 1904). On 
p. 236, he writes: - 'One wins confidence if in the personality of 
Jesus as. he himself (the believer) meets with it in the tradit- 
ional records he experiences that he is met by the revelation of 
the Spirit which lays compulsion on his inmost nature. From that 
point onwards we can view with composure all the attempts of his- 
torical criticism. For in that experience there has been extin- 
guished any possibility of our regarding the portrait of Jesus 
as the creation of men who longed for some such revelation of 
that Spirit'. Van A. Harvey also draws attention to this simi- 
larity in The Historian and the Believer, pp. 150-151. 
91See 
above, pp. 271-275. 
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neither is it a sufficient condition for the truth of an his- 
torieal claim. In this connection, Moody Smith's remarks are 
ain appropriates- %;; I- 
Is not the factor that has given the biblical picture 
of Jesus as the Christ its transforming power faith 
in it as historical reality rather than its historical 
reality per se? On the other hand, is it not conceiv- 
able that there could be a true portrayal of the 
reality of the New Being in the form of an imagined 
picture capable of bringing the New Being into reality, 
historical reality, in those who allowed themselves to 
be transformed by it? The fact that transformations 
of a sort take place by faith in Jesus Christ does not 
in any way guarantee the historicity of faith's object. 
Obviously the non-historical or fictional symbols of 
other religions have had transforming power, and it is 
not even certain that the biblical picture of Jesus as 
the Christ would completely lose its transforming power 
if it could be shown to be unhistorical. To argue that 
such phenomena could not be manifestations of the New 
Being is only to assert the historic Christian convic- 
tion, and it is not clear how such a conviction can be 
maintained apart from the Christian confession that 
Jesus is the Christ. 92 
Notwithstanding Tillioh's claim that it is the a priori 
of faith that its own existence is identical with the actual 
appearance of New Being within the area of estrangement, no 
relation of entailment can therefore be said to exist between a 
man's experience of the 'transforming power of New Being' media- 
ted by the biblical picture and his realization that a concrete 
historical person is portrayed there. For, following Smith's 
criticism, one cannot deny that a fictional character may be 
'powerful' without being a portrait of an actual individual. 
Does biography necessarily elicit more response from its readers 
than a work of the imagination simply because it tells of real 
events and real people? On the contrary, says John Clayton, 'a 
fictional creation is often more power-full precisely because 
it is a composite of characteristics of several individuals or 
92o 
. cit., p. 138 
292. 
because it epitomises common human experiences'. 
93 The fact, 
therefore, that the figure of Jesus of Nazareth pictured in the 
gospels has been sufficiently forceful to transform the atti- 
tudes and actions of successive generations of Christian be- 
lievers does not, in itself, 'guarantee' that this figure was 
drawn from life. This does not, of course, exclude the possi- 
bility that the gospels do portray an actual person, and that 
it 'was this reality, when encountered by the disciples, which 
created the picture'. 
94 But, as we have intimated elsewhere, 
the claim that a correspondence would exist between a photo- 
graphic record of Jesus and the concrete biblical material can 
be upheld only if no historical evidence to the contrary is 
forthcoming. 95 Were such information discovered, then this 
material, in so far as it purports to present that 'event in 
time and space' through which Essential God-Manhood appeared in 
existence, would have to be declared false and so abandoned, no 
matter how profound the responses it may continue to evoke. 
Indeed, if the analogic imaginis asserts a correspon- 
dence between the biblical picture and certain historical facts, 
should we not go further and say that the discovery of such 
adverse evidence remains a permanent theoretical possibility? 
In other words, if faith's experience allegedly 'guarantees' 
that essential manhood appeared in the person portrayed in the 
gospel e, and that his actual individual characteristics were 
auch as would support the gospels' description of them, then it 
is hard to see how this experience can abrogate that element of 
93o-poC_. 
, p. 157 
94ST, 2: 132 
95See 
above, pp. 264-268. 
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probability which is, according to Tillich himself, present in 
every claim to be certain about facts of the past. Even if it 
were the case that historical knowledge could be reached on the 
basis of some kind of 'experiential' evidence, our author's own 
understanding of the epistemological status of historical judg- 
ments requires that no historical statement, however it is sub- 
stantiated, can be absolutely oertain because all such state- 
ments are contingent. Since these assertions, by definition, 
refer to something which 'could be this or that', then the 
logical possibility of their falsification remains, irrespective 
of how they were originally attained. If faith can infer from 
its present experience-of transformation that the man pictured 
in the New Testament was the Christ, then this claim, inasmuch 
as it involves historical claims about the nature of this man' s 
life as a whole, can never be more than probable. Saying this, 
however, does not mean that Tillich is wrong when he holds that 
knowledge of revelation cannot be reduced to historical know- 
ledge; but it does indicate that he is mistaken - and mistaken, 
moreover, in the light of his own remarks about historical pro- 
bability - when he maintains that the confession 'Jesus is the 
Christ' transcends 'the alternative, "falsifiable" or "verifi- 
able"... '96 For if Tillich insists that there is an analogy 
between the concrete biblical material and the historical actu- 
alization of New Being in the personal life signified by the 
name 'Jesus of Nazareth', then the truth of the kerygmatic 
witness is conditioned by the historical claim. Admittedly, his 
theological application of the assertion 'Jesus is the Christi 
does not, strictly speaking, involve empirical statements about 
961 Interrogat. ion of Paul Tillich', Philosophical Inter- 
rogations, p"367 
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Jesus; but it does nevertheless entail a series of historical 
(and so corrigible) statements about the man to whom that name 
points. The saving power mediated to the faithful by the bibli- 
cal picture does not therefore possess its own certitude, since 
it is itself dependent on the existential appearance of New 
Being in a way analogous to scripture's image of it - and that 
is, logically at least, subject to empirical verification or 
`` falsification. For, given the contingency of all descriptive 
statements, one can assert neither the necessity of the analogy 
nor that it is necessarily true that such a correspondence 
exists. Though we may say, therefore, that Tillich is right to 
emphasize that the risk of faith is not merely historical risk, 
he is equally wrong to hold that historical risk is in no sense 
entailed by the risk of faith. 
We have already expressed the opinion that if Tillich 
cannot guarantee the past reality of someone who was actually 
called 'Jesus of Nazareth', then neither can he guarantee the 
past existence of the 'fact' pointed to by that name, that is, 
the f personal life' in which Essential God-Manhood (or New 
Being) is alleged to have entered the area of estrangement. 
97 
But even if we accept, for the moment, that New Being neces- 
sarily implies an historical individual as its bearer, does 
this still allow the analogia imaginis the degree of importance 
that our author claims for it? For example, given Tillich's 
.: 
1ý 
theological preoccupation with the state of the Christian - viz., 
the existential transformation of the faithful - what prevents 
us from saying that the process of transformation is primary, 
and the nature of its historical source merely the reflection 
97See 
above, pp. 279-280. 
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of this experience projected back into history? If the analogy 
can be maintained independently of historical research, can we 
rule out the possibility that Tillich has inferred from the 
experience of transformation that the intrinsic properties of 
the bearer of New Being, as pictured in the biblical narrative, 
are true (namely, that he did overcome existence in existence)? 
If, on Tillichts reasoning, every historical detail of the 
portrait could be false, except that an actual person existed, 
and if through that portrait we experience the 'transforming 
power of New Being', can we assume, in other words, that the. 
man depicted in the narrative was in fact the Christ, the one 
who did overcome the ambiguities of estrangement? Although we 
may grant for the purposes of this argument that the experienoe 
of transformation presupposes an historical source, can we 
guarantee that the faith we have is distinctly Christian? It is 
by no means certain that the concrete historical character of 
the so-called 'bearer of New Being' is commensurate with his 
transforming effects in us. 
98 
At this point, therefore, we must agree with John Clay- 
ton when he remarks that Tillich should have remembered his own 
warning against the danger of subjectivism if the ? expressive' 
element in art (that is, the 'spiritual power' which comes to 
expression through artistic forms) is not held in check by other 
98Tillich's 
remarks notwithstanding, one cannot there- 
fore exclude the view that in the analogic imaginis 'experience' 
rr does function as the source from which the contents of the bib- 
lical picture are derived, and not simply as the 'medium through 
which they are existentially received' (ST, 1: 48). This incon- 
sistency in Tillich's thought has often been noticed by commen- 
tators. See Tavard, op. _., pp. 24-25; Robert C. Johnson, 
Authority in Protestant Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1959) pp. 133-134; and Willem F. Zuurdee$, An Analytical 
Philosophy of Religion (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959 pp" 
156-157* 
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elements, notably by the empirical 'subject matter' or I con- 
tent'. 99 As Clayton continues, the inherent weakness of Tillich' s 
aesthetic model is that expressionism cannot produce ta criterion 
by which its product can be checked against that which it alleged- 
1 brings to expression). 
100 Indeed, so concerned is Tillich 
with the 'expressive' function of the biblical image, with 
faith's experience of the 'power' mediated by it rather than with 
the external factuality of the occurrence which forms, its 'con- 
tent', that it becomes doubtful whether his interpretation of the 
portrait as a picture of the Christ-event can ever emerge from 
the subjectivist circle. For though this account of faith's. 
religious experience may provide an important description of what 
it is like to think and act as if Jesus Were the Christ, of the 
inner transformation which accompanies faith, it yet remains 
silent on the crucial question of the portrait's validity; it 
cannot say, that is, whether the picture on which this faith is 
based is historically justified or not, whether there has ever 
existed a being before whom one could legitimately take up such 
an attitude. Thus, so long as our author founds his concept of 
the analogia imaginis on the 'expressive' role of the gospel 
image, on its transmission of the 'power of New Being' to the 
faithful, and so long as he offers no corroborative historical 
evidence for the truth of the analogy, it provides a most dubious 
basis on which to assert a. continuity between the New Testament 
record and a particular historical personality. 
99op. 
c, it., pp. 162-163. See above, Ch. V, pp. 231-237. 
s+ 
Clayton tells us that Tillich's paragraph on the ambiguity of the 
expressive element appears only in the German edition of S e- 
matic Theology. See Systematische Theologie, Bd. III, trans. 
Renate Albrecht et al. Stuttgarts Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 
1966) pp. 90-91. 
100Ibid 
, p. 163 
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Reviewing this appraisal of the analogic imaginis, we 
can hardly avoid the conclusion that Tillichrs concept seeks to 
resolve the problem of correlating subject and object in experi- 
ence somewhat after the manner of Kant' s critical idealism. The 
'given' (the 'fact') is known only as it is 'received' by the 
subject of experience - in this case, the man of faith. It is 
the subject which here determines the object, not in its being 
(the Ding-an-sich, the actual ministry and person of Jesus re- 
main unknowable) but, as Cushman puts it, in its being twhat it 
is known asp, 
101 In view of the erosion of historical material 
by radical biblical criticism, this is the only way the event 
'Jesus as the Christ' can be known at all. It is in this sense 
that the event includes both subject and object. The event of 
Christ is so enlarged as to encompass not only the career of the, 
man pointed to by the. name t Jesus of Nazareth', but also the 
life of the community of the faithful. On this line of reason- 
ing, therefore, the historical problem of Christianity is re- 
solved by relocating the empirical basis of faith within the 
t 
recognizable and appropriable life of the community of the New 
Being. 
But if this is the case, then we may justifiably ask 
Whether christology has not in fact been supplanted by ecclesio- 
logy. On Tillich's theory,, it would appear that, though eccie- 
Biology does include the 'historical fact' of a personal life 
in which essential manhood appeared, nevertheless without the 
church christology is impossible. The interdependence of the 
factual and receptive elements within the event 'Jesus as the 
Christ' seems to result in the view that the church is not 
101 R. E. Cushman, op. cit., p. 178 (my emphasis) 
2.98. 
merely constitutive of the event but that apart from the church 
there can be no discussion regarding the verity of the Christ- 
event. Nothing, it would seem, can be affirmed of the antecedent 
reality of the 'object' of faith except by means of the avail- 
ability of the phenomenon, that is, the community established by 
the experience of 'transforming power'. In this way, the histori- 
cal problem of Christianity is resolved within a phenomenalistic 
epistemology. 
Christology as ecclesiology is, admittedly, far from 
Tillich' s original intentions; but is it, we may wonder, far from 
the logical conclusion of his own arguments? If the experience 
of the 'transforming power of the New Being' provides an 'immedi- 
ate' certainty, and if it is not 'mediated by conclusions', 
102 
then it is hard to see how this experiential evidence should 
necessarily incorporate belief in an historical occurrence, much 
leas assure it. As long as Tillich insists on a correspondence 
between the historical actualization of the Itew Being and the 
kerygmatia witness, then the truth of that correspondence can 
only be asserted on the basis of an historical claim. Otherwise 
the continuity between the 'power' mediated through the picture 
and the 'power' initiated by the concrete manifestation of Essen- 
tial God-Manhood in existence cannot be affirmed. If the kerygma- 
tic claims about the bearer of New Being cannot, logically at 
least, be open to historical verification, no necessary connec- 
tion between the biblical picture and the historical figure 
portrayed within it can be presumed. 
103 Equally, if Tillich 
102 2: 131. See above, Ch. V, p. 211. 
103For 
an interesting article in support of this view, 
see I. T. Ramsey, tHistory and the Gospels: Some Philosophical 
Reflections', Studia Evangelica, III (Texte und Untersuchungen, 
88), Berlin, 1964, pp. 201-217. 
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claims that the kerygma. is the result and creation of the his- 
torical appearance of undistorted manhood to which it refers, 
he cannot avoid a search for the empirical truth concerning 
that 'personal life' through which New Being entered the area 
of estrangement. 
In the first chapter of this thesis, we remarked that 
.r 
Tillich's intention was to immunize the factual basis of Chris- 
tianity from the radical historical method employed by the 
biblical critic. 
104 Ironically enough, this aim is dependent 
on our authorls desire to guarantee the distinctly historical 
framework of the Christian faith. But the assertion that Chris- 
tianity is uniquely historical is devoid of content unless one 
can specify that place in which something unique happened in 
history. This must involve an historical claim about the his- 
torical figure proclaimed as the Christ by the faithful, namely 
that in. Jesus' own life existential estrangement was overcome. 
If this: is to be held - and we should remember that Tillich him- 
self viewed its denial as 'historically absurd+ 105 - and if we 
are not to surround Christianity with all the dangers attendant 
on belief in a mere "X" in history, then this fundamental chris- 
tological claim must be tested in such a way that a continuity 
between Jesus of Nazareth and the kerygma can be maintained. In 
other words, some relation must be established between the person 
n_ 'Jesus' in the gospels and the person there described as 
the Christ. For this reason, Tillich's distinction between the 
dimensions of faith and historical knowledge is not as clear-cut 
as he assumes. We grant that faith's knowledge of the salvation 
104See 
above, Ch. I, PP-46-47- 
.( 
105 , 2: 131, See above, Ch. V, p. 213. 
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wrought by Jesus cannot be exhibited simply by the methods of 
historical research; but faith can. claim immunity from such 
criticisms only at the cost of circumventing the material im- 
portance of Jesus' earthly ministry. The significance of Jesus 
for faith cannot be maintained by stressing only the 'thatness' 
of Jesus' existence independently of the special nature of his 
work and his- own attitude toward it. Yet it is precisely this 
problem of the continuity between the career of Jesus and the 
biblical picture which pushes before us the efforts of gospel 
research to make intelligible the messianic interpretation 
which is ascribed to Jesus' life and teaching. And to this 
extent, the theoretical risk remains that the biblical critic 
may find the historical evidence for such an interpretation 
either to be inconclusive, inadequate, or indeed, non-existent. 
--l 
', ý 
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